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ABSTRACT 
Aaron Todd Hale-Dorrell: Khrushchev’s Corn Crusade: The Industrial Ideal and Agricultural 
Practice in the Era of Post-Stalin Reform, 1953–1964 
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh) 
A study of N. S. Khrushchev’s crusade to make the USSR into a powerhouse corn 
producer, this dissertation sheds light on policy, governance, and life on Soviet collective farms 
in the post-Stalin decade, 1953–64. Neither “contradictory” nor “irrational,” as scholars have 
maintained, this agricultural program derived its rationale from the American model of corn-
based industrial agriculture that, after World War II, spread to industrial countries and to the 
Third World, where it became known as “the Green Revolution.” Inspired by the results that 
modern technologies—chemicals, machines, hybrids—were achieving, Khrushchev developed 
policies that linked the USSR to transnational currents in agriculture, which took its place 
among the many spheres in which Soviet practices paralleled global trends. Expecting these 
initiatives to boost Soviet farms’ productivity and to make the abundance heralding the 
communist utopia a reality, Khrushchev never lost faith that corn would rectify a chronic 
shortage of the livestock feed required to produce the meat and milk the USSR needed “to catch 
up with and overtake America.” By enriching citizens’ diets and providing them a better life, 
Khrushchev hoped to seize a victory in the Cold War competition with capitalism and to win 
over Third World “hearts and minds” for the socialist cause. Drawing on documents from 
central and local archives, I investigate how officials and peasants implemented Khrushchev’s 
policies, revealing the remarkable capacity of collective farmers and of officialdom to sidestep 
orders at every turn. As a result, the agrarian reforms proved imperfect and the returns, 
although substantial, did not match Khrushchev’s pledges, thereby sapping his legitimacy. 
Industrial farming thrived in social, economic, and climatic conditions around the world, but in 
  iv
the Soviet Union these methods were thwarted by policy failures, ingrained bureaucratic norms, 
the climate, Khrushchev’s own mistakes, widespread deceit by subordinates, and a labor crisis 
on the collective farms. These challenges remained to confront future reformers, but 
Khrushchev’s efforts left a legacy that made industrial principles—and corn—a part of Soviet 
farming practice throughout subsequent decades. 
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Vopros armianskomu radio: “Chto takoe kommunizm?” 
Otvet: “Eto sovetskaia vlast' plius kukuruzifikatsiia vse strany.” 
Question to Armenian Radio: “What is communism?” 
Answer: “It is Soviet power plus the corn-ification of the entire 
country.” 
—Khrushchev-era Soviet anecdote
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INTRODUCTION 
KHRUSHCHEV’S CORN CRUSADE, SOVIET INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE IN GLOBAL 
CONTEXT, AND POST-STALIN REFORM  
During the decade Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev led the Soviet Union, he softened 
Joseph Stalin’s repressive regime and raised citizens’ living standards. Yet his historical legacy 
has been defined considerably by ridicule. For instance, a Russian nickname for him, 
kukuruznik, or “corn-man,” captures his ardor for the crop he considered necessary to feed the 
livestock required to provide abundant dairy products and meat to the masses.1 Disregarding the 
constraints the USSR’s climate put on agriculture, Khrushchev never ceased cajoling farmers in 
every region of his vast country to plant corn, behavior that fueled endless jokes.2 While ousting 
him in October 1964, his former comrades denounced his agricultural programs as “harebrained 
scheming.”3 They named corn the cause of the failure of the 1963 harvest, which had culminated 
in breadlines and grain purchases on the world market. Echoing this sentiment by using words 
such as “incoherent” and “contradictory,” scholars have judged Khrushchev’s agricultural 
reforms a quixotic quest for a “miracle.”4 Even William Taubman’s sympathetic, Pulitzer Prize–
                                                        
1 Used today by those who remember the era, the moniker appeared in contemporary stories by foreign 
reporters. See, for example: Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Corn, the Crop Khrushchev Pushed, Appears to Be 
Sharing His Disgrace: Butt of Soviet Jokes,” Washington Post (December 14, 1964): A1. Here and 
throughout, corn refers to the plant known outside North America as maize and according to the scientific 
classification Zea mays. 
2 The joke on the preceding page appears in: Dora Shturman and Sergei Tiktin, Sovetskii Soiuz v zerkale 
politicheskogo anekdota (London: Overseas Publications Interchange, 1985), 200. To get it, the listener 
needed to recall V. I. Lenin’s maxim that communism meant Soviet power plus the electrification of the 
entire country. This and all subsequent translations are my own unless otherwise noted.  
3 Russian Sate Archive of Contemporary History [Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, or 
RGANI], f. 2, op. 1, d. 780, l. 105. Note on usage: I cite archival documents according to the internal 
subdivisions found in Russian archives. In order from largest to smallest, they are: fond (f.), or collection; 
opis'  (op.), or inventory; delo (d.), or file; and list (l.), or page. I provide full names of archives at first 
mention, but subsequently use only the corresponding acronym. 
4 Historian Elena Zubkova writes, “The term ‘Khrushchev's reforms’ is . . . arbitrary. . . . Reform is a 
  2 
winning biography of Khrushchev concludes that this “crusade” for corn “turned into an 
irrational obsession.”5 Fifty years later, Khrushchev’s reputation as the public face of a nuclear-
armed superpower with a rapidly growing economy has yielded to portrayals of his behavior as 
illogical buffoonery.6 In a 2011 interview, Sergei Nikitich Khrushchev noted that many consider 
his father “a comic figure,” contending that even historians misrepresent the elder Khrushchev’s 
policies. They claim, for example, “that Khrushchev brought corn from America to plant it 
beyond the Arctic Circle.” Defending his father’s legacy, he continued, “Of course, this was not 
the case: father simply ascertained that . . . corn contained the maximum amount of feed, so he 
said, ‘Let’s adopt that.’ Corn became a joke, but there were no corn rebellions like the potato 
rebellions in the time of Catherine [II].”7 
Far from being farcical, Khrushchev’s policies induced millions of Soviet citizens to 
plant, cultivate, and harvest tens of millions of hectares of corn on collective and state farms 
across the country. In 1953, corn plantings constituted 3.5 million hectares, or just 3.3 percent of 
the total of 106 million hectares sown. In 1955, Khrushchev used his command of the 
                                                        
program of consecutive actions directed toward changing existing political and economic structures or 
toward their complete replacement. It is difficult to view the actions of leaders in the Thaw period as 
coherent and systematic.” Zubkova, “The Rivalry with Malenkov,” in Nikita Khrushchev, ed. Sergei N. 
Khrushchev, William Taubman and Abbott Gleason, trans. David Gehrenbeck, Eileen Kane, and Alla 
Bashenko (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 83–84. A participant in the period and 
historian, A. A. Nikonov judged the reforms positive but “contradictory.” Nikonov, Spiral' mnogovekovoi 
dramy: Agrarnaia nauka i politika Rossii (XVIII–XX vv.) (Moscow: Entsiklopediia rossiiskikh dereven', 
1995), 3. Agricultural historian I. E. Zelenin concluded, “The reform path of N. S. Khrushchev was 
winding, tortuous, and highly contradictory.” Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva i sel'skoe 
khoziaistvo (Moscow: Institut istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2001), 275. Dissident chroniclers Roy 
and Zhores Medvedev termed his efforts a search for a “miracle.” Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev: 
The Years in Power, trans. Andrew R. Durkin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 65. 
5 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 373. 
6 For an American example, see: Peter Carlson, K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude Starring 
Nikita Khrushchev, America’s Most Unlikely Tourist (New York: Public Affairs, 2009). In weighing 
Khrushchev’s achievements, a popular modern Russian magazine concluded that he had “freed the 
prisoners, but planted corn.” “On vypustil zekov, no posadil kukuruzu,” Argumenty i fakty (March 26, 
2008): 57. For another example, see: “Kak Khrushchev nishchim limuziny daril,” Komsomol’skaia pravda 
(September 8, 2011): 3. 
7 Irina Mak, “Professor Sergei Khrushchev: Esli by ottsa ne sniali, v kontse 1960-kh v SSSR byla by 
rynochnaia ekonomika,” Izvestiia (April 9, 2010): 17. 
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Communist Party and government to increase that figure fivefold, to 17.9 million hectares. Year 
after year, he gave speeches—a contemporary anthology of them fills eight dense volumes—and 
enacted policies in a campaign to reach 30 million hectares by 1960 and, eventually, to match 
the United States by devoting 30 percent of Soviet cropland to corn. Corn plantings peaked in 
1962, officially reaching an astounding 37.2 million hectares.8 That figure, at 17 percent of the 
total, fell short of Khrushchev’s American benchmark only because Soviet farms in the same 
period had doubled their cropland, which now totaled 220 million hectares. 
This corn crusade, although flawed, was neither as humorous nor as harebrained as 
Khrushchev’s critics have claimed. Long recognizing that he dreamed of providing Soviet 
citizens a rich diet, scholars have overlooked the models that inspired him. Challenging the 
scholarly consensus on his agricultural reforms—and his broader reform program—I ask: What 
inspired him to imagine a project so vast and ambitious, and then to doggedly pursue it for over 
a decade? In answering, I find a heretofore-neglected logic explaining its purpose and potential. 
In short, Khrushchev was a “globally-informed high-modernist,” by which I mean that he 
embraced corn as an integral part of adopting the industrial farming model that reshaped 
agriculture first in the US after World War II and then around the world. American yields of 
corn expanded threefold in the postwar decades on the strength of these technologies, producing 
vast grain surpluses and driving down consumer prices for meat and milk.9 Productivity surged 
in countries with diverse social, economic, and climatic conditions as farmers applied similar 
methods. Larger grain harvests averted a potential food crisis stemming from the rising global 
population, which ballooned from 2.5 billion in 1950 to more than 7 billion in 2012.10 
                                                        
8 Naum Jasny, Khrushchev’s Crop Policy (Glasgow: Outram, 1965), 142. A hectare is a measurement of 
area equal to 10,000 square meters—a square with sides 100 meters long—or 2.47 acres. 
9 Arturo Warman, Corn and Capitalism: How a Botanical Bastard Grew to Global Dominance, trans. 
Nancy L. Westrate (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 188. 
10 World population expanded from less than 2 billion in 1900 to reach 3 billion by 1960, and 3.7 billion in 
1970. “World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision,” United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, 
  4
Khrushchev borrowed methods for growing corn from this industrial model, which offered a 
rationale for his agricultural reforms and dreams of an instant revolution in farm productivity. 
The success in other environments of the models he chose indicates that his reforms had the 
capacity to similarly transform Soviet farms, raising output and redeeming his pledges to 
improve citizens’ diet. I term his efforts a “corn crusade” because they embodied his almost 
religious faith in the principle that humans can overturn traditional approaches to agriculture, 
using science and technology to master nature and wrestle immense fertility from the soil. 
Embracing these convictions from its founding, the USSR had applied industrial farming 
methods only in limited spheres under Stalin. Khrushchev implemented them widely, according 
to the principle that the potential of any technology developed under capitalism was greater still 
under socialism. The resulting agricultural capacity would make the USSR a modern, 
productive, and egalitarian society, offering a noncapitalist development model that the Third 
World’s newly independent countries would rush to emulate. 
Although industrial farming increased world harvests, Soviet farms realized its potential 
too slowly to save Khrushchev’s political career and legacy. When ousting him in 1964, the 
political elite had to justify their move and minimize their complicity in the crop failures of 1963. 
They charged that the progress Khrushchev’s reforms achieved between 1953 and 1958 had 
halted, as output had risen a paltry 7 percent cumulatively between 1958 and 1962.11 Having 
maligned his policies, his former comrades nonetheless redoubled investment in industrial 
farming, suggesting that his ideas were not so “harebrained” after all. Recapitulating the 
arguments made by Khrushchev’s opponents, scholars have blamed his agricultural program’s 
poor showing on corn’s unfamiliarity, as well as on the climatic limits considered obvious to 
everyone but Khrushchev, who disregarded corn’s need for the warmth lacking in many locales 
                                                        
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm. 
11 A. N. Artizov, et al. eds., Nikita Khrushchev: Stenogrammy Plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty 
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia,” 2007), 259. 
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of the USSR.12 Certain that these forces had caused the crop’s failure, scholars have undervalued 
the program’s potential, leaving largely unexamined how the corn crusade became practice. 
I do not argue that Khrushchev succeeded; however, instead of taking the crusade’s 
defeat at face value, I ask: Why did Khrushchev’s endeavor fail? Without a doubt, climatic 
conditions and a shortage of specialized knowledge about the crop checked its potential, but 
these circumstances represented only two of many obstacles. What can the battles making up 
the corn crusade, as well as their outcomes, reveal about the how the USSR functioned during 
the decade of Khrushchev’s reforms? How did Soviet farms put American technologies into 
practice? How did the rural social and labor crisis inherited from Stalin hinder this effort? How 
did the bureaucracies that Khrushchev ventured to reform demonstrate inertia, even opposition, 
in managing potentially useful policies and economic measures? By seeking answers to these 
questions, a history of the corn crusade highlights the particular flaws of the Soviet system, 
those preventing farms in the USSR from equaling the huge harvests of feed for livestock that 
nonsocialist counterparts abroad used to increase output of dairy products and meat in the 
postwar period. By examining these themes through a history of Khrushchev’s corn crusade, I 
put agriculture, long neglected by scholars, at the center of attention and, thereby, contribute to 
the growing historiography on the era of post-Stalin reforms. Not only an agricultural program, 
Khrushchev’s endeavor serves as a lens through which to view in a new light the USSR’s political 
processes, administrative apparatus, rural society, food policy, foreign policy aims, and official 
ideology. Realizing the topic’s potential to draw diverse fields together, this study of corn joins 
conversations about agricultural history, environmental history, political history, and Cold War 
history. 
* * * 
                                                        
12 See, for example: Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 108; and I. V. Rusinov, “Agrarnaia 
politika KPSS v 50-e–pervoi polovine 60-kh godov: Opyt i uroki,” Voprosy istorii KPSS no. 9 (1988): 41. 
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Khrushchev’s agricultural reforms belong alongside those he championed in governance, 
society, and cultural policy. When Stalin died in March 1953, the “collective leadership” 
consisting of his inner circle recognized the need for new policies and practices. Reaffirming 
their socialist principles, they introduced reforms designed to bring the USSR closer to its ideal 
of an egalitarian but tightly governed society, and an economy of modern, state-owned 
industries. Ending arbitrary violence and freeing prisoners from labor camps, they encouraged 
optimism, creativity, and intellectual inquiry—within established boundaries. Recognizing the 
period’s reformist atmosphere, scholars have characterized it as “liberalization” and “the Thaw,” 
a term drawn from Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg’s eponymous and epochal novel.13 One of 
several contenders to succeed Stalin, Khrushchev amassed power and authority over several 
years as he backed a more flexible foreign policy and, in 1956, gave his “Secret Speech” 
enumerating Stalin’s crimes against the party to a closed meeting of delegates to the Twentieth 
Party Congress. Historians have recently highlighted continuities with the Stalin period and 
recognized that Khrushchev often rejected moderation; for instance, he renewed the assault on 
religion, dormant since the war.14 Earlier scholars attributed the inconsistent and erratic 
appearance of his reformism to hidden struggles within the leadership, the fortunes of his 
authority, or his personal preferences. Using archival documents to investigate struggles with 
the legacy of the GULAG prison camps, as well as related official and popular fears of 
criminality, historian Miriam Dobson convincingly argues that Soviet leadership’s “confidence” 
waxed and waned in response to changing conditions, a fluidity that explains the reforms’ 
                                                        
13 For more on “liberalization,” see: Melanie Ilič, “Introduction,” in Soviet State and Society under Nikita 
Khrushchev, ed. Melanie Ilič and Jeremy Smith. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East 
European Studies 57 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1–2; and Polly Jones, “Introduction: The Dilemmas of 
De-Stalinization,” in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the 
Khrushchev Era, ed. Polly Jones. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies 23 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 12–13.  
14 Tatiana A. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II 
to the Khrushchev Years, ed. and trans. Edward E. Roslof (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 187. 
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apparent unpredictability.15 New sources permit historians to reassess Khrushchev’s reforms 
and reveal previously obscured patterns, suggesting that a similar reappraisal of his agricultural 
programs’ motivations, principles, and mechanisms is needed. 
As an agricultural initiative, Khrushchev’s corn crusade shaped efforts to raise living 
standards by improving diets. The connection between crops and food unites agricultural 
history and food history: as essayist Wendell Berry put it, “Eating is an agricultural act.”16 
Historian Deborah Fitzgerald warns against isolating farming as an economic or technical 
process while neglecting rural communities and the cultural meanings of the food they 
produce.17 As scholars have reflected on agriculture’s social, political, cultural, nutritional, 
economic, and environmental facets, these concerns have also entered public consciousness.18 
Consumers now demand organic, free-range, and fairly traded foods while making celebrities of 
advocates for those grown locally. Recent studies, furthermore, demonstrate that these issues 
are relevant to both contemporary Russia and its past.19 A small scholarship stresses the 
agricultural side of the relationship.20 From the Soviet state’s revolutionary origins, it wrested 
                                                        
15 Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev's Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after 
Stalin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 157–58. 
16 Wendell Berry, “The Pleasures of Eating,” in Bringing It to the Table: On Farming and Food (Berkeley, 
CA: Counterpoint, 2009), 227. 
17 Deborah Fitzgerald, “Eating and Remembering,” Agricultural History 79, no. 4 (2005): 392–408. 
Historian Peter Coclanis similarly stresses how investigating scientific knowledge, economic forces, and 
cultural change can reveal “the material, physical, corporeal, sensible sides of agricultural history . . . that 
still have their place even in our increasingly discursive world.” Coclanis, “Food Chains: The Burdens of 
the (Re)Past,” Agricultural History 72, no. 4 (1998): 662.  
18 In academia, anthropologist Sidney Mintz’s history of sugar has been a foundational study of societies 
through their commodities. See: Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History 
(New York: Viking, 1985). 
19 Alison K. Smith, Recipes for Russia: Food and Nationhood under the Tsars (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2008); Edward M. Geist, "Cooking Bolshevik: Anastas Mikoian and the Making of the 
Book about Delicious and Healthy Food," The Russian Review 71, no. 1 (2012): 2–20; and Jukka Gronow, 
Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin's Russia (New York: 
Berg, 2003). On the postsocialist present, see: Nancy Ries, "Potato Ontology: Surviving Postsocialism in 
Russia," Cultural Anthropology 24, no. 2 (2009): 181–212. 
20 See, for example: Jenny Leigh Smith, “The Soviet Farm Complex: Industrial Agriculture in a Socialist 
Context, 1945–1965” (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006). 
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grain from the countryside to avert the urban food shortages that had discredited the tsarist 
regime. During the First Five-Year Plan, from 1928 to 1932, Stalin’s collectivization squeezed 
wealth and labor from rural communities to finance industrialization, damaging or destroying 
peasant economies and cultures.21 In the 1930s, industrial production surged even as farm 
output stagnated. Having suffered unprecedented devastation during World War II, the USSR 
rebuilt industry while recovery on farms lagged, leaving Stalin’s successors a crisis of low yields 
and food scarcity.22 Memories of wartime privation and the deadly postwar famine (1946–47) 
remained poignant.23 Although the government formally abolished rationing at the end of 1947, 
the average citizen ate a diet adequate in calories, but short on fruits, vegetables, meat, and 
milk.24 
Farming and food security furthermore had relevance to foreign policy because the Cold 
War was a competition not only for geopolitical influence, but also between socialist and 
capitalist systems vying to provide citizens avenues for consumption. As historian Vladislav 
Zubok has shown, Soviet leaders evaluated the world based on a “revolutionary-imperial 
paradigm,” balancing traditional great-power politics with idealistic internationalism and efforts 
to encourage imitators abroad. Reshaping Stalin’s hardheaded foreign policy, Khrushchev 
                                                        
21 On these policies and their consequences, see: Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and 
Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Lynne 
Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996); and Viola, The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of 
Soviet Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
22 O. M. Verbitskaia’s history of postwar rural communities covers this theme: Verbitskaia, Rossiiskoe 
krest'ianstvo: Ot Stalina k Khrushchevu; Sredina 40-kh–nachalo 60-kh godov (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1992). 
23 See: Nicholas Ganson, The Soviet Famine of 1946–47 in Global and Historical Perspective (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and V. F. Zima, Golod v SSSR 1946–1947 godov: Proiskhozhdenie i 
posledstviia (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Institut rossiiskoi istorii, 1996). 
24 On diets, see: Nikolai M. Dronin and Edward G. Bellinger, Climate Dependence and Food Problems in 
Russia 1900–1990: The Interaction of Climate and Agricultural Policy and Their Effect on Food 
Problems (New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 165. For more on the social history of 
rationing in the postwar years, see: Elena Iu. Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and 
Disappointments, 1945–1957, trans. and ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 52–55. 
  9
favored the revolutionary side without abandoning the imperial.25 Concerns about food security 
at home paralleled the imperative to mount an offensive to win “hearts and minds” in the Third 
World by offering the path to a more just society and comfortable way of life. Considering a 
socialist triumph inevitable, Khrushchev touted Soviet efforts “to catch up with and overtake 
America” in per capita output of meat, milk, eggs, and other foods, a promise to his citizens of a 
better life and to foreign leaders of a template for swift economic development. Through the end 
of the 1950s, growth surged, lending feasibility to his pledges, which in 1961 culminated in the 
Third Party Program’s vow to equal the US in per capita production by 1970, and achieve full 
communism by 1980. 
Growing demand for food in an urbanizing society spurred Stalin’s successors to fear 
that shortages might foment social unrest, which they hoped to preempt by enacting policies to 
stimulate farm output. When grievances about living conditions triggered crises in East Berlin in 
1953, as well as in Poland and Hungary in 1956, Soviet leaders violently suppressed them.26 
During the 1950s, the Soviet economy grew and living standards rose, but less quickly than 
Khrushchev promised, and his apparently empty pledges prompted uprisings. By the early 
1960s, his image became tarnished by slowing progress and by scandals such as “the Riazan 
affair,” which brought to light the fraud pervasive in the oblast’s heralded successes in meat 
production.27 Consumers found smaller supplies in the shops than they had come to expect, 
inciting anger. Throughout the period, unrest sparked by shortages remained local, indicating 
                                                        
25 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 104. 
26 György Péteri, "Introduction: The Oblique Coordinate Systems of Modern Identity," in Imagining the 
West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. György Péteri (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2010), 8. 
27 Oblast and local officials had fraudulently inflated production. Khrushchev’s ceaseless propaganda had 
peaked when the leaders of Riazan oblast in central Russia claimed to have fulfilled three times its annual 
norm for meat production in 1959, earning praise and awards. Much of that output turned out to have 
been coerced from peasants or even fictional. Officials bought retail goods and resold them as new 
production. Farms slaughtered their herds wholesale, including milk cows and calves, mortgaging future 
years’ product to earn short-term acclaim. Farms, districts, and oblasts across the USSR resorted to 
similar tactics. For a brief summary, see: Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 94–101. 
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that the population adhered to Soviet ideals but also expected authorities to deliver the goods 
they pledged.28 Historian Vladimir Kozlov argues that these “mass uprisings” signaled a “crisis 
of modernization” resulting from the struggles of state and society to adapt to post-Stalin 
circumstances.29 The most infamous instance, the Novocherkassk rebellion of 1963, saw workers 
explode in anger at rising food prices, falling real wages, and empty promises of imminent 
abundance. The government repressed them in a hail of gunfire, killing many.30 
Amid all of these domestic and international concerns, Khrushchev considered his corn 
crusade essential to revolutionizing farming in the shortest time at the lowest cost while 
maintaining the ideologically orthodox commitment to state and collective farms.31 Considering 
the extremes of the USSR’s climate merely a hurdle that the farms might clear by using proper 
techniques and crop varieties, he championed corn as a panacea ensuring that every region and 
farm contributed to his goals. Millions of collective farmers, state-farm workers, agronomists, 
administrators, party officials, and students labored to plant, cultivate, and harvest corn in every 
one of the USSR’s constituent oblasts and republics, from the irrigated valleys of Central Asia, 
across the southern steppes to the rich black-earth belt, and far to the north. 
Khrushchev did not choose corn at random; long before, the crop had arrived in the 
                                                        
28 Historian Robert Hornsby explains how unrest among working-class citizens reflected dissatisfaction 
with material conditions, which they expressed by demanding that leaders supply the more comfortable 
standard of living they promised. Hornsby, Protest, Reform, and Repression in Khrushchev’s Soviet 
Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Similarly, historian Vladimir Kozlov shows that 
belief defined the late 1950s and early 1960s, in contrast to the succeeding period of relative quiescence 
under L. I. Brezhnev. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin 
Years, trans. and ed. Elaine McClarnand MacKinnon (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 314. 
29 Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR, 11–12. 
30 For the most thorough investigation of the Novocherkassk events, see: Samuel H. Baron, Bloody 
Saturday in the Soviet Union: Novocherkassk, 1962 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
31 Differences in legal standing and production separated state and collective farms, although in practical 
terms the differences declined during the Khrushchev period. Generally, state farms employed capital-
intensive methods because they enjoyed higher levels of investment, offering the potential for efficient 
production. They often failed to meet these goals, imposing burdens on the state budget to which they 
enjoyed access in ways that the nominally independent collective farms did not. Collective farms relied 
more heavily on manual labor and, prior to post-Stalin reforms, had few of the resources necessary to 
embark on capital investments in production, which the state expected them to make on their own. 
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territory that would become the Soviet Union through transnational networks. First, the 
Columbian Exchange spread corn far from its New World birthplace, making it a common food 
for peasants in regions such as northern Italy and sub-Saharan Africa.32 It quickly reached the 
Mediterranean basin and spread via the Balkan Peninsula to modern-day Moldova, where 
yellow corn porridge—mămăligă in Romanian—served as a peasant staple. An alternate route 
through the Black Sea brought it to western Georgia, where it also became a regular part of the 
diet. In Ukraine, peasant farmers grew corn mostly in southern and western provinces.33 Many 
Slavic languages in the region share a common root with the Russian word for the crop, 
kukuruza, the origins of which remain uncertain. It may have come from Turkish, Greek, or 
even Italian, but each source is consistent with the crop’s arrival from the Mediterranean.34 
Before the Khrushchev era, peasants grew large amounts of corn in only a few locales, 
and as a staple of their diet rather than as livestock feed. Cool, wet conditions in the north and 
hot, dry ones in the south and east discouraged planting it beyond Georgia and southwestern 
Ukraine. Peasants viewed it as a crop of last resort in years of crisis. Corn’s life cycle did not fit 
well with traditional cropping patterns founded on winter grains such as wheat and barley, 
which peasants sowed in the fall to root, lay dormant in winter, and ripen the following summer. 
Only when harsh winters, heavy rains, or drought disrupted that strategy did peasants plant 
corn in late spring, allowing them to feed themselves because it became edible sooner than other 
grains. The state hesitatingly encouraged corngrowing in southern regions during the First Five-
Year Plan, but the chaos of collectivization and famine cut short those efforts. The USSR did not 
incorporate the Moldavian SSR until World War II, and the other locales where it was common 
                                                        
32 On this, see: Alfred Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: The Biological and Cultural Consequences of 
1492, 30th anniv. ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); and James McCann, Maize and Grace: Africa's 
Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500–2000 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
33 An account of farmers’ traditional uses for corn in what became the Soviet Union can be found in: L. V. 
Sazanova, Istoriia rasprostraneniia kukuruzy v nashe strane (Minsk: Urozhai, 1964). A less detailed 
English-language account can be found in: Warman, Corn and Capitalism, 108–9. 
34 Brian Cooper, “Russian Kukuruza and Cognates: A Possible New Etymology,” Slavonica 4, no. 1 
(1997): 46–64. 
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accounted for only a small percentage of cropland. Under Stalin, Soviet farms planted corn on 
fewer hectares than was economically feasible, and failed to adopt technologies making it more 
productive, which had emerged in the United States in the interwar years.35 
Khrushchev championed the crop, for which he was first responsible while serving as 
party leader in Ukraine, because experts stressed its importance to industrial farming and to 
American farms’ productivity. Before World War I, American farmers had depended on 
naturally rich soil and a welcoming climate to supply inexpensive meat and milk. Haltingly in 
the interwar period and then almost universally after World War II, they adopted new 
technologies that enabled unprecedented corn harvests. Annual output hovered around 75 
million metric tons in the early twentieth century. Harvests then began to climb, surpassing 100 
million tons in 1965 and reaching nearly 140 million tons in 1975, even though the number of 
hectares devoted to corn fell from 32 million in 1945 to 22 million in 1970. This change 
happened because yields increased more than threefold between 1945 and 1980.36 Machines, 
chemicals, hybrids, and related technologies made American farmers leading producers of grain 
for the world market. Regardless, most corn left the farm only as the beef, pork, poultry, and 
milk Americans began to consume more frequently because surpluses drove down prices after 
World War II.37 A similar process reshaped farming in Western Europe.38 After a postwar 
agrarian crisis made France a net importer of food in 1950, its farmers boosted productivity by 
using new technologies and expanding plantings of a traditional feed crop, barley, by 348 
percent, and those of relatively unfamiliar corn by 815 percent.39 By the end of the decade, the 
                                                        
35 Jasny, Khrushchev’s Crop Policy, 140. 
36 Warman, Corn and Capitalism, 186–88. A metric ton, or 1,000 kilograms (or 2,200 pounds), is slightly 
more than the English ton (2,000 pounds). I have used the metric ton throughout. 
37 Ibid., 189–91. 
38 Julie Hessler also suggests that the USSR developed in a similar fashion, only more slowly. Hessler, A 
Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 1. 
39 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006), 305. 
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country began to export butter, cheese, and other dairy products.40 
Corn became the engine and symbol of industrial agriculture owing to a self-reinforcing 
process: engineers and agronomists found the crop responsive to industrial technologies and 
therefore concentrated their efforts on it. Anthropologist Arturo Warman argues that corn 
surpasses all other crops in its “full and complete incorporation into the industrial era and 
modern capitalism.”41 It responded to breeders’ efforts to create hybrids, first in experiments 
around 1900 and then commercially in the 1920s and 1930s.42 Diverse landraces—locally 
adapted varieties resulting from prescientific selection—provided breeders the genes needed to 
develop hybrids resistant to pests, drought, and extremes of growing season. These hybrids 
hungrily consumed the synthetic fertilizers integral to industrial farming, converting them into 
yields as much as 30 percent higher than traditional varieties. Using herbicides and insecticides, 
farmers engineer regimented fields where corn thrived, while machines for planting, cultivating, 
and harvesting it boosted labor productivity, making the crop cheaper to produce. 
Existing interpretations of Khrushchev’s corn crusade have neglected the link between 
corn and industrial farming, and his faith in both. The ties between his program and the 
inventive, prolific models he saw in the US and around the world provided, as the title of 
chapter 1 puts it, “the logic of corn.” Interest in industrial approaches to farming emerged in the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s, soon after their invention in the US, and formed part of the Bolshevik 
admiration of America as the most modern and productive capitalist economy.43 This “industrial 
                                                        
40 This process replaced large landed estates, which had emerged in the late nineteenth century, with 
industrial farms, heralds of the “thirty glorious years” of postwar prosperity. For a history of this change, 
see: Chaia Heller, Food, Farms, and Solidarity: French Farmers Challenge Industrial Agriculture and 
Genetically Modified Crops (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013), 42–43. 
41 Warman, Corn and Capitalism, 26. 
42 For more, see: Deborah K. Fitzgerald, The Business of Breeding: Hybrid Corn in Illinois, 1890–1940 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
43 See, among the many works on this topic: Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and 
Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Alan M. 
Ball, Imagining America: Influence and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003). 
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ideal” introduced features of “the modern mass production factory and industrial board room” 
first into organizing farms on the Great Plains in the US, and then, at the end of the 1920s, 
gigantic state farms in the USSR.44 Ingrained in the industrial ideal, a “transfer mentality” 
emboldened Soviet authorities to apply American farming technologies in the USSR.45 This 
matched their belief that technology was “value-neutral,” meaning technologies borrowed from 
capitalism offered greater advantage because socialism would mitigate any negative 
consequences arising from their capitalist origins.46 Intense contacts continued through the 
First Five-Year Plan, but soon declined at Stalin’s orders. At the end of the 1940s, he broke them 
almost entirely during the most intense phase of Cold War hostility and antiforeign frenzy. 
Hoping to put industrial technologies to work on Soviet farms, Khrushchev reopened dialogue in 
1955 by sending the first Cold War era delegation of agricultural experts to visit farms, factories, 
and colleges in the US.47 He worked with individuals around the world who shared his vision, 
including American businessman Roswell Garst. When considered in the context of world trends 
in agricultural technology, Khrushchev’s reforms appear less outlandish and far more sensible: 
they were part and parcel of a concerted effort to realize Soviet ambitions to remake society and 
its interactions with nature. 
By casting Khrushchev’s industrial farming dreams as part of the USSR’s interaction 
with the world, I suggest that the USSR also shaped its global context by seeking to influence the 
Third World in ways that established scholarly conceptions of the Cold War have missed. An 
                                                        
44 I draw my definition of industrial agriculture from Deborah Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald, Every Farm a 
Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 3 
45 Ibid., 187. 
46 Historian of technology Paul Josephson routinely employs the term “value-neutral” in this way. Paul R. 
Josephson, Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth? Technological Utopianism under Socialism, 1917–1989 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
47 Chapter 1 analyzes reports the delegation made in writing and in person to the Central Committee 
Presidium. The latter are located in RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 107. The former are held in the collection for 
the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, f. 7486, in the Russian State Archive of the Economy [Rossiiskii 
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki, RGAE]. 
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edited volume on American modernization plans invites historians to reconceive the Cold War 
as a complex interaction including ideology and technology exchange among the superpowers, 
their blocs of allies, and Third World nations.48 Examining American development initiatives in 
this light, scholars have left Soviet alternatives in the background and undervalued their 
influence.49 By melding modern farming and irrigation technologies with Soviet ideology’s 
anticapitalist tenets, Khrushchev hoped to create a ready-for-export alternative.50 American 
development projects blossomed in the postwar decades, although they became known as the 
“Green Revolution” only in the late 1960s. Historian Nick Cullather has shown that officials in 
the American government and in nongovernmental organizations considered them 
countermeasures against communist-inspired reforms or insurrections. In fact, the official in 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) who coined the term “Green 
Revolution” explicitly contrasted that transformation with the “red” ones simmering in many 
corners of the Third World. Philanthropic agencies such as the Rockefeller Foundation wanted 
food power to preserve peace and American influence.51 Their leaders imagined that 
                                                        
48 Michael E. Latham, “Introduction: Modernization, International History, and the Cold War World,” in 
Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War, ed. David C. Engerman, et al. 
(Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 3. 
49 In a more recent article, Engerman encourages Soviet historians to remedy neglect of Soviet 
engagement in the Third World. David C. Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 12, no. 1 (2011): 183–211. Surveying the scholarship on the 
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The USSR in West Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2010). 
50 Highlighting socialist industrialization and ascribing social problems to capitalism, Soviet narratives of 
development tried to expand the USSR’s influence to newly independent states of the Third World. This 
illustrates the universalist aspects of Zubok’s “revolutionary-imperial paradigm.” Zubok, Failed Empire, 
94. Having long viewed the Third World as a front in the Cold War, scholars have mostly concentrated on 
military conflicts. Both the USSR and the US, made appeals on behalf of their respective models for the 
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their geographically defined spheres of influence. Engerman, “Second World’s Third World,” 189–90. 
51 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 7–8. 
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overpopulation and food shortage led to political instability, and the latter to rebellions that put 
American power at risk.52 This fear drove them to spread new crop varieties, irrigation systems, 
fertilizers, and other technologies rooted in modern farming. Although successful in increasing 
output, these technologies harmed many farmers by favoring those positioned to acquire 
fertilizers and hybrids, while pushing smaller subsistence producers further to the margins, or 
off their land entirely. The USSR loomed as a threat to this model of rural development because 
a socialist alternative, offering an equally modern template for agrarian development, pressured 
American advocates to acknowledge the dangers of rural poverty and inequality. Nonetheless, 
the Soviet alternative has remained an implicit but largely unexamined presence in histories of 
development and the Green Revolution.53 Therefore, I highlight the USSR’s connections to 
world trends in agriculture, taking a step toward a fuller analysis of Soviet counterparts to 
American development efforts in the Third World.54 
Considering the USSR a part—if an atypical one—of a global modernity, scholars have 
highlighted transnational links between Soviet developments and nonsocialist counterparts in 
consumerist values, media, culture, and technology.55 I further develop this connection by 
turning the spotlight on agriculture. To buttress the case that Khrushchev devoted the USSR to 
global trends in farming, I draw on conceptual frameworks interpreting the Soviet system as a 
                                                        
52 John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 119. Perkins also shows how officials and researchers considered breeding 
plants part of a battle between capitalist and communist ideals. 
53 For instance, Perkins frames the entire process of breeding high-yielding varieties of wheat as part of 
the Cold War contest, and gives almost no attention to the USSR itself. A vast scholarship debates the 
positive and negative effects of the Green Revolution’s social, economic, political, and environmental 
transformations, but the USSR rarely merits mention. 
54 Notably, one of the few Cold War era scholarly works devoted to corn in the USSR, a geography 
dissertation, examined Khrushchev’s corn program as an example of development policies in the context 
of a “totalitarian” and nonmarket system. It considered his efforts significant because success in corn 
cultivation might boost the USSR’s case as a development model. Jeremy H. Anderson, “The Soviet Corn 
Program: A Study in Crop Geography” (PhD diss., University of Washington, Seattle, 1964). 
55 For example, see: Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire 
That Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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commitment to building a socialist society with recognizable features drawn from a common 
modernity. Long neglected, the basis for considering the USSR in pan-European and world 
contexts has deep roots in the Soviet studies tradition, beginning with the Harvard Interview 
Project.56 In 1949 and 1950, scholars interviewed wartime expatriates who remained in Western 
Europe and the US, using responses to construct a model of the system consisting of three 
elements.57 First, the state possessed ambitions of totalitarian control over political, social, and 
cultural life. Second, components of society specific to the Soviet system hindered those 
aspirations.58 Third, the USSR had features in common with any “industrial society,” making it 
comparable to urban, economically advanced countries in Western Europe, North America, and 
beyond.59 The Harvard Project thus rejected the commonplace notion that the USSR stood 
apart, comparable only to Nazi Germany in its ruling party’s supposedly totalitarian grip on 
society. In addition to an industrial economy and urban population, the USSR adopted 
industrial farming, with attendant effects on how farms produced food and citizens consumed it. 
Khrushchev’s enthusiasm for industrial agriculture’s capacity to transform relationships 
with the environment demonstrated Soviet ideology’s embrace of a common modernist 
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understanding of nature as separate from society, an object for humans to master and bend to 
their purposes. Environmental historians, by contrast, emphasize societies’ integration into the 
environment, which is not merely the surrounding natural world, but a whole that includes 
both.60 The Soviet “promethean” vision held that humans could use science and technology to 
control nature.61 This dream perhaps reached its height in the “Stalinist Plan for the 
Transformation of Nature,” an unrealized scheme of irrigation canals, thousand-kilometer-long 
tree belts sheltering fields from wind erosion, land reclamation projects, and other measures 
designed to direct natural forces and increase economic output.62 These visions also influenced 
farming. Before collectivization, cultural preferences and climate shaped how peasants selected 
crops, managed farms, and interacted with natural forces. Soviet leaders’ formal control over the 
collective and state farms gave them license to alter these choices. Khrushchev used this power 
to agitate for planting corn outside its previous range, presuming that the crop could prove 
productive even in northern climates if harvested at less mature stages for use as livestock feed, 
rather than as fully mature grain for human consumption. 
These concepts further demonstrate the common ground the USSR shared with other 
twentieth-century modernizing states, as emphasized by historian Adeeb Khalid and by 
anthropologist James C. Scott. Khalid has characterized the USSR as an “activist, 
interventionist, mobilizational” state “leading [its] population on a forced march to progress and 
development.”63 Instead of an anomaly, the USSR’s ambitions compared to those of other states 
                                                        
60 Environmental historian William Cronon has particularly influenced my thinking on this point. See: 
Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991). 
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founded in the aftermath of World War I, especially the Republic of Turkey.64 Khalid’s account 
of the USSR’s Central Asian territories considers only briefly the environment and agriculture in 
the form of cotton production.65 Calling the USSR the quintessential case of “authoritarian high-
modernism,” Scott explains the concept by developing a metaphor drawn from human 
interactions with the environment: he likens efforts to govern a society to a farmer’s control over 
a field. Intermixing many complementary crops, a field organized according to the principles of 
polyculture is too complex for a distant bureaucrat to understand or manage. By simplifying the 
field into regimented rows of genetically identical hybrids of a single crop, industrial farming 
creates a uniform environment, allowing vital characteristics to be quantified in a few 
measurements describing the field’s size, the hybrid planted there, the soil’s fertility, and the 
crop’s yield. Equating the field to society, Scott illustrates high-modernist states’ ambition to 
know everything about the societies they govern and, therefore, more easily extract labor, taxes, 
and goods. To do so, states reduce societies to regular, quantifiable facsimiles—resembling the 
industrial field—bearing little relation to existing adaptive communities, akin to the complex 
polyculture garden. Not all high modernist projects of the twentieth century were destructive; 
however, the USSR was an “extreme but diagnostic case of authoritarian high-modernist 
planning” because World War I and the Civil War left peasant societies prostrate, unprepared to 
withstand the coercive standardization that culminated in collectivization. Scott contends that 
this placed peasants’ activities and the environment alike under the state’s dominance.66 In 
practice, collective farms fell far short of any such ideal. Although subject to the dictates of 
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bureaucrats in Moscow, collective farmers carried out those directives with little enthusiasm. 
Collectivization did not radically restructure crop rotations because authorities cared mostly for 
extracting food and labor to finance industrialization and feed workers. Khrushchev ambitiously 
attempted to change practices in hopes of realizing a vision of industrial farming inherent, yet 
latent, in the Soviet concept of modern agriculture. 
Scott concludes that high-modernist schemes, from relatively benign forms such as the 
planned city to humanitarian disasters such as the collective farm, failed because they dismissed 
mētis: the local, adaptable, practical knowledge suppressed in attempts to tame untamable 
social and environmental realities.67 The concept of mētis suggests that Moscow’s policies did 
not accommodate adaptive practices resulting from long experience with local conditions; 
environmental, social, and cultural forces impeded efforts to realize the potential of corn and of 
industrial farming. High modernism and mētis together frame an examination of how 
interactions among policies, people, and the environment evolved under Khrushchev. 
A history of the corn crusade must therefore consider Khrushchev as a product of 
modernism and the Soviet project. A “globally-informed high-modernist,” Khrushchev earned a 
practical education under Soviet power that ingrained into him and his compatriots these 
ideological preferences, themselves hardwired into the Stalinist system. That worldview 
predisposed Khrushchev to see the potential in corn as a part of an industrial farming complex, 
pushing him to expend enormous effort to implement principles shared with other twentieth-
century modernizing states. His scheme faced challenges from local conditions and Soviet 
practices that limited harvests, but in this light the corn crusade no longer appears “irrational,” 
“contradictory,” or “harebrained.” To repeat: I neither argue that Khrushchev succeeded, nor 
wish to rehabilitate his vision of corn-based industrial agriculture. Even if his policies had 
increased farm output in the short term and matched the results achieved in the US, the 
pressing economic and ecological consequences of industrial farming we face today demonstrate 
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that apparent postwar successes only postponed addressing industrial farming’s social, cultural, 
economic, and environmental repercussions.68 I do contend, however, that simply dismissing 
Khrushchev’s vision ignores a subject ripe for deeper analysis, and one that reveals much about 
the Soviet experiment in principle and in practice. 
* * * 
As a case study of the constraints on reform, Khrushchev’s corn crusade offers answers 
to questions about policy-making, governance, and labor. Tapping long inaccessible archival 
documents and a variety of published sources, I explore the complex reality of the corn crusade 
in practice to discover why Soviet farms fell short of nonsocialist benchmarks in the US, 
Western Europe, and even the Third World.69 The following section positions my dissertation in 
the scholarship on Khrushchev’s reforms and outlines the structure of the chapters. 
Khrushchev made agricultural reforms part of the political struggle that won him the 
                                                        
68 As Scott explains, high-modernist schemes provoked criticism. The architect and visionary of the 
planned city Le Corbusier (Charles-Édouard Jeanneret-Gris) inspired sociologist Jane Jacobs to praise 
the beauty and functionality of a mixed, organic urban community. Ibid., 132–46. Similarly, Lenin’s vision 
of the vanguard party and the centralized modernizing state spurred Rosa Luxemburg and Alexandra 
Kollontai to challenge him. Ibid., 168–79. Opponents of industrial agriculture have denounced the 
ecological, social, and cultural costs that standard economic analyses ignore. Several of them have 
particularly influenced my approach. Deborah Fitzgerald’s skepticism toward her subject is evident in her 
work. Journalist Michael Pollan has brought the problems of modern industrial agriculture based on corn 
monoculture to popular attention. Pollan, The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals 
(New York: Penguin, 2006). Additionally, farmer, poet, essayist, and activist Wendell Berry often 
denounces the harm industrial farming brings to the environment, societies, and cultures. See: Berry, 
Citizenship Papers: Essays (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2004); and Berry, Bringing It to the Table. 
69 In chapters 2 through 4, I draw on archives of top Communist Party organizations, especially the 
Central Committee’s departments (RGANI, f. 5). These include the general department (op. 30) that 
coordinated with the others and with regional committees. In the Khrushchev period, separate 
departments for party organizations communicated with regions in the RSFSR (op. 32) and the fourteen 
remaining union republics (op. 31). A similar structure existed for the agriculture departments (op. 46 
and op. 45, respectively). The records of many central Soviet and RSFSR government organizations are 
housed in the State Archive of the Russian Federation [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi Federatsii, 
GARF]. The documents of the USSR Council of Ministers (f. R-5446) provide insight into the formation of 
individual directives. By contrast, the RSFSR Council of Ministers (f. A-259) tended to fulfill executive 
functions. The ministries of agriculture for both the USSR and the RSFSR similarly coordinated and 
executed policy. GARF f. A-310 houses the records of the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture, while the USSR 
ministry’s files are in the RGAE (f. 7486). In addition, the records for several organizations responsible for 
inspection and oversight are housed in GARF, including the USSR Ministry for State Control (f. R-8300) 
and its RSFSR subordinate (f. A-340). 
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authority to dictate policy and launch his crusade. Stalin’s successors divided responsibilities 
and began to vie for position even as the old tyrant lay dying.70 Khrushchev took up leadership of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, comprised of between 200 and 300 top party 
and government officials; however, he initially appeared subordinate to the heads of the 
government, L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, and V. M. Molotov. Proving a master of intrigue, 
Khrushchev first built a coalition to overthrow Beria, whom the others feared for his control 
over the secret police. Becoming formal head of the party, Khrushchev gained authority to 
appoint its regional leaders, pack the Central Committee with loyalists, and reassert its 
authority, which Stalin had allowed to diminish. In 1954, Khrushchev initiated the “Virgin Lands 
campaign,” a bold agricultural program to plant wheat on millions of hectares of sparsely 
populated land in Kazakhstan and Siberia, as well as to cultivate unused lands across the USSR. 
That year, he quietly encouraged experiments in corngrowing far beyond the crop’s traditional 
range, extending no further north than Kyiv. In January 1955, he launched an all-out offensive 
on a front spanning millions of hectares. His aggressive and visionary measures helped persuade 
colleagues of his abilities, gaining him support against more cautious rivals such as Malenkov, 
whom he demoted from premier to deputy premier in early 1955. 
In June 1957, rivals fearful of Khrushchev’s growing power built a majority in the 
Presidium—as the highest party executive more commonly called the Politburo was known 
between 1952 and 1966—in favor of ousting him. Long disregarded party rules required the 
Central Committee to ratify the decision, but Khrushchev’s control over appointments gave him 
a majority there, allowing him to keep power and replace Presidium opponents remaining from 
Stalin’s entourage with his own supporters. This loosened remaining restraints on pursuit of his 
vision. Corn remained top priority as he overrode local authorities’ suspicion, as well as 
concerns about the crop’s unfamiliarity, the unfavorable climate, and unpredictable weather. He 
                                                        
70 This narrative of political struggle appears in much of the secondary literature. For the clearest and 
most compelling iteration, see: Taubman, Khrushchev, 236–57. 
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badgered local leaders to expand cropland, plant more corn, and bring in larger harvests. When 
they fell short of his goals, he blamed them and goaded them to redouble their efforts. Giving a 
speech in August 1958, for instance, he hoped to shame the officials gathered in the Russian city 
of Smolensk by dragging a three-meter-tall stalk of corn onto the stage. Claiming it had grown 
on a farm in neighboring Moscow oblast, a locale with an equally cool and wet climate, he 
taunted, “You have no corn like this on any collective farm.”71 
In pursuit of larger harvests, Khrushchev proselytized machines, hybrid seeds, synthetic 
fertilizers, and other technologies. In 1959, after five years of reform, Soviet farms appeared to 
have made progress: output had risen and forecasts promised further advances, raising 
optimism. Even his ambitious boast that the Soviet Union would soon “catch up with and 
overtake America” in per capita output of food seemed possible. The Soviet economy grew faster 
than those of its capitalist rivals. Soviet engineers had designed powerful rockets and launched 
the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik, in 1957. The Soviet “Scientific-Technical Revolution” 
transformed the economy: if tractors and hydroelectric dams had been the state of the art in the 
1930s, by the 1960s satellites and nuclear-power stations had supplanted them.72 Increasing 
international prestige forced others to recognize the USSR’s geopolitical strength. 
Rapprochement with the United States began in 1955 with the Soviet doctrines of “peaceful 
coexistence” and “peaceful competition” in economic and technical arenas, and reached a high 
point when in 1959 Khrushchev visited America—and Roswell Garst’s farm in Iowa. 
Subsequent years cast a shadow over Khrushchev’s victories and his corn crusade. 
Publicized successes proved fictional, and revelations of widespread fraud harmed his 
                                                        
71 N. S. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva, vol. 3 (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962), 272. 
72 The idealism and enthusiasm for science characteristic of the period appears prominently in the 
account of Petr Vail’ and Aleksandr Genis. Vail' and Genis, Shestidesiatye: Mir sovetskogo cheloveka 
(Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1988), 84–85. For more on the Scientific-Technological Revolution as part of the Cold 
War competition, see: Susan E. Reid, “The Khrushchev Kitchen: Domesticating the Scientific-
Technological Revolution,” Journal of Contemporary History 40, no. 2 (2005): 290–91. 
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legitimacy. In response, he moved breathlessly from one new measure to the next. The phrase 
“corn, Cuba, and China” encapsulates the troubles encircling him.73 Khrushchev seemingly 
backed down in October 1962 in the face of American threats during the Cuban Missile Crisis he 
created, harming his reputation for hardnosed negotiating with foreign powers. The increasingly 
public split between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China harmed his credibility in 
relations with socialist allies. Corn became emblematic of agricultural struggles and 
accompanying food shortages. After early extensive growth—securing larger harvests by 
planting more hectares—farms proved unable or unwilling to use chemicals, fertilizers, and 
hybrids to increase productivity per hectare. Grain reserves declined as demand outstripped 
supply. When crop failure struck in 1963, the USSR had to import wheat and limit consumption, 
a humiliating contrast to Khrushchev’s claims that abundance was on the horizon. Repeatedly 
reorganizing party and government bureaucracies, he alienated that power base. When those 
surrounding Khrushchev collaborated to remove him in October 1964, no one supported the 
man who had nurtured de-Stalinization and promised communism by 1980. 
This dissertation builds on post-Soviet histories of politics and reform under 
Khrushchev, which itself rests on earlier scholarship. In the 1970s, revisionist political scientists 
privileging the leader’s authority, or ability to get things done, challenged “totalitarian” 
interpretations and the “conflict model” of Soviet politics, both of which concentrated on power, 
or the leader’s security in a formal position.74 Considering policy-making a process in which 
                                                        
73 Scholars have explained Khrushchev’s political demise this way since the 1970s, beginning with the 
work of dissident historians Roy and Zhores Medvedev. See: Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev. 
74 “Revisionist” scholars recognized that the USSR under Khrushchev functioned differently than it had 
under Stalin, exhibiting fewer totalitarian characteristics. For examples of that earliest paradigm, see: 
Abraham Brumberg, ed., Russia under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of Communism (New 
York: Praeger, 1962). In the early 1960s, the “conflict school” advanced the view that Kremlin politics 
were inherently unstable. They underscored the limits on Khrushchev’s power, concluding that struggle 
continued after he had secured power in June 1957. These scholars used the tested tools of 
“Kremlinology,” seeking evidence in public statements, the order in which leaders’ names appeared in 
official announcements, and even their positions in photographs, and conjectured that factional fighting 
explained every policy initiative, subtle shift, or tactical retreat. For an example of this, see: Carl A. 
Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1966). For a critique of this mode of analysis, see: Jerry F. Hough, How the Soviet Union is Governed 
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disagreements never emerged into open conflict, the revisionists argued that Khrushchev tried 
to “build consensus” among representatives of various constituencies, gathering a coalition of 
“friends of change” large enough to silence its “foes.”75 Drawing on archives closed before 1991, 
historians have reexamined his reforms. Historian Miriam Dobson has argued that policy shifts 
reflected the leadership’s collective response to circumstances that swayed their mentality, 
rather than a realignment of separate interest-group coalitions favoring or opposing the status 
quo. Khrushchev and other leaders backed reform to address Stalin’s legacy, but they also feared 
instability. When unease about the pace or direction of change grew, their “confidence” fell and 
they halted or even reversed earlier initiatives.76 Other scholars have examined interpersonal 
relationships within the leadership, finding friendships and rivalries after June 1957, but no 
evidence of organized factions around individuals, or around conservative and reformist 
positions.77 
Although scholars have long written about Khrushchev-era agriculture policy, they have 
written around corn, only rarely addressing it directly. Contemporary western observers 
concluded that Khrushchev, no matter how innovative his approach, could not succeed so long 
as he left collective farms and nonmarket state procurements in place; moreover, climatic 
limitations, equipment shortages, and other concerns made this corn crusade “a precarious 
affair.”78 In the only work dedicated to corn, geographer Jeremy Anderson’s dissertation 
examined official statistics tracing the program, considering it part of a Soviet modernization in 
                                                        
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 232–33. 
75 George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics 
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1982); and Stephen F. Cohen, "The Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and 
Conservatism in the Soviet Union," Slavic Review 38, no. 2 (1979): 187–202. 
76 Dobson, Khrushchev's Cold Summer, 157–58. 
77 A. V. Sushkov, Prezidium TsK KPSS v 1957–1964 gg.: Lichnost' i vlast' (Ekaterinburg: Ural'skii tsentr 
akademicheskogo obsluzhivaniia, 2009). 
78 Lazar Volin, “Khrushchev's Economic Neo-Stalinism,” American Slavic and East European Review 14, 
no. 4 (1955): 461. Jasny similarly emphasized limits on the potential of corn in the Soviet Union, devoting 
a substantial part of his book to the subject: Jasny, Khrushchev’s Crop Policy, 140–86. 
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agriculture.79 Scholars of the conflict school studied agricultural initiatives only as a lens to bring 
the power struggle into focus, paying little attention to how policies worked in practice.80 
Published in 1976, Martin McCauley’s study of the Virgin Lands campaign took a step toward an 
analysis of policy implementation.81 Dissident historians Roy and Zhores Medvedev considered 
corn one of Khrushchev’s overambitious reforms, which after some initial success fell into 
disrepute.82 Since the opening of the archives, scholars have considered the corn crusade as a 
part of the political history of Khrushchev’s agricultural reforms, and of the social history of the 
postwar countryside.83 Despite the evident potential of a thoroughgoing history of Khrushchev’s 
corn offensive, no historian has yet seized the opportunities granted by access to the Soviet 
archives and by the growing scholarship on the period of post-Stalin reform. 
Putting agriculture back at the center of scholarly discussion, a study of the corn crusade 
highlights links between policy and practices, a mission integral to what historian Sheila 
Fitzpatrick calls “the new political history.”84 This approach envisions a complex political 
process in the tradition of revisionists such as Breslauer, Cohen, and Hough. Conventions 
beginning with the totalitarian school considered ideology most important in driving politics, 
while later scholars privileged practical, even pragmatic motivations. Fitzpatrick argues that the 
new political history should balance the two;85 as historian Peter Holquist puts it, ideology and 
                                                        
79 Anderson, “Soviet Corn Program.” See also: Jeremy H. Anderson, “A Historical-Geographical 
Perspective on Khrushchev’s Corn Program,” in Soviet and East European Agriculture, ed. Jerzy F. Karcz 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 104–28. 
80 See, for example: Werner G. Hahn, The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1972); and Sidney I. Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A 
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81 Martin McCauley, Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Land 
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practice are “symbiotic.”86 
Cultural history also informs this new approach to politics. As historian Laura Engelstein 
argues, scholars subscribing to the totalitarian interpretation considered culture only an 
instrument of politics, subordinate to ideology. In the 1970s, under the social sciences’ 
influence, scholars saw culture as a reflection of underlying social and power relations. Since 
then, historians have reinvigorated the study of culture, which Engelstein defines as a stable yet 
historical “system of values, signs, and conventions” permitting members of a society to 
understand collective and individual experiences.87 Considering language, subtexts, contexts, 
and intended audiences, I read sources for silences and unspoken assumptions. These shed light 
on the goals, ideals, values, and worldviews of actors responding to Khrushchev’s corn crusade 
with support or resistance. A history of his initiative therefore ties together elements of Soviet 
politics, governance, and society, with a concentration on attitudes and motivations of local 
officials and collective farmers. As Engelstein notes, the “habits of mind” (a term used by social 
historian Moshe Lewin) of these groups have received comparatively little investigation, 
especially as they evolved in the post-Stalin period.88 
In view of the new political history, politics was a multidirectional process that included 
regional and local authorities. Scholars concentrating on the flow of policy directives from the 
top downward have rightly considered Khrushchev’s authority to determine agricultural policy 
dominant. Agricultural historian I. E. Zelenin, for instance, has argued that the leader’s 
agricultural policies demonstrated “the establishment of his personal dictatorship” over 
agriculture, especially between June 1957 and October 1964.89 In practice, a complex set of 
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interactions extending far beyond the power struggles among top leaders in Moscow weakened 
Khrushchev’s authority.90 With these considerations in mind, this dissertation’s later chapters 
draw on documents in regional archives to scrutinize relations between the center and 
subordinates on the periphery. Historian Donald J. Raleigh notes that local studies potentially 
“enrich or complicate our understanding of major events and turning points” not by examining 
“typical” regions, but by shedding light on each locale’s features and unique interactions with 
the center.91 Local histories furthermore bring into focus the “symbiotic and dialectical” 
interactions between center and periphery, which make the former a product of interactions 
with the latter. Because local histories “have condensed within more general experiences,”92 
historians ought to consider individual regions cases that reshape established, Moscow-centric 
narratives. 
Initially, I selected two administrative divisions to examine, Moscow oblast and 
Stavropol krai; in the course of my research, I also visited the Baltic republic of Lithuania and 
the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in Kyiv. Moscow and 
Stavropol contrasted in climate and economic conditions, as well as in their distance from the 
center of power. Moscow suited my purpose because Khrushchev forced farms there to pioneer 
corn cultivation when he served as the oblast party committee’s first secretary from 1949 to 
                                                        
90 Fitzpatrick, “Politics as Practice.” For examples of analyses of the relations between the center and the 
regions, see: Yoram Gorlizki, “Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks 
Under Brezhnev,” Slavic Review 69, no. 3 (2010): 676–700. See also: O. V. Khlevniuk, “Regional'naia 
vlast' v SSSR v 1954–kontse 1950-kh godov: Ustoichivost' i konflikty,” Otechestvennaia istoriia, no. 3 
(2007): 31–49. Khlevniuk has brought additional attention to these issues by publishing a collection of 
documents: O. V. Khlevniuk, ed., Regional'naia politika N. S. Khrushcheva: TsK KPSS i mestnye 
partiinye komitety, 1953–1964 gg. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009). 
91 Donald J. Raleigh, “Introduction,” in Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917–
1953, Donald J. Raleigh, ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 5. Peter Holquist similarly 
contends that the archives in regions and republics must not simply add “local color” to existing accounts 
of high politics and ideological conventions, based only on evidence from central archives. Holquist, “A 
Tocquevillean 'Archival Revolution': Archival Change in the Longue Durée,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas 51 (2003): 77–83. 
92 Raleigh, “Introduction,” in Provincial Landscapes, ed. Raleigh, 1. 
  29 
1953.93 The oblast’s cool climate, brief summers, and poor soils placed it well to the north of 
corn’s traditional growing range. Because of his ties to farms in the area and the proximity of the 
city of Moscow, Khrushchev was able to urge the unfamiliar crop on farm managers. He held up 
model farms that brought in a crop as examples for others in the oblast and those in neighboring 
oblasts with similar climates, even though many could not grow corn economically. Farmers in 
Stavropol krai, far to the south of Moscow in Russia’s North Caucasus, had planted corn on a 
limited scale since the late nineteenth century.94 Its warm climate suits corn better than most 
regions of the USSR, although much of the krai suffers from frequent droughts and the irregular 
parching winds from Central Asia, known as sukhovei in Russian. Although harmful to all crops, 
both particularly damage corn by striking at the critical stages when the crop pollinates and 
matures. Nonetheless, in favorable years, farms yielded substantial harvests of grain, feed, and 
hybrid corn seed. The krai’s administrators pursued the crusade with enthusiasm: as late as 
1953, the krai’s corn crop remained miniscule, but by 1956, Stavropol had become the third 
largest regional producer of corn in the USSR, a position it maintained thereafter. In Lithuania, 
the center–periphery relationship mixed with the republic’s interwar history of independence 
and underlying nationalism to create unique political conditions that, above and beyond its cool, 
humid climate, made it a singular case.95 In Kyiv, a small sample of records of the Central 
                                                        
93 In Moscow, the Central Archive for the Social-Political History of Moscow [Tsentral'nyi arkhiv 
obschestvenno-politicheskoi istorii Moskvy, TsAOPIM] houses the files of party committees for the oblast 
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Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine for the years 1955 and 1956 shed light on cases 
from the republic’s oblasts.96 
This dissertation consists of seven largely thematic chapters that follow a loose internal 
chronology. Chapter 1 explores the themes of Khrushchev’s interest in industrial agriculture and 
the USSR’s place in the world, both outlined in depth above. Chapter 2, “The Politics of Corn,” 
defines how Khrushchev accumulated the authority to turn his ideals into policy between March 
1953 and June 1957, thus shedding light on the efforts that lasted until October 1964 to put them 
into practice. 
Subsequent chapters scrutinize how Khrushchev’s twin commitment to corn and 
industrial farming became policy in practice. They privilege the Soviet administrative apparatus 
that carried out Khrushchev’s initiatives and, in an apparent paradox, simultaneously hindered 
his ambitions. Chapter 3, “Technologies of Corn,” examines ministerial and local bureaucracies 
as they put into effect two measures Khrushchev designed to make industrial methods a reality 
on collective and state farms in the late 1950s. First, factories received orders to rapidly produce 
farm machines required to cultivate corn using mechanized labor rather than expensive manual 
labor. Second, the USSR imported American equipment and genetic material to quickly 
establish production of the most advanced hybrids then in use in the US. Chapter 4, “The 
Struggle for Corn,” investigates the officials responsible for putting policy into practice in several 
regions, paying particular attention to a case from Ukraine’s Kyiv oblast that mirrored the 
larger, more infamous Riazan affair. Additionally, this chapter calls attention to Lithuania, 
where officials bound by national solidarity worked to create a façade suggesting that they had, 
as ordered, planted corn in place of pastureland that Khrushchev dismissed as mere “grasses” 
unsuitable to industrial farming. In this case, as in others featured in chapters 3 and 4, local 
leaders only created the appearance of compliance, even at the risk of disobeying Moscow’s 
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orders. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 consider labor and society in Soviet agricultural communities, 
demonstrating changes in the importance of material rewards, moral incentives, and coercion. 
The first of these chapters, entitled “The Rhetoric of Corn,” surveys the propaganda campaign, 
capped by Khrushchev’s innumerable speeches that resounded in print and broadcast media. It 
explores how these strategies shaped citizens’ appreciation for the corn crusade as a source of 
material abundance and a campaign worthy of their participation. Chapter 6, “Competing for 
Corn,” uncovers the role of the Komsomol, or Communist Youth League. The organization held 
annual “Competitions of Youth Corn Growers,” in which those in their teens and twenties vied 
for awards, trophies, and prizes.97 In some locales, this generation made the corn crusade their 
own by tending to a majority of corn plantings. By contrast, chapter 7, “The Wages of Corn,” 
sheds light on material incentives—payments in cash or kind that collective farmers earned for 
their work—which Khrushchev enacted to mitigate the Stalin-era exploitation that often left 
peasants unpaid. This chapter highlights the transition from the old system to the new in 
Stavropol krai, offering a portrait of day-to-day life in its unusually large and wealthy farms. 
Khrushchev recognized the challenges he confronted in pursuing reform, what Taubman 
terms “the infernal unreformability of Russia.”98 During a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel 
Castro at the First Secretary’s summer home on the Black Sea coast, Khrushchev explained why 
real improvement proved nearly impossible. Having dreamed up his idea to divide party 
committees into industrial and agricultural sectors during a swim in the vacation home’s pool, 
Khrushchev wrote to the Presidium, giving its members time to consider and modify the 
proposal. He recalled, “A week later, each copy returned without a single change [because] 
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everyone agreed.” Those around him, he implied, did not consider the proposal flawless, but 
refused to risk contradicting him. Yet even good ideas could not achieve much: “In Russia there 
is so much inertia that it is almost impossible to overcome it. You would think that I, as First 
Secretary, could change anything in this country,” Khrushchev lamented. “Like hell I can! No 
matter what reforms I propose or carry out, at bottom, everything stays the same.” He then 
elaborated, developing one of his characteristic metaphors. “Russia is a tub full of dough,” he 
explained, “You put your hand in all the way to the bottom and it seems you are the master of 
the situation. You pull it out and there is a barely noticeable indentation. Then, before your eyes, 
it closes up, leaving only the dough.”99 Khrushchev controlled agricultural policy and faced no 
open challenge to his power; nonetheless, his initiatives fell short of his ambitious aims. Orderly 
administration proved difficult, so he attempted to overhaul administrative practices. Even 
these reforms, however, left Khrushchev with less influence than contemporaries imagined and 
historians have consequently presumed.
                                                        
99 N. S. Leonov, Likholet'e (Moscow: “Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,” 1995), 90. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE LOGIC OF CORN: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDUSTIRAL IDEAL IN GLOBAL 
AGRICULTURE 
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev spent Wednesday, September 23, 1959, on a farm near 
Coon Rapids, Iowa, surveying its cornfields under the watchful eyes of countless eager onlookers 
and a flock of reporters. During previous stops in Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, 
the boisterous Soviet premier had played the tourist, hamming for the media that swarmed him 
throughout his two-week journey across the United States. Among the adventures of “Mr. K” (as 
the press dubbed him) in America, his tour of Hollywood and dashed dreams of a visit to 
Disneyland have secured the greatest renown. Yet on the farm of Roswell “Bob” Garst that day, 
the assembled spectacle of machines, buildings, crops, and animals captivated Khrushchev. 
Laughing and bantering the entire morning, he engrossed himself in the operation of the hybrid-
corn magnate’s farm, from field to feedlot. His survey of that Iowan farm was a sign of an 
interaction possessing great practical significance, and his enthusiasm waned little with the 
passing of years. In his memoirs, he expressed admiration for Garst and his knowhow, “I walked 
around Garst’s farm and was delighted.”1 “I actually had a dual perception of him,” he 
elaborated. “As a capitalist, he was one of my class enemies. As a man who I knew and whose 
guest I was, I treated him with great respect and valued him for his knowledge, his selfless desire 
to share his experience with us.”2 By the time Khrushchev’s powder-blue Cadillac convertible 
sped away, he had satisfied his hunger for the technologies he had come to observe: corn 
                                                        
1 Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 3, Statesman (1953–1964), ed. Sergei N. Khrushchev, trans. 
Stephen Shenfield and George Shriver (University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 141. 
2 Ibid., 3:145. 
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cultivation as an integral component of the industrial ideal dominating American agriculture.3 
Soviet affinity for American farming technology ran deeper than Khrushchev’s visit to 
Garst’s farm that day, or even his interest in corn. Instead, the visit gave form to a longstanding 
dialogue that, as this chapter explains, provided the inspiration for Khrushchev’s crusade to 
spread corn cultivation across the Soviet Union. In the middle of the 1950s, the scheme 
provoked puzzlement among foreign observers, who considered it impracticable due to climatic 
constraints and the crop’s unfamiliarity. After Khrushchev’s fall in October 1964, commentators 
retained those assumptions about the illogic of planting corn in the USSR, and therefore few 
tried to understand the policy. Corn was built into the industrial farming models that spread 
around the world in the mid twentieth century. Emphasizing that these models provided “the 
logic of corn,” this chapter accounts for preexisting practices in the USSR and Khrushchev’s 
authority to define policy. In addition to giving the corn crusade its rationale, industrial farming 
principles provided the common thread tying together his agricultural reforms. Recent 
scholarship on those reforms regards them as a domestic issue, rather than a component of 
transnational developments.4 From the famous Virgin Lands campaign to less familiar 
initiatives to apply genetics, chemistry, engineering, and other knowledge to production, 
Khrushchev’s initiatives drew on an industrial ideal guiding foreign, especially American 
agriculture. I position agriculture alongside recent scholarship connecting Soviet culture, 
consumption, media, and technology to pan-European and global developments. Khrushchev’s 
USSR did not remain isolated behind a physical or intellectual “Iron Curtain,” but instead 
                                                        
3 Details of the trip, including the Cadillac the local chamber of commerce provided Khrushchev, appeared 
in the contemporary American press accounts summarized in a recent popular book. See: Peter Carlson, K 
Blows Top, 208. 
4  A small literature examines these links’ origins. The most significant is: Deborah Fitzgerald, Every 
Farm a Factory. For others, see: Kendall E. Bailes, "The American Connection: Ideology and the Transfer 
of American Technology to the Soviet Union, 1917–1941," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, 
no. 3 (1981): 421–48; and Dana G. Dalrymple, "The American Tractor Comes to Soviet Agriculture: The 
Transfer of a Technology," Technology and Culture 5, no. 2 (1964): 191–214. 
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inhabited a matrix of intrasystemic exchange.5 
That matrix included agricultural technologies and practices, as the Soviet Union 
developed both corn and industrial farming in a dialogue with kindred tendencies spanning the 
globe. Farmers gained productivity in a range of social, political, and climatic contexts—first in 
the United States and then in Europe in the postwar period. Farmers came to rely on “the whole 
package of modernity,” the irrigation, chemicals, fertilizers, educational outreach, technology, 
scientific knowledge, and the capital—in the form of credit—necessary to acquire these 
innovations.6 These also reached the Third World in this period. Although “the Green 
Revolution” acquired its name only at the end of the 1960s, it began as early as 1943, when the 
Rockefeller Foundation started the Mexican Agricultural Program. Initial efforts investigated 
hybrid corn’s suitability to Mexican conditions and collected the country’s many unique corn 
landraces. Researchers more successfully developed dwarf wheat varieties, for which American 
Norman Borlaug won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970.7 For decades an importer of grain, by 1958 
Mexico had used these new wheat cultivars to achieve self-sufficiency.8 States and 
nongovernmental agencies, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, put this suite of technologies in 
the hands of farmers in Latin America and in Asia, and to a lesser extent in Africa. Farmers in 
India adapted the wheat varieties beginning in 1961, providing a showpiece of the Green 
                                                        
5 György Péteri, "Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of 
State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe," Slavonica 10, no. 2 (2004): 113–23. 
6 Noël Kingsbury, Hybrid: The History and Science of Plant Breeding (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), 289. 
7 Ibid., 292. These dwarf wheat varieties solved a problem stemming, paradoxically, from conditions too 
favorable and yields that had become too high: on land fertilized, irrigated, mechanically cultivated, and 
treated with chemical herbicides and pesticides, existing high-yielding varieties failed because their tall, 
thin straw could not support a head of grain made too heavy by the higher yield that these ideal conditions 
enabled. When the grain neared maturity, the plant became susceptible to “lodging”: the straw collapsed, 
leaving the head on the ground and the grain ruined. Breeders solved the problem by crossbreeding 
varieties that best took advantage of the ideal conditions with dwarf varieties—those with strong straws 
only two-thirds the normal height—which researchers located in Japan after World War II. This process 
began in a breeding program at the University of Washington, which provided raw material for Borlaug’s 
breeding programs in Mexico in the 1950s. Ibid., 278–79. 
8 Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution, 115. 
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Revolution. By the 1966–67 growing season, the improved wheat covered 504,000 hectares in 
that country.9 Its wheat harvest nearly doubled in four years, reaching twenty-three million 
tons, providing the chronically undernourished country the food security that pessimists had 
considered impossible a few years before.10 Similarly, professional breeders identified and 
utilized dwarfing genes that permitted rice-growers in East and South Asia to reap benefits from 
fertilizer and irrigation. They transformed Africa’s sorghum into a dryland feed crop favored in 
the western reaches of North America’s Great Plains. 
Although scholars have devoted attention to the Green Revolution and its Cold War 
context, they have rarely considered the USSR. Yet its American backers saw agricultural-
development programs as a safeguard against Soviet alternatives and communist-inspired 
insurrections in rural areas. The USSR aggressively pursued many of these technologies, 
developing new varieties of wheat and other crops, expanding irrigation systems, and adopting 
new crops such as corn, rice, and sorghum. Soviet efforts contributed to the Cold War contest of 
development models, meaning that any analysis of global agriculture that leaves the USSR in the 
background misses vital motivations for and influences on efforts to feed humanity. 
To locate the USSR in that global history, I draw on secondary literature situating the 
corn crusade and industrial principles within the history of the Soviet project. Subsequently, I 
turn to published sources and archival documents to analyze how agricultural planners utilized 
those technological and policy templates. In particular, I examine a delegation of Soviet officials 
that reopened contacts severed during the Cold War’s intense initial phase by touring North 
America in 1955. Surveying Khrushchev’s speeches, selected memoirs, publications, and 
documents from Communist Party and government archives, I reveal how officials came to 
                                                        
9 Kingsbury, Hybrid, 300. 
10 For a more thorough analysis of the fears of overpopulation and chronic famine, as well as the case of 
India, see: Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution, especially chapter 6, “Hunger, Overpopulation, 
and National Security,” and chapter 8, “Wheat Breeding and the Consolidation of Indian Autonomy, 
1940–1970.” 
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regard corn as an important feed crop and conceived a shift in the doctrines guiding agriculture. 
Emphasizing the concepts motivating agricultural policies, I discern long-term trends rather 
than the day-to-day changes of Khrushchev’s speeches or policies. For the same reason, I 
concentrate on the words, views, and experiences of the Soviet leader and the small circle of 
advisors surrounding him. Official print media repeated and amplified the messages these 
officials conveyed in spoken and written word due to the party and government’s monopoly on 
mass communication. Thus the leaders’ words dominated newspapers and simultaneously 
established the themes of their content. 
Soviet leaders focused on the US because of its preeminence in applying the methods of 
industrial agriculture and America’s longstanding centrality in their worldview. The US 
performed a threefold role as model, benchmark, and competitor. First, portrayals of the other 
superpower described a society possessing advanced technology that Soviet industry and 
agriculture might borrow. This evaluation encouraged exchange of agricultural delegations such 
as the one that visited America in 1955. Second, Soviet authorities measured their country’s 
successes against the rival system, which, as they acknowledged, possessed advanced technology 
and afforded some citizens a comfortable standard of living. Khrushchev promised and earnestly 
attempted to provide similar comforts to Soviet citizens. Simultaneously, Soviet depictions 
contrasted American capitalism with the USSR’s socialism, claiming that poverty, oppression, 
joblessness, and racism were inherent in a capitalist society. The range of characteristics 
ascribed to America may appear paradoxical. The country could embody all of them only 
because these perceptions encompassed both the actual United States and the America 
constructed by Soviet discourses about the competitor’s society, culture, economy, science, and 
technology. 11 In this chapter, I strive to distinguish between American society, culture, economy, 
                                                        
11 Examining Cold War era technology and mobility, historian György Péteri has drawn attention how 
societies articulate identities in spatial terms: not only “East” and “West,” but “ahead” and “behind,” 
“within” and “without.” Péteri, “Introduction,” 2. Such a division, he argues, made it feasible for Soviet 
thinkers to ban social ills from their own country and ascribe them to the competitor. Anthropologist 
Alexei Yurchak has explored how the coding that had existed under Stalin and Khrushchev switched, as 
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and agriculture, and the corresponding Soviet images of them, which often diverged. 
* * * 
The Soviet Union participated in global developments in food and agriculture, which 
paralleled transnational links in science, technology, and culture.12 Disputing the preconceived 
notion of an impermeable “Iron Curtain” and reconceiving it as one made instead of nylon, 
historian György Péteri contends that the nylon stocking symbolizes the divergence in the 
quantity and variety of goods consumers could acquire, but also that it indicates how the curtain 
was more porous and translucent than heretofore presumed.13 The curtain’s penetrable nature 
permitted technology, goods, and ideas to circumvent barriers erected during the campaigns 
against foreign influences that accompanied the Cold War’s most intense stage (1947–53).14 In 
the Khrushchev era, Soviet society entered a new phase of interaction with the technology and 
culture of the US and the world.15 Soviet readers devoured Ernest Hemingway’s novels in 
Russian translation, while moviegoers flocked to see Yul Brynner on the big screen in The 
                                                        
Brezhnev-era Soviet society apparently succumbed to sclerosis. This endowed the western “other” with 
positive associations, while negative ones accumulated around the Soviet “ours.” Yurchak, Everything 
Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2006). 
12 Scholars have argued for positioning the USSR in pan-European and international contexts in the 
interwar period. See: Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and Interwar Conjuncture,” 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2, no. 1 (2001): 111–64; and David L. Hoffman, 
Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003), 7. More recently, Michael David-Fox has urged a far-reaching reconsideration of the trope of 
“Russia and the West” in the Soviet period. David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural 
Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
13 Péteri, "Nylon Curtain,” 114. 
14 For a study of this phenomenon’s influence on material culture, see: Greg Castillo, Cold War on the 
Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
Kristen Roth-Ey has recently examined post-Stalin Soviet media in this broader, global perspective. Roth-
Ey, Moscow Prime Time. For more on the roots of Soviet views of technology and tendency to draw on 
Western European and especially American applications, see: “Introduction: Tractors, Steel Mills, 
Concrete, and Other Joys of Socialism,” 3–17 in Josephson, Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth? 
15 Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 198. 
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Magnificent Seven.16 Youthful Texan Van Cliburn captivated Muscovite audiences in 1958 with 
virtuoso performances of piano concertos by Tchaikovsky and Rachmaninoff. By the 1960s, blue 
jeans and the Beatles found popularity among Soviet youth.17 
Increasing contact with the world in the 1950s combined with the Cold War competition 
to make material conditions within the USSR critical to Soviet goals. Stressing material culture, 
consumption, and living standards, or “byt” in Russian, historians have argued that these 
characteristics were integral to how socialist societies functioned, rather than being flaws that 
doomed them to fail.18 They contend that many Soviet citizens under Khrushchev considered 
socialism a better path to development, sustaining faith in its principles and promise.19 
Historian Susan Reid maintains that the scarcity of consumer goods did not ensure the USSR’s 
dissolution, as some observers suggested. Instead, authorities managed citizens’ shopping habits 
and purchases, permitting state socialism to survive as long as it did. Khrushchev chose material 
living standards as an arena for contesting the struggle between systems, demonstrating his 
                                                        
16 Vail' and Genis, Shestidesiatye, 53. 
17 For more on access to foreign culture and goods, see: Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral 
History of Russia's Cold War Generation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), especially chapter 3, 
"Unconscious Agents of Change," 120–67. 
18 During and after the Cold War, scholars contrasted the living standards prevalent under Soviet-style 
socialism and under capitalism, contending that these proved the superiority of the latter. This only 
intensified in light of many socialist systems’ dissolution between 1989 and 1991. Since then, historians 
have reevaluated consumption as an object for study, synthesizing strains examining production and 
political concerns on the one hand with those appraising “culture for culture’s sake,” on the other. See, for 
example: Crowley and Reid, eds., Style and Socialism. 
19 Historian Vladislav Zubok supports the claim that intensified contact and Soviet citizens’ resultant 
ability to compare their lived reality to that which they viewed abroad, in person or indirectly through film 
and literature, resulted in a sense of inferiority. Zubok, Failed Empire, 176. Susan E. Reid challenges 
assumptions that Soviet citizens automatically responded to images of American abundance in this way. 
Acknowledging the anonymous comments’ numerous methodological pitfalls, Reid analyzes reactions 
citizens wrote in books made available to attendees of the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 
1959, the site of the famous “Kitchen Debate” between Khrushchev and Vice-President Richard M. Nixon. 
She suggests that citizens did not consider their reality deficient because it lacked the consumer comforts 
that the exhibition represented as their American counterparts’ norm. Instead, the responses reveal 
commitment to Soviet ideals and promises of future abundance. Conceding that variance in living 
standards influenced the Cold War’s outcome, she convincingly asserts that events such as the exhibition 
did not preordain the result. Reid, "Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American 
National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9, no. 4 
(2008): 855–904. 
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confidence, but also acceptance of the capitalist world’s measurements of success. His decision 
to declare the socialist model an alternative, ostensibly superior version of “modernity” and “the 
good life” offered potentially great rewards; however, incompletely fulfilling his pledge to “catch 
up with and overtake America” risked the system’s legitimacy.20 The USSR might live up to 
socialist ideals, prove its superiority to capitalism, and fashion the communist future only when 
its citizens enjoyed conditions superior to those available to their American counterparts. 
The approach Khrushchev chose for revitalizing Soviet agriculture was part of his effort 
to prove to the world that socialism offered a preferable model for economic development. 
Lenin’s writings had ensured that the US represented the USSR’s competitor, a tenet of 
Bolshevik ideology reinforced by Stalinist propaganda.21 In the late 1930s and again during the 
height of the Cold War in the late 1940s, propaganda gave free rein to anti-Western sentiments 
and assertions of the USSR’s preeminence. Soviet authorities boasted that the USSR had 
bypassed the conflicts inherent in capitalism, which they characterized as a lesser stage of 
historical development. Throughout the Khrushchev period, Soviet propaganda called attention 
to racism, as well as gender and class stratification, in the US and Western Europe. Despite 
more positive portrayals of the West between 1955 and 1964, the Soviet press reminded 
audiences that colonial powers oppressed subaltern peoples, Jim Crow laws enforced 
segregation in the American South, minorities experienced everyday discrimination nationwide, 
the jobless faced their plight alone, and working-class Americans struggled to make ends meet 
even in the citadel of capitalist plenty. 
Scholarship on Soviet consumption has generally privileged material goods over food, 
but Khrushchev’s ambitions heightened the importance of both in foreign and domestic affairs. 
Under Stalin, authorities had attempted to provide a few luxuries as harbingers of future 
                                                        
20 Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the 
Soviet Union under Khrushchev," Slavic Review 61, no. 2 (2002), 212–13. See also: Katherine Verdery, 
What Was Socialism and What Comes Next? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 26–28. 
21 See: Ball, Imagining America, especially chapter 5, “Catch and Surpass,” 145–76. 
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abundance in light of general scarcity.22 In the postwar years, diets had been meager and cities 
swelled as millions crowded in, giving rise to fears of protest and unrest. Khrushchev, in contrast 
to Stalin, aimed to put three square meals a day on the nation’s collective table. He proposed to 
expand food production by cultivating corn and feeding it to livestock, raising output of meat, 
milk, and eggs. Soviet sources constantly emphasized the significance of food in efforts to 
improve living standards, equating this task with the advance toward communism. Khrushchev 
reminded audiences that only abundant food supplies could prove unequivocally that the USSR 
had transitioned from Stalinist socialism to the ideal society. For instance, he described how 
“the struggle for high yields of wheat and corn, for higher production of meat, milk, wool and 
other agricultural products” formed a constituent part of “the construction of communism.”23 
Although borrowed in part from capitalist models, corn and industrial farming provided the 
means for progress to a higher stage of socioeconomic development. 
Needed to best capitalist rivals and maintain stability at home, supplies of meat and 
dairy products required livestock feed, which Khrushchev believed corn could provide. 
Americans had long eaten more of these foods than Russians, a gap that had expanded after the 
war as industrial agriculture boosted productivity and drove down prices in the US.24 
                                                        
22 Stalin transformed the USSR into a society where a worker could afford champagne, but only if she 
could locate the rarity. Geist concludes that the first editions of the seminal Stalinist cookbook, the Book 
about Delicious and Healthy Food conveyed a socialist-realist representation of food. The foods on the 
book’s pages—caviar and champagne, to name two—were “often merely incidental to the cultural and 
ideological objectives of Socialist Realism” and consequently had “little bearing on reality.” Geist, 
“Cooking Bolshevik,” 3. The resulting cuisine, he concludes, reflected the personal intervention of A. I. 
Mikoian, Soviet minster of trade, which produced an “eclectic fusion of prerevolutionary Russian 
bourgeois cuisine, ‘scientific’ nutrition, and American industrial models.” This last included the hot dogs 
and ice cream with which Mikoian had returned from the United States in the 1930s. Ibid., 20. For more 
about the social and political significance of food as consumption, see: Gronow, Caviar with Champagne. 
23 N. S. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva, vol. 5 (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1963), 258. 
24 This forced the government to intervene by organizing export of the surplus, causing global prices to 
fall. Warman addresses this issue in depth, exploring the global effects of Public Law 480, which was 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s response to this problem. He concludes that, rather than improving 
living standards in the emerging Third World, imports simply compounded these countries’ dependence 
by altering patterns of production and consumption to the point that the newly independent countries lost 
their faculty to feed themselves. Warman, Corn and Capitalism, 188—89. Soviet authorities noted both 
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Khrushchev praised corn for its potential to similarly lift Soviet output. Although his speeches 
frequently incorporated iconic phrases, few became more momentous than his pledge “to catch 
up with and overtake the United States in per capita production of meat, milk, eggs, and butter.” 
He repeated this slogan throughout the period, first announcing it in 1955 while speaking to 
agricultural workers gathered in the city of Voronezh.25 Khrushchev typically stated only that 
this landmark event would occur “in the coming years.” In early 1957, however, he ridiculed the 
target offered by economists, 1975, and overoptimistically boasted that the USSR would achieve 
parity in only two or three years’ time.26 The slogan pushed agricultural managers and workers 
to intensify production, and featured in the Third Party Program adopted in 1961, which 
promised communism by 1980. As succeeding years’ results made this promise ring hollow, 
however, Khrushchev’s impertinence became a focal point for popular dissatisfaction, 
delegitimizing his leadership and contributing to his fall from power. Soviet leaders realized that 
the claim that socialism was superior would convince no one if the USSR could not feed and 
clothe its own people. 
The USSR funded projects that demonstrated a socialist alternative to the former 
colonial powers’ capitalist economies.27 In early 1955, Khrushchev encapsulated the Soviet 
position by recounting how K. Tursunkulov, chairman of a model collective farm in Uzbekistan, 
had told him of a visitor from India. Having inspected the farm’s fields, facilities, social services, 
                                                        
the surpluses and the American government’s responses. RGAE, f. 7486, op. 22, d. 88, l. 59. 
25 N. S. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva, vol. 2 (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1962), 59. 
26 Some historians have given the impression that this slogan became public only in 1957, as part of the 
political crisis that broke out that year. For example, see: Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 
110. Although Khrushchev’s inclusion of specific target year in the 1957 speech in Leningrad was the most 
important statement for intraparty politics, the idea of competition and the mission to “catch up with and 
overtake” the US predated that speech and even the Khrushchev era. For the details and political 
consequences of the boast Khrushchev made in Leningrad, see:  Taubman, Khrushchev, 305–6. 
27 Roy and Zhores Medvedev conclude that Khrushchev’s reforms reflected a desire to portray the USSR as 
a model to new nations of Africa and Asia, in particular India and Indonesia, for not only industrial put 
agricultural planning and production. Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 57. 
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and living spaces, the Indian began to weep. Khrushchev continued, “Comrade Tursunkulov 
inquired about what had disturbed the guest. ‘These are tears of joy in my eyes,’ the man 
answered, ‘for your rich and happy life, and tears of bitterness for the millions of impoverished 
and wretched people of the capitalist countries.’”28 The audience—Soviet agricultural workers, 
rather than foreign visitors—suggests one of Khrushchev’s purposes: to motivate leaders and 
laborers to work harder and produce more, not only for their own good, but to realize the 
USSR’s potential and provide convincing evidence for his argument. 
Making USSR a model for socialist development and equality that Third World countries 
should emulate, Khrushchev contrasted socialism with capitalism, wracked by unemployment 
and inequality. This appeal, and the economic and technical aid that accompanied it, became 
possible only after the USSR abandoned the indifference Stalin showed toward India after it 
gained independence in 1947. Relations warmed after 1953, culminating in Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s trip to Moscow in June 1955 and Khrushchev’s visit to India that 
November.29 Reversing Stalin’s stance, Soviet leaders then accepted the possibility of alternative 
paths to socialism, and extended sums amounting to one quarter of all Soviet aid to the Third 
World during these years.30  
Agriculture, and corn especially, became part of the Cold War’s competition between 
systems. The USSR scored major successes in science and technology, as its engineers achieved 
public relations coups such as the launch of Sputnik. Khrushchev staked his authority and Soviet 
prestige on these visible triumphs and therefore required a steady stream of them. To reach 
heavily publicized goals to provide a rich and varied diet, he needed a revolution in agricultural 
                                                        
28 Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 2:38–39. 
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Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1999), 26–27. 
30 Ibid., 65. This opening also expanded to encompass cultural phenomena, including nearly two hundred 
Indian popular films, the products of Bollywood, between 1954 and 1991. Historian Sudha Rajagopalan 
documents their enormous popularity among the Soviet filmgoers. Rajagopalan, Indian Films in Soviet 
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output. Turning to the United States for a model, he found it in the industrial ideal in 
agriculture. 
* * * 
The corn crusade and the agricultural practices Khrushchev promoted even before he 
inspected Garst’s farm in 1959 demonstrated Soviet commitment to what historian Deborah 
Fitzgerald terms “the industrial ideal in American agriculture.” In Every Farm a Factory, she 
investigates how, after World War I, American engineers and entrepreneurs developed these 
principles and the associated technologies, especially machines, rural infrastructure, commodity 
markets, migrant labor, and bank loans. These combined with “capital, raw materials, 
transportation networks, communication systems, and newly trained technical experts,” all of 
which brought features of “the modern mass production factory and industrial board room” to 
agricultural production.31  Output of the most marketable produce at the lowest cost replaced 
alternative priorities, such as preserving soil, water, local self-sufficiency, biological diversity, 
cultures, and rural social institutions. 
Bolshevik ideology and early Soviet practices made the US a prototype for farms and 
factories in the USSR. Following the Russian Revolution, some planners embraced Frederick 
Winslow Taylor’s time-motion organization of production and the management techniques of 
Henry Ford, industrial philosophies that merged into a catchall “Americanism.”32 Soviet critics 
charged that capitalist origins imbued them with an exploitative character. Advocates 
maintained that capitalist technology was the most advanced and that socialist conditions would 
rectify any problems resulting from their parent society, riven with class tension.33 Bolshevik 
                                                        
31 Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory, 3–5. 
32 Bailes, "American Connection,” 427. See also: "Introduction: Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth?" 19–63 
in Josephson, Would Trotsky Wear a Bluetooth? and Ball, Imagining America. 
33 Stites, Revolutionary Dreams, 146–49. Stites situates socialist intellectuals’ commitment to these 
philosophies within Russians’ long tradition of seeking solutions for perceived backwardness in foreign 
methods and ideologies. One cult of Ford developed among urban intellectuals, who saw the American 
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convictions held that technology was a set of “value-neutral” tools, invariably more productive 
under socialism than under capitalism. Soviet building projects initiated during the First Five-
Year Plan between 1928 and 1932—including a gigantic steelworks at Magnitogorsk and a 
modern automobile factory in Gorkii—borrowed American technology, designs, and expertise.34 
During the 1920s when domestic machine-building capacity remained nascent, the USSR 
imported the majority of its farm machines from the United States.35 When after 1928 the Soviet 
Union began to produce tractors, the new factories used plans, housed machine tools, and 
employed workers all from America to produce copies of American models.36 Nonetheless, the 
nonindustrial methods of most Soviet farming during that period and Bolshevik ideology’s 
preference for industry ensured that—with a few exceptions—agriculture received less attention 
and investment.37 
At the end of the 1920s, promoters of industrial farming practices spread them to the 
USSR. Soviet agricultural planners drew inspiration from American models and invited 
Americans to the USSR to establish demonstration farms, illustrating what Fitzgerald labels “the 
transfer mentality.”38 This concept encouraged experts on both sides to ignore local differences 
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On the other hand, peasants counted Ford—the man whose name graced their new tractors—among the 
heroes of the Revolution. For more on an opponent of these doctrines, P. A. Palchinskii, see: Loren 
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in farming practices and in conditions, whether on America’s Great Plains or in Russia’s North 
Caucasus, instead concentrating on those that appeared similar, and therefore subject to the 
same technological formulas. Fitzgerald concludes that this “rationalizing activity” generated an 
analytical approach that made devotees of industrial methods consider them “transferable to 
other countries in what became known as the Green Revolution.” Beginning in 1928, Soviet 
leaders turned to American experts, machinery, and organizational techniques to grow wheat on 
gigantic state farms in the sparsely populated North Caucasus.39 Conditions there approximated 
those of the farms in Montana where the initial experiments with industrial wheat production 
had taken place. The Americans had little more than a decade’s experience with the machines 
and organizational techniques, but Soviet authorities contracted with them to procure 
machinery, provide training, and establish industrial-scale farms that dwarfed all others, 
including the American templates. Profit and curiosity, rather than sympathy for Soviet dreams 
of building socialism, motivated these Americans, who numbered between 1,000 and 2,000.40 
Quitting the USSR for good when the contracts expired in 1932, these engineers and managers 
nonetheless left behind working farms employing advanced practices. The number of these 
gigantic farms remained small and they applied industrial farming methods mostly to planting 
wheat, rather than progressively to wider areas of production, as American farmers did. 
Nonetheless, when Khrushchev took charge of Soviet agriculture, he could nurture these 
precursors of industrial practice. 
To a large extent, Soviet leaders’ affinity for industrial methods stemmed from 
ideological preferences for a modernity characterized by technological panaceas, factory 
organization, and human mastery over nature. They considered natural conditions variables 
that humans might manipulate to their benefit. Environmental historian Douglas Weiner 
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40 Ibid., 157. 
  47
maintains that, especially by the Stalin era, Soviet thinkers considered nature an object to 
“conquer,” one to be “transformed and bent to human will—from the roots up.”41 This 
“promethean” spirit in Soviet ideology emphasized large-scale transformations of nature. Even if 
Soviet leaders never achieved their most ambitious schemes, this creed maintained its influence 
through the era of L. I. Brezhnev (1964–82).42 Although distinct from Stalin-era industrial 
forerunners, initiatives such as Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands campaign drew on those projects’ 
model of mass mobilization and “pointed to the state’s sustained interest in extending its control 
over nature.”43 The gigantic state farms established in Kazakhstan and Siberia utilized the 
methods for mechanized, industrial cultivation that the USSR adapted from America.44 They 
incompletely adopted anti-erosion plowing methods, including those observed on North 
America’s Great Plains in 1955, and managed soil fertility poorly. Consequently, the semiarid 
steppe’s productivity fell as winds carried away the irreplaceable topsoil, accumulated over 
centuries. These lands remained productive, but dependent on weather conditions that caused 
harvests to fluctuate from year to year, making them comparable in output to dryland farms in 
North America and Australia.45 Despite serious environmental challenges, the farms in the 
former Virgin Lands continue to produce significant harvests of wheat today.46 
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Agriculture is humanity’s most direct interaction with nature, and technology provides 
tools useful for structuring that relationship.47 During the nineteenth century and increasingly 
in the twentieth, developing practices reshaped farming in the industrializing world. New 
resources and novel technologies transformed traditional “closed” systems into “open” ones 
dependent on capital and technology.48 During the Khrushchev era, the Soviet Union invested 
considerable resources in factories to “fix” nitrogen, producing the fertilizer needed for “open” 
farming systems, a process in which Soviet capacity lagged behind capabilities of the United 
States and Western Europe. This innovation, although slower to arrive in the USSR, embodied 
the Soviet version of applying technology to farming. 
The scope of Khrushchev’s commitment to industrial farming indicated an accelerating 
advance in applying these technologies on Soviet farms compared to the Stalin period. During 
the 1930s, in addition to state farms, the USSR had established thousands of machine-tractor 
stations (mashinno-traktornye stantsii, MTSs) that parceled out machinery and trained 
agricultural specialists to the collective farms. Violent collectivization of peasant farms across 
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the country permitted the state to collect grain procurements through the MTS, achieving 
Stalin’s goal of control only at great cost to rural economies and communities. He predicted that 
combining peasant smallholders’ farms, livestock, and equipment would allow mechanization 
and economies of scale by creating large collectives.49 Although by global standards collective 
farms could access substantial machinery and capital, they remained insufficient to realizing 
modernist visions of industrial-scale production. The state and party invested too little time, 
attention, and resources to the collective farms, undermining benefits that might have accrued 
from actually applying industrial principles. 
After 1953, reforms made farms able to put industrial principles into wider use. 
Disbanding the MTSs in 1958 and forcing the collective farms to purchase machinery 
themselves, Khrushchev hoped the farms would efficiently use the increasing number of tractors 
and laborsaving implements.50 The industrial ideal also encouraged his fixation on corn as a 
panacea for the afflictions of agriculture. Renewed contacts with the US spurred Soviet officials 
to adopt technologies applicable to planting, cultivating, and harvesting corn and other row 
crops; applying synthetic fertilizers; employing chemical pesticides; developing high-yielding 
hybrid seeds; and putting those seeds into production. In the second half of the 1950s, 
technological solutions to problems in corn production transformed it on Soviet farms from a 
labor-intensive niche crop limited to southern regions into, at least on paper, one at the center 
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of a modern, mechanized system of industrial farming. Although implemented by Soviet farms 
difficulty, the technologies defined Soviet policy. Khrushchev transformed preexisting 
aspirations into guidelines for practice to such a degree that industrial farming methods took 
hold, expanding their reach even after his removal from power in 1964. Although his policies 
achieved uneven results, the reasonably coherent fashion in which they embodied the industrial 
ideal demonstrates the allegiance that he and his supporters owed to these global trends. 
This commitment to industrial farming competed with alternative visions for organizing 
agriculture that had enjoyed official backing under Stalin. Soviet soil scientists developed the 
“grassfield,” or travopol'e system of land management, which became universal as part of 
Stalin’s policy. Preferring intensively managed “closed” systems of crop rotations incorporating 
legumes to maintain soil fertility and on plowing regimes to improve soil structure, that system 
compensated for shortfalls in organic and synthetic fertilizers, as well as machines, all necessary 
to implement high-input “open” systems of industrial agriculture. Considering the methods 
orthodox under Stalin incapable of achieving his goals, Khrushchev zealously rooted them out. 
As early as 1954, he charged, “On a number of state farms the land is used for grasses, which 
means that practically [the farms] are planting nothing. There are a lot of grasses, but no 
livestock feed. This means it is necessary to plant not grass, but corn, wheat, and similar crops, 
which produce more.”51 He argued that rotations had to fit local climatic conditions, a contrast 
to his demands for almost indiscriminant expansion of corn to every region. This call to 
eliminate grasses reflected his devotion to industrial farming. He insisted that Soviet farms had 
to apply synthetic fertilizers and chemical herbicides to improve productivity, allowing farms to 
grow high yields of corn where clover and hay, requiring low inputs of labor and yielding modest 
harvests, had once reigned. Deeply integrated in industrial farming in America, corn thrived 
where chemicals have eradicated pests and synthetic nitrogen has eliminated constraints on 
fertility. Choosing industrial agriculture, Khrushchev reinforced his own preferences and 
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replicated practices Soviet experts observed in America as early as 1955.52 
In the Soviet case, the selection of corn to provide feed was a political rather than a 
technocratic choice, in which Khrushchev’s influence proved decisive. The exact moment he 
became acquainted with the crop is unclear, but it long predated 1953. He claimed in his 
memoirs that his first encounter with it occurred as a child in his home village, located in what 
was then the Russian Empire’s Kursk province. His grandmother and her fellow peasants raised 
corn in kitchen gardens, serving the ears as a summertime delicacy.53 Khrushchev spent his 
youth and young-adult years in Ukraine, where duties as a skilled worker, Red Army soldier, and 
party organizer in the Donbas industrial region kept him detached from agriculture. In his 
memoirs, he only remarked that corn grew near the metallurgical plant where he worked.54 
Khrushchev’s first exposure to corn as a field crop likely occurred in Ukraine in the late 
1930s. While Khrushchev was away climbing the ranks of the Moscow city party organization in 
the early 1930s, the government supported limited research on corn and halting efforts to 
promote the crop, which achieved little.55 In 1937, after eight years in Moscow, Khrushchev 
became responsible for farms when he returned to Ukraine to serve as Stalin’s satrap. There, 
Khrushchev absorbed information about corn’s potential by observing researchers and collective 
farmers in the fields. Drawing on interviews with Khrushchev’s personal agricultural advisor 
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A. S. Shevchenko, an advocate for corn, historian Anatolii Strelianyi writes that the future 
leader’s friend and collaborator A. I. Mikoian informed him of corn’s importance as food and 
animal feed in the United States in the late 1930s, following a visit as part of his duties as 
minister of trade.56 Strelianyi explains that Khrushchev fully converted to corn after Ukraine 
saved itself in 1949 from a repeat of the crop failures in 1946–47 by replacing wheat killed by 
frost and drought with nearly 2 million hectares of corn, which allowed the republic to meet 
Stalin’s crushing grain procurement quota.57 That year, corn fulfilled its longstanding role for 
peasants in the region as a crop of last resort.58 
Returning to Moscow in late 1949 as a devoted advocate for corn, Khrushchev assumed a 
position in the Central Committee’s halls of power as one of a handful of secretaries, as well as 
leader of the city’s influential party organization. He valued corn enough that he badgered local 
collective farms into planting the crop, previously unfamiliar in Moscow oblast. Political 
competition and conflicts over agricultural policy with G. M. Malenkov, a rival for Stalin’s favor 
and for control over agricultural policy, restrained Khrushchev’s ambitions until after the 
despot’s death.59 Khrushchev considered himself more attuned to agriculture and the needs of 
the downtrodden peasantry. Moreover, his experience with corn and knowledge of foreign 
practices convinced him of the crop’s potential as a source of livestock feed, shortages of which 
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had constrained plans to improve animal husbandry developed at the end of the Stalin period.60 
The corn crusade did not fully take root until 1955, but Khrushchev highlighted the 
potential of corn as a feed crop in early remarks about agriculture, including a speech to the 
Central Committee plenum in September 1953. “It is not accidental that corn has become 
widespread in a host of countries with advanced animal husbandry,” he reported. “Yet in the 
USSR, even in regions where corn grows best, it occupies an extremely small area.” He 
reprimanded the assembled party leaders, especially those from Ukraine and other southern 
regions for the falling hectarage of corn and their lagging attentiveness to it.61 He referred to the 
US only implicitly, but in February 1954, he insisted to a gathering of state-farm workers that 
they should plant more corn because American counterparts did: corn plantings in the USSR 
amounted to only 3.6 percent of arable land, while in the US that figure was 36 percent.62 
The abundance Khrushchev envisioned required not incremental growth in agricultural 
output, but a leap forward on the basis of corn. The USSR had witnessed production revolutions 
in industry during the five-year plans of the 1930s, but Khrushchev now wanted to master corn, 
plow up the Virgin Lands, provide more machines, use more fertilizer, and quickly reap rewards 
of more meat, milk, eggs, butter, and other desirable foods. Given world trends in agriculture 
and prior transformations achieved under the Soviet system, Khrushchev’s faith in a rapid and 
thorough transformation of Soviet agriculture through rocketing growth appears less 
“harebrained” and more sensible. 
* * * 
To achieve these goals, the Soviet experts sought the required technologies and methods 
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in the American Corn Belt, especially the state of Iowa. Soviet scientists and engineers examined 
American models that proved specific industrial farming techniques’ feasibility. A delegation of 
Soviet agricultural authorities sent to the United States in the summer of 1955 established ties 
that developed into sustained contact.63 Additionally, in 1959, Khrushchev saw American 
agriculture for himself during his visit to the US, and to Iowa. He furthermore sustained a 
decade-long friendship with Bob Garst, the man whom Taubman dubbed the Soviet leader’s 
“guru” on all things related to corn, but who promoted industrial farming in general.64 
Soviet experts had scant information about developments in American agriculture 
between 1935 and 1955. In the autumn of 1955, at his first meeting with Khrushchev, Garst 
asked why Soviet leaders knew so little about American practices, information freely available in 
any farm journal, when they had stolen secrets about nuclear weapons programs. Bursting into 
laughter, Khrushchev replied, “You locked up the atomic bomb, so we had to steal it. When you 
offered us information about agriculture for nothing, we thought that might be what it was 
worth.”65 Their lack of knowledge was actually a consequence of geopolitical and ideological 
conflict. After the enthusiasm of the 1920s and the First Five-Year Plan, direct ties with the US 
and Americans experts working in the USSR became rare.66 Soviet trade, scientific, and 
technical delegations visited the US sporadically before 1947, primarily in concert with the 
wartime alliance. Intense antiforeign sentiment in the USSR and anticommunism in the USS 
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that accompanied the Cold War’s deepest chill brought these exchanges to a halt. After Stalin’s 
death, in response to relaxation signaled by a summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955, reciprocal 
agricultural delegations renewed contacts, which quickly expanded to encompass parallel 
technical, educational, and cultural delegations.67 
The status of the officials and specialists from the USSR Ministry of Agriculture that 
made up the delegation indicated the gravity that Soviet authorities assigned to the exchange. 
Deputy Minister—soon to become Minister—V. V. Matskevich headed it, and it included 
Khrushchev’s personal agricultural advisor A. S. Shevchenko, corn-breeder B. P. Sokolov, and 
nine other engineers, scientists, and administrators. In the winter of 1955, the editors of The Des 
Moines Register learned that Khrushchev had praised corn and extended an unofficial invitation 
to Soviet experts. The State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded an 
agreement to exchange this delegation of Soviet officials for one to the USSR comprised of 
American private citizens. The Soviet officials’ journey took them from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific, and they subsequently stopped in several Canadian provinces. They nonetheless focused 
on the Corn Belt, especially Iowa. They visited farms, agricultural colleges, private companies, 
factories manufacturing machines, and other institutions that provided the organizational and 
technical support for industrial farming. They met with farmers, professors, engineers, 
corporate executives, political leaders, and many others. The delegation’s predeparture 
objectives included studying land management, animal husbandry, machinery, and research 
practices.68 In each sphere, they found industrial farming the guiding principle and corn the 
primary crop. They were also fascinated by features of American culture, society, and daily life, 
from the political climate to soda fountains. 
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Examining American farming practices, society, and economics, the Soviet specialists 
juxtaposed those conditions and Soviet equivalents, reinforcing their preconceived notions 
about America and their own country. Consequently, they noted with envy American farmers’ 
practical techniques, while accentuating socioeconomic trends they considered the 
repercussions of markets and of capitalism. They marveled at American farmers’ abilities to 
specialize by applying machines, science, and laborsaving technologies, but they devoted special 
attention to those used for growing corn and raising livestock. By underscoring differences 
between Soviet and American practices, the delegation showed their esteem for American 
technology, which concealed tacit suppositions about Soviet weaknesses. 
The delegation’s written report demonstrates the presumption that technologies 
resulting from capitalist competition were value-neutral and therefore applicable under 
socialism. It praises the quality, quantity, and diversity of machines in use on the well-equipped 
American farms. The document concludes that capitalism not only permitted, but required 
those capital-intensive production methods because those farmers unable to keep up in 
adopting the latest, most productive technologies would be driven out of business. It blames 
monopolies’ control over the prices farmers received for produce and those paid for the inputs 
they purchased. This difference in prices, it asserted, “constantly crushes” the farmers and 
therefore, “in order to make ends meet, [they] strive to increase marketable output and seek new 
means to limit expenditure of labor per unit of production.”69 Considering pressures on 
capitalists to seek profit and compete to ruin one’s neighbor inherent laws of capitalism, the 
report compares them to Soviet ideals, extolling the superiority of a system where no market 
and no hidden monopoly forced socialist farms to struggle to simply maintain solvency. From 
the Soviet perspective, the technologies allowing an individual American farmer to outproduce a 
collective farmer under socialism revealed the economic injustices ingrained in capitalism. By 
contrast, Soviet domestic and foreign propaganda labeled socialist farms the most egalitarian 
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and mechanized in the world. In his September 1953 speech, Khrushchev had contrasted 
socialist with capitalist agriculture, contending that it was “common knowledge . . . that modern 
agricultural machinery is concentrated in the hands of a small number of capitalist farmers, 
while manual labor and primitive machinery persist on the farms of the remaining majority of 
laboring peasants.”70 Even finding machinery widely distributed among American farmers, the 
Soviet delegation also saw that reality as a sign of the pernicious forces of capital. 
Soviet officials discovered the socioeconomic maladies their Marxist ideology 
preconditioned them to expect, such as capitalism’s erosion of farmers’ social and economic 
situation. Delegation members observed a declining number of farms and the increasing average 
size of those that remained, a fact backed by American statistics. They thus discerned an 
acceleration of the inherent destructive processes that gathered the means of production in the 
hands of the few. “The concentration of production,” they noted, “and the elimination of the 
smaller farms by the larger reaffirms Lenin’s axiom that capitalism’s fundamental and principal 
tendency is to eliminate small-scale production in both industry and agriculture.”71 The 
delegation diagnosed a historical trend that American officials acknowledged, although they 
considered it positive, and which continues to be visible as the cyclical squeezing of American 
family farms that allows corporations to consolidate land into increasingly large industrial 
operations. 
Judging socialist principles superior, the officials who visited the US nonetheless 
underscored efficiencies resulting from specialization. They argued that capitalist competition 
created “division of labor” unlike anything found in Soviet practice. It raised American farmers’ 
productivity by allowing them to buy food and supplies they might produce only less efficiently 
at home. The Soviet experts concluded that this practice raised productivity, but at a risk: “Being 
connected to many firms [as a result], in the event of unfavorable market conditions for 
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agricultural commodities, they fall into debt, descend into dependence on the firms, and are 
ruined.”72 Each Soviet farm and agricultural district, by comparison, supplied itself to the 
greatest degree possible, producing seeds, spare parts, food products, and other essential goods 
locally. Given the absence of the threat of financial ruin ingrained in capitalism, Soviet farms 
might benefit more from American-style specialization. 
In this and other ways, Soviet officials reaffirmed the superiority of state and collective 
farms, which offered stability in contrast to the precarious production relations of American 
capitalism. Addressing problems with labor, pay, taxation, and state procurements, reforms 
enacted in 1953 gave Soviet officials renewed confidence in their conviction that socialist farms 
embodied worthier principles.73 They stressed, “Having actually witnessed the destruction of 
small farmers in the USA and Canada, our socialist system’s enormous advantages became 
clearer.” According to the delegation, “Given our large-scale farms [and] planned economy, we 
enjoy enormous advantages over the USA. Our collective and state farms . . . can quickly 
increase output of agricultural products and decrease production costs by more effectively 
employing machines and organizing production.”74 Their findings on the consequences of 
capitalist competition reinforced the contrast between the United States as a source of practical 
methods and a socioeconomic system burdened by inherent crises. 
The delegation balanced admiration for American practices with an aversion to the 
society capitalism produced, reflecting the need to conform to the Soviet ideological worldview. 
Making assertions about the capitalist economy’s “intrinsic contradictions,” as in an article 
published by Matskevich in early January 1956, officials justified their focus on technology and 
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practices and, thereby, avoided discussing areas in which an alert Soviet reader might discern an 
unfavorable comparison with his or her own reality.75 Internal reports addressed to the Ministry 
of Agriculture and to the highest leadership in the Central Committee, however, praised 
American practices at the expense of Soviet counterparts, albeit cautiously. These internal 
reports followed conventions dictated by ideology, but also went beyond the boundaries that 
propagandistic aims imposed on public statements. 
Finding that American farmers specialized in producing only crops most suited to the 
local climate, the Soviet experts implied that the USSR might benefit from applying similar 
principles. They concluded that the “decisive prerequisite for the high level of agricultural 
output in the USA is . . . the distribution and specialization of production based on a fuller use of 
natural and economic conditions of individual regions.”76 Each American region gained 
advantages by growing only crops appropriate to local temperature, daylight, rainfall, and soil 
conditions. To illustrate, Soviet experts decided that Iowa nearly perfect for growing corn.77 
Although they did not acknowledge it, the Soviet Union’s climate put limits on agriculture in 
general, and specifically on corn cultivation.78 Khrushchev frequently expressed confidence that 
technology would permit Soviet farms to overcome such challenges; for instance, they might 
remedy shortages of rainfall by building irrigation systems and developing methods to retain the 
precipitation that fell as snow during winter in the fields, rather than letting it run off in the 
spring thaw. Scientific breeding held out the prospect of cold-resistant, fast-developing varieties 
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of corn that would achieve later stages of maturity in northern regions. In their written report, 
the delegation’s members noted the potential of research observed in both the US and Canada.79 
For these reasons, they devoted special attention to the methods and hybrids farmers employed 
in the northerly reaches of corn cultivation in North America, in the Dakotas, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ontario. So well known was Khrushchev’s interest in such hybrids 
that, when he met President John F. Kennedy in Vienna in 1961, Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
hinted to Khrushchev about a new one purportedly reaching full maturity faster than any other. 
In response, the Soviet agricultural attaché in Washington searched for information about it, 
finding nothing.80 
Regional specialization embodied the industrial ideal in practice by prioritizing the 
greatest production at the lowest cost, regardless of location, and then using modern 
transportation to distribute the output. This conflicted with Soviet agricultural planning under 
Stalin, which had favored regional self-sufficiency as a remedy to dysfunctional transportation 
and distribution systems that impeded regular deliveries of food to urban populations. 
Khrushchev abandoned this policy in favor of regional specialization.81 Approving of the 
delegation’s findings, he inveighed against growing crops where their yields remained lower 
than average in the name of self-sufficiency. It was more rational to free some regions from 
deliveries of grains and vegetables, shifting production of these foods to places where farms 
harvested higher yields. As a consequence of Stalin’s policy, Khrushchev grumbled, “we manage 
planning policy completely without a plan.”82 Yet his support of choosing crops based on local 
conditions contradicted the fact that the very same year, his orders caused Soviet officials to 
spread corn cultivation aggressively and with little regard for the local climate. 
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Khrushchev’s most famous programs, including the Virgin Lands campaign and the corn 
crusade, together embodied the principle of regional specialization. Before a Central Committee 
plenum in June 1954, he first outlined how the Virgin Lands program, set in motion earlier that 
year, was a foundation for further initiatives. The extensive growth in harvests of wheat grown 
on industrial-scale farms in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and other thinly populated regions promised to 
free settled areas of European Russia, the North Caucasus, and Ukraine for intensive livestock 
production. To achieve this latter goal, Khrushchev ordered farms in those locales to cut 
plantings of wheat and other staple grains, and expand those of corn needed to feed growing 
herds and for lifting their productivity. This boom in animal husbandry would deliver enough 
meat, milk, and eggs not only for local consumption, but also for urban centers around the 
USSR.83 
If American farmers’ climatic advantages were not sufficient, the delegation reasoned, 
then history provided them with an additional upper hand. No warfare had marred America’s 
settled regions since the Civil War nearly a century prior.84 The Soviet Union in just fifty years 
had passed through the Great War, Revolution, and its own Civil War, a period of crisis and 
privation (1914–21) that continued through collectivization and famine (1928–33) and 
culminated in the war against Nazi Germany (1941–45). Combat and German atrocities 
destroyed tens of thousands of rural communities in European Russia and Ukraine. The USSR 
required years to return collective farms even to prewar levels of production and capital 
investment. Even the perseverance necessary to recover from those blows encouraged Soviet 
leaders to consider their system remarkable. 
Finding much to consider during inspections of American manufacturers of farm 
machines, A. A. Ezhevskii, the delegation’s chief engineer, emphasized to Khrushchev the 
quality and quantity of American tractors, as well as the variety of implements and 
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supplementary machines. Ezhevskii stated that the number of tractors had risen from 1.5 
million in 1950 to more than 4.5 million in 1954, while the number of people working on farms 
had fallen from 13.5 to 8.5 million, meaning that “the level of mechanization in the USA is very 
high.”85 Although it remained unspoken, the comparison made clear that the quantity of 
American equipment outstripped the number of Soviet machines, contradicting Khrushchev’s 
claim just two years prior that Soviet farms boasted more machines than those in any other 
country.86 Ezhevskii added that American farms “possess a multitude of diverse machines, 
enabling complete mechanization of various productive and supplementary tasks.”87 Each 
permitted a single American farmer to produce more at less cost—the primary objective of 
industrial agriculture. 
Having considered the American practices he had observed, Ezhevskii proposed to retool 
Soviet factories to manufacture not whole pieces of farm equipment, but standardized 
components (engines at one, transmissions at another, and so on). Other factories might then 
assemble these into complete machines of more specific function, at lower cost, and in locations 
conveniently located near agricultural regions. Pointing to procedures used in factories of the 
International Harvester Company, Deere & Company, and other American manufactures, he 
argued that this measure offered increased productivity.88 In addition to becoming the building 
blocks of new equipment, the individual components could also serve as spare parts that, due to 
flaws in the planning system, Soviet factories did not supply in quantities sufficient to repair 
existing machines.89 Lauding Ezhevskii’s analysis of American practice and Soviet realities, 
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Khrushchev enthusiastically approved the proposal. He declared, “This is an illustration of what 
I was just talking about. Comrade Ezhevskii visited America and is drawing his own conclusions. 
What kinds of conclusions? He is drawing Russian conclusions. . . . This is our Soviet American 
(sovetskii amerikanets).”90 Loaded with historical significance, this term connoted an individual 
conversant in foreign technological expertise, but also able to turn a critical eye on it. Instead of 
blindly copying American machines and manufacturing methods, the Soviet American 
accounted for the realities of state socialism in melding the achievements of both into a superior 
solution to a given problem.91 
Praising Ezhevskii’s knowhow, Khrushchev contrasted it with the petty concerns of the 
bureaucrats in charge of the centralized ministries managing the Soviet economy, whom he 
frequently disparaged. Unlike the innovative Ezhevskii, Khrushchev complained, the 
bureaucrats only defended their own prerogatives to control raw materials, labor, and 
factories.92 He implied that they would reject Ezhevskii’s proposals because, even though more 
machines and a supply of spare parts might result, declining production by a given ministry’s 
proprietary factories might concomitantly decrease its bureaucratic masters’ power. 
The delegation’s written and oral reports on double-cross hybrid corn also indicate that 
Soviet officials had begun to view the controversial science of genetics as a value-neutral 
technology.93 Hybrid corn therefore reveals details about that discipline, the epicenter of the 
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contentious history of science in the USSR. Scholars have subjected to extensive inquiry the 
decades-long struggle between advocates for classical genetics derived from the work of Gregor 
Mendel and their bane, T. D. Lysenko.94 Because hybrid corn featured prominently in the 
delegation’s investigations in America, and because Lysenko’s ideas defined Soviet plant 
breeding, a brief digression into the history genetics in the USSR will orient the ensuing 
discussion. Accounting for the negative consequences of the doctrines of Lysenko and his 
supporters, the dissident historian and biologist Zhores Medvedev considered hybrid corn an 
illustrative case. As early as the 1930s, Lysenko and his camp had registered hostility to inbred 
lines and double-cross hybrids by incorrectly regarding their yields as inferior to those of 
intervarietal hybrids.95 Lysenko condemned American advances chiefly because they 
contradicted his theories postulating the inheritance of acquired characteristics, but also on 
account of the general campaign against foreign ideas. He did so, however, at the very moment 
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when double-cross hybrids took hold in American fields thanks to the promotion of men such as 
Garst.96 
Under Khrushchev, Lysenko’s power to further his theories ebbed and resurged, but 
supporters of genetics overcame them only by securing his final defeat in conjunction with 
Khrushchev’s own fall from power in 1964. By the middle of the 1950s, double-cross hybrids had 
boosted American yields, while hybrid corn spread to other countries as one of the high-yielding 
varieties (HYVs) that sparked the Green Revolution.97 American farmers used double-cross 
hybrids extensively, and in Iowa almost exclusively, demonstrating potential yields at much as 
30 percent higher than alternatives. In 1955, the Soviet delegation devoted itself to studying 
Americans’ mastery of the underlying science, the production of hybrids, and the use of the 
seeds because Soviet leaders could no longer afford to ignore the technology. This was 
particularly damaging to Lysenko, given his longstanding claim to authority based on linking his 
theories with production, rather than pure science. 
Earlier in 1955, supporters of genetics aimed an outburst of criticism at Lysenko, calling 
on party authorities to rescind the official endorsement his theories had enjoyed since a decisive 
meeting of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences in 1948, and to remove him 
from that organization’s presidency. A commission established by the Central Committee to 
investigate Lysenko and the academy found “substantial shortcomings and mistakes” in the 
affairs of both. It especially faulted Lysenko’s dictatorial control over the editorial boards of 
academic journals, as well as the biology instruction students in higher education received, 
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which did not “demonstrate the achievements of Soviet and foreign researchers [emphasis 
added] in the field of biology.”98 This charge stands out because Lysenko had led the campaign 
in the late 1940s against ideas or scientists from abroad, which he denounced as “bourgeois” and 
“formalist,” in contrast to the “materialist” and “Marxist-Leninist” labels he gave his own 
theories. In 1956, Khrushchev ordered the party to curb Lysenko’s administrative and editorial 
duties, an effort to combat brazen abuse of power; nonetheless, no one publicly renounced his 
authority in scientific matters.99 
Khrushchev had spoken favorably of hybrid corn before the October 1955 report by the 
delegation, but not about double-cross hybrids specifically; Soviet experts therefore had to 
demonstrate that American-style hybrids were superior to the intervarietal ones favored on 
Soviet farms to that point. Khrushchev satisfied their demands by providing funding and 
institutional backing for the research, a signal of disfavor toward Lysenko and his supporters 
that forced them, after reading the shifting currents of politics, to cease opposing hybrid corn. 
As quickly as 1958, Lysenko and his faction returned to attacking opponents, but double-cross 
hybrids remained immune. He reclaimed editorships of academic journals and attempted to 
resurrect his former methods—demonization and demagoguery—for old purposes, but he did 
not equal his past triumphs under Stalin. 
In their written account and oral reports, the delegation’s experts evaluated agricultural 
education and the applied sciences in the US with special focus on hybrid corn. Matskevich and 
B. P. Sokolov, the delegation’s corn-breeding expert, advocated adopting the double-cross 
hybrids because American researchers investigated them at the exclusion of intervarietal 
hybrids, and because Soviet scientists had the requisite knowledge. They therefore appealed to 
Khrushchev for official support and funding for research like that in the US.100 Sokolov and 
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Matskevich based their appeal on the extra production Soviet farms could expect as a result of 
their research, rather than on genetics’ own value as a theoretical science. To emphasize the 
point, Sokolov claimed that double-cross hybrids accounted for approximately 75 percent of the 
extraordinary growth in American corn harvests in the preceding two decades.101  
Given Sokolov’s interest in proving hybrid corn’s importance, reversing decades of 
official hostility, and securing support for research, he argued his case on the grounds that the 
USSR possessed the means to produce the double-cross hybrids. He began by noting that 
Russians had long experimented with creating hybrids. He then explained that he personally 
had worked on hybrid corn since 1930 and, although the Americans had bounded forward in 
practical applications of hybridization during that time, the Soviet Union had the basis to 
quickly match them. “It is therefore incorrect,” he asserted, “to concede hybridization to the 
Americans.”102 The American advantage lay in using the technology: “They have only employed 
this biological phenomenon, organizing very large hybrid-seed farms, which sell only the hybrid 
seeds to farmers.” Soviet research used the same knowledge and began with the same genetic 
lines.103 Nonetheless, it had produced few advances in production yields because of poor 
implementation. In the 1930s and 1940s, instead of following the trail blazed by pioneers in the 
US, the Soviet Union had developed less productive intervarietal hybrids, ignoring double-cross 
hybrids and leaving the geneticists—including Sokolov—who developed them on the sidelines. 
Sokolov indicated that problems in putting the hybrids into practice had served as the 
ammunition for Lysenko’s attacks. “How do we explain,” Sokolov asked in his presentation to 
Khrushchev, “the fact that such a beneficial measures is carried out so weakly here?” He 
emphasized disagreements among the experts favoring the double-cross hybrids and those 
against them during the time of experimental hybridization in the USSR. He then outlined, in 
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cautious and conciliatory terms, how Lysenko and company had asserted that simple hybrids 
solved Soviet problems because they were easy to produce and transmitted their improved yields 
to second and subsequent generations of seeds. Charges that the double-cross hybrids’ 
apparently superior yields in the US were fictive, Sokolov argued, did not stand up to scrutiny. 
Managers of state and collective farms, “listening to the opinion of the scientists who argued for 
the second and third generations [i.e. intervarietal hybrids], considered production of [double-
cross] hybrids unnecessary and therefore [that kind of] hybridization did not develop here.” 104 
This episode illustrates how the centralized authority of the party and Soviet government might 
hinder useful innovations by ignoring or even condemning them. By the same token, official 
support brought the necessary resources to master the technology. 
Responding to Sokolov’s appeal for backing, Khrushchev endorsed the geneticists, at 
least as far as their work concerned hybrid corn. Possessing the required knowledge, specialists 
needed funds and institutional resources that only the leader’s patronage could grant. “I am 
convinced,” Khrushchev stated in response to Sokolov’s proposals, “that 99 percent of what 
Comrade Sokolov reported here, he knew prior to the trip to America. The benefit of the trip is 
that he personally saw [the technologies] there and became troubled by the fact that we had not 
developed them, even though we had the knowledge.”105 He praised the geneticist, adding, 
“Comrade Sokolov has spoken well and drawn correct conclusions. Now we must set this matter 
in motion with his help.”106 He ordered his aides to prepare a proposal specifying where and how 
to produce double-cross hybrid seeds. They soon returned with a policy designating research 
institutes, selection stations, and state farms to carry out the necessary work.107 
Double-cross hybrids demonstrated the influence of American practice as a model, as 
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well as the USSR’s participation in worldwide adoption of hybrid corn, especially the most 
modern double-cross hybrids. Furthermore, it suggests both change in Khrushchev-era policies, 
and the continuity linking them to Stalin-era precedents. With Khrushchev’s approval, avenues 
of inquiry that Lysenko’s power had previously blocked suddenly opened. Despite these 
setbacks, Lysenko remained powerful and influential. 
For the USSR to efficiently embrace double-cross hybrids, it had to invest time, money, 
and resources to develop infrastructure and procure the required equipment. Following 
precedent set during Stalin’s industrialization drives of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the USSR 
imported this technology from the US. The delegation preached to Soviet leaders the importance 
of seed calibration, and of the specialized companies—Pioneer, DeKalb, Garst & Thomas, and 
others—that performed the component tasks of producing, harvesting, drying, sorting, treating, 
packaging, and distributing the production seeds.108 Although not blind to the potential profit, 
American companies—Garst’s firm in particular—sold the technology in part to contribute to 
global stability through food security. In early 1956, Garst arranged for the sale of double-cross 
hybrid seeds, the parental genetic lines, and the machinery to process Soviet-produced hybrid 
seeds, epitomizing the transfer of practical technology from capitalist to socialist hands. For 
their part, Soviet leaders sought a technological improvement in production and labor 
productivity, problems that had rendered earlier Soviet corn cultivation an extravagantly labor-
intensive endeavor, and which industrial methods were suited to solve. 
This sale of technology facilitated Soviet efforts to master a process they called 
calibration, which necessitated investment in machinery to economize on labor, the trade-off 
typical of industrial farming. The procedure required an automated factory that dried the raw 
seeds to preserve them, sorted them according to size and shape, treated them with fungicide to 
protect them, and packaged them in “fractions” of seeds of the same size and shape. Sorting the 
seeds enabled the “square-cluster method” of planting and cultivating, for which Khrushchev 
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unerringly advocated. It saved labor once the seeds reached the farmer by permitting a 
mechanical planter to distribute seeds not in a continuous row, as is common today, but instead 
in clusters of two or three plants separated by a prescribed distance from other clusters on both 
lateral and horizontal axes of the field. So that a regular number of seeds went through the 
planter’s regulator and into each cluster, the seeds had to be uniform in size and shape. By 
distributing the seeds in rows on both axes, with clusters of plants at the corners of empty 
squares, this method allowed farmers to use tractor-drawn cultivators to quickly and efficiently 
eliminate weeds traveling in both directions, rather than only one, as in a row of plants. This 
replaced manual labor with machinery in many tasks, epitomizing modern approaches to 
farming. Capital investments in machines, transport, and organization offered higher yields and 
substantial savings in time and labor once the crop was in the ground. Tellingly, however, at the 
moment when Khrushchev prescribed this method for row crops in the USSR, American farmers 
began to abandon it because increasingly available chemical herbicides for killing weeds made 
the squares superfluous and the extra labor they required unproductive. 
The Soviet delegation to the United States inaugurated expanded interactions between 
the USSR and its rivals. A parallel delegation visited Great Britain at the same time. Groups 
traveled to France, other Western European countries, and nations in the Eastern bloc. 
Scientists, engineers, and other specialists augmented their knowledge of theoretical and 
practical advances outside the USSR by accessing literature on agricultural science and 
technology published in Western Europe and North America, which began to make its way onto 
the pages of specialist newspapers and journals in the USSR. Before 1953, the antiforeign 
campaigns of the late-Stalin period and the rejection of foreign knowledge dictated by the power 
of Lysenko had bottled up such information. Subsequent contacts fostered a renewed flow of 
knowledge. The quantity of technical journals expanded; a journal dedicated to corn, entitled 
simply Kukuruza, appeared in 1955. It, along with the USSR Ministry of Agriculture’s daily 
newspaper, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo, frequently featured summaries, reviews, and translations of 
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foreign technical literature. They concentrated on developments in industrial farming and 
encouraged mechanization, electrification, laborsaving devices, improved breeding, and a host 
of other techniques associated with American practices. 
The Soviet experts who traveled to the US had possessed familiarity with corn and 
industrial farming prior to departing. They returned, however, with convictions that corn could 
and should constitute an integral component of a progressive, highly mechanized system of 
farming. Matskevich, Sokolov, Shevchenko, and the others had contributed to Khrushchev’s 
corn crusade before the summer of 1955. They did not bring back corn itself or a newfound 
belief in it, but rather the inspiration to transform it from a crop requiring vast amounts of 
manual labor to achieve modest yields into one benefitting from advances in machine building, 
chemistry, genetics, and management practices that scaled up yields while reducing production 
costs. The political leaders, with Khrushchev at their head, stood well-disposed toward these 
methods because industrial farming principles had captured Soviet theory and existed in limited 
areas of practice as far back as the 1920s. The delegation of 1955 observed an American system 
founded on familiar tenets, but embodying them more thoroughly. Its members returned to the 
USSR with their convictions confirmed about the proper path forward; their findings, moreover, 
reinforced the biases of the leader whose opinion mattered most: Khrushchev. 
* * * 
Although later witnessing American industrial farming practices for himself, Khrushchev 
first became acquainted with their proponents when he met Garst in 1955, a friendship that 
continued throughout his decade in power. Introducing himself to the delegation in 1955, Garst 
whisked Matskevich, Sokolov, and Shevchenko away from the other members and to his farm in 
Coon Rapids, Iowa. There they inspected the machines, hybrids, insecticides, herbicides, 
fertilizers, irrigation, and other methods used in its industrial farming operations.109 Garst 
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thereby secured an invitation to the USSR and, eventually, to an audience with Khrushchev.110 
Each loquacious showman found in the other a kindred spirit. From their first meeting in 1955, 
Garst pushed Khrushchev, already committed to corn, to adopt the latest industrial methods for 
cultivating the crop and using it as feed. Although he did not offer the technologies for free, 
Garst demonstrated evangelical zeal for spreading the system he had helped to develop. He 
believed that this package of technologies provided the only means for averting the global food-
production crisis many predicted. He was in some ways correct: the threat of that crisis receded 
into the future as advances transformed farming in industrialized countries and then in the 
Third World. Garst thus mixed humanitarian and commercial motivations, transcending 
barriers between Soviet socialism and American capitalism to spread technologies both he and 
his willing Soviet partners deemed value-neutral. Garst returned repeatedly to the USSR 
throughout the Khrushchev period, always heralding the latest in industrial farming and 
delivering practical knowledge about corn, livestock raising, and other methods for boosting 
production. Ensuring these principles flowed from Iowa to the world, Garst also imparted his 
knowledge to receptive audiences in Eastern Europe, for example in Hungary and Romania. He 
cultivated extensive contacts with specialists in those countries, beginning with stops he made 
there following his journey to the USSR in the fall of 1955.111 Proselytizing in Eastern Europe, he 
supported Khrushchev’s ambitions to spread favored methods where corn had been a staple, 
such as in Romania and Hungary, and to propagate the crop in new lands, particularly Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic.112 
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From the corn campaign’s start, Khrushchev pressured socialist allies to adopt machines 
and methods favored in the USSR. In a private conversation with his agricultural advisors in 
March 1955, he detailed his vision for a concurrent campaign in Eastern Europe. “This is a 
colossal breakthrough,” he enthused. “It’s difficult to even imagine the results. . . . If we get the 
Hungarians and the Romanians, who are now corn-growers [kukuruzniki], to harvest at waxy 
maturity, then they will overflow with grain and silage, but right now they have nothing to feed 
their livestock.”113 “Waxy maturity” means that the grain is almost mature, yet not completely 
dry. Harvesting at this stage allowed mixing the green plant mass and the grain to produce a 
greater volume of feed, suitable for preserving for winter as slightly fermented silage edible for 
cattle and sheep. Khrushchev encouraged this approach, rather than growing corn only for 
grain, and shipped seeds to Poland, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic.114 Reports 
from Soviet agricultural attachés noted encouraging increases in cropland devoted to corn: In 
1956, the attaché in Warsaw confirmed that Polish farmers had doubled that area to 200,000 
hectares.115 A cable from Romania documented the Bucharest attaché’s attendance at a 
demonstration of American machinery arranged by Garst on a nearby state farm.116 However 
well intentioned, this advice turned sour by the time of Khrushchev’s ouster. By 1964, he had 
alienated partners by persistently goading them about corn and methods for cultivating it. As a 
result, his former comrades condemned his condescending treatment of East European 
partners, especially an incident in which he berated Romanian leaders for lacking devotion to 
corn.117 
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In September 1959, Khrushchev traveled on a mission to build goodwill in the United 
States and to strengthen peace. Prior to meeting President Dwight D. Eisenhower at Camp 
David, Khrushchev captivated American journalists and broadcasters, spoke to Congressional 
and business leaders, visited factories, and toured Hollywood. He stopped at Garst’s farm in 
Iowa. Khrushchev’s apparently boundless enthusiasm for America mirrored Americans’ 
curiosity about the Soviet leader, as evidenced by the media attention he attracted. The 
conversation between Garst and Khrushchev occurred amid the crowd newspapermen, 
photographers, television cameras, and bystanders. In retirement, Khrushchev recalled, “It 
reminded me of what Prokop, the gamekeeper on our shooting preserve in Ukraine, used to say 
when I asked him how the hunting looked. ‘Well, Comrade Prokop, any ducks today?’ ‘Ducks 
everywhere, Comrade Khrushchev,’ he’d answer in Ukrainian. ‘Ducks as far as the eyes can see—
more ducks than shit.’”118 
Khrushchev’s trip to America also dominated the Soviet media, prompting publication of 
a book, Litsom k litsu s Amerikoi (Face to Face with America) chronicling the leader’s meeting 
with the US. It addressed a general audience, but it also announced the party line on agricultural 
policy.119 The book emphasized industrial agriculture’s contributions to American abundance, 
but also highlighted social and economic crisis churning under the surface of the outwardly 
prosperous capitalist society. In Iowa, Khrushchev visited a factory belonging to Deere & 
Company, the manufacturer of tractors and implements. There he spoke in favor of peaceful 
competition based on food production, assuring both his American audience and Soviet citizens 
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at home that his slogan, “to catch up with and overtake America,” demonstrated the USSR’s 
peaceful intentions. He promised that this represented “a much better competition than a 
buildup of hydrogen bombs and all types of weapons. Let there be more corn and meat, but 
absolutely no hydrogen weapons!”120 
The book chronicling Khrushchev’s sojourn also encouraged Soviet readers to consider 
themselves part of the struggle to feed the hungry and save the world. His conversation with 
Garst ranged over many subjects, with emphasis on Khrushchev’s interest in corn cultivation, 
raising livestock, and the industrial methods his American friend employed on his farm. Oddly 
enough, Garst first invoked the themes of peaceful cooperation and food’s global importance as 
a guarantor of security. The Soviet publication reported that he expressed willingness “to give all 
that is innovative to the Soviet Union. Let the USSR share it with China, India, and other 
countries, so that there are no hungry people in the world, so that there are no wars, and so 
there is peace on earth and friendship among peoples.”121 In publishing this, the Soviet 
authorities endorsed Garst’s statements, which coincided with the views that the American 
showman consistently espoused on the subject.122 
Khrushchev habitually enthused about development projects using industrial farming 
principles such as irrigation schemes to expand production at home and abroad.123 Speaking to 
the Central Committee in 1961, he raved about their potential to feed countries in danger of food 
shortages. “Irrigation will allow us to take a new step toward intensive management of 
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agriculture,” he argued, not only in the USSR, where the process was underway, but also in the 
Third World. In contrast to the “bourgeois economists” who predicted overpopulation and 
malnutrition, he envisioned plenty: “If the achievements of science and technology are properly 
utilized, then the potential for food production is simply limitless.” He then took the case of 
India as a template, suggesting that electric power, water pumps, and pipelines would permit 
farmers to make the land blossom. In the same breath, he touted the benefits Soviet farms could 
expect from applying industrial methods: they might allow average farms to equal the yields 
achieved previously by only the best, thereby more than doubling average yields of grain.124 
Khrushchev praised industrial methods’ virtues to anyone who would listen; for example, he 
created a scandal during an official visit to Egypt in early 1964.125 The Egyptian representative, 
Mohamed Heikal, later described how Khrushchev dismissed his country’s development efforts. 
“I tried to explain Egyptian methods of agriculture,” Heikal wrote, “but Khrushchev broke in: 
‘This is all nonsense, you’re wasting your time. Do you know what you ought to do? Chemical 
agriculture is the answer.’”126 
* * * 
Khrushchev paused the corn crusade temporarily, when efforts in the 1955, 1956, and 
1957 growing seasons yielded less than he had hoped. He returned to it with renewed vigor after 
1958, augmented by a renewed emphasis on the industrial ideal, embodied by more and better 
tractors, chemicals, hybrid seeds, and the other advances Garst advocated. These measures 
informed the sections on agricultural policy in Khrushchev’s Seven-Year Plan, adopted at the 
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“extraordinary” Twenty-first Party Congress in early 1959.127  The initial results of the Sixth Five-
Year Plan, adopted at the Twentieth Congress in 1956, had not matched Khrushchev’s 
ambitions. Unchallenged in his power after the crisis of June 1957, he set targets for the new 
plan’s final year, 1965, representing significant advances over gains already achieved under his 
guidance. As it happened, the feeling of potential abundance reached its height in 1958, but at 
the Twenty-first Congress the path seemed open to Khrushchev’s vision of industrial agriculture: 
capital investment in mechanization, electrification, irrigation, synthetic fertilizers, herbicides, 
and insecticides promised to raise yields of corn, not to mention other major crops. 
Addressing the Central Committee prior to the congress, Khrushchev evaluated the 
results of the previous five years, stated the convictions shaping the new plan, and proposed 
measures for continuing to increase output while lowering production costs. He demanded that 
Soviet farms apply the scientific knowledge, management practices, and training they already 
possessed, not to mention that they improve corn yields.128  The Soviet Union had benefitted 
again from Garst’s aid: in 1958, he invited Soviet specialists to his farm in Iowa to work side-by-
side with him, his sons, and his hired hands for the full agricultural year. At the plenum, 
corngrower A. V. Gitalov related his experiences as a machine operator on Garst’s farm, where 
he and his fellow Soviet specialists had mastered industrial farming methods.129 Evaluating 
Gitalov’s report, Khrushchev freely acknowledged the benefits of Garst’s invitation. “Traveling 
there to work, Comrade Gitalov learned much from Garst. We thank him. [Foreign detractors] 
always chide us communists, saying that we only criticize the capitalists. And now, as you can 
see, we thank the farmer-capitalist [Garst] for the profitable exchange.”130 The methods Gitalov 
had learned allowed the USSR to use machines and other laborsaving devices more effectively. 
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Khrushchev illustrated his point by calling attention to experiments on a collective farm in 
Russia’s Voronezh oblast, where N. F. Manukovskii had raised 200 hectares of corn without any 
manual labor.131 By contrast, predominant practices required manual labor to calibrate the 
seeds, cultivate the fields, and harvest the grain. Although Khrushchev did not highlight the 
influence of American technologies on Manukovskii’s work, he had used machines and 
technologies, such as the factory-calibrated seeds, that Soviet engineers had mastered because of 
exposure to American practices—or direct transfer of the technology.132 
When the Central Committee met in December 1959 to review the first year of the new 
Seven-Year Plan, Khrushchev again called attention to the most modern corngrowing methods 
and technologies. He praised the large corn harvests achieved in Kalinovka, his native village in 
Kursk oblast and home to a model collective farm thanks to his patronage. He sounded the 
attack, however, against the oblast leaders, who had ordered the collective farmers to produce 
hybrid seeds themselves, a task requiring a more favorable climate and technical skill the 
farmers lacked. 
Why do that? That stage has been passed by. Don’t get clever, comrades [i.e. the 
oblast’s leaders]. Don’t demonstrate your backwardness. Seeds should be raised 
only on seed-production farms. Take American practices as an example. Not 
every farmer there raises seed corn. He receives it from a company specializing in 
seed production. But here, some want to raise corn for silage and also produce 
seeds on their farms. This is primitive production [kustarnichestvo, lit. 
“handicrafting,” non-industrial production].133 This must not be done. We live in 
the age of specialization. Farms must be specialized.134 
Citing American precedents, Khrushchev asserted not only the superiority of the high-yielding 
hybrids, but also that the technology illustrated the specialization so critical to putting the 
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industrial ideal into practice. 
As Khrushchev and his allies argued for the importance of corn and industrial farming 
technologies, they professed a commitment to international cooperation despite renewed Cold 
War tensions. Postwar conflicts over the city of Berlin remained unresolved, straining a 
relationship that grew worse when Soviet forces downed American Francis Gary Powers’s spy 
plane in May 1960, and still further during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Nonetheless, the 
Soviet leaders maintained the doctrine of peaceful coexistence and competition. Contacts 
temporarily halted, but they signaled willingness to renew them, an effort likely reflecting their 
desire to proclaim the USSR’s peace-loving nature in domestic and foreign propaganda. 
Kukuruza: Dlia obmena opyta dveri shiroko otkryty (Corn: The Door for Exchange Is Wide 
Open), the book A. S. Shevchenko published in 1961, demonstrated that despite deteriorating 
relations, Soviet leaders looked to nurture contacts with the US, the benchmark in the 
competition of economic systems and an inspiration for Soviet efforts.135 Shevchenko declared 
that the USSR, as the book’s subtitle indicated, had “doors wide open for exchange,” while 
extolling the Soviet system’s superior principles in terms similar to those he and his fellow 
delegates had used in 1955. Confronting Western notions about the advantages of private 
ownership and capitalist development, he praised collective farms and Khrushchev’s plans to 
ride corn to victory in the race to provide abundance. Attacking the American alternative, he 
charged, “The restrictions the capitalist system places on agricultural development are well 
known, as well as how it limits creative initiative, ruins farmers, and drives many of them into 
the ranks of the poor.”136 He reassured Soviet readers that America had succeeded not thanks to 
private property, which created economic and social inequality, but on the strength of corn and 
industrial farming. He continued, “It is not the private farm, but rather corn, that has helped the 
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USA raise its grain production and, as a result, improve animal husbandry. But corn does not 
serve the capitalist system alone.” This conclusion exonerated Soviet collective and state farms 
of charges about inherent shortcomings, blaming inadequate production on struggles to master 
technology for growing corn. Shevchenko reassured his readers that the crop would provide 
equal riches once the Soviet Union had learned to care it. 
Even when the Seven-Year Plan proved insufficient to realizing his dreams, Khrushchev 
recapitulated his vision for expanding production to reach the longstanding goal “to catch up 
with and overtake the United States.” His plans to raise Soviet productivity by using industrial 
farming featured in the Third Party Program that appeared in late 1961, enumerating the steps 
necessary to ensure that communism would be a reality by 1980. Although famous for renewed 
attacks on Stalin, the Twenty-second Party Congress ratified this program and the policies 
established to reach its targets. Boosting yields per hectare and output per ruble of investment 
remained central to the strategy.137 The sweeping plan promised to adapt crops suitable to the 
various climatic regions, improve the qualifications of collective farm leaders, increase synthetic 
fertilizer production, and decentralize economic planning. It categorized these measures as 
“intensification.” 
Intensification in essence meant industrial agriculture, methods that remained central 
through 1964 and beyond. At the time of the congress, Khrushchev reiterated the connection 
among corn, livestock, and living standards. In place of singular miraculous solutions, such as 
corn, he emphasized interconnected reforms to how the USSR planned, used technology, 
selected crops, and administered farms. Not the sole reason for American farmers’ success, corn 
formed only part of the larger package of measures that was the “secret” of their productivity.138 
This theme remained throughout the last three years he held power: speaking to the Central 
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Committee in February 1964, he faced the consequences of the crop failures that forced the 
USSR to purchase grain abroad in 1963 to stave off crisis. Despite queues for bread that 
delegitimized his rule, he remained optimistic that intensification offered a path forward, and 
that the USSR required corn. Enormous potential remained in machines, of which farms needed 
more and better. Investing in the chemical industry would bring inexpensive synthetic fertilizer, 
herbicides, and insecticides, which had revolutionized agriculture in the US and beyond, to 
Soviet fields in greater quantities than before.139 To illustrate, Khrushchev had reported in July 
1963 that American farmers applied 35 million metric tons on 118 million hectares of cropland 
(a ratio of 1 ton for every 3.37 hectares), while in the USSR those figures were 20 million and 
218 million (a ratio of 1:10.9).140 He had proposed a radical expansion of that figure, boasting to 
US Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman that year that the USSR aimed to produce 100 
million tons.141 Intensification offered “the true path to increasing productivity of animal 
husbandry” by enabling “high yields of feed crops, especially corn and sugar beets.”142 European 
and American farmers had developed these solutions over the course of decades. Khrushchev 
gave the USSR just seven years to match that achievement.143 Even after ten years of wrestling 
with the rigid command-administrative system, he remained confident that the socialist system 
could achieve the extraordinary. In the US, the threat of destitution drove some farmers to work 
ever harder and others to become wage laborers in thrall to capitalist farmers. In the USSR, by 
contrast, “farmworkers labor for themselves and society. They are paid for the amount and 
quality of their labor.”144 
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Khrushchev’s promises encouraged popular expectations his agricultural policies did not 
satisfy, highlighting inconsistencies implicit in the multiple official narratives about the US and 
providing room for competing counterimages. Soviet leaders proved unable to meet demands 
they had raised, exacerbating the problem of managing some citizens’ comparisons between the 
Soviet society and the American other.145 In 1961, a disgruntled Soviet voter in Perm oblast 
wrote a note illustrating this failure, although it was only an anecdotal example of the critical 
remarks a tiny minority of Soviet voters scribbled on their ineffectual ballots. “Elect who you’ll 
elect,” the voter wrote, “but there is no meat, no fish. We say we’ve caught up to America, but 
why is it necessary to catch up to them when they live ‘in poverty’?”146 Having applied the 
technologies its leaders found in the US for several years, the USSR had neither matched 
America nor satisfied its citizens’ demands. Although, for a few years in the late 1950s, it 
appeared to make good on Khrushchev’s promises, the USSR ultimately did not achieve enough, 
a failure that contributed to his rising unpopularity and his former comrades’ decision to force 
him from power. 
Khrushchev’s plans to transform Soviet farming in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
demonstrate the high-modernist philosophy shared by all Soviet leaders. Khrushchev’s 
proposals echoed those G. M. Malenkov made in 1953 and 1954, when the two men vied for 
power. Malenkov had called in August 1953 for greater investment and concentrating on 
machines and synthetic fertilizer to boost production by raising productivity per hectare.147 By 
contrast, Khrushchev favored extensive growth that simply brought more hectares under the 
plow, as in the case of the Virgin Lands campaign. He trumpeted intensive methods only once he 
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had shunted Malenkov aside and considered his own authority secure. Arguing that 
Khrushchev’s policies changed direction around 1958 and embraced “full and complete 
intensification” only in late 1963, historian I. E. Zelenin suggests that these transitions 
demonstrate the “contradictory character” of Khrushchev’s shifts in policy.148 In later 
emphasizing intensive methods, however, Khrushchev did not have to change his convictions, 
cynically appropriating a defeated rival’s program or tacitly admitting the failure of earlier 
policies. He did adopt the terminology of “intensification” relatively late, but the policies had 
begun to germinate long before. Historian Elena Zubkova shows that Khrushchev had the 
courage of conviction in his struggle with Malenkov. Khrushchev believed not only that he was 
best suited to managing agricultural policy, but that his proposals offered the quickest and most 
efficient solution to the food crisis, while Malenkov’s suggestions seemed cautious and 
gradual.149 Khrushchev began to emphasize industrial methods not because his alternative 
extensive policies failed—they were in fact among his most successful—but because those initial 
efforts had been a step on the path to intensification, offering to free settled regions to plant 
corn. Even those extensive programs drew on a common set of high-modernist, or promethean 
beliefs that he and Malenkov shared. The two leaders selected proposals from the same 
playbook, disagreeing only on the manner of implementing their common doctrine. 
* * * 
To conclude, Soviet efforts to adopt industrial methods and expand corn cultivation 
show how the USSR developed not in insolation behind an iron curtain, but within a global web 
of ideas, technologies, and practices. The industrial farming methods that Khrushchev and his 
advisors observed abroad governed the goals he established and his policies for pursuing them, 
but so too did previous Soviet experiences. Beginning in the 1920s, Soviet ideology possessed a 
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special affinity for industrial agriculture, in keeping with the promethean current in Bolshevism. 
Faith that Soviet socialist enterprises would master “value neutral” technologies invented under 
capitalism spurred interaction between American and Soviet practices in industry. Similar 
exchanges in agriculture demonstrated what Fitzgerald terms “the transfer mentality” 
characteristic of adherents the industrial ideal in agriculture. Applying those principles to 
farming only infrequently under Stalin, the USSR responded to Khrushchev’s advocacy for 
them. The 1955 delegation and subsequent exchanges facilitated adoption and adaptation of 
American technologies. Because they considered state socialism a superior social and economic 
system, they believed that by applying those techniques under socialist conditions they might 
make enormous gains in productivity and living standards. 
I do not suggest that Soviet agriculture constituted part of the Green Revolution. The 
concepts governing agricultural policy in the USSR instead reproduced technologies that 
impelled the industrial ideal in the US. During the postwar period, state actors and 
nongovernmental agencies such as the Rockefeller Foundation put components of this suite of 
technologies in the hands of Third World farmers. Expanded harvests depended on new high-
yielding varieties of staple grains, including wheat, rice, and corn. A designation first applied 
only in the late 1960s, this Green Revolution furthermore relied on irrigation, chemicals, 
fertilizers, educational outreach, machines, scientific knowledge, and the capital—in the form of 
credit—necessary to acquire those innovations. The distinct Soviet version of industrial farming, 
using the same technologies, achieved ascendency under Khrushchev. In chronological terms, 
the Soviet fascination with these methods predated their spread to the Third World. Moreover, 
the USSR stood aloof from the government programs and nongovernmental organizations that, 
in the postwar period, shepherded these technologies spread in Latin America, Asia, and to a 
smaller degree in Africa. Instead, Soviet practice shared common roots with the Green 
Revolution’s American sources, developing as a related but distinct phenomenon contingent 
upon conditions peculiar to Soviet-style socialism. 
  85 
Industrial farming principles remained in place following Khrushchev’s exit from the 
Kremlin.150 Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the USSR continued to emulate world trends in 
farming practices, as foreign observers noted the capital-intensive industrial methods that drove 
the system.151 Soviet officials and publications labeled Soviet agricultural practices 
“agropromyshlennyi” (lit. “agroindustrial”). Building on the foundations constructed by 
Khrushchev, the leadership under L. I. Brezhnev expanded investment, leading to what one 
analyst called “agroindustrial integration.”152 The results suggest that the wager on industrial 
farming achieved only modest success, falling short even of the restrained hopes of the 
technocratic Brezhnev leadership. In years with favorable and unfavorable weather, harvests 
surpassed the historical norms of the Stalin and Khrushchev years. Maximum yields rose from 
1.11 metric tons per hectare (1955–60), already a substantial improvement over the Stalin 
period, to 1.85 tons per hectare twenty years later (1976–80). Yields in years with poor weather 
increased from .84 to 1.42 over the same period. Similarly, Soviet farms applied fertilizer in 
much greater quantities, with the total expanding severalfold between 1965 and 1980. Low in 
comparison with the US, the number of machines expanded, and capital investments in physical 
structures, irrigation, and drainage grew 9.5 percent between 1970 and 1975, and a further 7.3 
                                                        
150 Although subject to omissions and distortions, Soviet statistics outline the major trends. Combined 
investment in agricultural production by the state and collective farms climbed from nearly 13 million 
rubles during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951–1955) to more than 24 million between 1956 and 1960, 38 
million between 1961 and 1965, and almost 60 million in the five years leading to 1970. USSR Council of 
Ministers Central Statistical Department, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: 
Statistika, 1971), 359. These investments took the form of physical structures, electrification, irrigation, 
and power machinery. To illustrate, the Soviet machinery in terms of horsepower grew nearly fourfold 
between 1950 and 1965, and the number of physical tractors—threefold. Ibid., 373 and 378. 
151 Valentin Litvin, The Soviet Agro-Industrial Complex: Structure and Performance (Falls Church, VA: 
Delphic Associates, 1985). 
152 Robert Deutsch, The Food Revolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1985), 40. Grounded in Cold War-era political science, Deutsch conducted an insightful analysis of 
statistical trends. He concludes that despite significant investment, the USSR had not achieved high 
return on the resources plowed into agriculture. The remedy Soviet authorities tried to turn to in the 
1980s was to utilize the existing capital more effectively. 
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percent between 1976 and 1980.153 
Although Soviet agricultural planners chose industrial methods to drive their scheme for 
expanding production of corn and other crops, limits in their ability to implement these 
technologies curtailed productivity in practice. Anthropologist Arturo Warman argues that 
efforts to replicate American industrial corn production were impossible, because the model 
itself is unsustainable. He contends that the individuals and corporations who facilitated 
industrial agriculture in America expropriated and accumulated land, labor, and capital, to the 
detriment of communities, cultures, and the environment. These processes enabled the 
“miracle” of America’s expanded production between 1920 and the 1970s.154 Khrushchev 
attempted to earn similar dividends by applying the same technologies, supposing that socialist 
principles would diminish the negative effects. Success remained elusive, however, because of 
practical circumstances in the USSR, especially the climate and the destruction of rural 
communities and agricultural infrastructure wrought by collectivization and war. Because 
American industrial farming owed its success to particular historical, social, cultural, and 
environmental attributes, Soviet attempts to emulate its reliance on corn cultivation and 
industrial methods faced potentially insurmountable barriers. The USSR’s struggles to fulfill 
Khrushchev’s ambitions appear to confirm Warman’s contention. 
Nonetheless, Khrushchev’s policies and efforts to put them into practice suggest that he 
and his supporters attempted to adopt industrial farming in a comprehensible, if not 
comprehensive, fashion. Specific policies suffered from crude design and poor implementation, 
as I show in the chapters that follow. By concluding that Khrushchev derived inspiration from 
the industrial ideal, however, I challenge historians’ charges that his reforms failed because 
climatic or technological limitations that predetermined defeat. To understand why Soviet 
agriculture was unsuccessful in reaping the same higher yields American models achieved, this 
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study follows Khrushchev’s corn campaign into the spheres of policy and implementation, 
uncovering its fate among regional peculiarities, local climates, and prevailing bureaucratic 
practices.
  88 
CHAPTER 2 
THE POLITICS OF CORN: KHRUSHCHEV’S AUTHORITY AND LAUNCHING THE CORN 
CRUSADE 
As Stalin’s successors began to discuss remedies for Soviet agriculture’s failures in 
August 1953, Nikita Khrushchev used his expanding authority to extol corn’s virtues. Gathering 
republic and oblast leaders, he pressed them to cultivate more corn and use innovative 
techniques. “Some of you sitting here,” he commented, “perhaps even a majority, are thinking, 
‘Do you think you discovered America? We’ve been planting corn for many years.’” “And what 
do we get from it?” he asked. “We get small harvests.” Enlarging them required new methods, he 
calculated: “It’s all in the way you plant it.”1  Following experts’ advice and American examples, 
Khrushchev advocated square-cluster planting, making it party doctrine throughout the ensuing 
decade.2 He could not guarantee, however, that local and farm officials executed his orders. In 
the same remarks, Khrushchev recounted a trip to Ukraine’s Izmaïl oblast, where the leaders of 
a district assured him they had given orders and held meetings to ensure that managers and 
specialists had mastered the method used by record-breaking corn-grower M. E. Ozernyi. 
Meeting one collective farm chairman, Khrushchev asked, “‘Have you heard of Mark Ozernyi at 
all?’ He had not. . . . Comrades, the lectures began and ended with Mark Ozernyi, during which 
time our dear chairman was sound asleep. Therefore, Mark Ozernyi went in one ear and out the 
other.”3 
Khrushchev considered square-cluster planting merely one measure necessary to sustain 
                                                        
1 Tomilina, et al., eds., Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, 2:31. 
2 Nikonov, Spiral' mnogovekovoi dramy, 300–2.  
3 Tomilina, et al., eds., Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, 2:41. When telling stories set in Ukraine, 
Khrushchev peppered his speech with Ukrainian words that differed from the Russian. In this case, he 
substituted the verb “chuty” for the Russian “slyshat',” “to hear.” 
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his corn crusade. Interrogating how industrial farming principles became policy, this chapter 
examines the First Secretary’s authority, or capacity to secure approval for each step in the 
process. Observers at the time saw few limits on it, especially after he confirmed his power by 
defeating rivals in June 1957. The “conflict school” challenged that view, perceiving in each 
subtle policy shift a sign of struggle hidden behind the leadership’s façade of unity. In the 1970s, 
revisionist political scientists reversed that position, judging that no policy-by-policy contests 
constrained Khrushchev. They differentiated between power and authority, concentrating less 
on the leader’s grip on a formal post and more on the latter, the ability to get things done.4 
Soviet dissidents Roy and Zhores Medvedev argued that Khrushchev determined the goals and 
content of policy initiatives, especially in agriculture. Approving of early programs such as the 
Virgin Lands, they deemed his later policies unsatisfactory, emphasizing how they contributed 
to his downfall.5 Post-Soviet histories have sustained this line of argument, finding that 
Khrushchev’s power and authority combined to prevent any opposition from coming together 
for most of the period.6 Having survived the challenge by those he dubbed “the antiparty group” 
in 1957, he packed the Central Committee and Presidium with supporters who backed him until 
evidence of mounting foreign and domestic setbacks damaged his prestige and advancing age 
slowed him. By the 1960s, in that view, Khrushchev’s authority began to wane and his 
vulnerability rose gradually for several years prior to his ouster in October 1963. Party figures’ 
antipathy toward him, not to mention the negative public opinion they heeded only a little, 
increased as his downfall neared.7 
Examining how decrees mandating corn cultivation emerged, I argue that the 
                                                        
4 Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders, 3. 
5 Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, xiv. 
6 Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 4. Characterizing the period as a weakening in the 
“totalitarian regime,” he nonetheless suggests that Khrushchev relied on dictatorial powers and the 
“authoritarian control of the party and state” to achieve his ends. Ibid., 107. 
7 Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 171. 
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agricultural sphere diverged from that standard narrative. First, Khrushchev had already begun 
to solidify his authority over agriculture in September 1953, and achieved unchallenged control 
over the sector by the time he launched the corn crusade in January 1955: that is, well before 
June 1957. Second, his authority over agriculture persisted even as production shortfalls 
mounted and queues for food formed. Even in 1964, he continued to determine policy, even as 
his ability to ensure its execution declined. In fact, that latter capacity had never been as 
complete as scholars have imagined: the napping collective farm chairman and similar 
impediments limited Khrushchev’s capacity to carry out policies. He dictated the boundaries of 
debate, but could not enforce directives designed to bring his plans to fruition. 
Echoing Khrushchev’s successors, who condemned his policies as “harebrained 
scheming,” scholars have disparaged the potential of corn cultivation, thereby denying that 
other officials were responsible for the disappointing results.8 That portrayal fails to capture the 
whole phenomenon, because the principles behind Khrushchev’s wager on it reflected successful 
global precedents of industrial farming based on corn. Moreover, when the Presidium, still 
packed with Stalin’s men, accepted the policy in 1955, it was not yet under Khrushchev’s thumb. 
In fact, officials throughout the hierarchy only rarely voiced halfhearted protests. They paid lip 
service to party directives, but their actions sent mixed messages. The legacy of Lenin’s 
“democratic centralism” and years spent under the threat of Stalin’s repression, party discipline 
meant that no one openly dissented. In most cases, local authorities spread corn even in regions 
where the climate prevented it from succeeding. Yet even in locales with a favorable climate, 
their actions demonstrated skepticism, an unspoken assumption about the crop’s low potential, 
by eschewing recommended methods for cultivating it and by refusing to commit scarce 
machines, chemicals, fertilizer, and labor to growing a crop in which they did not believe. These 
choices ensured that corn did not succeed, fulfilling their expectations that it would fail. These 
                                                        
8 See, for example: Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 107; and Rusinov, “Agrarnaia politika 
KPSS,” 40–43. 
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behaviors reflect administrative practices that incentivized appearing to meet the requirements 
of some temporary campaign, but also encouraged officials to devote little effort to ensuring an 
actual harvest because they expected the leaders’ attention to soon move on to the next 
campaign. 
Before 1991, observers trying to make sense of Soviet politics could rely only on leaders’ 
public remarks. In the 1970s, political scientists Jerry Hough described how “inputs” such as 
desired outcomes, organizations’ requests for resources, ideological preferences, and related 
concerns entered “the black box of policy-making itself.” The box’s “output” consisted of orders 
requiring subordinates to implement policies aimed at achieving specific goals. Thus Hough set 
aside concern over power struggles, concentrating instead on issues of authority and 
administration.9 Access to government and Communist Party documents now offer historians 
an opportunity to reconstruct such processes.10 Private exchanges, unrecorded telephone calls, 
interpersonal relationships, and other untraceable influences also shape decision-making. 
Tapping archival collections and memoir accounts, this chapter pries open a corner of the “black 
box” by detailing the policies that launched Khrushchev’s crusade for corn. 
* * * 
Khrushchev and his fellow members of the “collective leadership” confronted a grim 
reality when Stalin died in March 1953. During Stalin’s final years, requirements of postwar 
reconstruction and military spending channeled investment into heavy and defense industries. 
The war had required government and party organizations to adapt to circumstances, but 
postwar reconsolidation of the hierarchical system curbed what might have been an opportunity 
                                                        
9 Hough, How the Soviet Union is Governed, vii. 
10 The Archive of the President of the Russian Federation [Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, APRF] 
contains materials of the Central Committee Presidium, but is closed. The declassified records of the 
Central Committee’s administrative and information-gathering apparatus, however, are available in 
RGANI. 
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for economic, cultural, and political experimentation.11 Farms struggled to repair damage 
suffered during the war and recover from the state’s extractions of grain to drive that 
investment. Millions of peasants who had served in the Red Army rushed from farms to 
factories, which offered better prospects, soon followed by millions of others.12 Cultural and 
intellectual life suffered in campaigns against “cosmopolitanism,” a charge accusing those with 
foreign connections of sinister anti-Soviet loyalties that frequently served to defame and even 
eliminate prominent Jewish figures. As the Stalinist system reentrenched itself, popular “hopes” 
that wartime sacrifices had earned a chance at a better life transformed into “illusions” and then 
“disappointments.”13 The mood darkening Soviet society paralleled the atmosphere in Stalin’s 
inner circle. Khrushchev recalled in his memoirs that, when he returned to Moscow from Kyiv in 
1949, he found that the aging dictator humiliated those even in the highest political positions by 
“behaving toward people as though he were God and had created them; his attitude was at once 
patronizing and contemptuous.”14 The tyrant’s suspicious disposition and need to cling to power 
despite declining health compelled him to manipulate his underlings, while isolation at the 
summit of his “cult of personality” led him to require their attendance at tense, alcohol-fueled 
                                                        
11 Amir Weiner, “Robust Revolution to Retiring Revolution: The Life Cycle of the Soviet Revolution, 1945–
1968,” Slavonic and East European Review 86, no. 2 (2008): 222. See also: Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold 
Summer, 15. Zubkova and Verbitskaia also cross the boundary between the postwar and post-Stalin eras. 
12 Mark Edele outlines opposing interpretations of this trend. Before the opening of the archives, social 
historians argued that millions of veterans had not returned to or left the countryside as quickly as 
possible. The standard Soviet position instead saw millions returning to solidify the collective farms, a 
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Drawing on more comprehensive materials in central archives, Edele concludes that the initial migration 
was relatively slow, growing to a flood only later. Ibid., 175–76. Overall, about two-thirds of all soldiers 
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subsequent years, as famine, taxes, and harsh working conditions on the collectives drove millions more 
to seek employment in industry. Between 1948 and 1950, 3.1 million departed villages in the RSFSR 
alone, and a further 4.5 million in the other union republics combined, a total of 7.6 million. Verbitskaia, 
Rossiiskoe krest'ianstvo, 81–83. 
13 Zubkova, Russia after the War. 
14 Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, 2:83. 
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soirées lasting into the early morning. For the political elite, no less than society as a whole, this 
period was “the bleakest of all.”15 
Stalin’s death appears as a turning point in this characterization, but recently scholars 
have reappraised the postwar years, discerning heretofore obscured trends and emphasizing 
continuities between Stalin’s final years and the subsequent era. Historian Amir Weiner 
highlights how the state controlled the economy and its foundational units, defining principles 
of the system that remained in place under Khrushchev.16 The collective farms, state farms, 
compulsory procurements, and onerous taxes on peasants’ personal plots remained, although 
evident abuses spurred the new leadership to enact tax and procurement reforms in August 
1953, aiding rural families and stimulating production. Even the reforms characteristic of the 
early post-Stalin years originated before March 1953, when circumstances inside the Kremlin 
foreshadowed change. Stalin’s power precluded any open challenge, but his age and failing 
health allowed members of his court a degree of independent authority in their assigned areas of 
responsibility. In the “Leningrad Affair” of 1949, the second city’s leaders paid with their lives 
for losing a factional struggle and for Stalin’s chronic suspicion of the city. Chastened, his 
underlings subsequently used their growing authority to ensure some stability. Illness and 
fatigue took their toll in the early 1950s, encouraging Stalin to vacation on the Black Sea coast, 
from which he exercised only loose control over party and state. In his absence, deputies 
developed a style of decision-making that political historians Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg 
Khlevniuk characterize as a precursor to the “collective leadership” associated with the period 
between March 1953 and June 1957.17 As these absences lengthened, the men who controlled the 
branches of the party, government, and economy gained influence over their respective spheres. 
                                                        
15 Taubman, Khrushchev, 211. 
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The party reemerged as a force beginning in 1952, a development that spanned the 
transition from Stalin’s final year to the early struggles among his successors for power. Scholars 
long characterized his death as a turning point, after which Khrushchev asserted the party’s role 
to further his cause in the struggle for power against G. M. Malenkov and his government 
constituency.18 This party renewal in fact began at Stalin’s behest, giving Khrushchev a point of 
departure from which to continue the process. In late 1952, Stalin reinvigorated procedures he 
previously had neglected, calling the Nineteenth Party Congress—the first since 1939. The gap of 
thirteen years contrasted with the first twenty-two years after the Revolution, when leaders had 
summoned eleven congresses, and the subsequent period when they convoked them every four 
or five years. The congress demonstrated a current of “party revivalism,” on which Khrushchev 
drew in 1953 as he augmented the authority of the party.19 He and the other members of the 
collective leadership strengthened it further by reestablishing regular meetings of other bodies 
Stalin had allowed to atrophy. They began to regularly convene the Central Committee 
Presidium, as Stalin had renamed the Politburo as he expanded its size at the congress, but 
which he also had replaced in practice with an informal handpicked coterie. Khrushchev insisted 
on regular Central Committee plenums, which brought the full body to Moscow to discuss major 
policy changes and provided Khrushchev a forum for propagating new initiatives. Misjudging 
the party’s resurgence and considering the government stronger based on its wartime and 
postwar preeminence, Malenkov became head of government in March 1953, voluntarily ceding 
his position as the most prominent Central Committee secretary to Khrushchev. 
Khrushchev’s rivalry with Malenkov ran at least as deep as conflicts between the two 
                                                        
18 This was a hallmark of the “conflict school.” See, for example: Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet 
Leadership, 29. It had remained a commonly held view. See: McCauley, Khrushchev and the 
Development of Soviet Agriculture, 41. Historians I. V. Aksiutin and A. V. Pyzhikov have argued for a 
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and A. V. Pyzhikov, Poststalinskoe obshchestvo: Problema liderstva i transformatsiia vlasti (Moscow: 
Nauchnaia Kniga, 1999). 
19 Yoram Gorlizki, “Party Revivalism and the Death of Stalin,” Slavic Review 54, no. 1 (1995): 1–22. 
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following the former’s return to Moscow in March 1949. Instead of Khrushchev, Stalin had 
granted Malenkov, despite his urban origins and background in industrial management, the 
mandate to supervise agriculture in his capacity as a Central Committee secretary. As party boss 
of Moscow oblast, Khrushchev confronted its collective farms’ exhausted soil and lack of 
machinery. He began to amalgamate them into larger units to pool capital and streamline 
administration, a strategy he had pursued in Ukraine. In March 1951, an article had appeared in 
Pravda under Khrushchev’s name in which he advocated demolishing the ramshackle villages 
and constructing what he called agrogorody, or “agrotowns.” Traditional detached wooden 
houses would give way to multifamily apartment buildings outfitted with modern conveniences. 
The new communities promised the smart physical appearance and cultural resources of urban 
life. Khrushchev had failed to account for the enormous cost and ideological implications of 
granting precedence to consumption over production, bringing swift attacks from Malenkov and 
others that, because they were blessed by Stalin, threatened Khrushchev’s political fortunes. He 
found himself compelled to beg Stalin for forgiveness, fearing the consequences of the boss’s 
disapproval. After surviving that political danger, he maintained an outwardly friendly 
relationship with Malenkov. Their families socialized and their apartments occupied the same 
building on central Moscow’s Granovskii Street, but Khrushchev’s resentments toward the 
polished but jejune bureaucrat simmered.20 
In 1953, Malenkov and Khrushchev agreed that agriculture was a pressing issue, but it 
had to await the outcome of the power struggle’s first round, in which the two joined with 
colleagues to topple L. P. Beria in June. In August, Malenkov took the podium at a session of the 
Supreme Soviet, the USSR’s rubber-stamp parliament. He announced reforms easing the 
extortionate taxes peasants paid on the output of their half-hectare personal plots, eliminating 
some restrictions on those allotments, and reducing compulsory deliveries of goods for which 
collective farms received payment less than production costs. Popular responses quickly 
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associated these policies with Malenkov. Bowing to the requirements of party discipline, 
Khrushchev expressed support for the initiatives to a group of oblast leaders on August 10, 
1953.21 
Khrushchev then responded quickly and decisively, motivated by temperament and the 
bitter aftertaste of the agrotown debacle. In the words of supporter A. I. Mikoian, Khrushchev 
“did not forget or forgive” Malenkov for the previous conflict or for the popularity the latter 
achieved by publicizing the measures.22 The party boss considered it his prerogative to announce 
the new policies and, in response, set out to make the Central Committee plenum scheduled for 
September a stage from which he could offer his own evaluation of the predicament facing 
Soviet farms. 
Khrushchev’s approach to composing his speech to this plenum illustrates the style he 
later applied to his frequent statements on agriculture. Gathering advisors before the session, he 
explained the pressing issues and the solutions he considered appropriate. The aides 
transformed his mercurial pronouncements into reports and plans of action. In August and 
September 1953, they commandeered an office on the top floor of the Central Committee’s 
headquarters, a handsome prerevolutionary building whose neoclassical façade overlooked 
central Moscow’s Old Square, and developed Khrushchev’s outline into a speech. Their number 
included A. S. Shevchenko and G. T. Shuiskii, his personal aides, as well as Pravda editors D. T. 
Shepilov and V. T. Poliakov, and academician I. D. Laptev, president of the Lenin All-Union 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences.23 In future instances, the composition changed, but usually 
included Shevchenko, V. V. Matskevich, and the heads of Central Committee departments. 
Holding no post other than that of Khrushchev’s adjutant on agriculture, Shevchenko controlled 
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access to the First Secretary and possessed powers that aroused resentment.24 In his memoirs, 
Shepilov describes the atmosphere of the period, when shared meals and car rides replaced the 
stringent hierarchy and suspicion of the Stalin years.25 Shepilov recalls that two teams labored: 
the one of which he was a member formulated a set of formal directives for the plenum’s 
approval. A parallel one prepared Khrushchev’s speech to the assembled party notables.26 
Historian A. A. Nikonov also describes how Khrushchev dictated major themes to 
subordinates.27 Moreover, the files of the Central Committee’s apparatus attest to similar 
practices as late as July 1964.28 
Shepilov later scoffed that Khrushchev’s speech had lacked direction and depth, the very 
characteristics for which Nikonov praised it. Not surprising given the circumstances of his 
subsequent fall from grace, Shepilov condemned Khrushchev. He expressed dismay that 
Khrushchev rejected his team’s resolution, forcing the plenum to instead adopt a version 
adapted from his own speech.29 “That report contained everything he saw in the countryside, 
everything he knew about agriculture,” Shepilov wrote. He contrasted his own formal training 
with Khrushchev’s experiential knowhow, concluding that the address “neither presented a 
fundamental analysis of the real state of our agriculture nor defined the basic issues that had to 
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be resolved to ensure further development.”30 Instead, the speech consisted of a mishmash of 
thoughts and schemes, with the important measures—such as those to increase grain 
production—hidden like wheat among the chaff. Shepilov charged that Khrushchev instead 
emphasized directionless tinkering on matters such as corn, missing the point by shunting aside 
the chemicals, fertilizers, and other applications of science and technology.31 By contrast, 
Nikonov praised Khrushchev’s speech because it for the first time acknowledged the desperate 
conditions facing rural residents.32 
That speech was necessary because Soviet leaders lacked knowledge about agriculture 
and rural life, hampering any attempt to remedy the situation. Bureaucrats had obfuscated 
things when reporting to Stalin, who consequently had known little about peasants’ lives and 
about agricultural production. Khrushchev later derided him for believing in the accuracy of 
extravagant socialist-realist films that portrayed singing peasants feasting at tables heavy with 
food and drink.33 He also criticized Stalin for never verifying the deceptive statistics he received 
from officials, who provided them perhaps to protect themselves.34 Khrushchev and his men met 
this problem in the summer of 1953, when their lack of data about peasants’ income, labor 
productivity, and consumption inhibited diagnosing rural social and economic ailments. 
Preparing Khrushchev’s speech, Shevchenko confronted V. N. Starovskii, head of the USSR 
Central Statistical Administration, after the latter repeatedly altered important data reported 
previously. When Shevchenko rebuked Starovskii for revising a statistic for the fourth time, the 
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statistician protested that each new version had been an improvement: that is, it had made the 
situation appear less dire. Shevchenko countered that he cared little for appearances, wanting 
only a clearer understanding. His riposte had little effect, however, because Starovskii returned 
the following day with a purportedly better figure.35 
Khrushchev prided himself on firsthand knowledge, which he demonstrated during his 
Stalin-era tour of duty in Ukraine. He delighted in inspecting farms in person and forcing other 
officials, willingly or not, to do the same. In August and September 1953, Khrushchev dragged 
those attending major gatherings in Moscow to the nearby model farms he knew well. There 
they observed demonstrations of his favorite methods and crops, including square-cluster 
planting and corn.36 He viewed Moscow oblast as a proving ground for corn cultivation and an 
example for similar areas lacking the rich black-earth soils and warmer temperatures found to 
the south and west, where corn was common. In Moscow, where it had been at most a novelty, 
the special farms achieved harvests that appeared to vindicate Khrushchev’s faith in it. 
Dragooning the others into these daytrips, he expected them to understand the planting and 
other techniques at a level equaling his own, an expenditure of time and effort few proved 
willing to match. 
Khrushchev’s message to the plenum itself criticized existing policy and revealed the 
difficulties farms faced, thereby affirming that he was in charge of agriculture. Yet his program 
lacked the singular focus on a particular solution characteristic of later statements launching the 
Virgin Lands campaign in February 1954 and the corn crusade in January 1955. He dismissed 
Malenkov’s assertion, made at the Nineteenth Party Congress, that the USSR’s grain supply was 
and would remain adequate. Khrushchev criticized his rival, whom he did not name, for using 
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misleading measurements of maximum potential yield with no accounting for spoilage or loss, 
rather than the actual harvest, a standard practice under Stalin. Khrushchev charged that grain 
output could not meet rising demand for food, let alone supply the feed necessary to meet 
production targets for meat, milk, and eggs. He highlighted many potential solutions, including  
mechanization, improved cultivation methods, and eliminating waste during harvest and 
storage.37 He extolled corn as a possible remedy because it provided grain and feed alike. In 
1954, corn cultivation consequently expanded from 3.5 million to 4.3 million hectares and in 
every union republic, as dozens of regions planted corn for the first time.38 
In 1954, Khrushchev and the party concentrated on the Virgin Lands adventure. Tens of 
thousands of volunteers, including many members of the Communist Youth League, or 
Komsomol, traveled to sparsely settled lands in Kazakhstan and Western Siberia to establish 
vast, industrial-scale farms for producing wheat for state procurement. Their initial results 
proved positive, bolstering Khrushchev’s prestige and authority over agriculture, but also 
making him overconfident in the size and reliability of these grain harvests. Extending the 
program to other regions, he pushed to expand the frontier of newly plowed lands, which 
required devoting capital that might have earned greater returns if invested in settled regions. 
Taubman concludes that the scheme proved a political boon in 1954 and 1955: by undertaking a 
program in the tradition of Stalinist mass-mobilization schemes, Khrushchev demonstrated the 
aggressive, visionary leadership offered by no other leader, least of all Malenkov.39 
Having prioritized the Virgin Lands, Khrushchev delayed his crusade for corn until the 
January 1955 Central Committee plenum, the fourth such meeting on agriculture in just 
eighteen months. His address developed from the familiar procedure, in which he convened his 
agricultural aides, diagnosed problems, and sketched out measures to remedy them. These 
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statements established the boundaries of debate over policy. Room remained only to determine 
how far and how fast to journey down the path Khrushchev had already chosen. Recorded in a 
document dated November 5, 1954, his contributions to the speechwriting process took the form 
of a monologue touching on some, but not all of the topics in the final speech, suggesting that he 
had additional input at some other point in the process. The text’s unpolished quality and 
informal language indicate that it was a set of instructions, rather than a formal memorandum. 
Reproduced for a small number of advisors, this and similar documents guided those who 
enjoyed Khrushchev’s confidence as they developed the proposals he expected to come to his 
desk. It contains no introductory phrases; instead, it launches into a critique of livestock-raising 
practices and, in particular, feed production.40 Khrushchev conveyed his unabashed enthusiasm 
for corn, “We will raise corn because it has proven itself. It possesses boundless potential as 
feed.” “There is a limit,” he cautioned, “but that limit is distant.” Acknowledging that solving the 
meat and milk problem required more than just corn, he allowed that even this miraculous crop 
could not succeed if unaccompanied by subsidiary measures. Technology proved essential 
harvesting corn before the frost, so he emphasized the priority of manufacturing necessary 
machines. Similarly, the harvest might go to waste in the absence of silos and other structures in 
which farms could store silage to nourish cattle during the long winters typical of most of the 
USSR’s agricultural regions.41 
The January 1955 plenum also removed Malenkov from his post as head of government, 
which aided Khrushchev’s efforts to consolidate his authority. Demonstrating his new clout, 
Khrushchev filled the plenum proceedings with discussion of his agricultural policies, yet 
scholars have assigned more significance to the political maneuverings than to the agricultural 
programs. Citing Malenkov’s failures of leadership and misstatements on ideological points, the 
First Secretary and other Presidium members forced Malenkov to become deputy premier. They 
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condemned him for advocating spending on consumer and food-processing industries, for a 
nonconformist position on the danger of nuclear war, and for ties to the disgraced Beria.42 By 
contrast, Khrushchev occupied the ideological high ground by following traditions that assigned 
primacy to heavy industry in investment plans, relegating agriculture and consumer goods to 
second place. The party boss was hardly an embattled consumer advocate, least of all at this 
point early in the decade, despite the concern for consumers and rural citizens evident in his 
earlier agrotown scheme.43 Criticizing Malenkov’s unorthodox positions did not require 
Khrushchev to opportunistically bend his policy preferences, only to pursue the line he already 
considered necessary. In agriculture, he called not for radical increases in investment, but more 
efficiently using the surplus capacity he saw in Soviet farms, which needed better leadership and 
smarter management of their productive capacities. These convictions motivated his frequent 
condemnations of party leaders and the bureaucracy.44 He imagined that resulting gains might 
produce a self-sustaining reinvestment by farms, allowing growth without resorting to a full-
scale diversion of resources from industrial and military budgets. At the same time, competition 
with Malenkov restrained Khrushchev’s enthusiasm, which reined in his policies until launching 
the optimistic initiatives following the June 1957 crisis that removed restraints on his 
authority.45 
Corn was foremost among the measures Khrushchev deemed critical to bringing this 
unutilized capacity into action. On January 25, 1955, he proclaimed the crop’s new status to the 
plenum, calling it “the decisive requirement” for increasing output of milk, eggs, and meat. 
Embracing a three-part approach to raising output, he argued for continuing to plow up virgin 
and fallow land, increasing the productivity of farms in settled regions, and raising the 
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proportion of cropland devoted to corn threefold.46 Corn offered a remedy to shortages of grain 
and feed alike. To substantiate this argument, Khrushchev resorted to a favorite tactic, 
reminding his audience of the comparison he had made in September 1953 between the extent 
of corn plantings and harvests in the US and in the USSR.47 
Khrushchev conceded that corn faced real climatic limits, but his enthusiasm for 
technological solutions pushed him to disregard tradition. He acknowledged boundaries on the 
area where corn might fully mature, producing grain, but only until Soviet specialists could 
develop techniques for overcoming cool and dry growing conditions.48 This presumption 
informed the mission of the delegation to the US later that year. Its experts examined corn in 
Iowa, but also focused on northerly regions of Minnesota and southern Canada where 
conditions more closely resembled those prevailing in European Russia.49 The plenum approved 
an initiative requiring each region and republic to attempt to grow corn, even where farmers and 
planners alike had previously considered it unsuitable; if a region already grew corn, its 
directives demanded more. Khrushchev declared that if farms grew corn not for grain, but for 
livestock feed, then the crop needed only to reach the “milky-wax” stage of maturity before 
harvest and could therefore grow much farther north than before. Khrushchev set about 
convincing his audience, bound by the traditional extent of corn cultivation, that this innovation 
in using corn would pay off. He dismissed the old northern boundary that ran from Chernivtsi in 
Western Ukraine through Vinnytsia, to the south of Kyiv through Luhans'k and eastward into 
Russia’s North Caucasus region. He agitated instead for planting it that spring hundreds of 
kilometers to the north.50 He demanded a rise in plantings from a postwar low of 3.5 million 
                                                        
46 Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 1:429. 
47 Ibid., 1:432. 
48 Ibid., 1:432. 
49 RGAE, f. 7486, op. 22, d. 89, ll. 135–36. 
50 Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 1:433. He repeated this assertion endlessly, 
demonstrating that he considered corn livestock feed from the beginning. Even the grain farms in 
  104 
hectares in 1953, or just 3.3 percent of cultivated land, to 28 million hectares in 1960, 
approaching 30 percent, its relative proportion of cropland in the US. To buttress this point, he 
used another favored tactic, a small example of a special farm that proved in his mind a general 
claim about a broad region. The Lenin collective farm of the Vurnar district in the Chuvash 
ASSR of European Russia’s upper Volga region provided the case. Reading from a letter written 
to the Central Committee by the farm’s chairman, Khrushchev described how in 1954 the 
collective farmers had grown thirty-five hectares of corn, a crop previously alien to the area, and 
harvested a high yield of silage and grain. “In recent years . . . we have tested planting corn in 
various regions of the USSR,” he enthused. “Everywhere, even in northern regions, where it has 
received proper care, good yields have resulted.”51 He qualified his ardor by emphasizing careful 
cultivation and use of machines; however, these conditions often went unmet, contributing to 
corn’s poor showing in the initial years of the crusade. 
A second, less publicized statement Khrushchev made at this plenum demonstrates the 
contrast between the addresses composed by others with his input, and his informal remarks. 
Contrasting with that more formal style, the closing statement he made on January 29, 1955, 
and the questions he posed to other speakers in intervening sessions illustrate the latter. “The 
Americans are not dumber than us,” he explained, noting that the preponderance of corn in the 
United States approximated the level he proposed for 1960, amounting to some 30 percent of 
arable land devoted to corn. Disregarding his earlier caution, he declared that corn could grow 
anywhere. “Now we can not only compete but, strictly speaking, we can overtake America 
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because the potential for corn cultivation now truly expands to cover the whole territory of the 
Soviet Union,” he blustered, assuring the audience that the resulting feed could raise the 
productivity of the lagging but vital livestock sector. 52 Later that spring, he went further still, 
claiming that corn might grow even in Yakutiia, a vast region of subarctic taiga in the USSR’s 
northeastern reaches.53 This and similar wild assertions, although they never led to anything 
more than timid experiments in those regions, gave rise to common claims that Khrushchev 
demanded corn cultivation beyond the Arctic Circle.54 
In January 1955, Khrushchev also addressed the pitfalls of party and government 
practices for managing the economy, warning that party bosses could not merely give farms 
orders and expect satisfactory results. Instead, they “had to drive into the consciousness of all 
farmworkers corn plantings’ importance,” a demanding task that officials had already 
misunderstood. He employed another of his favored tactics by taking to task one of the many 
regional leaders who had spoken in response to his opening report. Praising Z. I. Muratov, party 
leader of the Tatar ASSR, and expressing a desire to avoid giving offense, Khrushchev lambasted 
Muratov’s attempts at agricultural planning. He had earlier sniped at Muratov because he 
believed that the 40,000 hectares of corn the republic’s leaders proposed would not solve its 
feed shortage. Conferring among themselves, Muratov and his advisors had returned with a 
higher, but arbitrary figure. They decided that 200,000 hectares might satisfy Khrushchev’s 
demands, but they had not actually calculated the republic’s targets for livestock, the 
concomitant feed requirements, corn’s potential yields, or the hectarage required to produce the 
needed feed. Khrushchev fumed that this old method, simply naming higher figures to placate 
superiors' demands, did not satisfy his expectations for rational planning and management. 
Forcing this measure on the farms would unquestionably lead to “foolishness” and outlandish 
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excuses for the inevitable failure to produce its planned meat and dairy output.55 Khrushchev 
and others repeatedly ridiculed one such tale at the plenum. Leaders of districts and of Moscow 
oblast had claimed that their small efforts to grow corn in 1954 had not succeeded because of 
circumstances beyond their control. Flocks of rooks, they professed, had ravaged the fields by 
digging the corn seeds from the ground before they could germinate after planting.56 
Voicing characteristic antagonism toward the bureaucracy, Khrushchev thundered that 
in regard to corn they “must not be armchair administrators, but describe it to collective farmers 
so that they understand.”57 Often, district leaders were inept because few party members 
volunteered to serve, due to abysmal pay, low status, and grim living conditions. Those who did 
frequently wasted time holding “conversations empty of content” and filled “with generalized 
slogans.” Party chiefs possessed neither practical knowledge about production, nor the authority 
to ensure that policies were executed properly, circumstances compounded when they 
misunderstood directives from above.58 Khrushchev proved farsighted about the bureaucracy’s 
limitations, which stood out clearly to him before the corn program began thanks to his many 
years of experience in the system. 
The Soviet press widely publicized and endlessly repeated Khrushchev’s message on 
corn, providing the average local official a guide to the party line. Texts of important speeches 
and summaries of others, as well as unsigned editorials in Pravda and Sel’skoe khoziaistvo 
guided those responsible for agriculture. Following the January plenum, the headline of the first 
of these pieces, known in Russian as a “leader,” set the tone with its martial language by 
declaring, “The directives of the Central Committee plenum are a plan of battlefield action.”59 In 
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subsequent days, newspapers put the directives promoting corn at the center of attention under 
headlines declaring “a battle to fulfill them.”60 Interminable texts running four, six, or in this 
case, ten pages of dense columns, Khrushchev’s remarks saw thorough editing to eliminate 
sensitive content and to soften the First Secretary’s unscripted remarks.61 In addition, the party 
hierarchy distributed edited transcripts of plenums to subordinate organizations, which held 
their own meetings to convey their content.62 These statements of policy guided the words and, 
at least in theory, the actions of union, republican, oblast, and local party organizations. 
Despite procedures for disseminating orders and Khrushchev’s denunciations of 
bureaucratic routine in propagandizing corn and carrying out his plans to grow it, troubles 
caused further handwringing on his part. On March 4, 1955, he met with agricultural advisors 
I. A. Benediktov, P. P. Lobanov, V. P. Mylarshchikov, and F. S. Krest'ianinov. A stenographer’s 
record of the meeting sheds further light on Khrushchev’s goals and concerns, revealing private 
trepidation about hurdles in the path to growing large harvests of corn in 1955. 
Khrushchev again bemoaned administrative practices inherited from Stalin. Despite the 
passage of only a few weeks since the launch of his corn campaign, Khrushchev had already 
accumulated grievances against the bureaucracy. He grumbled that many officials merely 
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blathered about corn only as a grain, rather than as a source of grain and feed. Consequently, 
the spotlight the plenum had shined on the crop had already resulted in unsatisfactory radio, 
print, and film propaganda. Its frequency and volume had risen, but its substance had changed 
little. Khrushchev denounced even the Moscow newspapers responsible for setting the tone, 
Pravda and Sel'skoe khoziaistvo, for failing to effectively illuminate the matter. Officials and the 
press prattled endlessly about the crop’s importance and methods for planting it, but advocated 
techniques at odds with the party’s recommendations. Although they achieved little, officials 
chattered on: “Why?” he asked rhetorically, “Because they have been taught that way for 
decades; but now we’ve moved on.”63 His meaning remains opaque: Khrushchev might have 
implied that officials had learned from years of experience to view corn in this muddled way. 
The crop’s unfamiliarity in all but some southwestern regions, however, indicates that this 
criticism addressed the party and government machinery in general. Decades of experience in 
the Stalinist system had conditioned party leaders and agricultural managers to respond to any 
initiative in this way. They concentrated on the topic handed down from above with little 
consultation, confident that attention would soon move on to the next policy, allowing them to 
resume business as usual. Khrushchev feared—rightly, as it turned out—just this result in the 
case of corn. He demanded that his subordinates ensure that each leader at every level 
understood the importance of corn and that it would remain a permanent point of emphasis. 
Khrushchev advised the aides to use the press to find fault with some of these officials.64  
Although he did not name the offending article, Khrushchev complained that Shepilov, the 
editor of Pravda, “had printed a leading article [reproducing] text directly from the plenum 
[resolutions] in a bold type without commentary,” a description fitting the editorial in the 
edition of March 1, 1955.65 This was a flawed approach, Khrushchev stated. “We must make this 
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matter plain. What is written in the plenum directives is a point of departure, but we must 
clarify it so that everyone comprehends what it will look like in action.”66 A survey of articles in 
Sel'skoe khoziaistvo from January until the start of the planting season in May suggests that 
Khrushchev’s order had some effect. During February and March, they exhorted readers to 
participate by, as a recurring rubric put it, building “expansive socialist competition for high 
yields of corn.”67 In the two weeks following Khrushchev’s comments, content began to 
concentrate on specific tasks necessary to plant corn using the approved methods.68 
Lecturing his agricultural aides-de-camp, Khrushchev reiterated that corn furthered the 
mission to improve living standards and served as a means to meet rising consumer demand. 
Corn, fertilizers, and other measures provided the means for rapidly meeting those 
requirements. He told his advisors, “I believe only in [corn], otherwise no five or six years will 
save us. . . . We will use new means [corn] to do the job.”69 He did not specify from what or 
whom the Soviet leaders needed to save themselves; however, Khrushchev genuinely believed 
that improving citizens’ living standards, as measured by necessities like clothing, housing, and 
food, provided the only sure way to prevent social unrest. Failure might lead to the 
unpredictable mass disturbances Soviet leaders feared. In his memoirs, Khrushchev described 
how he and his compatriots felt unease, which made them cautious toward the Thaw. Carrying 
the thaw metaphor further, he wrote how they feared it might grow into a flood, that 
developments might “overwhelm us and we would find it difficult to cope. . . . We didn’t want 
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some tidal wave to come along that would sweep us away.”70 That threat might have resulted 
just as easily from discord sparked by empty store shelves as by revelations about Stalin’s crimes 
or the millions formerly interred in labor camps. Indeed, as historians have documented in the 
case of tragedies such as Novocherkassk, workers’ grievances occasionally did build into mass 
protest. 
Khrushchev’s goal to raise living standards illustrated his practical, even utilitarian 
understanding of socialism, which critics at home and abroad have disparaged.71 Speaking to a 
conference of farmworkers in Leningrad in April 1955, Khrushchev described popular demands 
Soviet leaders faced. He contended that living standards were not a problem of ideology that the 
party could solve simply by pointing out the injustices and irrationalities of capitalism. Instead, 
leaders had to answer to workers. “‘I believe in you,’” Khrushchev’s imagined citizen said, “‘I 
fought for this [system] in the Civil War, fought against the Germans, defeated fascism. But if 
it’s all the same, tell me: Will there be meat? Will there be milk? Will there be good pairs of 
pants?’” The socialist economy had to provide basic comforts or its achievements—hard won in 
the crash industrialization of the 1930s, defended in war, and reconstructed afterward—would 
prove in vain. Drawing laughter and applause, Khrushchev responded to those questions, “Of 
course, this is not [a question of] ideology. It is impossible to have the correct ideology but go 
about without pants.”72 Although he often emphasized material riches, Khrushchev also 
articulated an idealistic vision for reforming individuals, society, and politics, culminating in the 
Third Party Program that announced the “the full-scale construction of communism.” 
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Corn contributed to Khrushchev’s vision of achieving those goals. In a similar address in 
Saratov in mid March, he allowed that the USSR might achieve the abundance he promised 
without corn, but only by expending more time and resources. “Communism is not something 
pie-in-the-sky [chto-to zanebesnoe]. We are not priests who say that the earthly paradise is only 
temporary, while heaven is eternal and must be earned by suffering on earth. . . . We can [ensure 
a high standard of living] faster, easier, and cheaper with corn, if only we can learn how to grow 
it.”73 Corn possessed almost miraculous abilities in his mind, and Khrushchev rejoiced in finding 
anyone who shared his enthusiasm for it, even if they showed it in unusual ways. He frequently 
touted corn’s capacity to provide both grain and silage; speaking to his advisors in March, he 
described a third potential use. Describing his home village, Kalinovka, he explained how the 
collective farm’s corn plantings had produced so much feed that after two years it had 
abandoned other feed crops. He quipped that corn had yielded so much that the peasants fed it 
to all their livestock, with so much left over that some had begun “trying to distill moonshine 
from the mash, although unsuccessfully. As you can see, corn has even solved this third 
problem. True, these innovators might land in jail, but they are sure they can make 
moonshine.”74 
This March 4, 1955, conversation offers two instances in which Khrushchev’s informal 
musings produced specific action. Much like his plenum speeches, his public remarks evolved 
from private discussions with advisors. In this case, he ordered them to produce a text 
summarizing this commentary on recent events for him to deliver in Saratov on March 18. In the 
hands of the advisors, his thoughts became the basis for his numerous public remarks during his 
frequent travels around the country. He broadcast many of the judgments discussed in private 
to the conference, remarks spread to a much larger audience through a summary that appeared 
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in Pravda the following day.75 Additionally, it forms a link in a chain of events that resulted in 
policies designed to increase the production of corn harvesters, a subject addressed in chapter 3. 
* * * 
In 1955, the corn offensive Khrushchev launched achieved mixed results at best. For 
every farm or district that satisfied feed requirements, many fell short of their goals. The 
cropland devoted to corn ballooned more than fourfold over the 1954 total, surpassing 17 million 
hectares. Khrushchev controlled decision-making and policy in agriculture, but his authority 
over policy did not ensure that the USSR’s regions carried it out to his satisfaction. A short time 
separated the decision in January and planting in May, too little to solve the problem of 
managers’ and farmers’ unfamiliarity with the crop and the needed technology. Conceding that 
farms achieved little in the first year of the crusade, Nikonov concludes, “Every sensible 
beginning becomes an absurdity when taken to extremes.”76 Regional committees forced farms 
to plant corn with insufficient regard for preparing and educating workers, as well as cultivating, 
harvesting, storing, or using the grain and feed. Consequently, a substantial percentage of the 
fields yielded little to nothing, proving less productive than the oats and barley that corn 
replaced and tainting Khrushchev’s crusade with an inauspicious beginning. 
Khrushchev voiced concern about the haste ingrained in the Stalinist economy, as 
officials acted in contravention of measures enacted in April 1955 to rationalize and decentralize 
agricultural planning. Republic ministries no longer designated each farms’ crop rotations, herd 
size, and other details of daily operation, as they had under Stalin. Farms received orders only 
for quantities of given goods the state wished to purchase, leaving the method for producing 
those products to the farms’ discretion: but only so long as they pledged to grow more corn. The 
campaign mentality Khrushchev encouraged—even as he decried the resulting misdeeds—
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ensured that regional bosses saw corn as the year’s priority. Typically, leaders whose domains 
exceeded plans in whatever the current campaign demanded of them benefitted, while those 
who acted cautiously, let alone protested, risked censure and demotion. In 1955, oblasts and 
republics competed to outstrip Khrushchev’s expectations, but their leaders failed to secure 
outcomes that matched Khrushchev’s goals. Concerned only with appearances, many officials 
prioritized reporting that the farms under their control planted more hectares of corn, with less 
concern for the quantities of grain, silage, meat, and milk produced as a result. 
Statistics sent to Moscow support this conclusion. Owing to the atmosphere 
Khrushchev’s insistent campaigning created, however, they are even more suspect than normal. 
The leaders of oblasts and republics rightly deduced that they had to present an optimistic 
picture, and as a result farms in each of the climatic zones of the Russian republic [Rossiiskaia 
sovetskaia federativnaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika, RSFSR] planted more hectares of 
corn.77 In many of them, the 1955 figure exceeded that of 1954 by a factor of ten. In the 
Northwest zone, centered on Leningrad and stretching to the north and east to oblasts where 
cool, damp climates proved unsuitable for corn, the area increased from 18,900 hectares in 
1954—already an all-time high—to 272,700 hectares in 1955.78 This figure likely overstated the 
true quantity. In documented cases, local authorities reported that a farm had planted corn on a 
particular field, while actually sowing traditional crops, oats and barley.79 This likely occurred 
frequently. 
Despite pressure to succeed, authorities reported disastrously small harvests. The RSFSR 
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Ministry of Agriculture admitted to the Central Committee that approximately one hectare in 
ten in the republic had failed to germinate, yielding nothing; in some locales, the ratio was 
higher.80 V. N. Starovskii, head of the Central Statistical Department, reported that across the 
USSR 6.1 million of the 17.9 million hectares of corn were in “new regions,” where corn was 
unfamiliar. Of the 1.35 million hectares that failed, 958,000 were in those regions.81 Perhaps 
made in hopes that these results would convince Moscow of corn’s unsuitability to the local 
climate and land, local authorities’ claims may have supported silent protests against the crop. 
Northern oblasts appealed to Moscow to rescind requirements to plant corn in future years. 
Straddling the upper Volga River at least four hundred kilometers north of Moscow, Vologda 
oblast reported that its farms had harvested a mere 5,700 of 33,000 hectares, a failure rate 
exceeding 80 percent.82 Murmansk oblast in the far north dutifully tested corn on fifty-three test 
plots totaling fifty-five hectares, all of which failed, resulting in the cancelation of future 
corngrowing plans.83 More commonly, Moscow responded to claims that corn could not grow 
with criticism and demands for redoubled efforts. The statistics most likely underreported the 
failure rate, since recordkeeping made self-interested fibbing comparatively easy. In the 
simplest ruse, farms claimed that a field in which they had planted corn—in poor soil, 
inattentively cultivated, and therefore stunted, overrun with weeds, and yielding little—had been 
chopped and fed to livestock as fresh feed or even fed “on the root,” which entailed turning 
livestock loose in the field to eat their fill. In Riazan oblast, for example, a local inspector found 
that a district party secretary “reported fraudulently” [otchityvalsia ochkovtiratel'stvom] to the 
oblast committee that the district corn had produced a good yield, but that the farms had 
chopped it and fed it to cattle. Worse still, the party secretary forced the collective farm 
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chairmen to report the same.84 On paper, these seemed to be low-yielding hectares of corn, a 
result better than admitting to superiors that the crop had failed. 
Despite indisputable evidence of lackluster results, analyses that reached the Central 
Committee characterized the season’s campaign a partial success, necessitating further pursuit. 
Starovskii reported that across the USSR, those corn plantings that did yield a harvest surpassed 
other crops by providing between two and four times as much livestock feed.85 Material on the 
campaign often focused on individual farms, districts, and oblasts that stood out, obscuring the 
failures. Officials from Khrushchev on down asserted that where corn received proper care, 
harvests raised output of milk, realizing the policy’s promise. Milk output increased in 
Krasnodar krai by 37 percent. Moreover, the yield remained high through winter months when 
feed became scarce and dairy production traditionally dipped, a result achieved on the Stalin 
collective farm in Saratov’s Balashov district.86 This conclusion rested on a tautology: no farm 
that failed to produce a corn crop could prove that the climate would not allow the crop to grow. 
Instead, superiors blamed the managers for “the crudest violations of agricultural methods.”87 
These strategies likewise characterized the Soviet press’s coverage, a fact arousing 
Khrushchev’s ire. Neither public statements nor secret analyses could overlook the problems 
stemming from the poor quality of seeds, the absence of specialized machines, and the 
unfamiliarity of techniques such as square-cluster planting. Khrushchev privately expressed 
skepticism toward media reports of triumphs. In October, when meeting with the Soviet 
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delegation that had returned from North America, Khrushchev addressed the issue: “Right now 
we write in the newspapers that corn turned out well everywhere. . . . Yet in places where corn 
did not, [people] think that Soviet leaders are lying to them and to themselves, and clearly know 
nothing.”88 He did not specify any particular article or newspaper, but bullish portrayals had 
appeared often in Sel'skoe khoziaistvo, for instance.89 Wary of popular disaffection, Khrushchev 
demanded that the ministries “tell the truth about where things are good, about where they are 
bad, and about why. Then people will understand and adapt their attitudes [to corn]. And if we 
say that it is great everywhere, that will be bad.”90 In the days following Khrushchev’s remark, 
newspapers ran critical stories.91 One explained how, in central Russia’s Orel oblast, an entire 
district had reported its corn harvested, but farms in fact had fulfilled only 10 percent of the plan 
for conserving silage. “The whole crop has been harvested, judging from the reports. . . . In 
reality, substantial fields have yet to be harvested, and are yellowing and drying” while standing 
in the field, losing calories and nutrients by the day.92 
At no point did any official protest the policy of cultivating corn, for protest would have 
proven futile. Even if individuals viewed the scheme as an obviously wasteful enterprise, the 
party’s culture prohibited speaking out once the decision came down from the Presidium and 
the Central Committee. This “democratic centralism” apparently did not constrain party 
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members’ actions in practice, but it did govern their words. As far as the evidence allows us to 
determine, no Presidium member spoke out, even though in January 1955 that body, although 
positively disposed toward Khrushchev, was not completely under his control. No minutes of the 
Presidium’s meetings are accessible, but the absence of opposition can be posited from the notes 
V. N. Malin made of its sessions at Khrushchev’s orders.93 Additionally, after surviving the 
challenge to his power in June 1957, Khrushchev publically attacked former Presidium 
colleagues, especially V. M. Molotov, for resisting the Virgin Lands campaign in 1954.94 In his 
memoir, Shepilov similarly recounted receiving blame from one of Khrushchev’s backers for not 
championing that campaign. Yet Khrushchev never accused the others of having reservations 
about corn. Shepilov claimed to have spoken out against neither project, even though he 
considered them wrongheaded. “Like my generation of communists,” born around 1905 and 
educated in politics under Stalin, he wrote, “I had been raised in the spirit of utter loyalty to the 
party and the strictest discipline; to express doubts at the party’s directives would have been 
sacrilege.”95 His account perhaps seeks to justify his own inaction after the fact, but it also 
conveys the sense of regimentation shaping loyalists’ words. 
Regardless, party and government officials did not always carry out Khrushchev’s 
demands with enthusiasm or effectiveness. On occasion, they registered mild discontent. After 
the January 1955 Central Committee plenum, each republic and region, as procedure required, 
held a gathering to publicize the new measures. A few local figures spoke up, but dissent proved 
rare. Word of skepticism, however, did reach Moscow: a certain Comrade Koval, the Central 
Committee’s envoy to the gathering held in Riga, described the response in the Latvian SSR. 
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Speakers frequently mentioned corn in their remarks, but many spoke “timidly” on the subject.96 
Latvian leaders reported to Moscow a less controversial version of events, noting only that 
“certain communists . . . expressed doubts about the possibility of fulfilling the corn planting 
[plan].”97 Koval concluded that the republic’s agricultural leaders, including Minister of 
Agriculture A. A. Nikonov, had pronounced the phrases political expedience required, “which 
you cannot feed to livestock.” They did not, however, follow up with a program of action. At a 
special gathering of district officials from across the Baltic republic, anonymous voices from the 
audience questioned: “How will we plant? How will we harvest?” Addressed to republic party 
secretary I. E. Kalnberzin [in Latvian, Jānis Kalnbērziņš] and reproduced by Koval, an unsigned 
note complained that the policies Moscow imposed harmed farms’ development. Corn planted 
in 1954 at Moscow’s insistence had failed; to repeat that experiment on a larger scale in 1955 
demonstrated “foolishness.”98 Because they hid behind anonymity, those registering such 
complaints confirmed the danger of openly criticizing the party line. 
Years later, Nikonov included personal observations in his history of the period, 
characterizing his own actions by claiming to have spoken “in loud protest against the strong-
willed, even adventuristic directive.” He and his ministry objected to the order to plant 200,000 
hectares of corn in the small republic, judging that farms lacked the machines, seeds, and 
experience with the crop, which itself was unsuited to the climate. As a consequence of his 
protests, he “received for starters the labels ‘opportunist,’ ‘oppositionist,’ and ‘searcher for the 
easy way out.’ Later, ‘antiparty element,’ among others, was added.”99 These charges contained a 
serious, no longer mortal danger, as they might have done under Stalin. Nonetheless, the peril of 
demotion and disgrace stalked officials who showed insufficient enthusiasm in carrying out 
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Moscow’s orders. Although proving how vigorously Nikonov protested is impossible, his account 
conveys a sense of the atmosphere reigning in 1955, one in which lagging zeal for corn could 
damage otherwise promising careers. 
Furthermore, in the spring of 1955, the Soviet government began to reform agricultural 
planning, a measure Khrushchev championed. The initiative purported to limit the abuses he 
had denounced in speeches, for example in attacking the Tatar ASSR’s Z. I. Muratov at the 
January plenum. Few regional leaders had objected to corn. Most appeared to follow orders with 
enthusiasm, and some even overzealously imposed corn. Even after Khrushchev’s warning 
against enforcing arbitrary, one-size-fits-all plans from above, these remained common. As early 
as the speech in Saratov in March 1955, he cautioned, “I am in no way proposing to impose from 
above a designated percentage of corn in collective and state farms’ plantings.” Little benefit 
would come of doing so for the sake of appearing to follow Moscow’s directives, rather than 
rationally analyzing production.100 Khrushchev had plenty of reason to fear such practices. 
Nikonov recalled similar experiences in Latvia in 1955. A state farm director from the Komi 
ASSR, in the far northeastern reaches of European Russia, recounted another instance. His farm 
was ordered to plant many hectares of corn. The crop failed, but the farm received a similar set 
of orders the following year. The corn crop failed again, but the authorities continued to send 
similar plans for each of the four successive years.101 
The new procedure for planning replaced Stalin-era practices. Then, republic ministries 
of agriculture imposed a minutely detailed set of orders on the farms, one growing season at a 
time. Bureaucrats far from the farm and its local conditions designated the size of each crop and 
of the herd of different kinds of livestock. In the “new planning procedure,” farms mapped out 
those details for themselves, and several years in advance, based on government orders for 
particular goods: so much wheat, so much milk, so many eggs. The director of a state farm, 
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property of the government, had little choice to follow orders. Collective farms possessed at least 
nominal independence thanks to the reform. In principle, they had the power to organize 
planting schedules, crop rotations, herds, and other practical matters within the boundaries 
established by production plans; these required only formal approval by the district soviet’s 
executive committee. That body approved plans for the farms under its supervision, collated 
them, and passed them to the oblast soviet, which applied a similar procedure. On paper, this 
reduced local authorities’ influence; it apparently had little effect in practice. 
In fact, it created conflicts between farms and the district bosses, typically resolved in 
favor of the higher authorities with little regard for the collective farms’ independence.102 A case 
from Siberia’s Omsk oblast illustrates this interaction, although intervention by Moscow officials 
resulted in an atypical outcome. In early 1956, inspectors from the USSR Ministry of 
Government Oversight arrived to determine the results of corn cultivation in 1955, and to verify 
preparations for the coming year. They eventually adjudicated a conflict over crop structures 
between the Khrushchev collective farm and Isil'kul district party committee and soviet. On 
April 2, the ministry’s inspector attended a meeting of the farm’s administrative committee, 
where the chairman and other personnel described repeatedly submitting plans to the district 
bosses, who altered it to include less corn on three occasions. The farm’s management resolved 
to continue to argue their case before the local authorities while implementing their own plan, 
which staked much on planting, cultivating, and harvesting more hectares of corn. The case 
demonstrates local party authorities’ power to impose their priorities on the collectives. The 
Isil'kul district leaders demanded that the farms served by the local MTS plant 1,700 fewer 
hectares than the 9,000 hectares the farms recommended. They justified this by presuming 
higher yields unlikely given the oblast’s cool climate.103 The files do not reveal the district bosses’ 
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response to the inspector’s April 6 report on the conflict, which favored the collective farms’ 
case. This instance was exceptional because an envoy from Moscow interceded to resolve the 
dispute in favor of the collective farm and, not coincidentally, of planting more corn. Typically, 
when inspectors from Moscow or oblast affiliates intervened, local officials adopted their 
recommendation. In the unknown number of similar struggles between farms and their 
immediate superiors, unrecorded by inspectors, victory most likely went instead to the local 
authorities. 
Often finding oblast aggregate plans calling for reduced corn plantings in 1956, 
inspectors moved to overrule local authorities. The leaders of Kurgan oblast in the Ural 
Mountains proposed that state farms plant approximately 2,300 fewer hectares than in 1955. 
Declaring that they had failed “to learn proper lessons from last year’s failures,” the inspector 
had “corrected” their “mistake,” revising the plan to 70,000 hectares, an increase of 27.3 percent 
over the 1955.104 A similar memorandum about the Estonian SSR describes the catastrophe of 
1955 and measures to countermand the republic’s attempt to curtail its quota for corn in 1956. 
The republic’s inspectors visited farms and MTSs, finding the republic’s ministry of agriculture 
incapable of managing agriculture. Reporting to superiors in Moscow, they described yields in 
1955 of 7.8 metric tons of feed per hectare, far below the minimum of 25 tons considered 
necessary to ensure a favorable comparison to other feed crops.105 As in Kurgan oblast, the 
Estonian leaders had attempted to slash corn plantings by half, a measure inspectors 
overrode.106 
An inspection of the Latvian SSR revealed a similar decline, lending credence to the 
premise that, at first, officials interpreted the corn crusade as campaign lasting only for a year, 
which they could safely forget in 1956. The inspectors from Moscow criticized Nikonov and his 
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ministry, concluding that it “has not yet become an operational aide in managing the republic’s 
MTSs and collective farms.”107 The district soviets “treated formalistically” the process of 
approving the collectives’ plans.108 These facts combined to make them all guilty of allowing the 
republic’s corn plantings to decline by half.109 Summarizing district party secretaries’ responses 
to the corn policy and the planning reform, party authorities noted, “Some communists . . . 
expressed doubts that the corn planting [plan] could be fulfilled.” Echoing sentiments expressed 
in 1955, one in particular considered the corn policy “incorrect, unscientific . . . actions that 
contradict the directives of the January Central Committee plenum.” 110 These few isolated 
responses demonstrate the futility of protest. If the collectives had actually possessed the 
authority to choose crop structures, then higher authorities could not have forced corn on them 
when they lacked the fertilizer and labor power to plant, cultivate, and harvest a crop so poorly 
adapted to the local climate and soil. 
Addressing the Twentieth Party Congress on February 14, 1956, Khrushchev recapped 
his corn crusade’s first year. His most momentous address to the gathering was his “Secret 
Speech” incriminating Stalin in all manner of crimes against members of the Communist Party. 
In the earlier speech, Khrushchev had stuck to more utilitarian themes: growing feed supplies 
had raised milk production by increasing output per dairy cow, in some cases severalfold. He 
denounced those he deemed responsible for poor harvests, and the same pitfalls against which 
he had warned as early as March 1955. Faintly praising a few regions, he delivered a biting 
critique of the majority: “In a considerable number of districts, corn did not provide satisfactory 
results. The only reason is the careless attitude of those districts’ leaders toward its 
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cultivation.”111 Having seen the reports on corn’s high yields in the US, in Canada, and in certain 
cases in his own country, Khrushchev claimed that corn could not fail so long as collective 
farmers and local officials invested in growing it. Citing cases he considered evidence for his 
point, he again underscored the success the Lenin collective farm of the Chuvash ASSR, which 
he had praised in January 1955. 
Far from moderating his demands in the face of unsatisfactory harvests in 1955, 
Khrushchev pressed on using the authority he had accumulated since demoting Malenkov. Not a 
conservative, Malenkov had represented an alternative interpretation of the reform consensus, 
and his caution had checked Khrushchev’s more fanciful initiatives. While the First Secretary 
had to contend with rivals’ positions before June 1957, Zubkova shows that his policies 
remained judicious and produced considerable results. As the influence of Malenkov and others 
waned, their ability to restrain Khrushchev diminished. Khrushchev’s predictions and policy 
pronouncements, always optimistic, became excessively so, culminating in the boasts of rapid 
progress in agriculture. He thus drifted away from the agreement in favor of cautious reform 
reigning after Stalin’s death and, in so doing, lost the moderates’ support, precipitating the crisis 
of 1957.112 Reaching a similar conclusion, Taubman writes that Khrushchev’s dominance 
rendered him “defenseless against his own weaknesses and against entrenched bureaucratic 
resistance.”113 
The cumulative effect of the disappointing corn harvests of 1955 and 1956 nonetheless 
forced Khrushchev to reconsider his approach, diminishing pressure to plant corn in 1957 and 
1958, perhaps as a conscious response to low yields and high losses. The total for 1956, 23.9 
million hectares, fell to 18.3 million in 1957 before rebounding slightly to 19.7 in 1958. Only 
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afterward did it surge forward, reaching its peak in 1962.114 In a statement characteristic of the 
period, Khrushchev admitted to one of the annual farmworkers’ conferences that, although corn 
remained a priority, it was unprofitable and inferior to traditional crops unless it yielded some 
twenty-five metric tons of feed per hectare. This did not grant permission to abandon his 
favorite crop: 
Some might ask, “What’s this, you’re sounding a retreat? After constantly 
agitating for corn, now you say this about the issue.” No, comrades, this is not a 
retreat. I consider corn the queen of the fields. No crop can compare to corn, but 
as it is a queen, it requires appropriate honor.115 
Khrushchev thus indicated his own openness to tactical retreats from the principle that corn was 
a panacea for farms in every region, which he still believed should plant as much of it as 
possible. More cautious overall, he still used a favorite moniker for the crop, “the queen of the 
fields” thereby demonstrating that his enthusiasm for the crop had not at all flagged. 
Khrushchev emerged stronger after surviving the attempt to oust him in 1957, which 
resulted from conflicts within the Presidium, including over corn. At a Presidium session in 
June, a majority of his rivals unexpectedly moved to demote him. Protesting, he called attention 
to long-disused formal rules requiring a personnel change to be ratified by the body that had 
originally confirmed it. He correctly considered that unlikely because he possessed wide support 
in the Central Committee, the required authority. He had controlled the Secretariat since 1953 
and, with it, the authority to appoint secretaries of oblasts and republics. The Twentieth Party 
Congress had confirmed these appointees’ seats in the Central Committee.116  No one recorded 
the Presidium session, but Khrushchev’s ally M. A. Suslov opened the subsequent plenum by 
recapping the proceedings from memory and from notes. The Central Committee plenum 
overruled the anti-Khrushchev coterie and expelled the ringleaders from the Presidium and 
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Central Committee.  
Malenkov, Molotov, and the others had attacked Khrushchev on two fronts. First, they 
focused on his leadership style and the atmosphere he had fostered within the Presidium and 
other high party organizations. They charged that collective leadership had disappeared, and a 
new cult of personality—Khrushchev’s—had risen in place of Stalin’s, denounced at the 
Twentieth Congress. They criticized as mere showmanship his treks around the country to 
inspect farms, factories, and everything else of interest. The publicity surrounding these tours 
contrasted with practices under Stalin, when he and other leaders had remained in Moscow.117 
Second, they criticized Khrushchev’s frequent claims that the USSR was locked in competition 
with the United States to produce consumer goods, especially food. He had stated on May 22, 
1957, that the USSR would “catch up with and overtake the United States of America in output 
of meat, butter, and milk per capita.” Rejecting planners’ estimates that the USSR might achieve 
this feat in 1975, he gave free rein to his optimism by naming a much nearer date. Most likely, he 
intended it as a motivational challenge, rather than a statement of fact. Redacted versions of the 
text published later repeat the phrase “in the next few years,” but transcripts of the radio 
broadcast of the speech show that Khrushchev had specified a timeframe: 1960, or in the worst 
case, 1961.118 The First Secretary relished political confrontation, and appealed outside the party 
oligarchy, to the masses, for the support he needed to confront entrenched bureaucratic 
constituencies. Publicizing grand promises to raise popular expectations, he heightened the 
elite’s fears of popular discontent. He then presented his plans as the only way to satisfy the 
demands his own pledges had encouraged.119 
Scholars have frequently considered the rhetoric of “catch up with and overtake 
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America” a focal point of the charges against Khrushchev in June 1957.120 As recounted by 
Suslov, Malenkov attacked not the timeframe, but the slogan’s unorthodox substitution of a 
focus on agriculture for the traditional emphasis on heavy industry.121 In early 1955, Khrushchev 
had condemned Malenkov for this transgression against party dogma. Now Malenkov charged 
Khrushchev for making the same mistake, but Khrushchev had made the basic claim about 
competing with the US as early as February 1955, but it did not cause his rivals to react then. In 
a speech in Voronezh, he had told an audience of district party secretaries that the USSR “had 
entered a competition with the richest capitalist country in the world, the United States of 
America. We must work hard to overtake that country in the output of food items per capita.”122 
In Moscow in April 1955, he had elaborated, “In the competition with America, comrades, there 
is no doubt that victory will be ours. This is because our economy is based on the teachings of 
Marx and Lenin, and develops without the bourgeoisie, the landowners, or the exploitation of 
man by man.”123 
* * * 
Having survived the threat to his power, Khrushchev stood unchallenged in his 
authority. In October 1957, he forced the popular Marshal G. K. Zhukov, the wartime hero on 
whom he had relied for support in June, out of the Presidium for suspected political ambitions. 
Khrushchev also packed that body with supporters, promoting those who had been nonvoting 
candidates to full membership, and elevating new protégés to nonvoting status. Using his 
authority, he launched a major structural reform in agriculture, allowing collective farms to 
purchase from the state the machinery that had previously served them (at steep costs) as part 
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of the services offered by the MTSs. These measures did not proceed as planned during 1958, 
but Khrushchev’s ability to abolish one of the Stalinist system’s basic levers for controlling the 
countryside demonstrated his authority to secure approval for virtually any agrarian policy. 
Khrushchev’s relative caution about corn cultivation in 1957 and 1958 gave way to 
renewed expansion. At the Central Committee plenum of December 1958, he heralded corn and 
Soviet mastery of the industrial farming technologies he hoped to apply in the cornfields. His 
speech surveyed the achievements of his leadership in agriculture after five years. Additionally, 
he looked forward to the unprecedented Seven-Year Plan, slated for approval weeks later at the 
Twenty-first Party Congress. The plenum proved decisive because it relaunched Khrushchev’s 
crusade, but with a new twist: he no longer considered it acceptable to cultivate corn with vast 
amounts of manual labor. Instead, the addition of more tractors and harvesters, as well as larger 
supplies of fertilizers and pesticides, promised more corn at lower cost than competing crops. 
Khrushchev assured his listeners, “It is no exaggeration to say that rising yields and milk 
output, which completely satisfies demand for milk and dairy products has become possible 
owing to . . . corn.” Yields in previous years, he conceded, had sufficed in the initial stages of 
adopting the crop, but larger harvests were vital. He further stressed that leaders in some 
regions had acted in “bureaucratic” and “irresponsive” ways in 1958, much as they had in 
previous years. Local organizers and experts had made unacceptable recommendations about 
planting. Citing a publication by researchers in Latvia, Khrushchev ridiculed its advice to plant a 
quantity of seed per hectare three to six times higher than that he considered optimal, leaving 
not one or two plants in a cluster, but five or six. This situation ensured that the plants crowded 
each other out, collectively growing less, not more, green mass than two plants together. He 
charged that local bosses shrugged off the resulting low yields by claiming that corn would not 
grow in the republic. “But how could it possibly grow when planted in such a way?” he asked 
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indignantly.124 The published version of the speech omits a telling exchange between 
Khrushchev and the Latvian party chief that followed. The First Secretary said to his audience: 
“I looked over at Comrade Kalnberzin and he looked straight at the floor. We are friends and our 
gazes should meet, but [our points of view] have, so to speak, parted ways on the matter of 
corn.”125 When the Latvian leader admitted shame at his republic’s failures in corngrowing, 
Khrushchev further badgered him: “One cannot feed people on shame.” He thundered, “Let’s 
have corn instead, because today it is shameful and tomorrow it is shameful, but that furnishes 
neither meat nor milk.”126 Returning to his speech, Khrushchev denounced officials who did not 
go out into the fields to see and understand, remaining in their offices. From there, they only 
demanded reports that, while giving the appearance of leadership, told them nothing about 
actual progress in growing a corn crop.127 
Officials who addressed the plenum emphasized the critical importance of using 
machines in producing crops, especially corn. This was the scene of Khrushchev’s exchange with 
A. V. Gitalov, the tractor driver who traveled to Iowa to work on Garst’s farm. Gitalov 
characterized the machines and other technologies he had mastered there, all of which saved 
time, labor, and money—hallmarks of industrial farming. Khrushchev ordered the man to 
consult with engineers and designers in hopes that his observations might improve the design of 
new Soviet machines.128 
The Seven-Year Plan Khrushchev launched in January 1959 prioritized machines, a 
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vision he outlined in a speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress. He boasted of Soviet economic 
growth rates that exceeded those of the capitalist countries, presuming that they might continue 
or even accelerate. To achieve this in agriculture, he pledged new tractors, harvesters, and other 
machines, but at a rate of investment lower than over the previous five years.129 Maintaining that 
procurement and tax reforms had strengthened the collective farms, Khrushchev explained that 
the farms themselves would make up the difference in direct state contributions by investing 
from their income. They were, in fact, already purchasing their machines from the MTS.130 Over 
the seven years of the new plan, he stated, the agricultural sector would achieve 8 percent 
annual growth.131 In practical terms, this meant raising yields per hectare to improve both grain 
harvests and productivity of livestock; not coincidentally, both of these might result from more 
effective corn cultivation. The policies sought to raise the output a unit of labor and of capital 
produced while decreasing costs, goals that required machines, chemicals, and other industrial 
farming technologies. The formal document outlining the Seven-Year Plan clarified that the 
USSR would achieve targets by expanding irrigation systems, and using “scientifically based 
systems of land management” to select crops and practices suited to each region. In practice, the 
latter provided cover for eliminating hay and pastures and replacing them with industrially 
farmed row crops, particularly corn. The plan pledged to remedy longstanding shortages of 
synthetic fertilizers by producing 31 million metric tons in 1965, compared to the output of 10.3 
million in 1958. It called for Soviet factories to manufacture more than 1 million tractors and 
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400,000 harvesters, as well as electric-powered laborsaving devices used in milking and related 
tasks. Corn also found its way into the sanctified document, enabling ambitious targets for grain 
production and feed, necessary to satisfy growing demand for meat and dairy products.132 
The rates of investment the document forecast, as well as subsequent policies, proved 
inadequate to achieving Khrushchev’s lofty goals. Contemporary Sovietologists interpreted his 
frequent speeches to reinforce the priority of agriculture as a sign of struggle against a faction 
favoring heavy and defense industries.133 Khrushchev was clearly skeptical of those who 
maintained the orthodoxy that privileged those spheres, but he never advocated limitless 
investments in agriculture. Consequently, he did not have to struggle against an opposition on 
this front. This accords with historian Miriam Dobson’s idea that changing policies reflected not 
interpersonal or factional conflict, but subtle shifts of the group consensus.134 Khrushchev 
moved from the conservative stance in favor of heavy industry he held during the struggle 
against Malenkov to a moderate one favoring some reprioritization toward light industry and 
agriculture. This was enough to put him at odds with some conservatives, but not to provoke 
open conflict.135 Wanting to achieve success in both areas at minimum cost, Khrushchev 
invested in modernizing heavy industry and infrastructure. He concurrently sought more 
agricultural output through campaigns for efficiency, for better use of what he considered 
unused latent productive capacity, and for the USSR to increase output at a rate higher than the 
growth in capital investment.136 
In April 1959, Khrushchev already had new ideas, which he dictated in a memo to his 
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agricultural advisors cataloguing instructions on a range of issues, including mechanizing corn 
cultivation. He deemed that previous achievements in developing hybrid seeds and in other 
spheres reinforced his commitment to solving chronic fodder shortages with corn. The next step 
was machinery [tekhnika]: “The American example has already proven how to use composite 
mechanization; that is, planting, cultivation, and harvest is carried out only by machine 
operators.” Gitalov’s apprenticeship on Garst’s farm proved this, as did those who mastered this 
method at home. Khrushchev demanded more machines, better guidelines for using them, and 
more competent farm leaders. Those who proved adaptable and capable should take the places 
of “incapable and bureaucratized [obiurokrativshiesia] people.”137 
Although occasionally skeptical of sanguine pictures of progress, Khrushchev’s 
enthusiasm won out that day. Considering the Virgin Lands, he decided that corn might join the 
wheat grown over the previous five seasons on the Kazakh steppe, permitting livestock herds to 
expand. “I was especially gladdened,” he continued, “when I viewed the [documentaries] Animal 
Husbandry in the Virgin Lands, Corn Has Become Siberian, and Corn in Kazakhstan, showing 
that corn produces very good results . . . where they plant and properly care for it.”138 Comparing 
the region’s dryland conditions to the US’s Great Plains, he saw potential for corn where a more 
cautious evaluation would find the “queen of the fields” wanting and choose other crops, such as 
sorghum, better adapted to low-rainfall conditions. 
Regardless of Khrushchev’s grandiose vision of modern, technological farms outlined in 
the Seven-Year Plan, reality did not live up to those expectations. He demanded more machines, 
a path to high yields of corn. Sown grains, such as wheat and barley, required no cultivation 
during the growing season, saving labor. Corn’s extra productivity had to be purchased with the 
advance of more labor to eliminate weeds. Land, labor, and other resources remained 
underutilized without the machines needed to plant corn, remove weeds, and harvest the crop. 
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Despite Khrushchev’s many demands, Soviet factories produced far fewer of these machines 
than required because of deficiencies rooted deep in the bureaucratic system. When he inquired 
in the late 1950s, he received assurances that the stock of machines fulfilled needs, but in fact, it 
did not. Because of this falsehood, planners trimmed production, retooling for other purposes 
the factories heretofore producing agricultural machines. When Khrushchev learned of the 
shortage, it shocked him. In 1957, annual production of corn harvesters was 55,000, the fruit of 
efforts to boost their production in 1955. By 1960, this had fallen to a mere 13,000, even as the 
cropland devoted to corn expanded again toward the 30 million hectares Khrushchev originally 
demanded. Historian Anatolii Strelianyi concludes that that no matter how often Khrushchev 
agitated for this pet project, as soon as he turned his attention from any part of it, that 
component quickly went off the rails.139 Only his frequent, direct intervention could maintain 
satisfactory performance. Even in the best-case scenario portrayed in official statistics, the 
USSR remained short of the US in numbers of farm machines.140 
The revelation that his demands for machinery had fallen victim to the distortions of the 
system and the duplicitous actions of managers he trusted encouraged Khrushchev to reorganize 
structures, returning to familiar methods for disciplining the bureaucracy. He stripped the 
various ministries of agriculture of administrative functions remaining after the planning reform 
of 1955. He replaced USSR Minister of Agriculture V. V. Matskevich with a string of successors, 
each owing everything to the leader who headed party and government after 1958. Concluding 
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that American models influenced the reorganizations, Roy and Zhores Medvedev suggested that 
they had potential because they offered local authorities more initiative, but the bureaucracy 
carried out these reforms in a haphazard manner, which furthered the post-1960 sense of 
failure.141 Khrushchev then sought to move the ministry from its headquarters, a masterpiece of 
constructivist architecture built in 1933 on the Moscow’s Garden Ring, to a state farm in the 
surrounding oblast. There, its personnel were to run a model farm to demonstrate advanced 
technology, in addition to fulfilling their reduced administrative duties. Facilities on the farm 
remained unsatisfactory, and many lacked offices. Reluctant to abandon prestigious and 
comfortable apartments in the city for the rough conditions of the farm, personnel daily 
commuted long distances over poor roads. Tellingly, a year after the moves, some 75 percent of 
the more than 2,000 of the USSR ministry’s personnel had sought new employment elsewhere. 
The RSFSR ministry and those of the republics’ ministries underwent similar relocation.142 
Khrushchev’s inspiration for this and similar moves owed much to American precedents. 
The model farms to which the ministries of agriculture moved drew on the United States 
Department of Agriculture facility at Beltsville, MD, outside Washington DC, and Iowa State 
University in Ames, both of which he visited in 1959. He spoke approvingly of the Americans’ 
decentralized system. Funded by individual states, the faculties of land-grant universities and 
agricultural colleges collaborated with extension services to provide practical advice to farmers, 
a contrast to the endless, seemingly mindless orders Khrushchev saw emanating from his own 
bureaucracies. In fact, he first learned of the idea in 1955 from the Soviet agricultural delegation, 
which reported to him on its return about the Iowa State College, as the university was known 
until July 1959. The town of Ames was in an agricultural region, and students worked on its 
model farm. The USSR’s Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Khrushchev complained, was 
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located on central Moscow’s Miasnitskaia Street, scarcely a kilometer from the Kremlin.143 He 
later acknowledged the American influence, stating in February 1964 that he had “borrowed” 
from America in designing his reforms of the scientific-research apparatus and efforts to put the 
academics’ findings to work in production. In particular, he praised the agricultural colleges and 
their extension services.144 These reforms attempted to move the USSR’s agricultural education 
institutions to specialized small towns, Soviet mirrors of Ames, where students would have a 
connection to the land lacking in Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, or other cities. 
The academy escaped the fate of the ministries of agriculture, but Khrushchev had hoped 
to make a similar example of Moscow’s Timiriazev Agricultural Academy, the USSR’s most 
prestigious training and research institution. Although it had once stood on the city’s outskirts, 
the sprawling metropolis was closing in on it. Khrushchev proposed to move it “from the asphalt 
to the land,” to a site in his native Kursk oblast. He attempted to remedy a longstanding problem 
presented by tens of thousands of trained agronomists and other specialists who shunned work 
down on the farm in favor of administrative posts in towns and cities. In 1953, the figure of 
those active on farms or working for the MTS was only 96,000 of the 1 million trained 
technicians. In the mid 1950s, Khrushchev moved to improve rural living standards, and the 
total consequently rose to 280,000. When he abolished the MTSs in 1958, however, the 
attractiveness of that employment, which had been accompanied by status as a state employee, 
diminished, and the specialists’ numbers declined anew. Considering this a problem of training, 
Khrushchev proposed to solve it by transplanting the educational institutions where they earned 
their qualifications to the countryside. There, practical, hands-on education on the model of an 
American college might disabuse students of their disdain for assignments in rural areas. This 
plan led to success in building new training centers outside the city, but old ones, such as 
Timiriazev, remained without moving until after Khrushchev’s fall, largely due to the enormous 
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costs associated with constructing new facilities.145 
Khrushchev did not stop there in reorganizing, as he advanced plans to challenge the 
party and government bureaucracies he blamed for the disasters surrounding the Riazan affair. 
He placed his hopes in empowering their local levels and streamlining management. 
Consolidating the districts (raiony), he created new territorial production administrations 
specifically for administering agriculture, and charged them with competent, hands-on 
leadership responsive to local conditions and concerns. In practice, they proved too large to 
administer the increased numbers of people and farms, especially in light of unreliable roads 
and telephone communications common in the Soviet Union’s rural areas.146 Throughout these 
reorganizations, corn remained: Khrushchev devoted his speeches to it less frequently than in 
1955, but it continued to be a priority after 1960. Far from declining in importance, corn 
officially surpassed 28 million hectares in 1960 and reached its apogee, more than 37 million 
hectares, in 1962.147 
* * * 
In addition to tinkering with the bureaucracy, Khrushchev frequently grew dissatisfied 
with those he had placed in charge of agriculture. Recent scholarship on the Presidium and the 
First Secretary’s inner circle after 1957 demonstrates that he designated officials to assume 
responsibility for various policy areas. This included a Central Committee secretary to oversee 
agriculture, but he also frequently interfered with this work. Tiring of each individual in turn, he 
expelled them from the top of the party hierarchy just as quickly as he had promoted them; he 
did so with A. I. Kirichenko, an old associate from the Ukrainian days, and N. I. Beliaev, a hero 
of the Virgin Lands campaign. A key backer of Khrushchev in 1957, Kirichenko fell far and fast in 
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1960, first to secretary of Rostov oblast and then to director of a factory in Penza oblast.148 
Khrushchev similarly drove Beliaev from Moscow, appointing him first secretary of the party 
central committee in Kazakhstan. He constantly sought men who could meet his demands for 
competent managers, so he turned to state farm directors or party secretaries of agricultural 
oblasts to fill positions in Moscow, including minister of agriculture. Such was the story of I. P. 
Volovchenko, decorated director of a state farm in Lipetsk oblast whom Khrushchev plucked 
from relative obscurity to become chief of a diminished ministry in March 1963.149 
Those, such as Kirichenko, Beliaev, or G. I. Voronov, who sought greater independence 
or fomented intrigues fell quickly, or suffered due to the intrigues of others. As historian A. V. 
Sushkov’s meticulous study of the Presidium in this period shows, they all failed to keep power 
for a common reason: each lost the confidence of Khrushchev, the only one whose vote 
counted.150 The First Secretary’s overwhelming control over the fates of his advisors left them 
insecure, making their decision to force him into retirement before he could demote them the 
only logical one. In the meantime, they endured the threat of his dissatisfaction, always attentive 
to his moods. First secretary of the party in Ukraine in 1963 and 1964, P. E. Shelest recounted in 
his memoir several episodes when he escorted Khrushchev on inspections of the republic’s 
farms and factories. As soon as the First Secretary had departed, the phone would ring; L. I. 
Brezhnev and N. V. Podgornyi, Shelest’s predecessor and patron, would call from Moscow to 
inquire about any remarks Khrushchev had made about them or about Kremlin politics.151 The 
later antagonism between Shelest and Brezhnev warrant caution in considering the memoir 
when it involves Khrushchev’s successor, but Shelest’s description of the uncertainty and 
machinations fits with the atmosphere apparent in the inner circle. Even Brezhnev and 
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Podgornyi, among the five most powerful men in the USSR, feared Khrushchev and endeavored 
to avoid his ire by anticipating his moods and preferences. Given the rapid dismissal of aides 
who failed to achieve success in carrying out policy, everyone around Khrushchev had ample 
motivation to consider appearances first. It paid to show him the productive cornfields and well-
run farms, while concealing “shortcomings,” no matter how glaring and numerous. 
Notwithstanding the tense atmosphere in the Presidium, historians have found no 
evidence of organized factional struggles or coalitions before that which deposed Khrushchev. 
Mining archival and memoir sources, Sushkov concludes that no matter how dissatisfied, those 
around the First Secretary formed no permanent groups, a finding at odds with the 
Sovietologists who deduced constant struggle.152 Grievances simmered and temporary alliances 
formed, but no hardline or reform wings existed. Neither M. A. Suslov nor F. R. Kozlov, both 
considered potential alternatives or successors, possessed the authority to form a power base. 
Only the collaboration of Brezhnev, Podgornyi, and all the others to oust Khrushchev in 1964 
broke this truce, but their actions carried less danger of retribution from the leader because it 
enjoyed nearly universal support and the First Secretary almost willfully disregarded the 
sporadic warnings he received of a looming challenge to his power.153 
Yet even in 1964, when party and government constituencies were lining up against him, 
Khrushchev possessed the authority to determine the boundaries of policy debate. As was his 
habit, he dictated memoranda to the Presidium with increasing frequency, conveying 
observations made during travels and proposals for rectifying pressing problems such as the 
chronic shortage of synthetic fertilizer.154 Scholars sometimes interpreted this as a sign of 
weakness, which necessitated attempts to influence an opposition from which he was unable to 
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get approval for further agricultural reforms.155 Events in 1964 demonstrated that he continued 
to dictate these documents and, thereby, to define the terms of policy debate.156 In the 
stenographer’s records of the February 1964 Central Committee plenum, Khrushchev’s protégé 
Volovchenko delivered the main address on issues the First Secretary deemed important: 
industrial farming techniques including machinery, irrigation, land management, and more. His 
occasional interruptions demonstrate that, far from needing to defend his power, he used his 
authority to shape policy.157 His unpopular move to split party committees and apparatuses into 
agricultural and industrial wings joined other measures to finally ruin his credibility. Although 
his successors scrapped that reform and returned to the more orthodox styles, Khrushchev had 
set the boundaries for what was possible while he remained in office, and ingrained industrial 
agriculture into Soviet practice. 
* * * 
Between the Central Committee plenums of September 1953 and January 1955, 
Khrushchev determined the terms of debate over agricultural policy, setting boundaries within 
which the only question was of how to pursue his initiatives. The authority Khrushchev 
developed in pursuing the Virgin lands campaign permitted him to preach his corn crusade, 
forcing farms in every region to plant the crop in 1955. Party discipline required officials to 
demonstrate compliance with the moment’s initiative by parroting slogans: “Plant corn!” “Plow 
up virgin land!” “Catch up with and overtake America!” Officials groomed in the system 
Khrushchev inherited from Stalin acted this part on the assumption that attention would soon 
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move to a new proposal, allowing them to do as they pleased. Khrushchev had to struggle to 
convince administrators at all levels that corn would not disappear after a season, but had come 
to reign as “the queen of the fields.” Especially after 1958, Khrushchev promoted industrial 
methods for growing corn and many other crops, and his ability to determine these policies 
shows that his authority remained intact until 1964.  
For the sake of expediency, officials appeared to implement policies on corn, but 
frequently did so with little care for details required to ensure success. On some farms, plantings 
existed merely “on paper.” Some outstanding farms actually grew impressive yields of corn and 
produced large quantities of meat and milk, examples that improved the image of an oblast or 
republic. In many cases, farms planted corn, allowing authorities to satisfy statisticians and 
inspectors, but they devoted little labor to weeding it and harvesting it, ensuring that the crop 
yielded little. The heads of oblasts, districts, and farms declined to protest against the policy of 
planting corn, but their disregard for the crop demonstrates that they shared little of 
Khrushchev’s faith that it was the solution to requirements for livestock feed. By 1964, their 
skepticism had turned into a reservoir of discontent, emboldening those who dismissed the 
crusade as merely another of Khrushchev’s “harebrained schemes.” Yet the doubts many 
harbored, expressed silently in evasion and dissimulation that this and subsequent chapters 
document, harmed Khrushchev’s corn program and, by extension, his reforms to remake the 
USSR’s agricultural economy on industrial lines. Unconvinced that corn could grow in their 
locale, leaders neglected it even in areas where it could grow productively, contributing to a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
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CHAPTER 3 
TECHNOLOGIES OF CORN: INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTING POLICY UNDER 
KHRUSHCHEV 
Nikita Khrushchev frequently expressed displeasure with republic, oblast, and district 
leaders who lacked enthusiasm for his agricultural policies. As a case in point, A. A. Nikonov was 
fired from the post of minister of agriculture of the Latvian SSR because of an audience with 
Khrushchev. Although the republic had been reprimanded for protesting the planting of corn in 
1955, Nikonov remained minister in 1959, when Khrushchev, on one of his many inspection 
tours around the USSR, stopped in Latvia. Castigating Nikonov, he charged that the minister 
“did not love corn.” During an ensuing dialogue lasting an hour and a half, the party boss 
changed his tone, if not his opinion. While unconvinced by Nikonov’s data showing that corn 
grew poorly in Latvia’s cool, wet climate, Khrushchev listened attentively, resulting in a 
“constructive and calm” conversation. Nikonov later wrote that, despite the sympathy with 
which the First Secretary had apparently heard him out, he lost his post because of the meeting.1 
That did not happen until late 1960, however, when he was reassigned to an agricultural 
research institute.2 Nikonov’s fate nonetheless shows how officials felt pressured to convince 
superiors that they had devoted themselves to corn. 
For officials, even mild objections might result in censure or, if repeated, removal from 
their government or party posts. In early 1954, for instance, Khrushchev ousted the leaders of 
the Kazakh SSR after they dragged their feet in backing his Virgin Lands scheme.3 Later, leaders 
                                                        
1 Nikonov, Spiral' mnogovekovoi dramy, 303. 
2 Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 108. 
3 Khrushchev demoted the head of the government of Kazakhstan, Zh. Sh. Shaiakhmetov, whom 
McCauley describes as having a “cool attitude” toward Khrushchev’s scheme. McCauley, Khrushchev and 
the Development of Soviet Agriculture, 61. 
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ensnared in scandals similar to the Riazan affair suffered demotion. There were repercussions 
for being insufficiently enthusiastic about Moscow’s policies, or for standing out in ways that 
cast the party, the government, or Khrushchev in a negative light. The consequences of such 
missteps were no longer deadly, as they had been under Stalin. The threat of that past period of 
repression still hung over officials and society, but once the leaders had disavowed terror, it lost 
some of its power lower-level party functionaries.4 
The Presidium, Central Committee, and Council of Ministers drew up formal policies and 
enacted directives, but these alone did not guarantee the desired outcome. As Breslauer aptly 
put it, “Policy is not the same as results.” The rigid bureaucracy inherited from Stalin impeded 
Khrushchev’s attempts to put his vision into practice, hampering efforts to secure his 
objectives.5 His speeches and policies promoting corn illustrate his will to pursue the corn 
crusade to its logical end, if not beyond; however, the bureaucracies created hindrances that 
account in part for the disappointing results. This chapter sheds light on how economic 
ministries responded to policies designed to spread industrial practices for growing corn. In 
1955, Soviet leaders ordered factories to produce tens of thousands of specialized machines for 
planting, cultivating, and harvesting corn. They also invested resources in ventures to create 
double-cross hybrid corn seeds, drawing directly on American knowhow; by the end of the 
1950s, they achieved enough success to provide seeds for a substantial percentage of all corn 
plantings. 
This chapter explores the strength of and limits on Khrushchev’s authority, or ability to 
use the party and state bureaucracies to particular ends, especially in the period between 1955 
and 1958. Integral to the Soviet system, the party apparat and the ministries that ruled 
individual economic spheres shaped the corn crusade’s outcomes. Party organizations 
                                                        
4 The case for viewing the Great Purge of the latter 1930s at least in part as a chaotic method for making 
management orderly can be found in: Wendy Z. Goldman, Terror and Democracy in the Age of Stalin: 
The Social Dynamics of Repression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
5 Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders, 116. 
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permeated agencies, coordinating everyday economic affairs. Reversing Stalin’s wartime and 
postwar mandate requiring the party to concentrate on overtly political and ideological matters, 
Khrushchev demanded that it actively manage the economy. Scholars have considered this a 
ploy in his struggle against Malenkov, whose power derived from the ministries. By contrast, 
political historian Yoram Gorlizki has argued that this offensive against the centralized 
ministries inherited from Stalin in fact was a consensus view among the leaders, who hoped to 
reform them into responsive tools for executing policy.6 Gorlizki concludes that this was not 
merely a product of the power struggle or of Khrushchev’s “erratic and unpredictable 
temperament.”7 
Bureaucracies portray themselves as orderly formal hierarchies; Soviet party and 
government organizations were no exception. Concluding that they operated differently in 
practice would add little to the scholarly conversation on Khrushchev-era reform. Looking 
behind the façade of bureaucratic regularity, this chapter instead reveals formal regulations, 
unofficial procedures, personal relationships, and stopgap measures that concurrently permitted 
the system to function and constrained its ability to do so in an orderly manner. Scholars have 
described how individuals used such methods to their own ends; however, enterprises and 
organizations also employed them, especially to meet the plan’s demands for output. Sociologist 
Alena Ledeneva terms these features “self-subversive” because they permitted individuals to 
function within the system, but in greasing the wheels they undermined the formal procedures 
that might have made them operate smoothly.8 
                                                        
6 Yoram Gorlizki, “Anti-Ministerialism and the USSR Ministry of Justice, 1953–56: A Study in 
Organizational Decline,” Europe–Asia Studies 48, no. 8 (December 1996), 1282. 
7 Ibid., 1307. Gorlizki thus differs subtly from those historians saw Khrushchev as the head of an 
insurgent, pro-party movement that advanced an alternative vision of the roles of party and government. 
See, for example: Aksiutin and Pyzhikov, Poststalinskoe obshchestvo. 
8 Drawing on interviews and textual references, Ledeneva sheds light on practices known in Russian as 
blat, developing an ethnography of pervasive but hidden maneuvers to “use personal networks and 
informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal 
procedures.” Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1. Individuals used connections (sviazy) and acquaintance 
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Ministerial and local officials impaired Khrushchev’s vision of corn and industrial 
farming by inertia and subterfuge. Khrushchev countered with antibureaucracy rhetoric that 
pinned a variety of epithets on these practices, and then was amplified in the press. Published 
sources and internal documents alike used the terms po shablonu or shablonno to denounce 
administration “by formula,” with little thought for practical outcomes. They similarly 
denounced formalizm (excessive concern for outward appearance, rather than results), 
ochkovtiratel'stvo (duplicity, deceit), pripiski (distorting records by adding fictional production 
or work), obman gosudarstva (deceiving the government), biurokratizm, and the related 
volokita (red tape). Not exhaustive, this list leaves out a number of practices, such as bribery, 
that were likely prevalent but did not feature in antibureaucracy discourses or the inspection 
reports shedding light on such actions. I have selected cases that illuminate the tension between 
pressures on officials to fulfill orders from above, to defend their own authority, and to fortify 
their own job security. 
Khrushchev’s struggles against the bureaucracy constituted an attempt to smooth the 
erratic operation of the state economy and its command-administrative machinery. In theory, 
central authorities directed local officials, who then controlled their subordinates, down to farm 
managers and party secretaries. Responding to Khrushchev’s demands to plant more corn, party 
and state officials increased the annual allotment of cropland to corn fivefold in 1955, and more 
then tenfold over the ten years to 1964. The corn crusade could not have reached such scope and 
scale without the control permitted by this system, a legacy of Stalin that had developed over 
decades, but which was also evolving as Khrushchev reasserted the party’s role in the economy. 
One strain of scholarly opinion credits the bureaucracy with dampening Khrushchev’s 
supposedly ill-conceived initiatives, achieving a net positive. Historian Anatolyi Strelianyi lauds 
the bureaucracy for preventing disastrous outcomes that, in his judgment, might have resulted 
                                                        
(znakomstvo) to achieve private ends, securing a visit to a better doctor, entrance to a prestigious 
university, exclusive theater tickets, or any of a hundred other necessities, the nature of which varied 
according to an individual’s social position. 
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from fully executing Khrushchev’s policies. He further argues that efforts to decentralize did not 
alter the system’s basic mode of operation. For all the antipathy Khrushchev voiced toward the 
party and government bureaucracies, the influence he did have on policy outcomes flowed 
through them. In considering the corn crusade, Strelianyi writes, “If the apparat had delayed in 
carrying out [Khrushchev’s] decisions, the harvests would have been greater. . . . As far as 
possible, the apparat and in particular its lower reaches adapted [the corn policies] to real 
conditions, otherwise the results would have been even more deplorable.”9 Writing years later in 
his capacity as an agricultural historian, A. A. Nikonov agrees that it had the authority and 
flexibility to pursue specific ends, be they the leader’s or its own. In contrast to Strelianyi, he 
maintains that Khrushchev needed the officials in charge of agricultural policy, but they 
disregarded useful orders, ensuring negative outcomes. “The party apparat had been 
established,” he concludes, to make it “capable of overseeing [policy implementation], and was 
properly selected and well schooled.” He concedes that they often failed in this mission, 
resulting in chaos, and argues that even these organizations’ earnest efforts did Khrushchev’s 
corn initiative “more harm than good.” Acting “according to formula” (po shablonu), authorities 
pressed this and other “panaceas” on subordinates in response to the irresistible agitation to 
plant corn after the January 1955 Central Committee plenum.10 
Wrangling with the bureaucracy, Khrushchev found that achieving his aims proved 
difficult. Republic, oblast, district, and farm authorities followed directives with greater regard 
for appearance than for substantive results. Strelianyi correctly concludes that this was not 
“resistance,” a conscious or programmatic effort to reverse them; however, common tactics did 
hinder Khrushchev’s ability to carry through a policy to fruition. Strelianyi describes these as a 
collective “frame of mind” that drove officials to discount orders from Moscow they considered 
                                                        
9 Strelianyi, “Khrushchev and the Countryside,” 131–32. 
10 Nikonov, Spiral' mnogovekovoi dramy, 302. 
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impracticable, pursing the expected ends through effective, if unauthorized means.11 
Relying on archival records of central inspectorates and oblast authorities, this chapter 
gives special attention to forms of reporting outside normal party and government channels, 
where failures and delays revealed themselves more frequently. This includes the records of the 
Ministry of Government Oversight (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennogo kontrolia),12 and the party 
information network that allowed officials and members to report abuses. Newspapers similarly 
could criticize individuals or local circumstances, but not the leaders, their policies, or basic 
principles of the Soviet system. My approach assumes a significant risk of overemphasizing 
breakdowns and underrepresenting the normal functioning of the system. Given the nature of 
the archival record, I make no effort to quantify the scope of frauds, inefficiencies, and 
malfunctions, but their prevalence in the archival record, in contemporary denunciations by 
Khrushchev and other prominent figures, and in memoir accounts suggests that they were 
common. 
Violations and punishments prove difficult to quantify because each administrative 
region had its own office that coordinated activities with superiors only on large-scale inspection 
campaigns. A brief characterization of the activities of the USSR inspectorate will clarify the 
scope and scale of inspections. In 1959, the USSR Commission for Government Oversight, 
successor to the ministry of the same name, carried out many inspections of farms and 
enterprises related to agriculture. Twenty-three multiregion and multirepublic inspections 
focused on major directives resulting from the Twenty-first Party Congress, the Central 
Committee plenum of December 1958, and joint decisions of the Central Committee and Council 
of Ministers. Encompassing broad geographic areas, these undertakings involved personnel 
from local inspectorates working alongside officials sent from Moscow. They collated findings 
                                                        
11 Strelianyi, “Khrushchev and the Countryside,” 132. 
12 For the early years of the corn crusade (to 1957), these are primarily in GARF, f. R-8300. From 1957 to 
1962, it was the Commission for Government Oversight, found in GARF, f. R-9477. 
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into reports about districts, oblasts, and krais, and those into reports for republics, and then into 
a summary for the whole USSR. Procedure required government and party authorities at each 
level to pass resolutions designed to remedy any negligence discovered. In 1959, inspections 
covered nearly 2,000 agriculture-related sites across seventy oblasts, krais, and republics, 
including 829 collective farms, 510 state farms, procurement facilities, construction projects, 
and research institutes.13 Union-wide inspections resulted in the punishment of only 115 
individuals: of these, only 27 were fired, and 25 earned “strict reprimands,” a warning that left 
them only one misstep from dismissal.14 In addition, the organization also investigated letters of 
complaint, or directed them to the relevant local party committee or inspectorate: the 
commission received 197 in all about agricultural issues. It investigated 50 while redirecting the 
remaining 147 to other offices. The majority of these called attention to common problems, such 
as abuse of power, theft of state property, waste, fraudulent accounting practices, and violations 
of the collective farm charter.15 These figures show that the number of inspections was 
inconsequential in comparison to the vast size of the USSR. Even accounting for those carried 
out by regional inspectorates, they seem insufficient to have had more than a minimal deterrent 
on officials. 
* * * 
In 1954 and 1955, Khrushchev frequently decried lethargy and inefficiency, spurring the 
bureaucracy into action. The Soviet mass media followed his lead, as evidenced by an editorial 
cartoon from the March 27, 1955, edition of Pravda that combined an image (figure 4) with a 
text to convey two topical messages. It reads, “In the struggle for high yields of corn, we must 
ensure . . . [sic] that there are more cobs like this one [at left] and fewer like this! [at right].” 
                                                        
13 GARF, f. R-9477, op. 1, d. 369, l. 1. 
14 GARF, f. R-9477, op. 1, d. 369, l. 11. 
15 GARF, f. R-9477, op. 1, d. 368, l. 14. 
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Given that Khrushchev had launched the corn crusade only two months before, the image 
renewed the common call for attention to the new, unfamiliar crop on which he staked so much. 
It also typified the attack on the phenomenon pictured at right, where the “cob” burst not with 
kernels that would produce meat and milk, but bureaucrats who stood in the way. They crowded 
around a conference table, churning out “resolutions” and “orders” that kept subordinates busy 
on paperwork, instead of out in the fields offering practical aid and advice to the farmers. This 
reminded audiences that Khrushchev’s campaign against the ministries and their endemic red 
tape continued apace, in parallel with his agricultural initiatives. 
 
Soviet newspapers, Khrushchev’s speeches, and his personal example of hands-on 
leadership together formed a critique of the bureaucrats responsible for implementing policy.16 
The Central Committee left no doubt about the importance of corn in an April 1956 letter to each 
                                                        
16 Notable for its publication in Pravda, this cartoon joined many others as part of the antibureaucracy 
campaign that was especially strident in 1954. See, for instance, M. Abramov, “Pozitsiia ‘udobnaia,’ no 
vrednaia,” Sel'skoe khoziaistvo (June 8, 1954): 2; M. Abranov, “Ufimskii meteor,” Sel'skoe khoziaistvo 
(April 25, 1954): 4; M. Abramov, “Biurokraticheskii ‘posevnoi agregat,’” Sel'skoe khoziaistvo (May 25, 
1954): 2. Although all condemn officials for failing to carry out needed measures, one cartoon in particular 
calls attention corn. V. Ivanov, “Kukuruza kantseliarskaia,” Komsomol'skaia pravda (June 23, 1954): 2. 
Figure 4: D. Fomichev, "Untitled," Pravda (March 27, 1955): 4. 
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oblast in the RSFSR, which highlighted reports of “major shortcomings” in preparing for the 
spring planting then underway. It sternly reminded, “First secretaries of oblast and krai 
committees are required to personally direct corn planting.”17 It demanded that they mimic 
Khrushchev’s approach to leading, for example by conducting on-the-spot inspections and 
understanding the details of production techniques, rather than exercising control from a 
distance through directives and reports. 
The Soviet system worked only when officials executed Moscow’s orders. Local 
agricultural and party officials who did not do so faced withering criticism. For instance, in early 
1955 the Central Committee condemned the authorities in the Moldavian SSR, who “manage 
from the office; visit collective farms, state farms, and MTSs extremely rarely, and [therefore] 
know little about the state of affairs.” Short on knowledge visible only with on-site observation, 
“they do not make specific proposals to develop agriculture on the basis of local capabilities.” 
Only this sort of apathy, the report concludes, could explain a petition by officials in the 
republic’s Tiraspol district, an area long known for cultivating corn, to decrease corn plantings 
by 100 hectares when other regions were increasing their commitments to the crop tenfold or 
more.18 The message was simple: good leaders expanded plantings of corn. Bad ones remained 
in their office, mindlessly following bureaucratic procedures by issuing orders and demanding 
progress reports. The same document singled out the Karelian SSR, where one MTS had 
received 1,112 directives from the republic’s agricultural office in 1954 and 105 more in January 
1955 alone.19 Amounting to more than three per calendar day, these orders diverted personnel to 
tabulating results and sending reports, none of which improved output. 
                                                        
17 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d.157, l. 7. 
18 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 23, ll. 4–5. 
19 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 23, l. 5. In another example, the Vologda oblast agricultural department sent its 
subordinates 3,400 orders of various sorts in 1952, a number that grew to 4,500 in 1953. M. A. Beznin and 
T. M. Dimoni, Krest'ianstvo i vlast' v Rossii v kontse 1930-kh–1950-e gody,” in Mentalitet i agrarnoe 
razvitie Rossiii (XIX–XX vv.): Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii, 14–15 iiunia 1994 g., ed. V. P. 
Danilov and L. V. Milov (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1996), 159. 
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* * * 
Khrushchev applied these critiques to the economic ministries in Moscow, in particular 
those responsible for manufacturing agricultural machines. In November 1954, he had called for 
output of tractors, planters, harvesters, and other implements suitable for row crops to rise. In 
discussions during the January 1955 Central Committee plenum, he upbraided S. A. Akopov, the 
minister of automobile, tractor, and agricultural machine building, for these failures.20 The 
shortages clearly affected farm work, especially given the pressures resulting from the building 
corn crusade. Khrushchev’s goal that each republic, oblast, and krai should grow millions of 
hectares of corn required machines to plant, cultivate, and harvest it and, moreover, the farms 
and MTSs had to use those on hand more efficiently. For instance, in the spring of 1955, officials 
in Stavropol krai ordered the MTSs to redistribute the corn planters available. If spread evenly 
among the krai’s planned 280,000 hectares of corn, the burden on each of the 1,911 planters 
would amount to a substantial 147 hectares. In reality, the average for individual MTS fluctuated 
wildly between 36 hectares per planter and more than 1,000. Krai authorities ordered those 
MTSs with many planters to transfer some to those that had few, a common practice. Later 
inspections found, however, “that many MTSs did not fulfill the krai agricultural department’s 
order, . . . while some transferred those in disrepair.”21 
In privately conferring with his agricultural advisors in March 1955, Khrushchev gave 
informal orders that produced specific government actions, demonstrating his authority over 
policy. His verbal instruction set in motion the Central Committee apparat, which formulated a 
policy to address long-running shortages of machines. “I would ask,” he politely commanded, 
“that you do something about wheeled tractors, specialized implements [for growing corn], and 
                                                        
20 RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 124, l. 54. 
21 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6539, l. 6. 
  150
silage harvesters. Focus on that and consult with Comrade [I. I.] Kuz'min.”22 A lighter, more 
maneuverable tractor with wheels provided advantages in planting and cultivating row crops 
such as corn. Tractors in the USSR typically had caterpillar tracks, making them better suited to 
plowing and tasks requiring more horsepower. As the delegation to the US discovered later that 
year, American wheeled tractors were lighter and more powerful than Soviet equivalents, a 
finding that set in motion efforts to improve Soviet models.23 Both decisions demonstrated that 
Khrushchev understood that his wager on corn could not succeed on the basis of manual labor 
alone. An official in the Central Committee department responsible for industry and 
transportation, Kuz'min served as a liaison to the ministries managing industrial production in 
those spheres.24 
As a result, Soviet ministries diverted significant resources to carrying out Khrushchev’s 
informal directive. Central Committee officials orchestrated policies for the Council of Ministers 
to approve, allocating funds and factories to manufacture the needed machines. In May 1955, 
the Council of Ministers ordered the silage harvesters necessary to alleviate a prospective 
burden on the farms and their workforce during the fall season, when other important crops also 
matured. Officials often expressed concern about overwhelming demands for labor during the 
harvest, a result of the burden bringing in corn put on farms. To combat the problem, the 
government instructed factories belonging to ten separate ministries to produce nearly 40,000 
harvesters by fall. This involved the Ministries of Heavy Machine Building, Transportation 
Machine Building, Agricultural Machine Building, General Shipbuilding, and more; the jumble 
                                                        
22 RGASPI, f. 556, op. 22, d. 64, l. 33. 
23 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 107, l. 8. The delegation’s engineer, A. A. Ezhevskii, reported to Khrushchev that 
the USSR’s common Belarus tractor weighed 3.25 metric tons and delivered thirty-seven horsepower. The 
American tractor he selected for comparison, made by International Harvester, delivered 49.5 horsepower 
and weighed just 2.83 tons. 
24 Shepilov derided Kuz'min as an undereducated sycophant, unschooled in the affairs Khrushchev tasked 
him to manage and unskilled in anything but flattering the leader. Shepilov, Kremlin’s Scholar, 303. For 
more on how the Central Committee directed the formation of government policy, see: Hough, How the 
Soviet Union is Governed, 444–45. 
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of bureaucracies hints at the sisyphean task of coordinating the investment of just over 300 
million rubles.25 
Emphasizing the importance of machines in verbal orders and in speeches, Khrushchev 
guaranteed that the government invested resources in them, but his measures nonetheless faced 
numerous obstacles. Ordered to produce the corn harvesters, the ministers initially protested 
that they lacked the necessary materials. Before passage of the Council of Ministers’ directive in 
May, Minister of Construction N. A. Dygai and Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy A. G. Sheremetev 
objected that commitments to existing projects had already depleted reserves, preventing their 
ministries from filling the new orders.26 By early August, investigators had proven those claims 
false. Most damagingly, they discovered that the ministers had claimed that they lacked the 
materials, but simultaneously ordered subordinates to find and allocate them.27 The ministers 
had tried to shed new responsibilities that complicated existing production plans. Authorities 
interpreted these as attempts limit obligations and fulfill plans, favoring that parochial interest 
over the pressing need determined by party and state leaders. Sheremetev and Dygai 
consequently earned reprimands, while other ministers received only warnings for lesser 
infractions.28 
Despite the supposed efficiency of their vertical integration, the ministries each failed to 
meet the directive’s goals for delivering the harvesters on time. Inspectors discovered that the 
ministries had fallen far behind the schedule required to ensure delivery by harvest in late 
August and September. On August 10, 1955, Deputy Minister of Agriculture G. S. Sitnikov 
reported to the minister of government oversight, V. G. Zhavoronkov, that his ministry had not 
                                                        
25 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 89, d. 111, l. 259. At the exchange rate of four Soviet rubles to a US dollar, this 
amounted to over $75 million in 1955 and, when adjusted for inflection, more than $650 million in 2012. 
The union-level government’s budget for that year, by comparison, was 112 billion rubles. 
26 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 89, d. 111, ll. 148–49 and ll. 210–11. 
27 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 89, d. 111, ll. 288–89. 
28 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 89, d. 111, l. 299. 
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received the scheduled allotment of machines. The manufacturers’ record was dismal: according 
to the original directive, they should have completed approximately 35,000 silage harvesters by 
the date of Sitnikov’s report. In fact, the Ministry of Heavy Machine Building had achieved the 
most success by assembling 600 of the 10,000 ordered, or 6 percent of its quota. Sitnikov could 
only dryly note, “Such unsatisfactory production of these devices threatens to prevent delivery in 
time for the harvest.”29 
The frustration Khrushchev expressed with the ministries also sheds light on the 
relationship between the party leader’s authority and the government’s formal powers. The 
ministries’ mismanagement of manufacturing explains his hostility toward S. G. Akopov at the 
January plenum. Hearing experts describe the more efficient practices they had observed in 
American factories, Khrushchev again expressed irritation at Soviet ministries’ failings. When 
that ineffectiveness threatened his goals for the corn program and this policy, government 
organizations, including the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Government Oversight, 
identified and corrected breakdowns. An interim inspection report dated June 20, 1955, and 
distributed to Presidium members demonstrates the intertwining of party and government 
operations.30 Even as Khrushchev asserted the party’s primacy and its authority over the 
economy, the ministries were a crucial contributor to the success or failure of a policy. 
The Council of Ministers carried out a similar program for building and delivering 
machines for the harvest in 1956 and made further efforts thereafter. Directives passed in March 
and June 1956, earmarked a budget of more than 2.3 billion rubles for these efforts.31 The 
ministries responsible fell behind and delivered the machines later than the schedule demanded, 
although they did complete delivery by November 1956.32 Inspections revealed concerns familiar 
                                                        
29 GARF, f. R-8300, op. 24, d. 773, l. 60. 
30 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 89, d. 111, l. 287. 
31 GARF, f. R-8300, op. 24, d. 810, l.5. That total equaled $575 million in 1956, or $4.9 billion in 2012. 
32 GARF, f. R-8300, op. 24, d. 810, l.188. 
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from 1955, further exacerbated by complaints about the acute lack of spare parts to repair 
existing machines, a recurring grievance. 
Authorities frequently heard complaints that the machines factories delivered were 
poorly constructed. Among the letters the Ministry of Government Oversight received in 1956, a 
particularly vehement one blamed factory workers in the city of Barnaul. A group of combine 
drivers working for an MTS in the surrounding Altai krai wrote to the quality-control 
inspectorate to report major defects in the machines they received. Workers applied paint 
improperly and assembled the harvesters’ various components so haphazardly that the valuable 
equipment fell apart during transport to the MTS. The results were clear by the time the 
combines reached their destination: “They are shipped barbarically,” the letter continues, 
arriving covered in rust, having been stored in the open air, subject to the rain. “Why should we 
pay 30,000 rubles for a combine?” the letter asks. “And what’s more – for this junk? . . . It would 
probably be better to just send us the raw materials.”33 This evidence is anecdotal, but the 
constant refrains in the Soviet press made the poor quality of factories’ output well known. 
Historian Donald Filtzer comments on the “notorious” issue of defective production and 
damaged goods, as well as their considerable cumulative effect across the economy.34 
Because supplies of agricultural machines remained insufficient to meet the needs of 
expanding cornfields over the coming years, local leaders often lobbied for larger allotments of 
the planters, cultivators, and harvesters farms needed. In early 1957, for example, officials in 
Russia’s Kostroma oblast petitioned the RSFSR Council of Ministers for increased aid. Seeking 
resources permitting farms to adopt industrial farming practices, the oblast bosses hoped for a 
larger allotment of tractors and harvesters, as well as annual deliveries of 37,000 metric tons of 
synthetic fertilizers and 14,700 metric tons of seeds offering higher yields of wheat, oats, barley, 
and corn. Moscow authorities did not fulfill all these requests, indicating limits on their ability—
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or willingness—to support Khrushchev’s objectives.35 
Appeals from below suggest that shortages of machines remained common into the 
1960s, despite Khrushchev’s efforts to remedy the problem. In 1962, the leaders of Stavropol 
krai desperately requested a larger allowance of implements to aid farms in cultivating 
expanded corn plantings, the largest in the history of the corn crusade. Although they reckoned 
that they needed 2,000 more planters to address previous years’ shortfalls, they most likely 
overestimated their requirements in hopes that the lower actual number they received might 
meet their needs. Having received no planters at all in 1960 and 1961, the krai authorities 
petitioned for an expanded allotment of 1,900, but Moscow had earmarked only 220, and those 
were scheduled to arrive until in the year’s third quarter, after the planting season. Similarly, the 
krai’s farms did not have enough cultivators, threatening corn plantings with being overcome by 
weeds. The leaders therefore requested that deliveries for the first half of 1962 expand from 650 
to 1,000. Finally, they claimed a need for 1,500 trucks for transporting seeds during planting 
and grain during harvest, but had only 1,290 on hand. They requested 290, but received an 
allocation of only 80.36 These pleas notwithstanding, Stavropol received only an supplemental 
allocation of 30 trucks, 540 planters, and Moscow’s unhelpful assurance that they had no 
resources to provide more.37 
* * * 
Moscow pressured oblast, krai, and republic heads to implement policies, but frequently 
encountered unresponsiveness. Hidden beneath the appearance of inertia were local officials’ 
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efforts to balance these responsibilities with calculations of risk and reward. The details of an 
expansive effort to produce double-cross hybrid corn for use in production illustrate this 
phenomenon. The hybrids offered up to 30 percent more output than other hybrids and 
varieties, and this caused authorities to undertake a crash program between 1955 and the end of 
the decade to acquire the new varieties, grow them, harvest the grain, store it, transport it, and 
construct factories for processing it into seed ready for the following year. Although the path to 
realizing the policy was not smooth, Soviet officials did so by 1960. The interconnected 
processes left a wider paper trail in the archives in comparison to the vast majority of plantings, 
which collective and state farms grew to use themselves for animal feed; that corn appeared only 
in statistical reports. By contrast, Khrushchev and his advisors considered these hybrids vital, so 
party and government officials participated directly in organizing production. 
By pouring substantial resources into the program, leaders hoped to supply hybrid corn 
seed sufficient for all plantings by the end of the 1950s. Before 1955, farms had produced 
intervarietal hybrids, but after Khrushchev blessed the double-cross hybrids favored in the US 
that October, the drive to boost production enjoyed support from the highest levels. Entitled 
“On collective and state farms’ transition to planting hybrid corn seed,” the resulting plan 
established a target of 169,000 metric tons of seed in 1956 and 300,600 tons by 1960.38 In 1956, 
the initial offensive involved over 600 state farms and 1,400 collectives across southern oblasts, 
krais, and republics. Officials had to coordinate time-sensitive and technical processes 
throughout the growing season, without which the grain would prove useless as seed. The first 
year, farms in Ukraine exceeded the plan of 120,000 metric tons by producing 141,300 tons. 
Defective planting, detasseling, harvesting, and storage, however, ensured that 34 percent were 
unsuitable as seed and, therefore, fewer than 100,000 tons was in fact the valuable hybrid 
seed.39 
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Central authorities first had to make sure that farms planted the seeds at all: 
bureaucracies require written orders to function smoothly, but circumstantial evidence indicates 
that Soviet officials commonly issued and executed informal verbal instructions. Those could 
land subordinates in the predicament of having received that authorization, but also having no 
proof to show inspectors. On April 27, 1956, the chairman of Stavropol krai’s “Will of the 
Proletariat” collective farm wrote to district authorities requesting that his farm be freed from 
an obligation to plant 150 hectares of seed corn. He pleaded that this order, on top of existing 
plans to produce seed potatoes, overburdened the farm. The chairman received permission over 
the telephone from the krai agricultural administration to plant only 50 hectares of the genetic 
lines necessary to produce the prized VIR-42 double-cross hybrid.40 He did not, however, 
receive “official clearance” in the form of a written confirmation.41 When the collective’s deputy 
chairman explained this unwritten order to the inspectors who visited, it failed to placate them. 
From a distance, it seemed that the local officials had simply refused to implement the 
directive from above. In the first report on the issue, the farm managers offered an 
“explanation” for the deficiencies uncovered on the day of the inspection, pointing to this verbal 
order. The second report, the inspector’s formal one to the Ministry of Government Oversight in 
Moscow, does not repeat that claim, or provide any rationale at all for the farm’s decision to 
plant only 33 percent of its assignment of hybrid corn. To an official in Moscow reading the 
latter report, the farm’s managers simply refused to carry out orders. Such informal 
authorizations, unsupported by written confirmation appear in the archival record rarely, 
unsurprising given the fleeting nature of a telephone conversation. Two outcomes were possible: 
verbal orders subsequently gained the backing of written ones or, if not, entered the record as an 
unexplained failure of a subordinate organization to follow its orders. The “Will of the 
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Proletariat” collective’s managers did not shirk orders from above; in fact, the farm received 
commendations and was considered one of the best in the krai, as the assignment to produce the 
seeds attests. The farm’s leaders did not resist, but made a conscious choice to deemphasize 
corn in order to concentrate on the more familiar task of growing potatoes; in so doing, they 
failed only to follow bureaucratic rules. 
Inspections of other regions revealed similar “shortcomings.” In the Moldavian SSR, 
inspectors disclosed, “Many managers of collective farms and MTSs undervalue the importance 
of raising high-yielding hybrid corn seeds.” The farm bosses planted far fewer hectares than 
ordered, but reported that they had planted the full amount. One of the republic’s farms, the 
most extreme of six cases cited, reported that it had planted the full seventy-four hectares. The 
inspection report dryly noted, “However, the inspection revealed that this contradicted the 
actual situation . . . and in fact [the farm] planted a total of only four hectares,” or 5 percent of 
the planned total.42 Although leaders declared the program vital, local officials failed to carry out 
orders for a reason indiscernible through the archival record, and then lied to superiors in an 
attempt to maintain the appearance that they had complied. 
Even when farms planted the prescribed number of hectares, good-faith efforts to 
produce hybrid seed might still fail. In the summer of 1956, inspectors sent to the “Donetsk” 
state farm in southern Russia’s Kamensk oblast discovered major flaws in seed-corn plantings. 
The director and chief agronomist protested that they were not to blame. First, in May, the 
oblast agriculture department sent them a telegram giving instructions that reversed the names 
of the parental forms of the VIR-42 double-cross hybrid. The document reversed the names of 
the paternal form, Svetoch [“torch”], which pollinated the maternal form Slava [“glory”], the 
one requiring detasseling. To compound the problem, the farm then received seeds in a 
proportion—four times more of the maternal form—matching the faulty formula. On July 1, the 
state farm’s managers estimated that the fields would yield approximately eighty metric tons of 
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seeds of a nonstandard variety without the desired characteristics.43 Inspectors later reported 
that shortages of the necessary seeds made this problem, magnified by the oblast agriculture 
office’s incorrect instructions, an oblast-wide phenomenon.44 
Even though they commonly unearthed mistakes and coverups, Moscow’s inspectors 
occasionally discovered positive results. The one responsible for Kamensk oblast, for instance, 
concluded that despite the “serious shortcomings” (another stock phrase) found on the 
“Donetsk” farm and other state farms, “the inspection showed that many MTSs and collective 
farms have endeavored to carry out party and government directives, and have organized work 
fairly well.”45 In comparison to the typical tone, this was a glowing review. 
Having planted the corn required to produce the double-cross hybrids, farms faced a 
demanding task: detasseling. They had to organize scarce manual labor for timely work, and 
negotiate the dry conditions that threatened to damage the crop. The hybridization process 
required workers to cut off or pull out the pollen-producing tassel, the topmost part of the plant, 
from the plants in the rows containing the maternal line before those plants dispersed their 
pollen. This allowed those plants to be pollinated by the paternal line in the neighboring row, 
resulting in seeds that combined genetic material from each line. Reports from 1956 confirm 
that the state farms tasked with raising the double-cross hybrids had little manual labor 
available in July, but much was needed to complete this process on tens of millions of individual 
plants constituting thousands of hectares of corn. In Stavropol krai, a major producer, farms 
planted 7,325 hectares for this purpose. A worker could detassel two hectares during the two-
week work period, amounting to a need for 3,670 workers.46 The krai agricultural department 
requested in mid July that the heads of local secondary, postsecondary, and technical schools, 
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then in summer recess, organize students to perform the job. The farms pledged to instruct the 
students how to do the job, as well as in the science and benefits of hybrid seeds. In return, 
students would earn room, board, and pay.47 An end-of-the-year report concluded that the farms 
completed the process, but in some cases “hybridization plots had to be scrapped due to poor 
detasseling.”48 In Central Asia’s Kyrgyz SSR, for instance, farmworkers removed the tassels from 
the wrong plants, did so incompletely, or planted the rows of the maternal lines too far from 
those of the paternal. As a result, approximately one third of plantings had no worth as seed.49 
In the Moldavian SSR, that figure was 1,759 of 16,346 hectares, or 9.3 percent.50 
The harvest also proved a laborious and troubled effort. In 1956, many regions 
experienced a late spring and early frosts, making picking the corn on time even more vital. 
Labor shortages and poor organization caused a large percentage of farms to fail.51 Beginning on 
September 27, 1956, inspectors in Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, as well as Belgorod, Kamensk, 
Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts took stock of the situation. They reported to the RSFSR Council of 
Ministers on October 5 that farms had harvested only 527 hectares, or 1.7 percent of the total 
area and 2.7 percent of the plan’s target for that date.52 As late as November 10, the situation 
remained “extremely unsatisfactory” because only 70 percent of the harvest was in.53 
Many local considerations contributed to the general delay. As a case in point, 
farmworkers and managers had little incentive to work on picking the hybrid corn because so 
many pressing harvest-time tasks coincided with the effort. In Krasnodar krai, inspectors found 
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on one farm that ninety-four hectares of the prized VIR-42 hybrid was ready for harvest in the 
field, while the 700 collective farmers devoted their energies to regular production plots of corn, 
most likely because they received feed for personal livestock as pay for that work. Additionally, 
20 percent of collective farmers did not turn out for work, choosing instead to tend their private 
plots. Even with enough farmworkers, the harvest might proceed in a “disorganized” manner. 
They unknowingly or uncaringly picked corn from the separate rows at the same time, mixing 
the valuable double-cross–hybrid seed from the plants of the maternal line with the normal 
grain from the paternal line.54 
Once harvested, the corn might be stolen along the way from the fields to state stocks. 
Collective farmers in the Kyrgyz SSR harvested 100 metric tons of cobs in one field, but by the 
time the grain reached the collection point, it amounted to only 41.8 tons. As a report laconically 
noted, “the lack of necessary protection [means that] the corn in the field is fed to livestock, 
carried off, or spoiled.”55 Other republics faced similar problems in organizing the harvest and 
preventing theft. Even the part of the crop that made it in government procurement points did 
so very slowly: in late November 1956, Minister of Agriculture V. V. Matskevich declared that 
only 19.3 percent of the 178,000 metric tons of seed harvested had arrived, “an exceptionally 
disturbing state of affairs.”56 The corn continued to stream in, but the longer that took the 
further its quality would decline and the less would arrive. On farms, thieves had more 
opportunities to steal it, while managers might divert it to other uses. While there, it spoiled 
faster because of higher moisture content, which had to be removed by drying it in specialized 
ovens or carefully hung in a humidity- and temperature-controlled storeroom. 
Local officials declared success in growing hybrid corn, even when it eluded them; 
consistent obfuscation made higher authorities skeptical of inflated claims. A summary on the 
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whole USSR addressed to the minister of government oversight illustrates this distrust. “Soviet, 
party, and agricultural organizations,” the document notes, “have carried out major [sic] efforts 
to ensure completion hybrid-corn–seed production. At the same time, the inspection 
demonstrated that substantial shortcomings exist.” The document reproduced a common 
formula, claiming “major” efforts and, in contrast, admitting only relatively minor 
“shortcomings.” The underlining of “major,” was done in pencil, in the same hand as a comment 
in the margin reading “Really?” [“Imenno?”]. Thus whoever read the report, perhaps Minister 
Zhavoronkov, to whom it was addressed, expressed disbelief in that claim.57 
Once the seeds had been harvested, obstacles yet remained, as the government had to 
store, transport, and distribute them. In 1956, inspectors visiting collection points under the 
USSR Ministry of Grain Procurement and its subsidiaries revealed still more “serious 
shortcomings.”58 Managers of the facilities had to construct new structures and maintain old 
ones, all needed to dry, store, and distribute the seeds. Inspectors found that these jobs 
remained incomplete and far behind schedule, although they lagged for comprehensible 
reasons, especially shortages of construction materials. Far less understandably, the on-site 
bosses had frequently reported tasks complete when they were not; often, work had not even 
begun on the jobs. In July 1956, scrutiny of the Nevinnomysk grain-collection facility in 
Stavropol krai discovered irregularities in repairs and preparations, to have been completed by 
July 1. The bosses had submitted routine paperwork declaring the jobs finished and given 
quality-control grades of “good” and even “excellent.” Yet inspectors from outside the krai found 
a different situation altogether. “In fact,” they concluded, “on July 13, 1956, . . . work was not 
complete on certain bins [for storing grain], as had been reported in the fraudulent documents.” 
Those indicated that 625 meters of border fence had been repaired; in fact, no one had begun to 
do so. On May 23, the facility’s managers reported a gate in the fence installed; in July, 
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inspectors found that this was not true.59 The head of the organization under scrutiny had to 
justify him/herself as part of the inspection process. In this case, the director could only plead a 
lack of building materials, specialized drying and ventilation equipment, labor, and other 
resources.60 This explained why the work was incomplete, but not why documents had 
fraudulently declared it complete. A similar state of affairs existed at the Bogoslov, Urakov, and 
Eren-Shakhar procurement points in Stavropol krai.61 Found on four of the six sites inspected in 
the krai, these were common incidents; moreover, a summary for the whole USSR noted similar 
instances in other oblasts and republics.62 
More than simply not completing projects on time and within the budget, these 
organizations lied to superiors. They declared complete some tasks they had not even begun. 
They probably did so to create the appearance that they had fulfilled the plan. The potential 
punishment for submitting false documents was less than the reprimand for admitting failure to 
fulfill production plans, repair schedules, and so on. Failing to meet plans seemed certain to 
result in extra scrutiny, unearned bonuses, censure, and—if frequent—firing. On the other hand, 
superiors might not notice fraudulent reporting, leaving it unpunished. These officials acted in 
ways that reflect a rational weighing of this risk of punishment against certain reproof for 
leaving plans unfulfilled. 
Even when procurement agencies acquired, dried, and stored the seeds, they still had to 
face the logistical challenge of distributing them. Khrushchev demanded that farms across the 
USSR’s regions, oblasts, and krais plant corn, but most could not produce seeds locally because 
of climatic constraints. As a result, authorities ordered farms in a narrow band stretching from 
the Moldavian SSR through parts of southern Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and irrigated lands 
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in Central Asia to produce the seeds. They had to supply all others, giving rise to a gargantuan 
task of transporting the seeds each winter. Telegrams conveyed the desire of oblast committees 
receiving the seeds to guarantee that shipments reached their destination, for example between 
the party committee of Chita oblast in Russia’s Far East and the Ukrainian Central Committee. 
Even though the schedule called for transport in March and April, already in February the oblast 
secretary sent an insistent telegram to Kyiv in hopes of expediting shipment.63 Many other 
regions, such as Altai krai, did likewise.64 Once the seeds arrived, the receiving farms might 
neglect them. A series of inspections in Moscow oblast, for example, revealed that many farms 
had stored their allotments from state procurement agencies improperly, allowing the seeds to 
spoil. Questioned before the oblast soviet, the district officials responsible hoped to blame the 
producers and shippers, claiming that the seeds had already rotted by the time the district had 
received them.65 Despite their entreaty, the officials received a “strong reprimand” for failing “to 
demonstrate necessary care for storing corn seeds prior to planting.”66 
The ministerial bureaucracies and the farms themselves thus used formal and informal 
practices to run the economy. Such practices helped the bureaucracies operate by breaking 
through barriers, but also introduced their own inefficiencies. Corn expected to become hybrid 
seed received heightened scrutiny from inspectors because it was destined for state procurement 
and because it offered a radical increase in yields. That attention made the hybrid-seed plantings 
unrepresentative of the whole, but it calls into question reports appearing in newspapers and 
traveling up the party hierarchy that claimed results too good to be true. Probing beneath the 
surface of local authorities’ claims to have made “major efforts,” admitting only minor 
“shortcomings,” these inspections revealed failures and introduced solutions to the problems. 
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Accentuating failures, the inspectors documented how the system functioned—or 
malfunctioned—thereby revealing otherwise indiscernible informal practices. 
* * * 
Once produced and procured, the double-cross hybrids traveled to specialized 
calibration factories. The USSR imported the first three of these factories under a contract with 
Roswell Garst, which grew from the contacts the Soviet delegation had established in 1955. 
Leaders hoped to speed production of new hybrids by buying the parental lines as well as the 
technology needed to sort seeds by size and shape in a process they called “calibration,” 
preparing them for more efficient and productive planting. They planned to install the machines 
in time for the harvest of 1956. These projects enjoyed the support of authorities in Moscow, 
who frequently sent investigators with wide powers to identify delays, to speed progress, and to 
single out officials responsible for the frequent “shortcomings.” Efforts to complete these three 
factories, as well as the larger number that the USSR constructed in subsequent years using 
Soviet copies of the equipment, demonstrate labor and materials shortages characteristic of the 
economy. 
Authorities sited two factories in Ukraine, one at Novomoskovs'k in Dnipropetrovs'k 
oblast and another at Buialik in Odessa oblast, with output of 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of 
seed per season, respectively. They constructed a third at Ust'-Labinsk in Krasnodar krai, which 
consisted of a cluster of factories with a combined capacity of 12,500 tons. Beginning in early 
1956, work proceeded with the goal of full operation by the end of December, in time to process 
seed grown in 1956 for planting in 1957.67 Specifics about how workers built walls, roofs, roads, 
and other facilities are not relevant to this analysis, but the procedure party officials used to 
apply pressure to managers and workers, thereby speeding the process, demonstrates their 
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desire to encourage efforts to bring the plants on line as quickly as possible. 
Early reports signaled that delays threatened almost from the start. On August 17, 1956, 
the director of the building trust—equivalent to a general contractor—responsible for the two 
sites in Ukraine alerted party authorities in Kyiv and Moscow to the slow tempo of progress. 
Contravening standard procedures, which called for officials to minimize failures when 
reporting to superiors, the director bluntly declared: “Conditions on the construction site 
threaten to disrupt the timetable established by the USSR Ministry of Grain Procurements in 
order No. 315 of May 31.” Defending himself, he blamed a lack of qualified workers for delays.68 
On September 13, the Ukrainian Central Committee in Kyiv ordered republic, oblast, and district 
committees to designate someone to take “personal responsibility” for progress on each site. The 
republic party authorities dispatched officials from Kyiv to Dnipropetrovs'k and Odessa, and 
assigned another in Kyiv to verify progress at regular intervals. Each party committee received 
orders requiring “strict oversight by ministries and departments over all aspects of construction” 
as well as reports to superiors every five days.69 They thus underscored the significance of the 
project. 
Acting on these orders, authorities in Kyiv assigned the officials and secured skilled 
workers needed for each site. They found that frequent delays occurred because construction 
materials arrived irregularly or behind schedule. The sorting machines had reached the USSR by 
August, but neither they nor required technical drawings were yet on hand. Arriving from the 
US, the machines were first transported to Moscow, where engineers studied them in order to 
reverse engineer Soviet copies. Only afterward did they ship the equipment to the construction 
sites.70 This circumstance left on-site officials facing a tight schedule. As a measure of progress, 
in early September, the Novomoskovs'k construction firm had spent only 1.3 million rubles, or 
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26 percent of its 5-million-ruble budget. Similarly, the Buialik trust had spent only 19 percent of 
its 4-million-ruble budget.71 During September, officials helped by dispatching required workers 
and organizing a second shift.72 
By early October, the periodic reports to Kyiv described an improved situation, but 
ongoing challenges. On October 13, 1956, Odessa oblast authorities explained that they had 
commandeered students, collective farmers, and others to organize a second shift. This is 
reminiscent of the practice of “storming,” typical of Soviet industry: supplies arrived at factories 
irregularly, forcing directors to spend time accumulating raw materials needed to produce the 
planned output for a given month, quarter, or year. Workers long had little to do, but then at the 
end of the period, they would throw themselves into high gear, working overtime and making 
heroic efforts to meet production quotas just in time.73 The progress report on the calibration 
plant’s construction, furthermore, entreated higher authorities to devote additional building 
materials to the project. Electrical equipment and structural metal, for instance, were difficult 
for the oblast party committee or the construction trust to acquire, so they asked officials in Kyiv 
to use their influence to do so.74 In late October, reports to Moscow confirmed that delays 
continued.75 Even the media joined the fray: the republic’s newspapers, both Russian-language 
Pravda Ukrainy and Ukrainian-language Radian'ska Ukraina, publicized the slow progress.76 
Acting as an outlet for complaint, the newspapers forced the USSR Ministry of Grain 
Procurements and oblast party committees, as well as their local counterparts, to redouble 
attentiveness to the lagging projects. During Roswell Garst’s second visit to the USSR, in 
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October 1956, officials from each of the three construction trusts gathered at the site in 
Krasnodar krai to consult with the American corn impresario.77 Given the previous delays, the 
production lines unsurprisingly remained incomplete on the November 1 deadline. New orders 
established December 30 as the target.78 In December, the goal became January 25, 1957.79 
As these efforts show, officials in Moscow and Kyiv assigned great importance to the 
project, a conclusion reinforced by Khrushchev’s personal attention. The Ukrainian party 
authorities routinely compiled reports on the two construction sites that reached Khrushchev. 
As a result, he pressured Ukrainian leaders, including his protégé A. I. Kirichenko, first secretary 
of the republic’s party, to speed things along. An appraisal by the Ukrainian Central Committee 
Agricultural Department, dated December 21, 1956, made its way from Kyiv to Moscow, and 
from Moscow into the Ukrainian party’s files in Kyiv, having acquired along the way a personal 
note Khrushchev wrote to Kirichenko in the margin, dated December 22.80 The First Secretary 
demanded that Kirichenko “read and consider” the situation with the construction sites, an 
order that required a real response. A note in the same file indicates that Kirichenko read the 
report, but not any commands he gave in response. For its part, the report painted a picture of 
failure: “Unsatisfactory management of construction by the Ministry of Grain Procurements, 
local party committees, and government organizations has disrupted the timetable for beginning 
production.” In the end, the factories went into operation late, in piecemeal fashion, and without 
the secondary structures needed to keep them running, such as housing for workers.81 
A 1958 analysis of the economic costs and benefits of the factories shed light on their 
mixed results, and on subsequent adaptations of the technology. The largest plant, at Ust'-
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Labinsk in Krasnodar krai, proved too costly to operate and unable to take in enough suitable 
raw material from the surrounding farms to run at full capacity. Officials therefore ordered no 
more of that size. More usefully, they could construct factories with a 5,000-ton–per-season 
capacity for 2,770 rubles per ton. The smallest size, with a 2,500-ton capacity, came in at 4,099 
rubles per ton. Both plants, like the largest, struggled to procure sufficient quantities of raw 
seeds from nearby farms.82 Sites near railroad junctions, existing procurement facilities, and 
asphalt roads connecting adjoining farms were rare. The analysis therefore recommended 
building small-capacity plants, even though both construction and operation per unit of output 
cost more.83 It furthermore suggested more rigorously managing production, selecting the best 
sites, and overseeing the many steps needed to produce the seeds.84 
Once the first three calibration factories went into production in early 1957, leaders 
embarked on an expansive program to construct more using domestic adaptations of the 
American equipment. The USSR Council of Ministers adopted a directive on December 4, 1956, 
designating sites in Ukraine, the Moldavian SSR, and the RSFSR’s southern regions. In the 
RSFSR, the six plants were sited in Rostov oblast, Krasnodar krai, North Ossetia ASSR, and in 
Stavropol krai, the focus of this section. In 1958, the program continued with nineteen large-
capacity and six smaller-capacity factories.85 Even after improvements trimmed their cost, each 
carried a price tag of several million rubles, making this a substantial capital investment. 
In March 1958, RSFSR inspectors discovered serious delays in building the first two 
factories in Stavropol krai, at the settlements of Rasshevatka and Bogoslovsk. At Bogoslovsk, the 
first of two 2,500-ton–capacity production lines went into use at the end of 1957, but it operated 
inefficiently because of poor construction. Workers had installed equipment behind schedule on 
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the first production line, a problem evident in building the second, due in time for the 1958 
harvest.86 The construction trust in charge of the site lacked machines to move earth and raise 
structures, forcing managers to substitute large quantities of workers. The inspectors 
furthermore judged that poor leadership and inadequate political agitation had allowed 
workforce turnover to skyrocket: 54 percent of workers left in the first quarter of 1958 alone. 
Inspectors found similar conditions at Rasshevatka, located in Novo-Aleksandrovsk district.87 At 
the end of May, a summary of inspections conducted at sites across the RSFSR confirmed that 
these were common problems. Much like the plants in Ukraine in 1956, many sites lacked basic 
building materials, such as bricks and timber.88 The situation in Stavropol had progressed little, 
so inspectors pressured the krai soviet to pass a resolution demanding improvement on 
“unsatisfactory progress.”89 Summaries incorporated findings of many individual inspectors, 
whose reports offer more detail: the inspector’s specific documentation on Rasshevatka and 
Bogoslovsk complained of slow and poor quality work in all areas, underscoring not only the 54 
percent turnover rate, but also that the 125 workers on hand should have been sufficient to fulfill 
work quotas. “Nonetheless,” he noted, “because of poor labor organization and bad work, the 
construction plan was unfulfilled.” He further observed that the site’s head had been fired “for 
poorly organizing construction, unsatisfactory management, low-quality results, and resulting 
cost overruns,” but as of May 9, 1958, no replacement had been named.90 
By August 1958, little had improved in getting construction back on schedule. I. I. 
Samokhval, head of the krai grain-procurement office and the official nominally responsible, 
reported to krai party-committee secretary I. K. Lebedev. Typical of documents of the sort, it 
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consists of two pages that dryly listed budget and technical details, and two more that shift 
responsibility from Samokhval to others. Spreading blame widely, he categorically denied that 
he or his organization deserved any of it. Tasks requiring substantial amounts of labor, such as 
installing equipment and completing buildings, were carried out “extremely unsatisfactorily” 
because the local construction trust had organized work inefficiently and permitted the labor 
shortage to persist. Equipment and other needed components arrived late from manufacturers 
located outside the krai. “Such a low tempo in completing and installing,” Samokhval concluded, 
“threatens completion of the plant’s full capacity in the designated timeframe.”91 
An inspector from the RSFSR’s Committee for Government Oversight, successor to the 
ministry, corroborated parts of Samokhval’s evaluation. Further details emerged not only about 
delayed material deliveries and the insufficient workforce, but also about shoddy on-site 
management. The construction trust had appointed a foreman who later proved to be “a person 
without education, a con-man who mostly took bribes and lowered output norms.”92 
Suppressing the quota of labor required in a day, week, or month was a frequent ploy to pad the 
pockets of workers and managers by making the plan easier to fulfill and overfulfill. That 
provided opportunities to earn bonuses without extraordinary effort, making workers happier 
and creating the appearance of effective leadership. 
The inspector suggested remedies for the site’s problems that illuminate the effects of 
Khrushchev’s maligned administrative reforms, the sovnarkhozy or Councils of the National 
Economy [Sovet narodnogo khoziaistva]. First, he recommended the krai party committee pass 
a resolution admonishing the construction trust. Second, he proposed that they pressure the 
local sovnarkhoz, an administrative entity designed to coordinate production within its domain 
and with other sovnarkhozy, to more ensure manufacturers produced and delivered the needed 
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equipment quickly.93 Instituted in early 1957, the councils controlled heavy and consumer goods 
industries, but left industries related to defense under centralized ministries in Moscow. It was a 
step in Khrushchev’s attempt to raise efficiency by reining in the ministries, but in effect 
replaced their overcentralized and parochial bureaucracies with new problems. The system 
forced regional councils to coordinate and cooperate among themselves, which they had few 
incentives to do. Scholars have concluded that the reform increased the localism that placed 
narrow interests ahead of efficiency in pursuing national priorities, complicating coordination of 
economic initiatives.94 
The same inspector’s evaluation of the Bogoslovsk site found similar conditions, but a 
particularly severe labor shortage. In seven months of 1958, 175 workers had left, replaced by 
only 103 new hires. The problem was so pressing that the construction trust contracted with a 
nearby corrective-labor colony for manual laborers, including skilled construction workers. The 
colony sent an average of only fifteen workers, even though the agreement specified fifty. The 
need for such measures, however, demonstrates how acute the labor shortage had become and 
how constant the demand for continued progress.95 If authorities could not prevent mass 
turnover in a labor force free to move about, then prison labor had to substitute. 
The concerns of Samokhval and of the inspectors proved well founded. On December 30, 
1958, long after the production lines were scheduled to be working, the krai party committee 
passed a resolution condemning delays in bringing major components of the plants into 
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operation. In late February 1959, inspectors found that the calibration line had finally put out its 
first production, but workers had not yet completed critical jobs such as fine-tuning the 
machines.96 Having failed to clear storage areas, managers left unprocessed seed to lie in the 
open air. Stocks of the chemical fungicides were on hand, but the factories had not yet begun 
treating seeds.97 Local party committees also had failed to carry out orders, including “to 
implement the directive of the CPSU krai committee bureau to improve production,” for 
example by implementing measures to conserve fuel and electricity. Furthermore, they had 
failed in “cultural-educational work,” which included encouraging workers to emulate the best 
workers and to participate in a new campaign to create “communist labor brigades.”98 
These problems were not specific to Stavropol krai; inspectors found them at similar 
construction sites in Ukraine. Beginning in April 1958, the USSR Committee for Government 
Oversight carried out a series of inspections revealing failures and delays throughout the 
republic. The site at the town of Lozova in Khar'kiv oblast stood out as the most troubled. In 
several documents, inspectors and party officials alike judged the work of the oblast 
construction trust and its on-site managers “unsatisfactory.” The first managers had “wastefully” 
used resources, resulting in a recommendation “to hold them responsible” (privlech' k 
otvetstvennosti), meaning reprimand, firing, or penalties as party members.99 In this case, they 
were fired for their “irresponsible approach” to the job in February 1958.100 In April, inspectors 
still found progress wanting, as poor management led to a disorganized labor force and so many 
mistakes in construction that inspectors labeled the supposedly complete factory “brak,” or 
defective production. Many individual elements they deemed flawed due to “unskilled” 
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[“negramotnyi,” lit. “illiterate”] work.101 Those responsible denied the existence of such flaws or 
blamed them on the poor supplies and low quality of building materials.102 Holding a meeting of 
the construction site’s personnel, a visiting inspector ordered workers to fix the defects, and 
afterward recommended formal reprimands for the officials in charge.103 Even after this second 
intervention, the oblast party committee found in June 1958 that the chaotic state of affairs 
continued. Despite efforts, “the plants’ construction continues to lag behind, and is 
unsatisfactory” because the proper machinery and materials were not on hand. Word of 
continued delays caused the Ukraine Ministry of Grain Products to hold high-level meetings to 
discuss solutions; officials sent orders to solve the shortages, delays, and shoddy work at Lozova, 
but also at similar sites in Odessa, Khmel'nytskiy, Chernivtsi, and other oblasts.104 
Word of these failures, which reached even the Central Committee, did not ensure that 
on-site officials got results. A summary, dated June 9, 1958, went to the USSR Council of 
Ministers and to A. I. Kirichenko, the Central Committee secretary then responsible for 
agriculture who had until a short time before been head of the Ukrainian party.105 Summarizing 
the failures outlined above, the report distributes blame widely: 
Inspectors determined that the RSFSR Ministry of Grain Procurements and 
Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Grain Procurements, their oblast administrations, the 
bureaus of oblast party committees, and bureaus of oblast soviets where the 
plants are being constructed have not organized timely and full-scale building 
this year. The [republics’] Councils of Ministers have not established necessary 
oversight. As a result, construction and installation plans for the first quarter, 
and for April, have not been fulfilled; [progress] on construction of the plants is 
therefore unsatisfactory.106 
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Central Committee secretary F. R. Kozlov, moreover, sent copies of the report to the heads of the 
respective Councils of Ministers, as well as to the USSR ministers of agriculture and of grain 
procurements.107 His demand that they correct these faults demonstrated the consideration high 
authorities gave to the matter, but even this vigilance did not succeed in smoothly completing 
the factories. 
* * * 
Even after the calibration plants began to ready seed corn for planting, operation proved 
disorderly. In early 1959, inspections in Stavropol krai revealed that managers often violated 
standard procedures. First, large quantities of grain designated for processing and use as seed 
lay in the open air at collection points, merely covered with tarpaulins offering insufficient 
protection against rain, snow, wind, and sun, rather than housed in well-ventilated buildings.108 
Second, workers did not keep up with the schedule. As of January 15, 1959, they were still 
cleaning and drying seeds, the process’s first stages, which should have been completed by that 
date. I. I. Samokhval again explained delays by citing mitigating circumstances, none of which 
hid the fact that the plan’s targets remained unmet. Reporting to the krai party committee, he 
acknowledged that progress had been “unsatisfactory.”109 Inspectors later found that, of the 
annual quota of 16,000 metric tons for farms in the krai and 64,000 tons for shipping outside it, 
only 3,766 tons were sorted and only 2,000 tons ready for distribution on March 1, 1959, as 
spring planting loomed. The plan required that 42,000 tons should have shipped by that date. 
Samokhval received the bulk of the blame for this failure. The krai party committee concluded 
that, despite orders to “achieve the rhythmic functioning of all sections and machines, the Grain 
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Procurements Administration, Comrade Samokhval, and the plant directors are unsatisfactorily 
fulfilling them.” Parts of the production line remained incomplete because machinery had been 
improperly installed and, furthermore, managers failed to organize production efficiently. Even 
demands that Samokhval attend meetings of the party committee’s bureau on February 27 and 
March 3, 1959, and account for his actions achieved little effect. The party committee later 
indicated exasperation with the calibration plants’ operation, and with Samokhval; however, 
officials recommended not a reprimand, but only that the negligent manager visit the bureau for 
the third time.110 
Although the day-to-day operation of the plants had improved somewhat by later in 
1959, a corruption scandal ensured the downfall of several officials, including Samokhval. 
Inspections in September 1959 found that the Bogoslovsk procurement facility and neighboring 
calibration plant regularly fulfilled its quotas.111 They also revealed irregularities in the use of the 
grain corn that was the plant’s raw material, and the resulting calibrated seeds. The krai 
procurement office and its head, Samokhval, had declared lots totaling 178 metric tons 
unsuitable for seed, and had reclassified them for use as feed. Samokhval claimed that the fault 
lay with the calibration machine, which intermixed low-quality, irregularly shaped kernels with 
the useful seed, rendering the output substandard.112 This incident proved the culmination of a 
long chain of irregularities, which apparently led superiors to fire Samokhval. A summary of the 
“abuses of position” by procurement-department workers up to and including Samovkhval 
documents the case, as well as other instances in prior years. Between 1957 and 1959, he and his 
deputy had sold grain to a collective farm in Leningrad oblast, and, in return, bought timber 
allegedly for use in constructing the seed-corn calibration plants. In fact, the lumber proved to 
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be of very low quality.113 Samokhval and his subordinates presumably profited from the 
exchange, perhaps by embezzling the difference between the grain’s sale price and the low 
purchase price of the low-quality timber. In each case, Samokhval “attempted to shirk 
responsibility,” but his actions in 1959 proved a breaking point. He gave orders diverting 697 
metric tons out of a lot containing 1,071 tons of corn from seed processing to industrial refining 
into oil, starch, or spirit. The state had paid farms nearly 600,000 rubles as bonuses for 
producing the raw material for hybrid seed. When Samokhval diverted the corn to other uses, 
that expenditure went to waste. He insisted that the corn had not been up to the standard for 
seeds, but produced documentation to that effect for only 236 tons. Other officials attested that, 
when they shipped the lots of grain from the collection points to the plant, they had been 
between 86 and 88 percent satisfactory. The inspectors’ report details two similar incidents, 
labeling the three of them “proizvol,” a common term used to characterize bureaucrats’ arbitrary 
moves in pursuit of expediency or personal profit.114 These “illegal actions” incriminated 
Samokhval. I found no specific documents in the Stavropol archives confirming that he had 
been fired from his administrative position, but his name does not appear in any related files 
from subsequent years.115 
In spite of hindrances, delays, poor quality, and spoilage, Soviet efforts to introduce the 
most advanced hybrids achieved some successes in subsequent years. In 1961, plans called for 
farms to produce 1 million metric tons of a range of hybrids suited to the USSR’s various climate 
zones.116 The program involved fifty research institutes, and more than 2,000 state and 
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collective farms.117 The Committee for Procurements reported an actual output of 1.25 million 
tons of such seeds, with the result that the state paid out bonuses of 188 million rubles to farms 
for the hybrids most in demand.118 Even this effort, however, proved insufficient to meeting 
collective farms’ requests for hybrid seeds to plant an expanded area—more than 37 million 
hectares—planted in 1962.119 
* * * 
Illustrating common practices, one multiregion inspection sheds light on how the corn 
crusade proceeded in individual districts and on individual farms. On August 20, 1958, the 
RSFSR Committee for Government Oversight began a campaign to survey corngrowing in 
Krasnoiarsk krai in eastern Siberia, as well as in Briansk, Orel, and Penza oblasts of central 
European Russia. Inspectors fanned out from Moscow, teaming with local counterparts to 
scrutinize how farms organized labor, propagandized proper methods, harvested the crop—
termed “the struggle with waste during the harvest” in the documents—and accounted for the 
resulting feed. The results for Krasnoiarsk krai, a vast region of mostly cool climate in the basin 
of the Enisei River, brought a number of surprising details to the attention of authorities in 
Moscow. First, the inspectors showed that the cropland devoted to corn had declined steadily 
from a peak of more than 250,000 hectares in 1956, to only 195,000 in 1958.120 Khrushchev 
reversed this trend by renewing the crusade at the December 1958 Central Committee plenum. 
Second, the inspectors collated their findings into a document that, although differing 
from the boilerplate reports local committees made to superiors, resembled them. It began by 
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identifying farms that had proven that satisfactory results were possible, but continued to list 
the failures of the great majority. Attributing the krai’s rising meat and dairy output to 
“vanguard” farms and their harvests of corn for feed, the officials concluded that this 
“demonstrated that, even given the conditions of the krai, observing the correct methods for 
cultivating corn could ensure a high yield of green plant mass.” They detailed the activities of the 
Stalin collective farm of Minusinsk district, which did everything by the book and achieved the 
best yields in the region. At thirty metric tons per hectare, however, these were just barely above 
those considered economical. They documented the problems and prohibited practices causing 
many farms to grow only low yields of corn. Far more common, these farms harvested yields as 
low as 10 percent of those achieved by the Stalin collective farm. In 1956, the average yield for 
the krai had been 4.1 tons per hectare; even in rising to 5.4 tons in 1957, yields remained 
approximately 20 percent of the target.121 In 1958, worse still, the harvest fell to a mere 3.3 tons 
per hectare. This figure, however, was suspect: the inspectors found many instances when farm 
personnel calculated yields inaccurately, measuring the harvest by volume rather than weight, 
or even by simply estimating it.122 Additionally, the farms harvested their corn too early, at the 
end of July and in early August when the corn was still maturing, because they faced demands to 
also harvest wheat, barley, and other staple grains, which tied up machines and workers in late 
August. Consequently, the nutrient content of livestock feed made from corn was low, a fact 
contributing to lower weight gain and milk output of the farms’ livestock. Farms planted corn on 
poor land, applied no fertilizer, and did little if any work to remove weeds. Each of these 
widespread practices meant that the corn that did grow drew on fewer soil nutrients, competed 
with more weeds, and yielded far less than it—or traditional feed crops—might have. As they so 
often did, the inspectors blamed these failures on local officials, concluding, “Numerous facts 
demonstrate that, as in past years, in many collective and state farms they still do not devote the 
                                                        
121 GARF, f. A-340, op. 1, d. 116, ll. 6–7 
122 GARF, f. A-340, op. 1, d. 116, l. 14. 
  179 
necessary attention to this valuable feed crop.” Local officials defended themselves by citing 
shortages of tractors and implements. The inspectors found eighty-four suitable tractors, a total 
they deemed sufficient for the district. They also found that state farms in particular had 
adequate machinery, but those farms failed to remove weeds on the more than 900 hectares of 
corn.123 The inspectors instead blamed party and agricultural officials for “clearly insufficient 
efforts” to organize and educate workers.124 
Locales such as Minusinsk district were located on the southern edge of Krasnoiarsk 
krai, where the climate was comparatively mild, but some of the krai’s farms were too far to the 
north to grow corn. Contemporary critics and subsequent scholars have overstated the 
importance of the northerly climate, which had a hand in corn’s failure only in some locales, and 
these accounted for only a small percentage of the total cropland, and of cropland devoted to 
corn. The most northerly districts in Krasnoiarsk krai that planted corn did bring in predictably 
dismal harvests: in 1958, frosts came as late as June 5 and as early as August 16, leaving only 32 
days between with sufficient warmth to sustain corn’s growth, far short of the approximately 
100 needed. Inspectors found that these farms planted only a few hectares of corn,125 a total that 
amounted to a tiny percentage in comparison to the hundreds of hectares planted on farms in 
the krai’s southern districts and the hundreds of thousands planted across Krasnodar krai, 
Stavropol krai, Ukraine, and the Moldavian SSR. 
Efforts to grow corn in the far north were doomed to fail, but the average yields for the 
entire USSR were low because southern farms harvested low yields, not because of the failure of 
a few hectares in areas truly too far to the north. Economic analyst Naum Jasny documented 
that in 1959 farms grew corn on 22.4 million hectares, or 11 percent of the total cropland of 
196.3 million hectares. More than half of that total was planted in climatic regions even the 
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skeptical Jasny considered suitable for corn. Some 5.7 million hectares were in northern regions, 
such as these districts of Krasnoiarsk krai, but these accounted for less than 6 percent of the 
more than 100 million hectares of crops in those regions.126 Thus the northern margins of arable 
land accounted for little of the total crop area devoted to corn, and corn occupied only a tiny 
fraction of their area. The low yields they grew determined a comparatively modest part of the 
overall yields for the USSR, which themselves remained low.127 
Other regions replicated the transgressions of farms in Krasnoiarsk krai. In Briansk 
oblast, years of directives by local party and agricultural officials had achieved little, the 
inspectors concluded, “because these orders had not been accompanied by organizational work 
to train machine operators, collective farmers, and state-farm workers” in practices such as 
square-cluster planting.128 Farms used their land—from the inspectors’ point of view—
irrationally, did not know how to plant corn properly, organized labor inefficiently, and 
calculated yields inaccurately. As a result, even their small harvests cost a lot to produce. Similar 
reports about individual districts, and about Orel and Penza oblasts, arrived at the same 
conclusions.129 In Tambov oblast, local authorities sought to educate district officials in how to 
grow corn, but the farms did not implement the plan.130 Almost universally, inspectors reported 
that even in the fourth year of Khrushchev’s corn crusade, farms did not satisfactorily carry out 
basic tasks required to effectively plant, cultivate, and harvest corn. Other crops received their 
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attention, as farms assigned less suitable fields to corn, applied little fertilizer to them, doled out 
less labor, and concentrated on crops their managers deemed more profitable—typically because 
they required less time and labor to plant, cultivate, and harvest. Under these conditions, corn 
could hardly succeed. 
Officials declined to plant or devote attention to corn for reasons that varied according to 
local conditions, but one case illustrates the kinds of opposition Khrushchev’s corn crusade 
faced. The Briansk oblast inspectorate explained to superiors in Moscow that farms in 
Novozybkovsk district preferred familiar crops to corn. Managers remained faithful to lupine, a 
legume rich in protein, which replenished nitrogen in the soil and required little labor or 
machinery to plant and harvest. A report on the district details how corn required higher 
investments of labor, while yielding less than the alternative. Most collective farms planted 
between ten and thirty-five hectares of corn, a comparatively small quantity that allowed them 
to avoid accusations of neglecting the crop entirely. In 1955, the district’s collective farms 
produced 50 percent of their silage from corn, a figure that fell to 30 percent in 1956 and a mere 
8.7 percent in 1958. In that year, they produced only 3,000 metric tons of corn silage, less than 
one-tenth of the 31,000 tons they produced from lupine.131 Yields of meat and milk rose in those 
years, suggesting the lupine was better adapted to the climate conditions and labor 
requirements the farms could sustain. Corn produced economical yields on only the best farms, 
whereas average ones produced less feed growing it, and at a cost up to five times higher. Lupine 
was superior, the local inspectors concluded, not only because officials did not ensure proper 
measures to grow corn, but also because lupine, “makes low demands on the soil, yields large 
crops without fertilizer, and requires insignificant amounts of labor.” These characteristics 
allowed the “collective farms to receive cheap feed rich in protein, which livestock eat readily; 
moreover, the crop raises the fertility of the soil.”132 At least in the short term, local officials had 
                                                        
131 GARF, f. A-340, op. 1, d. 116, l. 62. 
132 GARF, f. A-340, op. 1, d. 116, l. 63. 
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effectively dodged demands from above to plant corn, pursuing an alternative strategy that 
allowed them to raise output of meat and dairy products, the benchmarks that mattered most. 
These crops nonetheless came under increasing attack in Khrushchev’s campaign in the years 
after 1958 to supplant those he dismissed as “low yielding” and labeled mere “grasses,” favoring 
row crops grown using industrial farming technologies. 
* * * 
Moscow’s policy initiatives required officials in local administrations and in ministries to 
cooperate. Those functionaries responded to Moscow’s demands, but sometimes in ways that 
proved counterproductive, thereby hindering the strategies Khrushchev designed to achieve 
goals and held back progress as he defined it. Local party authorities and economic 
bureaucracies concealed their inability or unwillingness to follow orders from above, hoping to 
create at least the appearance that they had complied. They thus demonstrated doubt about corn 
that they could not express openly. In the mid 1950s, these actions coincided with the 
antibureaucracy campaign Khrushchev championed, an effort to make organizations carrying 
out economic policy more responsive to Moscow’s orders. In increasing the Communist Party’s 
duties to implement and oversee economic policies at the expense of the ministries, he did not 
eliminate their power. They, along with krai and oblast agricultural departments, local 
construction trusts, district bosses, and farm authorities, retained significant influence over 
policy outcomes. 
Using his authority to make policy, Khrushchev steadfastly promoted the industrial 
farming methods and technologies Soviet farms needed to realize his vision of a modern system 
of agriculture. Efforts to put his vision of industrial corn cultivation into practice between 1955 
and 1958 concentrated on introducing more machines, new hybrid corn varieties, and related 
technologies. Yet the evidence in this chapter also suggest that his policies were insufficient to 
realize his vision without additional heroic efforts to turn policy into practice. Local authorities 
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sidestepped expectations, seeking to create a façade that demonstrated compliance. Those 
obstacles grew after 1958, as officials adapted to Khrushchev’s increasingly insistent demands to 
see industrial farming ideals in practice on Soviet farms. The strategies local authorities used 
evolved in tandem to Khrushchev’s campaign for a modern Soviet socialist agriculture, which 
would not rely on the crops he denounced as “grasses,” but instead required industrially farmed 
row crops such as corn.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STRUGGLE FOR CORN: CENTER–LOCAL RELATIONS AND IMPLEMENTING POLICY 
“Comrades!” Nikita Khrushchev thundered in a speech in Voronezh in February 1961, 
“We must strictly punish charlatans who try to embellish [their successes], and to hide the 
mistakes they’ve made.” He then described a letter blowing the whistle on officials in the oblast: 
anticipating the First Secretary’s arrival and the anger the sight of unharvested corn would elicit, 
the heads of collective and state farms located along Khrushchev’s route ordered workers to 
attach a rail, requisitioned from a nearby railroad depot, to a tractor and use it to knock down 
corn in the fields. They thereby hoped to disguise the fact that the harvest, which they should 
have finished months earlier, remained incomplete. In the particular case described in the letter, 
the state farm lost the livestock feed grown on 300 hectares. Confirming the story, the 
investigating Pravda correspondent faced pressure from the oblast authorities to suppress his 
findings. The oblast’s party boss, S. D. Khitrov, then lied to Khrushchev, claiming that this was 
simply a standard practice for gathering the corn plants for use as feed after the grain had been 
harvested by hand. “I will soon be sixty-seven years old,” Khrushchev countered, “and I don’t 
believe in such fairytales. . . . In reality, this was deceit (ochkovtiratel’stvo). Why did they do 
this? They wanted to deceive me.”1 
Considering Khitrov’s deceit and similar cases, this chapter sheds light on center-
periphery relations and the dynamics of how local party organizations implemented policies 
designed to make Khrushchev’s vision of corn-based industrial farming a reality. I argue that 
relationships among local officials, the pressures the system placed on them to organize 
                                                        
1 “Opiraias' na peredovom opyt i dostizheniia nauki, dobivat'sia obshchego pod"ema sel'skogo khoziaistva: 
Rech' tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva na soveshchanii peredovikov sel'skogo khoziaistva oblastei 
Tsentral'noi chernozemnoi zony Rossiiskoi Federatsii v gorode Voronezhe, 11 fevralia 1961 goda,” Pravda 
(February 19, 1961): 3. The text can also be found in Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 5:35. 
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production, and the influence of superiors in Moscow combined to complicate orderly 
management of agriculture and hampered efforts to carry out corn-planting and meat-
procurement campaigns. Acting within their regional networks, party leaders created the 
appearance that they had simultaneously raised dairy and meat output while pursuing policies 
Khrushchev deemed integral to his vision of abundance through industrial farming, especially 
plowing up pastures and replacing them with corn. I divide this chapter chronologically, with 
the scandals resulting from fraudulent procurements that rocked the Soviet Union in 1960 and 
1961, most famously in Riazan, as the turning point. Before that, Khrushchev promoted strong 
regional leaders who appeared to secure the results he demanded; subsequently learning that 
the apparently successful secretaries had abused their powers, central authorities moved to 
combat the deception. They therefore worked to curb local authorities’ power, resulting in the 
administrative reorganizations Khrushchev undertook between 1961 and 1964. 
To understand regional party organizations, I draw on historian Oleg Khlevniuk’s 
typology of regional leaders, how their networks operated, and how they responded to 
Khrushchev’s campaigns. Khlevniuk identifies three kinds of networks and explains how each 
network came into being, interacted with superiors in Moscow, and either achieved some 
stability in personnel or fell victim to internal conflicts. The “dictator” secretary was secure in 
his power and authority over subordinates, directing a regional party organization exhibiting 
rigid hierarchy and populated by subordinates dependent on the good graces of the dictator for 
their job security.2 The archetype for this style of regional secretary was A. N. Larionov of Riazan 
oblast, who responded with enthusiasm to Moscow’s demands, appeared to meet them, and 
garnered resultant accolades. The opposite of the dictator, the “weak secretary” lacked the 
authority to verify that subordinates carried out commands, producing a network of competing 
interest groups. In such an arrangement, the region often failed to carry out Moscow’s policies, 
                                                        
2 Khlevniuk, “Regional'naia vlast' v SSSR,” 33–35. In this instance, “region” encompasses union-republic, 
krai, and oblast party organizations. 
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bringing officials from the Central Committee in to install a new secretary, perhaps a potential 
dictator.3 The “norm-bound” network typically evolved from one or the other into a compromise 
between the two. Most common after Moscow authorities quashed the dictators whom they 
blamed for the scandals of 1960 and 1961, this type became almost universal under L. I. 
Brezhnev. In the compromise network, formal lines of power worked alongside patronage and 
cooperation among equals to ensure efficiency, stability and consensus that required little 
interference by Moscow to maintain.4 Building on Khlevniuk’s work, historian Yoram Gorlizki 
finds that regional party networks demonstrated the need for trust—to fulfill promises and not 
to betray illegal actions to higher authorities—among party officials for a region to function.5 It 
took time to develop the relationships necessary for these ties: Gorlizki shows this by contrasting 
the dictatorial powers of Larionov with Kirov oblast’s weak secretary, who lacked the power, 
authority, and established ties to subordinates in his network. 
In examining how regional leaders and networks carried out policies related to corn and 
industrial agriculture, I use Khlevniuk’s typology to make clearer the tangled lines of authority 
characteristic of center-periphery relations. I explain how officials attempted to secure their own 
power, to maintain it, and, where necessary, to implement policies. I therefore join recent trends 
in scholarship on the role of regions in the Soviet system. Early on, Jerry Hough demonstrated 
how regional leadership influenced industrial policy.6 Typically, studies of the political system 
privileged individuals by viewing regions mainly as the launching pad for the careers of future 
leaders in Moscow, the path trodden by M. S. Gorbachev and many others.7 Since the Soviet 
                                                        
3 Ibid., 35–36. 
4 Ibid., 37–39. 
5 Yoram Gorlizki, “Scandal in Riazan: Networks of Trust and the Social Dynamics of Deception,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 14, no. 2 (2013): 243–78. 
6 Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
7 Khlevniuk, “Regional'naia vlast' v SSSR,” 31. Gorbachev began his career as an official in the Stavropol 
city and krai Komsomol committees, and then advanced through the krai party committee. 
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archives became accessible, foreign scholars and those from post-Soviet countries alike have 
expanded interest in local history, including on important regions such as Riazan.8 Historian 
E. A. Rees identifies “conflicting centripetal and centrifugal forces” that defined relationships 
between center and periphery, and concludes that centralization peaked under Stalin, while the 
Khrushchev period saw “a relative moderation” that enhanced local authority.9 In his study of 
postwar regional elites, historian V. P. Mokhov argues that local party organizations exercised 
increasing influence over economic activity in the post-Stalin period.10 Their authority grew 
further after Khrushchev’s ouster: regional party secretaries under Brezhnev remained subject 
to Moscow’s rules, but felt increasingly entrenched in their regions, an atmosphere defined by 
official emphasis on “stability in cadres.” Secure from removal, they developed a style privileging 
informal operational norms and interpersonal relationships over formal procedures.11 
* * * 
Beginning in September 1953, Moscow pressured regional leaders to implement 
Khrushchev’s agricultural policies. As early as March 1955, mere weeks after launching the corn 
crusade, he denounced those who merely sloganeered about corn but did not mobilize local 
efforts to realize the directives from Moscow. Khlevniuk finds that between 1953 and 1957, 
Khrushchev replaced many oblast party secretaries. By choosing potentially strong, even 
dictatorial secretaries to succeed them, the leader hoped to create hierarchies capable of 
efficiently executing his campaigns. Weak secretaries became targets for dismissal because they 
                                                        
8 See, for example: A. F. Agarev, Tragicheskaia avantiura: Sel'skoe khoziaistvo Riazanskoi oblasti, 1950-
1960 gody; A. N. Larionov, N. S. Khrushchev i drugie; Dokumenty, sobytiia, fakty (Riazan': Russkoe 
slovo, 2005). 
9 E. A. Rees, “Introduction,” in Centre-Local Relations in the Stalinist State, 1928-1941, ed. E. A. Rees 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 1. 
10 V. P. Mokhov, Regional'naia politicheskaia elita Rossii, 1945–1991 gody (Perm': Permskoe knizhnoe 
izdatel'stvo, 2003), 13. 
11 Gorlizki, “Too Much Trust,” 676–79. 
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failed to do so.12 The secretaries who gained power and seats in the Central Committee owed 
their positions to Khrushchev, disposing them to support him against his rivals in the Presidium 
in June 1957. 
During those four years (1953–57), Khrushchev used his power as head of the Central 
Committee Secretariat to replace at least half of the secretaries under his control, sacking those 
who did not meet his expectations in agriculture. For instance, Briansk oblast party secretary 
A. D. Bondarenko lost his post in January 1954 because the Central Committee singled out his 
slow and ineffective response to the September 1953 plenum’s directives. Officials reported that 
the oblast’s farms had not prepared for spring planting in general and for expanding the corn 
crop in particular. Once officials sent from Moscow opened the floor at a party meeting to 
criticism of Bondarenko, the complaints swelled into a wave. Local party officials, the secretary’s 
subordinates, “sharply criticized members of the oblast committee bureau for rarely venturing 
into the districts; for seldom speaking with collective farmers, MTS workers, and district party 
activists; for uncritically evaluating the state of affairs in agriculture; and for accepting the 
serious shortcomings of the collective farms, MTSs, and state farms.”13 With Moscow’s blessing, 
the plenum charged that Bondarenko “had not provided leadership,” and replaced him with 
A. U. Petukhov, a functionary of the Central Committee apparat, a bullpen for potential regional 
bosses.14 I. V. Storozhev, deputy chief of the Central Committee Department for Party 
Organizations, carried out Moscow’s wishes by supervising similar transfers of power in 
Iaroslavl, Tula, Smolensk, and Kalinin oblasts. In summarizing that work, Storozhev 
characterized the scale of the problem Khrushchev confronted by writing, “Progress in 
organizational and political work in the locales . . . is weak. . . . Party activists do not struggle to 
                                                        
12 Khlevniuk, “Regional'naia vlast' v SSSR,” 33–34. 
13 RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 149, ll. 6–9. This document, as well as the others similarly cited, are reproduced 
in full or in part in the document collection edited by Khlevniuk. Khlevniuk, Regional'naia politika N. S. 
Khrushcheva, 57. 
14 Khlevniuk, Regional'naia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 58. 
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develop agriculture.” Linking these regions’ failures to the contemporaneous campaign against 
red tape, Storozhev concluded, “The actual business [of agricultural reform] drowns in a flood of 
directives.”15 
Censuring those regional authorities he considered lax, Khrushchev pressured them to 
address apparent failures. The case of the Moscow oblast party committee and its response to 
the corn crusade is illustrative. At the Central Committee plenum in January 1955, the First 
Secretary expressed displeasure with his successor as head of the oblast party committee, I. V. 
Kapitonov. Acknowledging that the previous year had witnessed “very serious shortcomings in 
cultivating corn, for which Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev justifiably criticized us in his report,” 
Kapitonov outlined measures designed to guarantee future success.16 Still dissatisfied, on the 
plenum’s final day Khrushchev criticized bureaucratic practices that ensured that no one 
effectively managed the economy. “There are so many [officials], but the task is a failure,” he 
lamented. “Why?” he asked rhetorically, “Because, comrades, of the many windy speeches made 
up of stock slogans. . . . They repeat [them], but they don’t know how to plant [corn] and care for 
it. . . . My fellow Muscovites, for example, [have] plenty of land . . . and a propagandist for every 
hectare, but [the oblast’s] corn has failed.” Khrushchev continued his broadside: “Why? 
Because, Comrade Kapitonov, there were very many speeches and very little comprehension. 
That is the only way to explain it. They blathered and blathered, but at the end of the year there 
was nothing to harvest.”17 Whether, like Bondaerenko, they lost their secretaryships, or, like 
Kapitonov, they did not, secretaries became vulnerable for failing to pursue the corn crusade 
with sufficient vigor to satisfy Khrushchev. 
As a result, the Moscow oblast committee stepped up the campaign for corn, holding 
                                                        
15 RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 153, ll. 202–5, cited in: Khlevniuk, Regional'naia politika N. S. Khrushcheva, 
73. 
16 RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 121, l. 66. 
17 RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 126, l. 119. 
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conferences and meetings on the subject throughout 1955. In June 1955, an oblast committee 
plenum featured speakers who declared corn “a crop of decisive significance” in raising meat 
and dairy output.18 “It is impossible to say that . . . measures for fulfilling the directives of the 
January Central Committee plenum went smoothly and without mistakes,” the secretary of a 
district party committee admitted. The campaign against red tape meant that officials had to 
acknowledge management failures: “For this we were justifiably criticized in the regional 
newspaper . . . in an article entitled ‘Without leaving the office.’”19 Each subsequent speaker also 
described what the district or farm organization under his leadership had done to grow corn and 
meet goals for meat and dairy output. 
Success in Moscow region remained elusive, but pressure from Khrushchev forced them 
to continue their efforts. In July 1955, the oblast agriculture department found the state of corn 
cultivation on farms “unsatisfactory.” A number of farms, MTSs, and districts had put some 
effort into weeding the corn plantings, but a great many had done little. As a result, the director 
of the oblast agricultural department reprimanded many officials in charge of various MTSs, and 
fired one MTS director for failing to organize work needed to grow corn.20 In January 1956, the 
regional authorities held a conference at which political leaders and researchers evaluated the 
past year’s results and offered advice about how to select the best plots of land, to plant, to 
cultivate, and to harvest. Many recommendations repeated Khrushchev’s principles, while 
some—to plant not two or three grains in a cluster, but six or even eight—diverged from them.21 
Others frankly admitted “widespread misfortunes with the corn crop in 1955.” Although the 
                                                        
18 TsAOPIM, f. 3, op. 159, d. 6, l. 7. 
19 TsAOPIM, f. 3, op. 159, d. 6, l. 39. For similar examples from the spring planting in May 1955, see: 
TsAOPIM, f. 3, op. 159, d. 6, l. 39.  
20 TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, d. 2152, ll. 28–32. To illustrate, the collective farms served by the Mytishchi MTS 
had weeded 96.8 percent of their corn plantings at least once, and 65 percent of them a second time. In 
the territory of Podol'sk MTS, by contrast, farms had weeded only 39.7 percent the first time and none a 
second time; in some cases, entire collective farms had not begun the vital work. 
21 TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, d. 2305, l. 12. 
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oblast’s corn plantings had expanded fivefold over the 1954 figure, reaching 91,000 hectares, or 
19 percent of grain plantings, only a few farms brought in a fruitful harvest.22 This was, the 
oblast party leaders claimed, the fault of local leaders who “gave less attention, . . . did not 
demonstrate sufficient care, and allowed . . . unorganized and untimely execution of work.”23 
* * * 
Regional leaders were coerced to plant corn, procure grain, and execute Moscow’s 
directives. This pressure came from Khrushchev and, behind the scenes, from powerful officials 
such as the leader’s right-hand man, V. P. Mylarshchikov, head of the Central Committee’s 
Agricultural Department for the RSFSR from 1954 to 1959.24  That post positioned 
Mylarshchikov to manage the information flowing to the Presidium, and to work with the First 
Secretary to shape policy as one of his sel'skokhoziaistvenniki, or personal agricultural advisors. 
Proximity to Khrushchev gave him authority exceeding his formal powers, which he used to 
enforce Moscow’s policies in the RSFSR’s regions. He earned respect and fear in that capacity, 
embodying the rude, brusque, and pugnacious leader characteristic of the “little Stalin,” the 
dictatorial leader whom writer Ilya Ehrenburg captured in the antihero, factory director I. V. 
Zhuravlev, of his epochal novel The Thaw. Documents and memoirs alike speak to 
Mylarshchikov’s actions, their effect, and the impression they created in regions across the 
RSFSR.25 
                                                        
22 TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, d. 2306, ll. 10–11.  
23 TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, d. 2306, ll. 21. 
24 Mylarshchikov served as a subordinate to Khrushchev on the Moscow oblast party committee from 1951 
to 1953. Strelianyi, “The Last Romantic,” 650 f. 115. For more on the Central Committee apparat, its 
powers, and its evolution in the Khrushchev period, see: Alexander Titov, “The Central Committee 
Apparatus under Khrushchev,” 41–60, in Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the 
Soviet Union, 1953-1964, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilič. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and 
East European Studies 73 (New York: Routledge, 2011).  
25 In Stavropol krai, for instance, he attended a party conference where the party leaders addressed 
charges that they had come up short in grain procurements. Unfortunately, but perhaps tellingly, the 
Stavropol krai committee’s file on the meeting does not record his speech; it notes only that 
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Earning a fearsome reputation as a troubleshooter, Mylarshchikov executed 
Khrushchev’s orders by ensuring that oblasts planted corn, supplied grain for state 
procurement, and fulfilled a host of related tasks. In December 1956, M. P. Karpenko, deputy 
minister of agriculture for the RSFSR, wrote to Khrushchev outlining a case, based on personal 
experience, against the Central Committee operative. First, Karpenko referred to events during 
his previous posting in Siberia’s Krasnoiarsk krai, where the party secretary, N. N. Organov, had 
gained fame for surpassing state grain procurement quotas in 1955. Karpenko bemoaned how 
Organov had intimidated farms to sell grain to the state above and beyond the plan, even to the 
point of forcing them to sell grain set aside to pay farmers or to plant the next year’s crop. 
Listening to Karpenko’s protests, Organov explained that he understood these actions’ 
disastrous effects, but also “alluded to compulsion by Comrade Mylarshchikov” and explained 
that he had to obey orders from the Central Committee to procure the grain at any cost. To meet 
those demands, the leaders of the krai took actions they considered “irresponsible” and “counter 
to their party conscience.” Any who spoke out, however, faced firing and blacklisting.26 
Karpenko’s letter observes that Mylarshchikov’s detrimental influence had become more 
evident once Karpenko had moved to Moscow to become a deputy minister, a post giving him a 
republic-wide perspective. For instance, inspections in Krasnodar krai, a southern grain-
producing region rapidly expanding its corn plantings, had revealed irregularities in 
procurements there. Local authorities had filled out paperwork attesting to sale to the state of 
10,000 metric tons of corn, in reality unharvested in the fields. This ploy ensured that annual 
procurement plans appeared fulfilled, even when they were not. Karpenko also saw the 
corrupting hand of Khrushchev’s own aide in this case. 
Who spreads this antigovernment practice around the country? Why is this done? 
Does it not happen in the wake of the one considered a practical, competent 
organizer of grain procurement? I have mentioned Comrade Mylarshchikov’s 
                                                        
Mylarshchikov was present, but not the content of any speech he gave. GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 7072, l. 1. 
26 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 157, l. 141. 
  193
name many times. I have the impression that it has some kind of magic power; 
people speak [of him] as an omnipotent figure, one whom they especially fear.27 
In early 1957, investigators corroborated the charges Karpenko made about Krasnodar krai, 
blaming the chairman of the krai soviet, B. F. Petukhov. He and an official in the krai’s 
procurement agency had “given verbal orders to district soviets and procurement agencies” to 
make up the collective farms’ shortfall in corn purchases by accepting other grains while 
recording that they had delivered corn. This cost the state some 3.6 million rubles. Echoing 
Karpenko’s language, the inspectors termed these actions “antigovernment behavior,” and 
demanded that Petukhov appear before authorities in Moscow to account for himself.28 
According to Karpenko, Mylarshchikov backed flagrant abuses of power with threats and 
curses. Karpenko resisted Mylarshchikov’s illegal orders, which the latter met with “all manner 
of insults.” His description of the dictatorial department head as “rude, haughty, irascible, and 
vindictive” is corroborated by others’ testimony.29 In his memoir, party secretary first in 
Novosibirsk oblast and then in Iaroslavl oblast F. I. Loshchenkov characterized Mylarshchikov 
as “a rude man, considerate of no one.” Regional and ministerial officials’ protests to 
Khrushchev achieved nothing, as Mylarshchikov continued “to mercilessly force [oblast leaders] 
to expand corn plantings.”30 Such dictatorial behavior served as a model for subordinates, who 
took the aggressive, unhesitating approach apparently necessary to carry out Moscow’s orders. 
Karpenko concluded that Mylarshchikov’s actions in grain campaigns “taught people [to act] in 
such a way that the grain [procured] becomes bittersweet.”31 Complaints by Karpenko, 
Loshchenkov, and others failed to rein in Mylarshchikov. Khrushchev noted in the margin of 
                                                        
27 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 157, ll. 146–47. 
28 GARF, f. A-259, op. 7, d. 8050, ll. 44–46. 
29 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 157, ll. 146–47. 
30 F. I. Loshchenkov, Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva: Zhizennye nabliudeniia (Iaroslavl': Izdatel'stvo LIA, 
2000), 29. 
31 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 157, l. 150. 
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Karpenko’s letter only that he had read it on December 28, 1956, but Mylarshchikov remained in 
his post for more than two years afterward, until 1959. 
The chairman of a collective farm in Stavropol krai wrote to N. A. Bulganin, the Soviet 
premier, describing this pressure to sell grain, seemingly at odds with the more relaxed post-
Stalin atmosphere. Among all those Bulganin’s office received, the chairman’s letter was selected 
for inclusion in a summary about attitudes about agricultural affairs, meaning it is neither 
typical nor representative; however, the letter documents the coercion collective farms faced. 
The writer apparently intended to remain partially anonymous: he signed the letter and 
indicated the district, Georgievsk, but the signature was illegible. The writing of someone with 
formal education, the text itself evokes the scene. The chairman begged Bulganin to dispatch 
investigators to uncover the problems in the krai: 
Please get to the bottom of this, send people from the Central Committee. Only 
let them be judicious, not like those from the bureau of the krai party committee, 
who threaten the collective farm chairmen: ‘If you don’t meet wool procurements, 
we’re going to shear you and fulfill the plan that way.’ I came to agriculture from 
industry, and have fallen in love with it despite all of its unbelievable difficulties. I 
will say that [the bosses] do not value, do not like, and want neither to hear nor to 
understand the people who work on these dusty steppes in rain and snow. 
He then described the pressure that collective farms faced to sell grain to the state, even at the 
expense of their daily operations or the wellbeing of the collective farmers. He did not 
understand “why the Central Committee’s published resolutions, even after Stalin’s death, 
diverge from the actual state of affairs.” Officials in Moscow and the krai administration 
“continued to sugar-coat things” by forcing the farms to write five-year development plans, but 
“when it comes to the root of the matter, we forget about them.” Under the conditions his 
collective farm faced, there was nothing to pay the farmers for their labor, and therefore they 
justifiably refused to work until they could earn wages permitting them to purchase the flour 
and other goods they needed. The chairman condemned the krai officials for their actions in 
such situations: “They holler, ‘Give up the grain!’ and the krai party committee secretary, 
Comrade Lebedev, declares that the collective farmers instead ‘can pig out on corn’ (budut zhrat' 
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kukuruzy).”32 The phrase captures the official’s equal contempt for the peasants and for corn: a 
feed fit only for animals, a judgment reinforced by the verb “zhrat',” which connotes not eating, 
but consuming messily, greedily, in an animal-like fashion. 
* * * 
This pressure created an atmosphere in which the regional networks responsible for 
carrying out Khrushchev’s corn crusade had incentives to push an initiative beyond its limits. 
After Stalin died, Khrushchev and the party leaders purposefully strengthened the regions, as 
Khlevniuk emphasizes, to make them tools to achieve practical results. The new strong 
secretaries brought their subordinates under tight control, becoming “secretary-dictators” well 
placed to carry out Moscow’s “adventuristic” policies. Having proven themselves by achieving 
results, the secretary-dictators could call on powerful backers in Moscow to intervene on their 
behalf, solving conflicts and shielding their regions from any suspicion of wrongdoing.33 This 
self-reinforcing process helped A. N. Larionov become so prominent. In August 1958, for 
instance, he complained to Khrushchev that inspectors from Moscow came to his region more 
frequently only because it was nearby.34 Larionov tried to use his influence in Moscow to deflect 
attention from his oblast at a time when investigations might have uncovered the systematic 
fraud underway that year, the one before the famous meat procurement scandal.35 Drawing on 
several helpful studies of the infamous event, a brief summary of the scandal reveals several key 
elements of center-local relations. 
All along, regional leaders were responsible for agricultural production and for managing 
appearances, but that pressure grew after 1957. Problems arose in cases where the secretary-
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dictator aggressively pursued Moscow’s campaigns to appear even more successful and receive 
even more acclaim.36 Instead of growing and producing more, they made outlandish promises to 
double and triple deliveries of meat or dairy products, backing them with fraud to create the 
image of success. The managers in charge of farms, districts, oblasts, and republics reported in 
ways that cast themselves in the best light, feeding the chronic “data inflation” of the Soviet 
system.37 Khrushchev’s exhortation for the USSR to “catch up with and overtake America” 
catalyzed efforts that turned into a runaway chain-reaction. Through 1959, events seemed to 
bear out his belief in the revolutionary leaps forward in output made possible by new technology 
and by thorough use of productive capacities already existing in the countryside. Secretary-
dictators appeared to provide the needed leadership, and Larionov was foremost among them 
Riazan oblast worked a “miracle” that evolved first into farce and only later into a 
tragedy. Having apparently boosted milk output in 1958, Larionov pledged that his oblast’s 
farms would deliver outlandishly large quantities of meat in 1959. It seemed that his leadership 
had brought to life Khrushchev’s dreams of an agricultural revolution on the cheap. In his 
history of the Riazan affair, A. F. Agarev concludes that Moscow’s influence proved the decisive 
cause.38 Fresh off a small victory in 1958, Riazan oblast leaders responded to the December 1958 
Central Committee plenum by proposing an objective of 75,000 metric tons of meat, 150 percent 
of the planned quota for the year. The day before an oblast conference was to formally adopt the 
pledge, Mylarshchikov arrived from Moscow armed with orders from Khrushchev. The Central 
Committee functionary forced Larionov to name not that ambitious target, but one twice as 
high.39 Praise rained on the Riazanites as they reported first 100,000 and then 150,000 tons 
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delivered. Leaders earned prestigious awards and the oblast received the Order of Lenin; the 
press made them a model for all others by trumpeting the “success” on the front page of Pravda. 
In fact, Riazan was a model for all, as similar frauds occurred commonly, if nowhere else 
so concentrated or spectacular. To meet quotas, farms slaughtered animals of all types, 
including dairy cattle and calves. They bought peasants’ private livestock and passed it off to the 
state as their own production. When these methods proved sufficient only for the first 100,000 
metric tons of meat, oblast representatives traveled by night to neighboring oblasts to buy 
animals, selling them as if they had been raised locally. Pressed to meet soaring expectations, 
individuals and institutions bought meat, butter, and other goods in stores and sold them to the 
state as if they were new output. Rumors of duplicity became too loud to ignore only as 1960 
wore on. Confronted with evidence of the crime and Moscow’s anger, Larionov took his own life, 
damaging the legitimacy of Khrushchev’s agricultural reforms and leaving the oblast with 
exhausted farms incapable of meeting even the modest quotas characteristic of years before 
1958.40 In late 1959 or early 1960, Mylarshchikov left the Central Committee to become head of 
a conglomerate of state farms in Moscow oblast. It is possible that this was a demotion in 
response to his role in the still-hidden affair, but it seems unlikely, especially in light of his 
promotion to head the RSFSR Ministry of Agricultural Production and Procurements by 1963. 
In 1961, the Central Committee began to take a hard line on regional leaders and party 
organizations. Khlevniuk’s study of regional networks finds a campaign to stamp out pripiski—
fraudulent additions of fictive production to statistics—and related schemes, as “scandals of 
various grades of intensity swept through the majority of regions.” The secretaries and other 
local authorities that fell victim had responded too enthusiastically to Khrushchev’s calls to 
boost production and compete with the USA.41 Gorlizki underscores how the scandals went 
farthest where a secretary-dictator headed a network of subordinates with stable tenure: only 
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there had they established enough trust in each other to launch such schemes and conceal them 
from outside authorities. Like any large criminal enterprise, the subterfuge was possible only 
because each official could depend on the others to remain silent about the fraud, to suppress 
complaints by their own subordinates, and to remain unified against any superior asking 
questions.42 Larionov had been a model “secretary-dictator,” and his fall proved a template for 
these scandals. Khrushchev and other party leaders in Moscow understood the danger and set 
about cleaning the slate only in 1961, at the cost of the prestige of the party and of Khrushchev. 
This also created an environment in which Khlevniuk’s norm-bound or compromise network 
became the most common, a trend that culminated when that type of network became almost 
universal under Brezhnev.43 For instance, Gorlizki sees a typical example of this type of secretary 
in G. S. Zolotoukhin. After decade leading Tambov oblast, Zolotoukhin was reassigned to 
Krasnodar krai in 1967. There, he secured substantial authority, but nonetheless respected 
seniority in approving promotions; moreover he encouraged “propriety and decorum” among 
party officials instead of shouting at and insulting them.44 
Documents also attest to how local officials colluded with authorities in Moscow. Central 
Committee officials such as Mylarshchikov developed ties to the regional leaders, including 
Larionov, which encouraged all to cover up the falsifications in procurements. The post-Riazan 
campaign was above all designed to break those connections.45 Hoping to gain prominence 
through the apparent success of farms, districts, or oblasts under their supervision, officials in 
Moscow or republic administrations arranged credits, cajoled officials, or procured needed 
resources. In this, they mimicked the efforts required to create a Stakhanovite in the 1930s or a 
Hero of Socialist Labor in the 1950s. Memoir accounts suggest that officials in Moscow knew 
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about these actions, providing tacit approval even if they did not order them. When KGB 
chairman A. N. Shelepin and P. N. Doroshenko, the head of the Central Committee’s 
Agricultural Department for Union Republics, investigated reports before the scandal broke in 
Riazan, they aroused the anger of Central Committee secretary N. G. Ignatov, who chastised 
them for casting doubt on the star of the show.46 Letters arriving in Moscow complained that 
officials sent to inspect the oblast neither knew about nor cared about such violations of legality 
and conscience, confirming an established pattern. A young functionary in the Central 
Committee Propaganda Department, G. L. Smirnov discovered pripiski and other frauds in 
Kazakhstan’s Pavlodar oblast in 1959. Agriculture lay outside his responsibility, but he dutifully 
reported his findings to his superiors, who warned him not to pursue the issue.47 
Although most cheating overstated deliveries to the state of meat, dairy, and eggs, these 
frauds sometimes involved further deception in accounting for corn plantings and harvests. An 
anonymous letter to authorities in Moscow charged that M. M. Stakhurskii, party secretary of 
Ukraine’s Zhytomyr oblast, had encouraged and even required subordinates to deceptively 
record their corn crops. These measures caused real production to fall, reversing gains made 
between 1953 and 1958. Stakhurskii ordered efforts “‘to improve the situation’ somehow, [to 
make the oblast] appear in a better light to the republic leaders.” He and his subordinates 
therefore “embarked on direct but poorly disguised fraud in yields, gross harvest, and output of 
meat and dairy products.” The accounting maneuvers they used made the harvest of corn silage, 
actually 12–13 metric tons per hectare, appear twice as large. Collective and state farms planted 
many more hectares of corn than the plan ordered, brought in all of them, and then claimed the 
full amount of corn harvested while reporting that they had planted only the number of hectares 
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designated in the plan, artificially raising the average yield.48 The following year, in 1961, the 
head of the USSR Statistical Department V. N. Starovskii informed the Central Committee that 
this practice had been widespread.49 
Stakhurskii attempted rule as a dictator, but disaster befell him because he did not have 
the required authority and trust among his subordinates. The anonymous letter from Zhytomyr 
oblast further detailed how Stakhurskii’s henchmen made district secretaries force collective 
farms to take such actions; this suggests that the writer was one of them. Describing 
Stakhurskii’s behavior, the letter highlights his obstinacy, unwillingness to listen to others, and 
inclination to pressure subordinates, all actions of a secretary–dictator.50 The Ukrainian Central 
Committee reported to Moscow that they had removed Stakhurskii from his post because of his 
leadership style, omitting the question of fraud in corn planting altogether.51 A weak secretary, 
Stakhurskii had not established enough trust—or fear—to prevent a subordinate from blowing 
the whistle. Unable to keep the fraud hidden and lacking the authority to force compliance, weak 
secretaries struggled to carry out Moscow’s directives and to conceal any under-the-table efforts 
to do so, bringing down this sort of retribution from superiors.52 The circumstances suggest that 
Stakhurskii resembled not A. N. Larionov, but A. P. Pcheliakov of Kirov oblast, whom Gorlizki 
casts as a archetypical weak secretary.53 
So was A. M. Naumenko, party boss of Ukraine’s Sumy oblast. In early 1961, he faced 
charges almost identical to those leveled at Stakhurskii. Authorities in Kyiv sent investigators to 
get to the bottom of a letter alleging that crops remained unharvested in the oblast, and that the 
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Naumenko was rude and abusive. Those dispatched to look into the complaints found that it had 
not been written by a local Supreme Soviet deputy, a claim probably intended to lend greater 
credibility to its indictment.54 Even though some charges proved untrue, inspectors nonetheless 
began to look into events in the oblast. This illustrates why secretaries often tried to “suppress 
criticism,” as the sources term it, and present the best possible face to outsiders. Before the 
Riazan scandal broke, central authorities had largely ignored violations; new emphasis on the 
problem afterward meant that officials had to cover their tracks. An ill-placed step might spur a 
disgruntled member of a regional party network to write a letter revealing to authorities what 
everyone knew, or at least what was rumored. That act summoned inspectors into the region to 
discover all manner of unpleasantries. In Naumenko’s case, this resulted in the Central 
Committee secretary F. R. Kozlov’s order to N. I. Podgornyi, chief of the Ukrainian party, “to 
administer harsh justice” to the perpetrators.55 
Cases similar to those of Naumenko and Stakhurskii proved widespread. Chief 
procurator of the USSR R. A. Rudenko reported to the Central Committee that authorities had 
begun prosecution for fraud in nearly 300 cases in the first half of 1961 alone, most of them in 
agriculture.56 Party committees in every republic, krai, and oblast held meetings on the issue, 
which brought still more charges into the open. On a collective farm in Ukraine’s Vinnytsia 
oblast, peasants denounced the chairman for falsely reporting sale of 100 hogs, as well as 
planting of 106 hectares of wheat and barley, and 628 hectares of corn.57 The Central Committee 
also learned of a district in Odessa oblast where officials reported that all corn had been 
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harvested, when in fact nearly 10 percent remained in the fields.58 Officials in oblast and krai 
offices responsible for statistics also made mistakes or purposefully passed on inaccurate data.59 
In the end, a Central Committee functionary concluded, “The formalistic approach to 
considering the letter [requiring meetings and action against fraudulent reporting] means that 
instances of deceit continue to exist even now, when the question of the struggle against pripiski 
had already been discussed.”60 
The wave of scandals that swept across the USSR also included false accounting for 
planting, harvesting, and yields of corn. More than making corn merely a footnote in the larger 
and well-known story of frauds, this fact reinforces earlier findings about the divergence 
between appearance and substance in economic management—even far from the famous 
example of Riazan’s miraculous meat and dairy procurements. Finally, only those unlucky 
enough to be caught made it into a report such as Rudenko’s, meaning that reporting on 
cheating remained sporadic and incomplete. Any estimate of the scope and scale of fraud would 
have to conclude that it was substantial and widespread. Together, these facts indicate that 
summary figures for corn planting, although the only statistics we have, should not be taken at 
face value. 
* * * 
Although the leaders of “Red Plowman” collective farm in Ukraine’s Kyiv oblast carried 
out fraud resulting in a scandal typical for the period, a memoir reveals participants’ motivations 
and sheds light on the atmosphere of the time. In a memoir published in the 1990s, P. E. Shelest 
recounts serving as secretary of the oblast party committee in 1961. In part comprised of diary 
entries, his narrative records his rise from aviation engineer to offices in district, city, oblast, 
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and republic party organizations. Benefitting from Podgornyi’s patronage, Shelest became head 
of the oblast in the mid 1950s, after which he navigated the era’s Riazan-like scandals. Taking 
pains to portray himself in the best possible light, he frankly discusses the Khrushchev era in all 
its complexities. He mixes dismay at the period’s turmoil with a nostalgia for it that is not 
surprising given his experience after 1964, which ended in his fall in 1971 from the post of first 
secretary of the Ukrainian party as a consequence of conflicts with Brezhnev. 
In late 1954, Shelest was promoted to the post of second secretary of the Kyiv oblast 
committee. To support their choice, authorities in Kyiv submitted to the Central Committee in 
Moscow a report on his prior work in the city committee and as a factory director. They 
characterized him as “energetic,” “experienced in party and economic affairs,” and “possessing 
organizing talents, initiative, and determination,” all boilerplate terminology.61 He served in the 
oblast committee under G. E. Girshko, whom Shelest praises as a respected colleague while 
bluntly terming his leadership style ineffective. Although Grishko shouted at subordinates, he 
demanded too little of them.62 In 1954, Grishko fell ill, leaving Shelest to act as first secretary. 
He had to struggle to control the district committees, turn around the oblast’s lagging farms, 
and establish his own authority. He achieved this goal by emulating Khrushchev’s leadership 
style. “There was no corner of the oblast, its enterprises, farms, or fields I did not personally 
visit,” he writes, “speaking with the people; observing what they did in the fields; and listening 
to their advice, suggestions, and demands.”63 He cultivated relationships with individuals, rather 
than relying on the oblast committee’s administrative apparatus or on the district committees. 
Shelest describes a meeting with a collective farm’s business manager to learn details about life 
on the farm. He thus learned about peasants who secretly distilled moonshine, news that was 
                                                        
61 RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 13, ll. 48–49. 
62 Shelest, Da ne sudimy budete, 112. 
63 Ibid., 117. 
  204 
unlikely to reach him through official channels.64 He visited collective farms unannounced, 
discovering in several cases district officials forcing collective farmers to exceed their 
procurement plans or to replace chairmen supported by the peasants with candidates more 
amenable to the district bosses’ arbitrary orders. Only Shelest’s intervention prevented such 
violations of “collective farm democracy” and abuses of authority by the district party 
committees.65 Getting his hands dirty, he devoted between 75 and 80 percent of his time to 
managing agriculture, despite training as an engineer and repeated statements that he preferred 
industry.66 
Although on their front lines, Shelest downplayed his own involvement when addressing 
the scandals that shook center–periphery relationships. Protective of subordinates while 
disgusted by their actions, he blamed Khrushchev for creating the conditions that drove good 
communists to fraud. News from Riazan of spectacular surges in production agitated Shelest: an 
entry under February 21, 1960, describes his discomfort with the campaign that resulted when 
Moscow and Khrushchev himself harangued other party committees for failing to equal that 
“success,” requiring each oblast to reproduce it on local farms but giving them no time to 
actually increase output. “In our souls, neither Podgornyi, with whom I have spoken several 
times, nor I agree with such methods,” Shelest wrote. “Shameful phenomena, lying and double-
dealing,” he termed them in another entry from that year.67 Yet the feverish atmosphere of the 
campaign forced him, like the all others, to “make a wager” on a farm, mimicking the supposedly 
miraculous increases in production achieved in Riazan. Shelest had previously proven himself 
willing to protect subordinates: he took action against perpetrators only when newspaper 
reports brought their shortcomings to light. In December 1959, the secretaries of the Berezansk 
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district party committee were punished for fraud and related offenses only after an article 
denouncing them appeared in Izvestiia, the newspaper of the central government in Moscow.68 
The model farm in Shelest’s Kyiv oblast was the “Chervoniy khliborob,” or “Red 
Plowman” collective farm of Obukhov district. Needing to promote such a farm, Shelest 
formulated a plan with its chairman, I. F. Kabanets, and its party secretary. Shelest described 
the chairman as an honest and scrupulous leader, one whom Khrushchev had met and praised 
for his business-like approach and practical knowledge.69 Kabanets had received accolades and 
had given a speech on his work at the December 1959 Central Committee plenum, a rare honor. 
In response to the apparent success of Riazan oblast, the farm’s leaders redoubled their efforts 
and escalated promises of meat and dairy deliveries. Large investments of money supported 
legitimate measures, but illicit efforts followed. Shelest lamented to his diary, “This is double-
dealing and adventurism! But there is nowhere to run, and we cannot lag behind. I reported to 
Podgornyi and he, much as I have, ‘gave his approval.’”70 The tone of this passage—signaled by 
the quotation marks surrounding the phrase—indicates trepidation, but it also most likely 
reflects the consequences of which Shelest knew only afterward, including the punishment 
meted out to those responsible for fraud. Although it is possible that even at the time Shelest 
harbored such reservations, he had to remain silent about his discomfort with the overall 
situation because of the reigning campaign mentality. He thus tacitly condoned the actions 
needed to meet Khrushchev’s pressing demands. Outlandish pledges and their fulfillment by any 
means proved the only possible strategy, at least in the short term, to shield regional leaders 
from such pressure from above. 
At first, the Red Plowman collective farm appeared resoundingly successful, bringing 
praise for Kabanets and Shelest. In 1960, the results looked excellent on paper: the collective 
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produced more and paid its collective farmers well. The capstone of the chairman’s twenty-five 
years of leading the farm, this success received glowing publicity in central newspapers and 
earned him a citation as a Hero of Socialist Labor, one of the USSR’s most prestigious awards. In 
January 1961, Shelest addressed the Central Committee plenum on agriculture, where he 
reported glowingly on the farm’s output, staking his own prestige and that of his patron, 
Podgornyi, on the farm’s reputation.71 
Ominous rumors began to circulate that hinted at prohibited practices, falsified reports, 
fraudulent sales to the state, and violations of the collective farm’s charter. The dam burst in 
March 1961, when inspectors from the Central Committee arrived from Moscow to investigate 
these charges and other “charming things,” as Shelest sardonically termed them in his private 
writings. He wrote that all of these “unpleasant affairs, if they are confirmed, are bad; but if they 
are not confirmed, a black shadow has fallen [anyway].”72 
In early April, inspectors V. V. Vasil'ev and P. A. Provotorov arrived from Moscow, 
confirmed the allegations, and forced local officials to punish the guilty.73 The managers of the 
Red Plowman collective farm had systematically purchased meat, milk, and other commodities 
from collective farmers and other private individuals to resell to the government disguised as the 
farm’s production. Official directives had, however, expressly condemned this common practice. 
“Comrade Kabanets,” the inspectors concluded, “transformed the collective farm into a 
procurements office, tasked not with producing agricultural goods, but with double-dealing 
(ochkovtiratel’stvo).” More than half of the production of 1960 had been the result of this 
scheme, in which the farm purchased animals—perhaps by pressuring the seller—from 
individual collective farmers and resold them without adding value by fattening them. The 
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inspectors found, moreover, that the oblast committee under Shelest’s guidance had scrutinized 
the farm’s operations in March 1960. That probe had uncovered infractions sufficient to earn 
Kabanets and Miroshnichenko only a minor reprimand and warning, which Moscow’s 
investigators condemned as “superficial” in light of the new discoveries.74 
In March and April 1961, the investigation found infractions beyond the procurement 
irregularities. Kabanets had hired individuals, not collective farm members, to organize the 
purchases, rural counterparts to an industrial enterprise’s “expeditor,” or tolkach—the word 
literally describes a simple tool used to apply force to an object, a “pusher.” These semilegal 
figures used connections, barter, and bribes to smooth out irregularities in the supply system, 
locating necessary materials in time to fulfill production plans.75 The rural expeditor used 
similar means to slightly different ends: the Red Plowman farm’s buyers, each a resident of the 
nearby city of Kyiv, had spent over 4.5 million rubles in buying livestock for resale to the state. 
They had disbursed significantly more than the 3 million rubles in credit Shelest had arranged 
to help the farm expand production capacity. Each of the three buyers earned for his efforts 
some 44,000 (old) rubles, a substantial sum at a time when a collective farmer might receive 
approximately ten rubles for a day’s work, and frequently much less.76 Their given names—
Ziama, Avram, and Khaim—and family names furthermore suggest that they were Jewish. Given 
common stereotypes about the inclination of members of that ethnoreligious community to 
economic activities the state deemed illicit, those who read the report by Vasil'ev and Provotorov 
might have lent this identity significance. The documents in the Central Committee’s archive 
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state only that the local authorities turned the men over to the criminal-justice system for 
punishment.77 
In addition to machinations ensuring the farm’s apparent success, the investigation 
revealed an accounting fraud related to corn. The farm’s management falsified meat- and milk-
production figures, but also inflated data on the corn harvest. Official records indicated the 
collective farm had planted 916 hectares and grown just over 40 metric tons of silage per 
hectare, a high average. In reality, it had planted barely one-third of that total, 310 hectares, and 
achieved only 37.9 tons per hectare.78 The ruse performed a role in the larger fraud: if the farm 
had not reported a harvest of fodder sufficient to feed the large herd it purportedly possessed, 
the figures for the farm’s livestock would have appeared more suspicious. Both the feed and the 
cows it was to feed existed only on paper. Documents attesting to nonexistent corn harvested 
lent credibility to the façade of high productivity the farm had constructed for itself, while 
concurrently complying with Khrushchev’s known preference for corn. 
Shelest and the oblast committee had to censure the Red Plowman collective farm’s 
leaders, Kabanets and Miroshnichenko, a necessity he later judged “difficult.” He wrote, “They 
were condemned because they, according to the Riazanites’ example, purchased livestock for 
producing meat. And now we hold them responsible? But for what?”79 On March 24, 1961, the 
bureau of the Ukrainian Central Committee handed down reprimands—rather than dismissals—
to district party secretaries in the oblast, including those of Obukhov district. The dealings that 
landed Kabanets and the Red Plowman collective farm in trouble were common within Kyiv 
oblast, and in many oblasts across the USSR.80 
In his analysis of Khrushchev’s agricultural reforms, historian Anatolii Strelianyi argues 
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that only in 1961, after Larionov was exposed, did local officials begin to understand. They had 
created showpieces rather than organizing real production, exacerbating underlying problems of 
underinvestment and low productivity on all but the best farms. They had provided Khrushchev 
“big promises and individual examples of well-managed affairs,” while concurrently allowing 
business-as-usual to continue elsewhere, out of the spotlight. Strelianyi suggests that they 
thought it was only “a kind of propaganda show, intended in part for domestic consumption, but 
basically designed for the West.” For his part, Khrushchev demanded real production because he 
believed in the rightness of his cause—industrial agriculture and corn. “This was no show,” 
Strelianyi concludes, “but actual work; not a game of ‘catching up to and overtaking America,’ 
but a real effort to do so.”81 When Khrushchev became aware of local leaders’ deception, he 
expected the regions over which they lorded to make good the difference between the output 
they claimed and what they actually produced, a task state and collective farms could not 
achieve because of the recent campaigns. Khlevniuk explains that these scandals encouraged 
Khrushchev to break the regional networks headed by dictatorial leaders in the mold of Larionov 
and, within two years, to announce his scheme to divide party committees into agricultural and 
industrial branches.82 Alienating many of supporters, Khrushchev removed the dictators, paving 
the way for the leaders who became the norm under Brezhnev.83 
* * * 
A champion of industrial farming, Khrushchev overturned longstanding land-
management practices and crop structures in most corners of the USSR. His convictions on the 
issue solidified while he was Stalin’s deputy in Ukraine, where he struggled against Moscow’s 
efforts to impose a one-size-fits-all policy, but he found further inspiration in the US and 
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Canada. The grassfield system of crop rotations, or travopol’e, had become Stalinist dogma even 
before its founder’s death in 1939, and it remained the basis for land management after 1953. As 
early as February 1954, Khrushchev subjected it to criticism, making his case for corn at a 
conference of state-farm workers by reviling Rostov, Kursk, Krasnodar, and Stavropol for 
growing too little of the crop. He lamented that, whereas farmers in the US planted corn on over 
30 percent of their cropland, in the USSR that figure was merely 3.6 percent. A voice from the 
audience offered an explanation: “They are afraid of row crops!” These required weeding 
between the rows, and therefore more labor. In reply, Khrushchev noted several farms where 
corn provided the largest harvest of livestock feed, while local authorities favored other crops 
because they required less labor. He charged that these state farms used their lands 
“incorrectly.” “Why do we run things so poorly?” he asked. “Because the people who run these 
farms have lost their sense of responsibility for their assignments. There is no communist left 
within such people.” He angrily continued, “We must steadfastly wage war against this evil, 
comrades.” Invoking a trope from Stalinist rhetoric, he concluded, “We must unmask such 
people.”84 
Repeating this criticism at the Central Committee plenum in January 1955, Khrushchev 
attacked A. I. Kozlov, minister of state farms and an ally of G. M. Malenkov. Previously under 
fire for his ministry’s policies, Kozlov mounted the podium to give an anodyne speech outlining 
the results of 1954 and plans for 1955, but Presidium members pounced. Bulganin charged, 
“Your policy actually contradicts the party line. At the last plenum, they warned you about your 
work methods—clerical-bureaucratic work methods.”85 Khrushchev and L. M. Kaganovich 
joined in, upbraiding Kozlov for breaking rules on land usage, and for failing to ensure that his 
ministry’s farms planted corn. They attacked Kozlov because he supported Malenkov, who was 
demoted at this plenum. Furthermore, they renewed their attack on him for earlier mistakes, 
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dating from before 1953, when Kozlov headed the Central Committee’s Agricultural Department. 
That post gave him responsibility for forcing farms to use the grassfield system that, with the 
support of T. D. Lysenko, had been dogma. Khrushchev fulminated about Kozlov’s responsibility 
“as former department head, who determined agricultural policy and was primarily guilty for 
the current chaos.” “You are like a goose that pops out [of the water], flaps its wings, and goes 
along its way, clean and dry,” he continued, suggesting that Kozlov would not get off so easily.86 
Attacks such as these served only to silence open criticism of Khrushchev’s antigrass, pro-corn 
policies.87 
Khrushchev portrayed the grassfield system as antithetical to modern, progressive—
industrial—farming. He made an epithet of the term “grassfielders” [travopol’shchiki] for its 
advocates. He could not make the system or the grasses disappear quickly. By 1960, Khrushchev 
had spent years promoting corn, but grasses and fallow remained. He acknowledged shortages 
of planters, cultivators, and harvesters for row crops; however, as Strelianyi argues, Khrushchev 
considered “peasant conservatism” and officials who applied the grassfield system as a rigid 
doctrine as the brakes on progress. He therefore renewed his attempt to overturn the grassfield 
system and replace it with one based on synthetic fertilizers, machine power, herbicides, and 
pesticides, even though many of those were in short supply. “[Oblast] party leaders undertook to 
destroy the grasses,” Strelianyi concludes, “just as zealously as they undertook to do anything 
recommended by Moscow that did not demand a lot of work and that could be accomplished by 
decree and crude pressure.”88 
Many leaders followed these orders, but when considered as part of practice the scene 
becomes more complicated. The antigrass campaign peaked in late 1961, after a Central 
Committee plenum where Khrushchev advocated again for destroying pastures and replacing 
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them with corn, sugar beet, sunflowers, and other row crops—likely as a way to make up for the 
shortfall created by the recent widespread frauds. Khrushchev vigorously denounced those he 
named grassfielders; in Moscow in December he railed against officials who “rob the collective 
and state farms of the ability to rationally utilize the land’s abundance.” At their insistence, 
farms planted not high-yielding corn and other crops suitable to industrial agriculture, but low-
yielding “grasses.” He indignantly pointed out that, of the 220 million hectares of arable land, 
some 29 percent grew grasses, hay, oats, or—worst of all—remained fallow, idle while the 
nutrients reaccumulated in the soil, a practice that industrial farming rejected in favor of 
applying synthetic fertilizer.89 To realize Khrushchev’s dream of catching up with America, 
Soviet farms had to learn from the capitalists themselves. Having quoted Lenin to that effect, 
Khrushchev offered an anecdote from Russia’s history: 
We must learn and implement every useful thing, as Peter the Great did after the 
Swedes defeated him at Narva [in 1700]. He responded, ‘Thank you for the 
lesson!’ and set about learning how to make war. He mastered it, and defeated 
them at Poltava [in 1709]. He handed them such a defeat that afterward the 
Swedes never again tried any military campaigns.90 
Khrushchev’s message is clear: the capitalists had bested the USSR in farming technology in the 
postwar period and now it was time to master those industrial methods, in particular by 
replacing grasses with intensive methods for raising corn. 
Khrushchev attacked the leaders of republics, oblasts, krais, districts, and even of 
individual farms for insufficient zeal in pursuing his offensive against pastures. Thus he chided 
A. A. Nikonov for “not loving corn” and publically shamed I. E. Kalnberzin. His admonishments 
of L. I. Maksimov, director of the “Kuban” state farm in Krasnodar krai, illustrated Khrushchev’s 
simultaneous reliance on American examples, and his passion for the goals of “overtaking and 
surpassing America” and achieving the abundance needed to bring about communism. 
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Imperious and crude, he browbeat officials who failed to meet his expectations or to show 
enthusiasm for corn. Although exemplary for its large harvests of staples such as wheat, 
Maksimov’s farm did not utilize the potential Khrushchev saw in corn. A few days before, a 
newspaper article called attention to Maksimov’s failure to instantly adapt to Khrushchev’s 
demands to reject the grassfield management system for intensive corn cultivation. The farm 
devoted only 16 percent of its plowland to corn and, of that, made only 1.6 percent of that crop 
into silage for use as livestock feed. By contrast, the farm devoted 29.4 percent of its land to 
hayfields.91 
Khrushchev fixated on such seemingly mundane technical details because he considered 
them vital components of his agricultural reforms and, by extension, of the Soviet mission to 
compete with capitalism and construct communism. In early November, he condemned 
Maksimov’s management: “Comrade Maksimov, you know agriculture well, but if you were a 
farmer in America . . . could you compete with Garst? What would your production cost on the 
market? Garst would trample you. He does not plant grasses; he plants corn.” Khrushchev 
demanded to know how the unfortunate state farm director expected to efficiently produce 
inexpensive milk and meat without fully devoting his efforts to the most productive fodder crop, 
corn.92 The leader invoked Garst as a source of legitimacy for his claims that only corn offered to 
permit the USSR to equal American abundance. “In peaceful competition with capitalism, the 
victory of communism is not in doubt,” he explained. “But our country can and must solve 
problems of historical significance: to overtake and then surpass the USA, the most developed 
capitalist country, in per capita output of food.” Describing how Soviet farms would do this, he 
highlighted Maksimov’s failures. “We possess colossal potential, but we must more quickly and 
fully utilize it, bringing all reserves into action. We cannot allow things to progress at their own 
speed. We are demonstrating before all the world the socialist economy’s attributes; the criteria 
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that will decide which system is better are the people’s material and spiritual rewards.” This was 
the decisive benchmark, and corn’s role in meeting it could not have been clearer: “If we speak 
of developing livestock raising, then the most important element of this task is feed.”93 His 
ferocity notwithstanding, Khrushchev also proved capable of magnanimity: in 1963, he 
dispatched a letter in which he praised Maksimov for having learned his lesson and turned 
around the farm’s operations—by planting more corn.94 
During the antigrass campaign, party authorities resolved even technical disputes in 
favor of those who could invoke Khrushchev’s policy preferences. Each oblast, krai, district, and 
farm had to develop “scientifically grounded” plans for crop rotations: that is, a scheme to 
eliminate pastures and plant corn. In February 1961, a journal on agriculture in the North 
Caucasus published an article by a researcher at the Stavropol krai agricultural research 
institute, V. K. Moroz. Describing a plan he developed for the krai’s “October” collective farm, 
the expert argued for the “economic effectiveness” of using grassfield rotations to ensure 
sustainable production at low cost despite the low rainfall of the area. Claiming the mantle of 
Central Committee directives requiring efficient and inexpensive production, Moroz used the 
word “grassfield,” a transgression sufficient to guarantee his defeat.95 
Even though Moroz proposed only methods derived from similar principles rather than 
the entire grassfield system the chief economist of the krai agricultural department, a Comrade 
Chachin, denounced Moroz and his findings in a letter to F. D. Kulakov, secretary of the krai 
party committee. Chachin noted that the Moroz’s scheme earmarked as little as one-twelfth of 
the collective farm’s fields for corn, cutting the area from the 1960 total of 4,600 hectares, or 23 
percent of cropland. In place of corn, the plan called for more perennial hayfields, which 
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Khrushchev had anathematized.96 
Chachin and Moroz each had credentials and drew on data to support his argument, so 
politics decided between them. Denouncing Moroz’s plan as a covert preservation of the 
grassfield system, Chachin won support for his request that party officials “ensure that directors 
of research institutes make production recommendations based on objective analysis of actual 
data, rather than the subjective, archaic proposals of certain scientists [i.e. V. R. Vil'iams].”97 In 
his response, Moroz defended his proposed crop rotations and plowing methods as the only 
means to counteract the dry conditions, wind erosion, and soil salination threatening the farm.98 
He dismissed Chachin’s argument that corn offered more feed, countering that output in a single 
year was secondary to preserving the soil.99 Despite his argument on grounds of sustainability, 
Moroz could not prevail in a political struggle against the weight of Khrushchev’s 
pronouncements. 
Reporting to Kulakov on the conflict, a functionary in the krai party committee 
maintained that Chachin “was correct to disagree with the crop rotations of the ‘October’ 
collective farm.” In fairness, Moroz had written the article in 1959, when his recommendations 
accorded with the party line. It had languished in the hands of the journal editor throughout 
1960 while Moscow’s policies changed. By acknowledging that his old pronouncements were no 
longer valid, Moroz escaped serious consequences. The party committee called both men in for a 
“conversation” and then let the matter drop. 
The conflict resolved itself without lasting harm to Moroz, but the tenor of Chachin’s 
attack illustrates the feverish atmosphere Khrushchev encouraged, in which any advocacy for 
pasture, hay, or other elements of the Vil'iams system brought swift reaction. Few local 
                                                        
96 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 8487, l. 27. 
97 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 8487, l. 28. 
98 Salination is a concentration of salt in the soil that, if unchecked, cuts the productivity of farmland. It 
commonly results from irrigating otherwise dry agricultural land. 
99 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2 d. 8487, l. 32. 
  216
authorities could endeavor to resist Khrushchev’s demands to eliminate those practices. 
Republics and oblasts responded promptly, either because their secretaries hoped to curry favor 
with superiors, or because they were too weak to dodge the orders. Khrushchev’s zeal for 
replacing grasses with corn furthermore provides the most compelling evidence for the widely 
held contention that he took his corn crusade beyond reasonable boundaries: not coincidently, 
plantings of corn reached their largest extent in 1962. In the case of Stavropol krai, the effect 
was clear: party and agriculture officials enthusiastically ordered pastures plowed and corn 
planted. At the beginning 1961, the krai’s farms boasted more than 450,000 hectares of 
perennial grasses. By the fall of that year, they had plowed up 123,500 of them, or 27 percent. 
According to the plan, only 75,000 hectares would remain by the end of 1963.100 Officials 
planned to cut the proportion from about 12 to less than 2 percent of cropland. In March 1963, 
officials spoke of having “disavowed the grassfield system,” although they acknowledged that in 
practice that process remained incomplete.101 
The movement in Stavropol krai to replace pastures with corn corroborates Strelianyi’s 
finding that many zealously carried out Khrushchev’s demands. Most regions across the USSR 
followed a similar path. The next section turns to Lithuania, a specific case in which the 
republic’s Communist Party and government dodged those orders, preserving the cultivated 
pastures that had long been the foundation of agricultural land use. 
* * * 
In Lithuania, the party and government responded to Khrushchev’s corn campaign in 
ways that illustrate a center-periphery relationship mediated by nationalism. Drawing on 
documents from the party archive in Vilnius, I show that officials cooperated to avoid following 
Moscow’s orders. With a history of independence between the wars, Lithuania differed from 
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most other regions because solidarity based on nationalism helped local leaders to achieve their 
subterfuge.102Nationalism influenced the whole history of Soviet rule in the republic, beginning 
with its establishment. As they drove the German forces westward in 1944, Soviet forces 
repeated police and military actions they had originally used in 1940 to establish Soviet power 
there and in neighboring Latvia and Estonia, sparking anti-Soviet partisan resistance that 
persisted until 1950. After Stalin died in 1953, L. P. Beria moved quickly to reduce repression in 
the USSR’s western regions in hopes of improving stability.103In the post-Stalin era, mutual trust 
among officials developed during the exceptionally long tenure of Antanas Sniečkus, who led the 
republic’s party in 1940 and again from 1944 to his death in 1974. Headed by an authoritative 
secretary who avoided dictating to subordinates, the republic’s party organization proved stable, 
exemplifying the “norm-bound” type of network. Formal procedures balanced with informal 
relationships, all of which helped protect local initiatives from what leaders considered 
Moscow’s meddling. 
Beria’s action opened the way for suppressed national sentiment of each republic’s 
titular nationality to reemerge, promoted by cadres drawn from among the local people.104 
Historian Elena Zubkova has concluded that the party organization in Lithuania differed from 
those of its Baltic neighbors due to Sniečkus’s longevity and the stability this provided.105 
Postwar policies recreated the practice of korenizatsiia, an initiative characteristic of the 1920s, 
when Soviet authorities favored cadres belonging to local cultural and linguistic groups.106 This 
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program required that the national culture have socialist content acceptable to Soviet 
authorities. Beria’s moves signaled an initiative to promote Lithuanian leaders, rather than 
import Russian ones, strengthening the republic’s party and government organization after 
1953. The republic’s leaders nonetheless had to toe the line that Moscow drew between 
permissible local interests and deviations termed “bourgeois nationalism.”107 The line shifted 
with time, and local leaders constantly had to ensure they did not overstep it. Khrushchev 
largely neglected the issue of national sentiment in the union republics, an attitude that 
historian Jeremy Smith argues changed only episodically, when a scandal called attention to an 
individual republic.108 
Historians of the Soviet Union have found that nationality is not an essential and stable 
category, but instead is created and maintained via historical processes.109 Sociologist Diana 
Mincyte shows that Lithuanian peasants responded to postwar collectivization not only with 
subtle forms of resistance, the “weapons of the weak” as James Scott terms them, but also by 
asserting themselves through relations with the land.110 An anthropologist, Mincyte explores 
how collective farmers organized their private plots, revealing the interconnection among land, 
labor, and community. She argues that their practices, which allowed them to use power in these 
circumscribed spheres to offset their subordinate status, “testify to the limits of Soviet power 
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and the contradictory experiences of Soviet citizenship.”111 In light of this connection between 
land use and national identity, Lithuanian political leaders responded to Moscow’s orders to 
change the ways collective farms used the land. However tenuous the republic bosses’ 
connection to peasants’ actual ways of living and working, authorities adapted to and avoided 
dictates from above, suggesting that control over land use helped fortify their credentials as 
national leaders. 
In a practical sense, the republic party apparatus guarded its prerogatives to control the 
economy, political appointments, and other aspects of governing the republic. This meant 
resisting the interference of central authorities in Moscow. The contest over the grassfield 
system and corn cultivation demonstrates that Moscow determined formal policy, but that did 
not guarantee that subordinates would carry it out, especially when a party network unified by 
identification with a titular nationality dug in its heals against a directive. 
Sniečkus and the Lithuanian Communist Party responded to Khrushchev’s demand that 
each republic plant more corn with footdragging not unlike that in neighboring Latvia. In 1954, 
Khrushchev had agitated for modest growth in corn plantings; Lithuanian farms had received 
enough seed to plant 10,000 hectares, a tiny percentage of their cropland. They planted only 
4,000 hectares, and fed the remainder of the seed to livestock.112 Unknown in Lithuania to that 
point, corn had to earn its place. At the Central Committee plenum in Moscow in January 1955, 
Sniečkus acknowledged that party leaders “had yet to overcome the stubbornness of certain 
collective farm managers, agricultural specialists, as well as party and government officials who 
consider it impossible to cultivate corn in the republic.” He pledged the republic to planting 
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40,000 hectares, ten times more than in 1954.113 On February 18, 1955, party leaders gathered in 
Vilnius to endorse the January plenum’s resolutions, and to ensure that district officials 
understood the new campaign for corn. Adopting the crop was one of many measures required 
to augment the output of meat and of the dairy products for which the republic was known. 
Highlighting corn’s potential, Sniečkus acknowledged that Lithuanian farms underappreciated 
the crop. He said, “It should be an important part” of the solution to feed shortages, and the 
party deserved blame for not promoting it in the past.114 
Enacted in early 1955, reforms in agricultural planning tasked the republic’s Communist 
Party, Council of Ministers, and Ministry of Agriculture with designing a five-year plan for dairy 
and meat production. Each territorial unit across the USSR formulated a document, “Measures 
for increasing output of grain and of livestock raising,” which outlined targets for 1960 and 
promised to meet them two, three, or even four years sooner.115 Cautiously describing only 
“significant expansion of corn and feed crops, as well as boosting their yields,” the Lithuanian 
plan did not define exact proportions of cropland to be devoted to each crop. It noted only that 
the sum of hay, pastures, corn, and related crops would expand from 399,000 hectares in 1954 
to 853,000 hectares in 1960.116 
For the first year of Khrushchev’s corn crusade, district leaders reported dismal results to 
Vilnius. On April 25, 1955, even before spring planting, the republic’s premier lamented the lax 
attitude of the Ministry of Agriculture toward the farms themselves. The republic’s MTSs had 
ordered 100 corn planters, but received only 40. The 66 planters on hand capable of planting 
corn were enough for only 3,300 hectares, or 2.3 percent of the plan; this figure indicates that 
the plan had doubled since February to a total of approximately 80,000 hectares. Farms had yet 
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to designate fields, to apply fertilizer to them, or to collect the seeds from government 
distribution points.117 The situation had not improved by the end of July, when inspectors 
reported “unsatisfactory progress.” “The inspection demonstrated,” their evaluation reads, “that 
the directors and agricultural specialists . . . have not ensured that corn was planted correctly . . . 
and have failed to organize timely cultivation.” For instance, managers had assigned laborers to 
weed only 56.9 percent of corn plantings; in some districts, that figure was as low as 18 
percent.118 Inspectors deemed that farms used the available machinery poorly, a problem 
compounded by their managers’ “continued underappreciation” of the crop and “most cautious” 
commitment to it. Many of them claimed that the spring’s cool weather had caused corn to grow 
slowly, a problem that such organizational delays only worsened. One collective farm, for 
example, reported that 174 farmers were weeding corn, but only 10 actually turned up in the 
fields.119 Lithuanian farms differed little from those of other oblasts and republics to which 
Khrushchev hoped to spread corn in 1955. Moreover, the situation changed only a little by the 
end of the 1950s, as the republic achieved few of Moscow’s corngrowing objectives. 
In the early 1960s, Lithuania became exceptional only in responding to Khrushchev’s 
campaign against hay and pastures. He demanded that the Baltic republics replace their 
longstanding crop rotations based on pastures with row crops grown using industrial farming 
methods. Nonetheless, the state supplied few of the seeds, machines, and chemicals necessary to 
grow large crops of corn. Additionally, Lithuania’s cool, humid climate suited corn poorly. Most 
experts favored a system of managed pastures, a local adaptation of the grassfield system 
Khrushchev condemned. The legumes and grasses of these crop rotations replenished the soil, 
and required little labor and few inputs, such as synthetic fertilizers. Moscow’s order to supplant 
that system with corn emboldened the republic’s party organization and government to quietly 
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subvert it. 
A scandal erupted in November 1961, shedding light on the processes at work in the 
republic and in the Soviet Union. A group of Lithuanian agronomists and scientists working at 
the republic’s Institute for Land Management attacked Khrushchev’s antigrass dogma. 
P. Vasinauskas, director of the institute, and a group of colleagues signed a letter advocating 
their solution for meeting Lithuania’s demands for livestock feed. They rejected making V. R. 
Vil'iams’s grassfield system dogma, as it had been under Stalin, a position that did not 
contradict Khrushchev’s pronouncements. Instead of row crops such as corn, however, they 
supported managed pastures, which they believed suited the land and climate of Lithuania, 
where temperatures were cool and annual rainfall abundant.120 The republic’s Russian-language 
newspaper, Sovetskaia Litva, (Soviet Lithuania), published their views, which backed plantings 
of clover and other legumes that return nitrogen to the soil. 121 This was antithetical to 
Khrushchev’s industrial farming principles, which used synthetic fertilizers to achieve the same 
result in less time. 
Khrushchev had created an antigrass fever that forced the bureau of the republic’s 
Central Committee to condemn the letter as “politically harmful.” On December 22, 1961, it 
resolved that the specialists’ views “contradicted the party line on the grassfield system of land 
management, . . . leaving the grassfield system in place and opposing the fodder crops such as 
corn, sugar beet, and other row crops.” The Central Committee formally reprimanded 
Vasinauskas, as well as his superior, the minister of agriculture, who failed to denounce the 
letter and prevent its spread. Finally, the Central Committee threatened both the institute 
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director and the minister with strict punishment in the event of similar failures in the future.122 
Even before the resolution passed, the tenor of Sovetskaia Litva changed, as it denounced the 
scientists and asserted that corn was superior. The newspaper did not publish the Central 
Committee resolution, but on the same day, an article argued for land-management reform, 
signaling the issue’s significance. It described several collective farms in the Ignalina district 
that resisted replacing grasses with corn and other row crops, in opposition to party 
directives.123 
Dissatisfied with the Lithuanian Central Committee’s moves, Khrushchev attacked the 
leaders of Lithuania for lacking faith in corn and in modern industrial farming. Having 
somehow learned of the letter, he denounced it, and the “grassfielders” who wrote it, in the 
presence of Sniečkus and other Lithuanian leaders. In a speech in Minsk on January 12, 1962, he 
seized on an excerpt from the letter arguing that cattle had evolved a complex biological system 
to digest grasses, which offered the logical solution to the feed shortage, rather than grain, beets, 
or other feeds. “Why do the Lithuanian researchers call on the collective farmers to continue 
using old-fashioned methods?” Khrushchev questioned. His answer was that they had 
insufficient faith in corn.124  He insisted that corn was also vital for farms in Belarus, where he 
was speaking, as well as in neighboring regions of Ukraine. Growing agitated, he resorted to 
ridicule: “Some might say: ‘What’s this, Khrushchev has come just to rip us apart, to criticize 
us?’” He then asked sarcastically, “Did you think that I came to read you some of Pushkin’s 
poems?” Instead, he considered it his job to call attention to failures, forcing officials and 
organizations to reform flawed ways steeped in the dogma of the grassfield system. He taunted, 
“You can read poems on your own.”125 
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Throughout early 1962, the Khrushchev’s rebuke colored Lithuanian officials’ actions 
and the content of the republic’s newspapers. Sovetskaia Litva often ran articles encouraging 
managers to reject the old crop rotations and accept row crops.126 In a front-page article, district 
party secretary A. Davidonis declared, “The grassfield system . . . has harmed the agriculture of 
our republic. N. S. Khrushchev very justly criticized Comrade Vasinauskas” and the others for 
alleged support for that system.127 Republic authorities held a series of conferences for district 
leaders to detail the case for corn. “At the recent conference of Belorussian agricultural workers 
[that is, in Minsk],” Sniečkus reported dispassionately to one of them, “shortcomings in the 
leadership of collective and state farms were revealed.”128 
In February and March, Sniečkus censured district leaders for “failure to restructure 
crop rotations and, especially, for adopting high-yielding row crops—corn and sugar beets.”129 
Khrushchev’s attack on the Lithuanians for loyalty to the grassfield system continued to mount. 
On March 7, 1962, he again castigated them in an address to the Central Committee plenum. 
This forced Sniečkus to acknowledge the apparent accuracy of Khrushchev’s critique, concluding 
that Khrushchev’s criticism of the ideas in the letter “aided in a thorough understanding of the 
grassfield system’s fallacious nature. . . . [It helped] our specialists grasp their mistakes.”130 At a 
Lithuanian Central Committee plenum in late March, Sniečkus condemned the agricultural 
bureaucracy for continuing the “extensive grassfield system.”131 He also noted Khrushchev’s 
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tirade in Minsk in January, calling the criticism “just and deserved.”132 Sniečkus concluded by 
calling on farms to reduce their pasturelands by approximately 20 percent in 1962 alone, 
planting corn in their place.133 Yet another plenum in July resulted in a report to Moscow 
highlighting a pledge to increase the republic’s corn plantings by 61,000 hectares, or 51 percent. 
Sniečkus had described how the republic’s leaders “had drawn practical conclusions” from 
Khrushchev’s censure, embarking on a program to “reexamine crop structures” and “alter them 
toward fuller and more rational land use by expanding plantings of row crops.”134 
Authorities connected the dispute over land management with larger fears about 
nationalism and loyalty to the Soviet Union. In March, Sniečkus had underscored concerns 
manifestations of impermissible nationalist sentiments in agricultural training colleges. Like the 
republic’s land-management institute, these schools came under fire for disseminating dogmatic 
interpretations of agricultural science—coded language meaning Vil'iams’s grassfield system—
and for the low level of their students’ knowledge about corn. Officials in the Lithuanian Central 
Committee also felt uneasy over students’ lack of enthusiasm for “scientific atheism” and 
“historical materialism” courses, part of their general education curriculum. Moreover, they saw 
nonconformist tendencies in the alarmingly low attendance in Russian-language lessons and 
classes on the history of the Communist Party.135 
Khrushchev’s authority seemingly compelled the Lithuanian party and its leaders to 
carry out Moscow’s policy, furthering his crusade for corn and bringing industrial farming to 
Soviet farms. These precluded the Lithuanian researchers’ conservative, albeit agronomically 
sustainable, approaches. Yet evidence points to the conclusion that there is more to this history 
than the professed success of Khrushchev’s efforts to change land management. Given the 
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secretive nature of the actions involved, the following is a circumstantial account of how 
Lithuanian officials evaded Moscow’s demands, a strategy that enjoyed the support of the 
republic’s highest officials, including Antanas Sniečkus. A speech he made shortly after 
Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 contains the most compelling evidence for this finding. 
After speaking at a gathering of republic party officials about the plenum that ratified 
Khrushchev’s forced retirement, Sniečkus spoke more frankly to the republic’s Committee for 
State Security (KGB). Significantly, the text of this speech is located not in the collections of the 
republic’s Central Committee, but in Sniečkus’s personal files. In the triumphant tone 
characteristic of the days following Khrushchev’s ouster, Sniečkus first recounted the events of 
the October plenum. “For months, even years, there has not been confidence in tomorrow,” 
Sniečkus recalled, blaming “all of the reorganizations.” These made it impossible to avoid feeling 
“constrained.” Khrushchev even “terrorized” high-ranking officials for perceived mistakes by 
pinning on them “labels and nicknames.” He had created the appearance of “democratic 
methods of leadership, when this was actually only the external side, while a true dictatorship 
existed within the Presidium” reinforcing his “boundless authority.”136 Sniečkus acknowledged 
that the USSR had achieved some progress under Khrushchev, but only in those areas where the 
First Secretary had not “violated Leninist methods of leadership,” as he had with growing 
frequency in the 1960s.137 Naturally, Sniečkus applauded Khrushchev’s defeat of “the antiparty 
group” in June 1957, which had brought to power those who now had ousted Khrushchev. 
Above all, Sniečkus underlined the crisis in agriculture by repeating the charge, made at 
the October plenum, that nothing had improved since 1958. He boasted that in Lithuania the 
outcome had been different: in fact, output was higher than before. Holding Khrushchev 
responsible for the Riazan affair and the ecological challenges of the Virgin Lands campaign in 
Kazakhstan, Sniečkus added the campaign against grasses ongoing since 1961. Khrushchev 
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forced unnecessary change across the USSR, pressuring party officials to eliminate grasses 
wholesale by plowing up even productive fields. Sniečkus reminded his audience of the incident 
when the Lithuanian agricultural researchers’ letter had elicited a fierce rebuttal by the First 
Secretary, and how he had transformed the grasses from a technical into a political issue by 
viewing support for them as a challenge to his personal power and authority.138 
Faced with demands to destroy the pastures so long a part of the region’s agriculture, 
Sniečkus and the republic’s party leaders responded with dissimulation and delay. Other regions 
had bowed to “enormous pressure” from above, but not Lithuania. Sniečkus recalled how the 
republic’s leaders had meekly accepted the denunciations from Moscow, pledging each spring to 
plow up pastures in the fall and each fall to do it in the spring. “In truth, we sabotaged this 
business,” Sniečkus revealed to his audience. “We believed in the practitioners and specialists in 
our republic, but not in Khrushchev.”139 He continued, “During these years when they pressured 
us, we reduced our area of perennial grasses by 3 percent, but that was only old clover and the 
like. We held out.” He then described how they ameliorated the pressure placed on them by 
Moscow. “You speak with the chairman of the collective farms: you’ll learn that we sent them 
directives [to plow up pastures] and then we gathered meetings . . . in Dotnuva [site of the 
republic’s agricultural institute] or some other place.” The key was to do so away from Vilnius, 
because in the republic’s capital they might be overheard “by all sorts of people.”140 Indeed, 
Sovetskaia Litva had reported on meetings convened at Dotnuva, where Sniečkus, the minister 
of agriculture, and other officials met with district leaders and collective farm personnel.141 
Sniečkus revealed, “There, without the stenographers, we told them, ‘Comrades, we must do this 
and do that.’ And people understood . . . They knew that it was truly necessary to do it that way; 
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. . . We did not sleep many nights because [authorities in Moscow] attacked us first from one 
side, then the other.”142 He thus implied that the formal measures and official reports served 
only to throw Moscow off the trail, while in private the republic’s party leaders encouraged 
farms to carry out policies they considered correct, even though they contravened directives 
from Moscow. He claimed that, as a result, the republic’s output remained high; in contrast to 
the falling milk output in regions where farms plowed up pastures and planted corn, in 
Lithuania it grew 24 percent even in 1964.143 
Collective farms employed several strategies to circumvent orders to plow up pastures 
and plant corn. Some planted corn in a strip several rows deep along roads leading to and from 
the farm.144 Any visitors hostile to the farm’s mission to preserve pastures would see only that 
façade, while the hay, clover, or other traditional crops grew on the hidden remainder of the 
field. In a second strategy, farms planted the corn far from the road on the presumption that if it 
remained out of sight, inspectors could not accurately estimate the size of plantings, and 
therefore had to rely on easily falsified statistics. As second secretary of the Lithuanian Central 
Committee and the only Russian in the republic’s top leadership, B. S. Sharkov was viewed as 
Moscow’s representative in the republic, making it unlikely the others informed him of such 
plans.145  In June 1961, Sharkov had denounced a district party committee because it “had not 
learned from the criticism” of superiors, as party discipline required, or dropped its stubborn 
resistance to changing crop rotations. “What have you learned from this?” he asked. “You said, 
‘We must plant the corn further from the road, so that it is not visible.’”146  Similar accusations 
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flew when farms rejected the square-cluster method for planting corn, a technically challenging 
practice that Khrushchev’s policies required all regions to employ. According to Sharkov, the 
republic’s agricultural institute advocated against the method. He sniped that they acted as if 
“crop science does not require geometry.”147 
Moreover, as early as December 1958, the republic’s policy on grasses and, in particular, 
procuring seeds caused a stir. Speaking to a Central Committee plenum in Moscow, Sniečkus 
described his republic’s efforts to meet Moscow’s demands for more corn. He praised small 
successes and promised further improvement.148 At the same plenum, he had to respond to V. E. 
Chernyshev, party secretary of neighboring Kaliningrad oblast of the RSFSR, who complained 
that farms in his oblast sold their grass seeds to neighbors in Lithuania, where prices were 
higher. Red clover sold to the state for only 20 rubles per kilogram in the RSFSR, while across 
the border in Lithuania the same seeds sold for 32 rubles. Chernyshev supposed that this was 
the result of “an abnormal situation, some sort of disturbance [shumikha].”149 In response, 
Sniečkus presented the republic’s five-year plan to raise output by committing to plant more 
clover, which constituted 25 percent of the republic’s cropland in 1959, and doubled the 1953 
total. Although it occurred before Khrushchev’s feverish campaign against the grassfield system 
in 1961, the incident put Sniečkus on shaky ground. He said that higher prices were required to 
ensure a supply of seeds sufficient for the program. When challenged about the source of the 
extra seeds, Sniečkus replied coyly that they bought them “from friends,” a response that, 
according to the stenographer’s record, drew laughter from the audience. Furthermore, the file 
in Sniečkus’s personal papers that contains his speech from October 1964 also contains a 
transcript of this exchange, suggesting a relationship between the two.150 
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N. G. Egorychev, then secretary of the Moscow city party committee, years later 
recounted a meeting with Sniečkus during a vacation on the Baltic Sea coast in August 1964, the 
period when party leaders were plotting to remove Khrushchev. The usual dinner, drinking, and 
“comradely socializing” that accompanied such meetings gave Egorychev an opening to start a 
conversation about Khrushchev and the cabal against hum. Sniečkus and the other Lithuanian 
leaders steadfastly avoided being drawn into it. Later, after Khrushchev’s fall, Sniečkus called 
Egorychev to offer an apology, revealing that he had rejected the overture out of fear that it was 
a “provocation.”151 The Lithuanian party boss’s anxiety seems especially understandable in the 
event that he had something, such as pervasive fraud in agriculture, to hide from Khrushchev’s 
emissaries. 
This scheming to protect pastures and reject corn required solidarity among the officials 
of the republic. A disgruntled party member could write to the authorities in Moscow, as those 
in Ukraine or other regions did at the height of the scandals following the Riazan affair. Gorlizki 
concludes that stability and trust established over a decade or more allowed Larionov to go 
further than most other regional leaders.152 In Lithuania, built-up trust and a sense of belonging 
to the republic’s titular nationality made this possible by discouraging officials from breaking 
ranks and writing to Moscow. In his speech to the KGB party committee in October 1964, 
Sniečkus illustrated how he maintained unity through personal relationships with local officials, 
frequently Lithuanians, with whom he had developed a rapport in his long years leading the 
republic. Sniečkus recounted how in a private meeting he dissuaded a collective farm chairman 
from writing a letter to Khrushchev to account for the republic’s agricultural problems and plead 
the case for pastures. The man “was extraordinarily agitated,” Sniečkus related, “but I told him, 
‘Whatever you write, the repercussions will fall on me,’” implying that such a letter would only 
draw Moscow’s ire rather than solve the problem of its overbearing authority. Having agreed to 
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wait patiently, the chairman admitted, “‘We see how our republic leadership cushions many of 
Khrushchev’s improper policies.’”153 Sniečkus hoped to use this story to illustrate links between 
key party figures and those responsible for putting these back-room maneuvers into practice. 
The incident demonstrates the mechanism for and the importance of building trust in 
Sniečkčus’s authority in the republic. Moreover, Sniečkus spoke about these tactics openly to 
subordinates. Because he did so after Khrushchev’s removal, he faced no threat to his power for 
revealing the whole story, reflecting a sense of relief that the crisis had passed and the 
emergence of the post-Khrushchev’ period’s atmosphere of stability that gave local party 
organizations relative freedom to act in their own regions. 
It is unlikely that other local party organizations carried out similar large-scale 
subterfuge, or that those schemes could work without the element of nationalism. The strong 
trust that Larionov had built up in Riazan was rare, as Gorlizki shows. As this Lithuanian case 
suggests, national identity set the republic apart, pushing local officials to present a united front 
against external authorities seeking to alter historical relations to the land and agricultural 
practices. Based on this evidence, nationalism facilitated efforts to construct and maintain a 
norm-bound, or compromise, network, one both efficient at achieving results and presenting a 
comparatively unified face to outsiders, the bearers of Moscow’s authority. 
According to the metaphor popularized by historian Yuri Slezkine, the USSR was a 
“communal apartment,” in which each national republic was a different room connected 
through the main hall—the RSFSR—all combining into the larger Soviet Union.154 To extend 
Slezkine’s apt phrase, the walls of each room permitted its inhabitants to do as they pleased so 
long as they remained out of sight of the head of the apartment building’s residential committee; 
that is, the central authorities in Moscow. In the Khrushchev period, Lithuania’s party leaders 
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and rank-and-file members built solidarity against interference in economic policy. Historian 
Ronald G. Suny writes that the period between Stalin’s death and the early 1970s was one of 
weakening control and increasing independence from Moscow. Republic leaders “forged their 
own ties with their populations through the manipulation of ethnic symbols.” These allowed 
them leverage and leeway, “as long as economic growth continued and the worst excesses of 
nationalism were contained.”155 Once the deportations ended around 1950, a new Lithuanian-
but-Soviet (or Soviet-but-Lithuanian) elite arose under the guidance of Lithuanian leaders, with 
Sniečkus at the top. Moscow-based authorities expressed concern that nationalism in republics 
should remain within acceptable boundaries. The environment gave republic leaders an element 
of independence, so long as the assertions of belonging to a nation remained either hidden or 
subsumed beneath an overarching Sovietness. National identities, which helped groups 
transcend the overarching Soviet framework during M. S. Gorbachev’s glasnost' reforms, 
contributed to the union’s dissolution. The rapid reemergence of nationalist movements into the 
open in response to Gorbachev’s policies, with Lithuanians among the first and most passionate, 
suggests that they existed all along. Therefore, they had coexisted—although out of sight—during 
the Khrushchev era with senses of belonging acceptable to Moscow. 
* * * 
Khrushchev expended great effort to persuade subordinates to put industrial farming 
technologies to work in the fields under their control. Tirelessly promoting row crops and 
industrial methods for farming them, he worked to replace crops and land-management 
practices he dismissed as conservative and inadequate to the task of raising production to equal 
American benchmarks. He attacked local authorities who did not implement his policies or meet 
his expectations because they challenged his authority, but also because they were obstacles to 
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his dreams of American-style abundance and constructing communism. During the first five 
years of his leadership (1953–58), Khrushchev backed strong regional leaders who promised to 
and seemed to carry out his policies. These “secretary-dictators” made his revolution in 
agriculture a reality, but in 1960 and 1961, the resulting scandals damaged Khrushchev’s 
legitimacy. The Central Committee therefore moved to oust those regional secretaries it held 
responsible. Yet Khrushchev still demanded that regional party organizations move quickly and 
decisively to carry out the campaign of the given moment. In 1961 and 1962, this meant plowing 
up hayfields and disavowing the “grassfield” system, and replacing them with corn, sugar beets, 
and other row crops grown using industrial technologies. 
The dialectical relationship between center and periphery becomes clearer through an 
examination of how each type of regional network Khlevniuk identified responded to the policies 
Moscow required them to implement. Khrushchev’s overwhelming authority to determine policy 
could not guarantee that regional networks, with their own leaders, priorities, internal 
dynamics, and relationships with superiors in Moscow, made those policies a reality. In turn, 
Khrushchev had to respond. Center-periphery relationships proved one of the obstacles to the 
success of his corn crusade. Unwritten rules and informal administrative practices—sometimes 
even illicit ones—supported efforts to ensure outward compliance with Moscow’s policies. This 
is not to suggest that the Red Plowman collective farm of Kyiv region, Lithuania, and the other 
examples in this chapter encompass all possible kinds of subterfuge. Furthermore, not every 
farm practiced fraud in reporting about corn and other crops, and not in every year. These 
episodes illustrate strategies available to leaders who had to secure themselves and their regions 
against Khrushchev’s charges of failing to achieve miracles. His attempt to pursue this crusade 
extended to direct appeals to individuals and groups in his speeches, the subject of chapter 5. 
The Soviet press amplified the party line on the corn crusade, encouraging the farmworkers who 
grew corn and representing the crop as a source of abundance to those who would consume the 
meat and dairy products it provided.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE RHETORIC OF CORN: SELLING ABUNDANCE TO SOVIET CITIZENS 
In his speeches, Nikita Khrushchev frequently extolled corn’s virtues with much 
bombast. Taking its cue from him, the Soviet press routinely termed it “a miracle crop,” or 
chudesnitsa in Russian, and “the queen of the fields.” In other cases, Khrushchev observed, “The 
USA is mounted on a racehorse, which is corn, and we must catch them on that same 
racehorse.”1 On another occasion he declared, “Comrades, corn is a tank for use by soldiers, by 
which I mean collective farmers. It is a tank with the capability to overcome barriers . . . on the 
path of creating plenty for our people.”2 Elaborating on the examples of Khrushchev’s exuberant 
rhetoric about corn, this chapter evaluates how the Soviet mass media encouraged urban and 
rural audiences alike to perceive corn as a means to expand supplies of meat, milk, and eggs, as 
well as new foods made from corn.  
The second section of the chapter considers how the press spoke to farmworkers, 
pushing that targeted audience to regard corn harvests as their contribution to the mission to 
provide that plenty. Khrushchev’s speeches exhorted workers to devote themselves to their 
work. The press called on farmworkers to emulate outstanding “vanguard workers,” to help 
build the communist society that promised a better life, and to prepare themselves to build that 
higher stage of socioeconomic development. Instead of a survey of the press’s output, this 
chapter considers representative examples highlighting appeals to these principles and, thereby, 
the ways in which the press conveyed messages through a long-established language of words, 
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symbols, images, and practices that Soviet authorities used in an attempt to shape the world.3 I 
analyze the content of mass-circulation newspapers Pravda and Izvestiia, as well as 
publications widely read but targeting a specific audience: for instance, the Ministry of 
Agriculture published Sel’skoe khoziaistvo (Agrciulture) for peasants, farm personnel, and local 
officials of agricultural districts. In 1961, its name changed to Sel’skaia zhizn’ (Rural Life), but 
its audience and function remained consistent. I examine the content of Kukuruza (Corn), an 
“academic-technical” monthly dedicated to publicizing best practices for an audience of local 
officials, farm mangers, specialists, and other technical personnel. First published in 1955, after 
1964 it became Kukuruza i sorgo (Corn and Sorghum).  
Providing a sense of the volume of publications on the subject, a bibliography of 
materials about corn domestically published from the tsarist period to the end of 1959 lists more 
than 4,000 books, pamphlets, articles, and book chapters, the vast majority of which appeared 
between 1955 and 1959. The categories cover subjects ranging from basic cultivation methods to 
recommendations for specific regions of the country.4 By another count, a further 1,075 books 
on the subject were published between 1960 and 1964.5 The Soviet national bibliography listings 
of journal and newspaper articles present a similar picture of the volume of information about 
corn that flooded the Soviet press after 1955.6 Notably, these publications cite only Russian-
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(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR, 1961). 
5 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 149. 
6 Letopis' zhurnal'nykh statei (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vsesoiuznoi knizhnoi palaty, 1926–); and Letopis' 
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language items, but materials also were published in many other languages. In 1955, the initial 
burst of agitation for corn saw the production of more than 100 posters advocating for corn, 
their print runs ranging from a few thousand for locally produced examples to tens and even 
hundreds of thousands. The print runs of seven exceeded 100,000, and those of three topped 
200,000: these seven alone totaled 1.125 million posters.7 Additionally, Soviet Radio often 
broadcast similar messages.8 
Drawing on the work of historian Thomas Wolfe, I analyze the content of mass-media 
depictions of the corn crusade to reveal how the Soviet press sought to reshape citizens’ beliefs 
and actions. Finding that Thaw-era journalists enthusiastically pursued their mission, Wolfe 
considers the press a medium for practices of “governmentality,” a concept first articulated by 
Michel Foucault. By drawing on the words of sociologist Mitchell Dean to interpret the concept, 
Wolfe suggests that it helps interpret attempts “to sculpt, mobilize, and work through the 
choices, desires, aspirations, needs, wants, and lifestyles of individuals and groups.” Swaying 
their targets “to make themselves into both subjects and objects of government,” these practices 
aimed to influence conduct.9 As Wolfe shows, journalists navigated the complexities of the 
Thaw-era currents in the Soviet system, fulfilling their assignment to help govern society not 
                                                        
gazetnykh statei (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vsesoiuznoi knizhnoi palaty, 1936–). 
7 Letopis' izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva (Moscow: Vsesoiuznaia knizhnaia palata, 1944–1966). 
8 A survey of scripts in the files of the Soviet radio for 1955, for instance, finds that many of the 
semiweekly broadcasts on themes related to agriculture included information about corn. Examples 
include: “A conversation with the chief of the Department of Feed Crops of the USSR Minister of 
Agriculture, B. F. Solov'ev, ‘Corn in every region!’” broadcast February 28, 1955, from 20:00 to 20:29. 
GARF, f. R-6903, op. 12, d. 296, ll. 370–71. Also: “Corn in the fields of Smolensk,” broadcast March 12, 
1955, from 6:45 to 6:59. GARF, f. R-6903, op. 12, d. 296, ll. 427–36. Content likely appeared on television, 
which was in its infancy. Much more common, especially in rural areas, were showings of short 
propaganda and documentary films. 
9 Thomas C. Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 13. Foucault and the theorists who followed him 
developed the concept by observing liberal societies of Western Europe. By revealing that 
“governmentality” helps explain practices used by the Communist Party to rule in a state-socialist society, 
Wolfe notes that his research strengthens the case for considering the USSR as part of common twentieth-
century global industrial society. Ibid., 16–17. 
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directly, but by “acting upon others’ actions.”10 In this specific case, the press encouraged Soviet 
citizens to view corn as a source of the material plenty Khrushchev promised, and to act by 
joining efforts to grow it. 
* * * 
The Soviet media broadcast Khrushchev’s speeches about corn and repeated his message 
ad nauseam from 1955 until 1964, when the campaign abruptly ceased following his ouster. The 
leader and the press encouraged farmers to love their work because, although arduous, it 
promised to strengthen the Soviet Union and world peace, and provide abundance. In April and 
May 1955, when Khrushchev first preached his corn crusade, Soviet authorities gathered party 
members, workers, and other groups to collect signatures on a petition, “The World Peace 
Council’s Declaration against Preparations for Nuclear War.” A Soviet-backed organization, the 
council denounced the Cold War and represented the USSR to the world as the defender of 
nonaggression and disarmament in the face of capitalist powers’ threats to peace. Hundreds of 
thousands of everyday citizens signed the document. As they did, they pledged to work more 
productively in order to fortify the USSR against perceived American aggression. Farmworkers 
in Stavropol krai, for instance, promised to grow record harvests of corn. “War is hateful,” 
exclaimed the head of a brigade on a farm in the krai’s Libknecht district. “I witnessed enormous 
destruction and saw numberless victims,” he continued, evoking the German army’s presence in 
the area in late 1942. “We will defend peace by working: fighting to implement the directives of 
the January Central Committee plenum, we pledge to raise a corn crop of 32 tons per hectare.”11 
Across the USSR, workers producing steel, coal, sugar beets, and many other goods echoed this 
sentiment. A new priority after the January plenum, corn featured in the reports the party 
                                                        
10 Ibid., 12-13. Wolfe argues that these efforts were not a crude bludgeon, but in fact an elegant system for 
shaping and directing the individual in a collectivist society. The press, therefore, “was the institution in 
Soviet society able to present a continuous reflection of the state of socialism and the achievements of a 
socialist society.” Ibid., 2. 
11 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6396, ll. 107–8. 
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organizations of Balashov,12 Briansk, and Vladimir oblasts dispatched to Moscow to document 
their efforts in support of both campaigns.13 Although not subject to any direct sanction for 
refusing, attendees at such meetings responded to the expectation that they would make a 
pledge. These “socialist obligations” seem to have affected the average worker little because, 
whereas the “vanguard” workers always met theirs, everyone else quickly began to ignore them. 
Nonetheless, frequent campaigns of this kind appealed to patriotism, socialism, and—in this 
case—antiwar sentiment. 
In this regard, pledges to grow corn exemplify “moral incentives,” a term I borrow from 
historian O. M. Verbitskaia, who uses the Russian “moral’noe pooshchrenie” to describe rewards 
such as the “honorary certificates, medals, and orders” that farmworkers received in lieu of 
wages during and after World War II.14 The authorities had appealed to patriotism and 
Orthodoxy to inspire farmworkers to grow crops needed to feed workers in the factories and 
soldiers at the front.15 “Moral incentives” appealed to the socialist virtue of farmworkers, trained 
specialists, farm managers, and district officials, encouraging them to work diligently and grow 
corn. Official culture promoted these values throughout the period; in fact, they bring to mind 
the commandments enshrined in 1961 in Khrushchev’s “Moral Codex of the Builders of 
Communism,” which exhorted citizens—and young people in particular—to be honest; work 
conscientiously; and devote themselves to collectivism, communism, patriotism, and related 
principles.16 
Communist Party and Soviet government directives promoting corn after the January 
                                                        
12 Part of Saratov oblast for most of the USSR’s existence, the town of Balashov served of the center of its 
own oblast between 1954 and 1957. Other constituent districts had joined it from Stalingrad (today’s 
Volgograd), Voronezh, and Tambov oblasts. 
13 RGANI, f. 5, op. 16, d. 707, l. 39, l. 56, l. 59, and l. 77. 
14 Verbitskaia, Rossiiskoe krest'ianstvo, 49. 
15 Chumachenko finds that this was far from the only justification for Stalin’s policy of reviving the 
Orthodox Church. For more, see: Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia, 7. 
16 For more on the codex, see: Vail' and Genis, Shestidesiatye, 7. 
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1955 Central Committee plenum required the press to show that rank-and-file workers in every 
corner of the USSR responded with enthusiasm to Khrushchev’s promotion of the crop. On 
February 3, the text of his speech at the plenum appeared in Pravda, and replies followed in 
subsequent issues. Articles about Altai krai, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and many other regions 
trumpeted their “great enthusiasm” for efforts to wrest high yields of corn from their farms’ 
fields. Such stories showed the readers how they were expected to respond: they saw that farms 
should expand corn plantings, as the Altai krai’s “Path to Communism” collective farm did to 
nearly 1,000 hectares with the promise of a fourfold increase in the feed supply.17 Similarly, an 
article on the front page of the February 6 edition explained how the farmworkers of Voronezh 
oblast discussed the plenum resolutions and, in response, named new obligations in a 
competition. It reported that the Molotov collective farm, which had begun growing corn a few 
years prior, had made just such a pledge.18 This piece appeared alongside others, for example 
publicizing the pledges from Belarus to expand meat and milk output. The newspaper placed all 
of them beneath a banner reading, “Laborers of towns and the countryside announce their 
preparedness to realize the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” With this, the Soviet press constructed a dialogue 
between Khrushchev and farmworkers who apparently welcomed plans to grow corn and 
achieve abundance. That conversation, in turn, signaled to readers the course of action expected 
of them. 
Another aspect of this campaign showed readers the most modern methods in use on 
Soviet farms, a point that even an industrial worker, far removed from the cornfield, could view 
with pride. Even general-audience newspapers such as Pravda emphasized these modern 
technologies. Dry descriptions of or the technical specifications of a particular machine seem 
                                                        
17 “Uvelichenie proizvodstva zerna – reshaiushee uslovie pod"ema zhivotnovodstva,” Pravda (February 5, 
1955): 1. 
18 “Posevy kukuruzy – istochnik kolkhoznogo bogatstva,” Pravda (February 6, 1955): 1. Still others 
appeared the following day, on February 7, 1955. 
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unlikely to have captured the audience’s imagination. Instead, images of equipment conveyed 
the message quickly. On March 7, 1955, a picture of a state-of-the-art corn planter appeared, 
and, on April 25, 1955, another of a similar implement in use in Ukraine’s Odessa oblast. These 
images conveyed the message that farms planted corn in the most efficient way possible, a far 
cry from the truth since much corn was planted by hand that year. Other media venues conveyed 
this goal: the annual displays at the pavilion aptly named “Kukuruza,” which opened in 1958 at 
the Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy [Vystavka dostizheniia narodnogo 
khoziaistva, or VDNKh], showed best practices for growing corn and featured displays about 
farms that brought in large harvests. Although designed to speak to specialists, the exhibit also 
touted corn to passing exhibition goers.19 This effort continued throughout the decade: after 
1960, Khrushchev promoted “intensification” and emphasized the chemical industry’s 
contributions of synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides to agriculture. He claimed that 
these methods, which American farmers applied with increasing frequency, would raise yields of 
corn and every other crop to make Soviet farms meet his promises.20 
Although the press aimed messages extolling the potential of corn at specialists and 
farmworkers, it also sought to influence the would-be consumers of the meat, milk, and other 
foods this “miracle crop” would make readily available. Khrushchev relentlessly promoted this 
message by linking corn to livestock feed, and it to fuller grocery shelves. If the people 
demanded enough meat and milk “to catch up with and overtake America,” then the party had to 
embrace Khrushchev’s plans to provide it. This vision became an unmistakable part of the 
                                                        
19 For an article explaining the pavilion’s displays on technical aspects of corn cultivation, see: 
B. Medvedev, “Otkrylsia vsesiuznyi smotr kukuruzy na zerno,” Sel'skoe khoziaistvo (October 11, 1959): 2. 
For a view of the pavilion as seen by the everyday Soviet citizen, see: I. Sokolov, “V gorode chudes,” 
Sel'skaia zhizn' (May 19, 1961): 1. For more on VDNKh in the period, see: Sonja D. Schmid, “Celebrating 
Tomorrow Today: The Peaceful Atom on Display in the Soviet Union,” Social Studies of Science 36, no. 3 
(2006): 331–65. 
20 For a prime example of this, see: “Accelerated development of the chemical industry is the principle 
condition for developing agricultural production and for rising material conditions for the populace,” his 
address to a Central Committee plenum on agriculture in December 1963. Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo 
kommunizma v SSSR, 8:261–340. 
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march to “construct communism,” which inspired the calls in the Seven-Year Plan, ratified in 
1959, for improved productivity and rising living standards. 
Images associated with the plan evoked pride in Soviet achievements, and optimism 
about future successes. The illustration covering much of the front page of Komsomol’skaia 
pravda on January 1, 1960, represented corn as part of this larger message (figure 5). The most 
popular public holiday in the Soviet calendar and a substitute for the ideologically impermissible 
Christmas, New Year’s Day offered citizens an opportunity to bid farewell to the old year and 
welcome the new one. In this spirit, the image depicted the achievements of 1959: the nuclear-
powered icebreaker Lenin, launched that year to much fanfare, embodied technical progress. 
New housing blocks, factories, and tractors conveyed a sense of economic advance. A rocket 
speeding toward the cosmos called attention to the Soviet space program, which basked in the 
light of the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and subsequent flights. Even a superficial glance at the 
rocket reveals that it combined symbols of technological modernity with images conjuring up 
Khrushchev’s agricultural revolution: it consisted of a standard-looking nose cone and rocket 
engines, but a body made of layers of grapes, cotton, wheat, and corn. Each crop signified that 
the USSR’s level of material abundance was soaring; truly, at that moment it appeared so. 
Impressive annual growth rates in industry and agriculture surpassed those of capitalist 
competitors. The efforts of Riazan oblast still looked like a miracle, not a calamity. Messages 
such as this one guided a broad swath of the public to see the Soviet Union on a path to progress 
and imminent abundance. 
Furthermore, the authorities opened new stores and cafes featuring foods made from 
corn, designed to popularize the unfamiliar crop. The government set up cafes named 
“Chudesnitsa,” in several cities, including on Moscow’s Garden Ring near the Ministry of  
  242
 
Figure 5: Details from image. "S novym godom, s novym schast'em," Komsomol'skaia 
pravda (January 1, 1960): 1 
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Agriculture, and on Leningrad’s Nevskii Prospekt.21 Stores devoted to foods made from corn 
appeared, including one on Moscow’s Leninskii Prospekt. Searching several archives in Moscow, 
I did not discover materials about these shops; however, press coverage provides some insight. 
A 1963 profile of the Moscow store in the monthly journal Kukuruza heralded it: “When you 
cross the threshold of the new store, you automatically get the sense that foods made from corn 
are richly represented here.” Extending the metaphor that dubbed corn “the queen of the fields,” 
it further suggests that this richness was “regal,” or “queen-like,” and enthuses, “It is almost 
unbelievable that so many delicious things can be made from corn.” The consumer could 
purchase cornmeal, corn oil, porridge, cornflakes, popcorn, canned corn, cakes, candies, and 
more, at least fifty different foods in all. Packaged to attract attention, each carried names 
evoking confidence: “Miracle,” “Rocket,” “Golden Cob,” and “Amber.”22 In keeping with the 
spirit of the era’s journalism, the article focused on everyday citizens.23 According to the writer, 
the store received high marks from the customers for the quality of the service and of the foods 
for sale.24 The customers, all women, embodied the ideal Soviet consumer, reinforcing historian 
Susan Reid’s finding that shopping and other homemaking chores were not only the 
responsibility of women, but also were depicted in the press as feminine responsibilities.25 So 
integrated with Khrushchev’s vision was this store that, when he fell from power in 1964, both it 
and the entire imagery of corn-based abundance disappeared almost overnight.26 
State enterprises produced the actual foods featured in those shops in quantities too 
                                                        
21 Several sources attest to these cafés existence. On the one in Leningrad, see: N. B. Lebina and A. N. 
Chistikov, Obyvatel' i reformy: Kartiny povsednevnoi zhizni gorozhan v gody NEPa i khrushchevskogo 
desiatiletiia (St. Petersburg: “Dmitrii Bulanin,” 2003), 239. On that in Moscow, see: GARF, f. A-259, op. 
45, d. 852, l. 115. 
22 “Za steklianye dvery magazina,” Kukuruza 9, no.1 (1963): 52–53. 
23 Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism, xiii–xix. 
24 “Za steklianye dvery magazina,” Kukuruza 9, no.1 (1963): 53. 
25 Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen,” 214. 
26 Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 128 
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small to radically alter the average diet, but large enough to reinforce the symbolic relationship 
between corn and plenty.27 For instance, in 1963, factories produced 15,500 metric tons of 
cornflakes and 1,000 tons of frozen corn-on-the-cob, in addition to fresh corn, canned corn, 
popped corn, and other culinary items. Spread among a population that numbered 225 million, 
this amounts to a paltry seventy grams (2.5 ounces) of cornflakes per person for the year, hardly 
enough to alter the average diet.28 Regardless, advertising campaigns in the pages of Kukuruza, 
as well as the mass-circulation daily designed for agricultural personnel, Sel’skoe khoziaistvo, 
encouraged readers to view the previously unfamiliar products as a nutritious and valuable food. 
Accounts of those who lived through the period suggest that this campaign achieved some 
success. Writing in American exile about the culture and atmosphere of the Thaw, essayist Petr 
Vail’ and cultural critic Aleksandr Genis noted that, whereas the hallmarks of the Stalin era were 
solid and monumental (the metro, the war, high culture), those of the Khrushchev decade were 
eclectic and domestic: the ubiquitous five-storied housing block and popcorn.29 
Rather than appealing for citizens to consume corn itself, Khrushchev and the press most 
often represented it as a source of beef, pork, milk, butter, cheese, and eggs. In a trend common 
to urbanizing societies, the people living in cities did not produce their own food, but instead 
purchased it in state shops or at the peasant market.30 In the 1950s, about half of the Soviet 
population lived in towns and cities. Rural dwellers largely produced their own food on small 
private plots, earning for work on collective farms small dividends of grain, flour, and bread, 
staples they could not produce on their own. Urban workers, intellectuals, officials, and other 
                                                        
27 Edward Geist notes efforts in the late 1930s to bring canned corn and cornflakes—signifying industrial 
modernity—to the ideal Soviet cuisine in the pages of the Book about Healthy and Delicious Food. Geist, 
“Cooking Bolshevik,” 11–14. 
28 GARF, f. A-259, op. 45, d. 852, ll. 1–7 and l. 58. In comparison, a modern standard-sized box on 
grocery-store shelves weighs in at more than 200 grams. 
29 Vail' and Genis, Shestidesiatye, 209. 
30 Jenny Leigh Smith catalogues this process in chapter 3 of her dissertation. See, for example: Smith, 
“Soviet Farm Complex,” 128. 
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consumers, by contrast, depended on state procurements; only those with cash could tap the 
private markets where collective farmers sold more expensive but varied produce.31 In his 
speeches, Khrushchev linked corn to an abundant, nutritious, and varied diet. As early as June 
1954, Khrushchev described how the Virgin Lands campaign and corn crusade promised to 
make good on this pledge. Seeing lagging productivity of livestock herds on state and collective 
farms, he diagnosed the problem as insufficient supplies of nutritious feed, a longstanding 
problem. Looking to American models, he determined that corn would provide it, and therefore 
tasked farms with using corn grain and silage to guarantee deliveries of meat, milk, and eggs to 
urban centers around the country.32 In July 1954, he reinforced the message: “We want Soviet 
people to eat to their hearts’ content, and not just bread, but good bread, as well as sufficient 
meat, milk, butter, eggs, and fruits. Living on bread alone, we might just get by. We must more 
than get by; we must ensure that Soviet people’s lives become better and more beautiful every 
day. We have constructed a socialist society, and are confidently moving toward communism.”33 
Moreover, this message formed the basis of his subsequent declarations that the USSR was in 
the process of “overtaking and surpassing America” in per capita output of these foods. 
A source of material wealth and a signal of the potential for progress unlocked by 
modern industrial farming, corn—in an apparent paradox—also appeared in the press as a sort 
of miracle of nature. In her cultural history of advertising in late imperial Russia, Sally West 
finds that Russian advertising, like that of contemporaries around the world, connected the 
modern to the magical.34 I do not want to overstress the resemblance, given the very different 
context of market competition and private advertising. The technological aspects of renderings 
of corn in the press are visible, for instance, in the image juxtaposing corn and the modernity of 
                                                        
31 For more on these markets, see: Hessler, Social History of Soviet Trade. 
32 Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 1:331. 
33 Ibid., 1:342. 
34 Sally West, I Shop in Moscow: Advertising and the Creation of Consumer Culture in Late Tsarist 
Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011), 193. 
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the rocket. A cartoon in the March 14, 1962, issue of Sel'skaia zhizn' equated corn with the space 
age: accompanied by the caption “Animal husbandry and its ‘sputniks,” or its “traveling 
companion, the sketch depicts a globe of cattle, hogs, and chickens orbited by corn, beans, and 
sugar beets, the feeds for which Khrushchev lobbied. The leitmotif that corn was a “miracle 
crop” was most visible in the name “Chudesnitsa” for the cafes in Moscow and Leningrad. The 
term also appeared several times each year in Pravda and much more commonly in Sel'skaia 
zhizn', especially between 1961 and 1964. 
Furthering the idea that corn was special, exceptional, and even astounding, in a March 
1955 speech Khrushchev conceded that the USSR might achieve the abundance he envisioned 
using other crops, but at greater expenditure of time and resources. Although claiming that 
communism was a practical and material stage, rather than “something pie-in-the-sky,” he 
described corn as if it possessed almost-magical productive powers.35 Echoing Khrushchev’s 
enthusiasm, the press introduced audiences to the potential of the unfamiliar crop. In April 
1955, a story in Komsomol'skaia pravda raved, “Corn is the key to increased grain production, 
to plentiful meat and dairy products. One little kernel of this miraculous plant, planted by caring 
hands, gives two or even three full-weight cobs; that is 1,000–1,500 grains and 4–5 kilograms of 
green mass.” Translated into terms of food, “this means 1.5–2 liters of milk, 60–80 grams of 
butter, 2–3 cans of delicious canned corn or approximately 100 grams of pork. And this from 
only one little kernel!”36 When early results did not meet his expectations, Khrushchev protested 
that corn would not work miracles without proper care. Failures to meet his expectations 
reflected poorly not on the crop, he charged, but on the leaders and farmworkers who planted it 
and expected a bounty of food without having to cultivate it, irrigate it, harvest it, and feed it to 
livestock. He complained that they “plant corn and wait to everything to happen on its own. No, 
                                                        
35 Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 2:27. 
36 “Pomozhem vyrastit' kukuruzu: Pis'mo studentov Voronezhskogo sel'skokhoziaistvennogo institut k 
studentam sel'skokhoziaistvennykh vysshikh i srednykh uchebnykh zavedenii,” Komsomol'skaia pravda 
(May 5, 1955): 1. 
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corn is definitely not a fairytale crop. It gives high yields only to those who take the correct 
approach, work on it, and use the necessary technologies.”37 
The press emphasized the extraordinary qualities of the crop by referring to it as a 
“bogatyrskaia kul'tura,” or “hero crop,” evoking the knight-errant (bogatyr) who was the 
protagonist of many medieval Russian epic tales.38 In March 1962, Sel'skaia zhizn' took this 
image a step further, combining the motif of the “hero crop,” with Khrushchev’s horse 
metaphor: a knight emblazoned with a red star and armed with a lance rides astride a horse 
made of corn. The banner overhead reads, “To the front!”39 The image accompanies a quote 
from Khrushchev that further reinforces the point that corn was unusual and wonderful: “Corn 
is a blessing to humankind (blago dlia chelovechestva). Skillful cultivation of this valuable crop 
provides great wealth to the country and the people.” The accompanying story noted that a 
hectare of corn yielding 50 metric tons of silage, a high but not record-breaking yield, would 
produce 1.56 tons of pork or 10.4 tons of milk. The story sought to shape readers’ attitudes to 
corn, reinforcing the connection between the crop and abundance. 
Creating anthropomorphized portrayals of corn, visual propaganda routinely used 
femininity to reinforce the message that corn offered abundance. Artists used a pastiche of styles 
loosely derived from earlier conventions for representing women.40 When depicting corn, they 
                                                        
37 Khrushchev, Stroitel’stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 3:184. 
38 See, for instance: “Moguchii potok,” Pravda (February 2, 1960): 1; “Gimn kukuruze,” Pravda 
(November 14, 1960): 2; “Tak vyrashchivat’ kukuruzu,” Izvestiia (December 2, 1960): 1; and “Bogatyrskoe 
zerno,” Sel'skaia zhizn' (September 26, 1962): 1. 
39 The text reads: “Na udarnyi front!” The adjective “udarnyi” has meanings of “storm” or “shock,” as in 
“udarnik,” or “shockworker.” 
40 Historian Victoria E. Bonnell identifies three in her study of photos and stylized representations of 
women on propaganda posters of the interwar period, the baba, the kolkhoznitsa, and the krest'ianka. 
These tropes help make sense of a theme equating an anthropomorphic and feminized corn with 
abundance, which did not recreate any one of the three types, but instead borrowed elements of both the 
krest'ianka and the baba. The earliest post-1917 images of peasant women drew on tropes associated with 
the baba, a pejorative term denoting a mixture of shrewdness and fecundity with backwardness and 
ignorance. During collectivization, propaganda posters appealed to urban audiences, convincing them 
that Soviet power had transformed the countryside. To that end, artists a new symbol for the peasantry: a 
young, thin, stern kolkhoznitsa, the female collective farmer. After 1934, posters had to appeal to rural 
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frequently created figures displaying neither masculine nor feminine characteristics. When they 
did abandon this gender neutrality, however, they always gave corn feminine features. Most 
common between 1962 and 1964, these images coincided with the development of a more lively 
visual style characteristic of Thaw-era publications. In the example of Kukuruza, this meant 
covers adorned with color and laid out using angular, geometric forms reflecting the influence of 
modernist graphic-design conventions revived after the Stalin period’s conservatism. In contrast 
to the static, stiff portraits characteristic of earlier publications, the press carried more pictures 
of individuals at work. Playful imagery brought illustrations onto the pages of text and adorned 
headlines. The content of journals changed too, as Kukuruza began to include content not 
directly pertaining to science, technology, or production. 
The femininity of corn revealed itself in three elements: first, the figures wear a shawl 
tied under the chin, in the fashion favored by older women and evocative of the baba. This 
contrasted to the kerchief, tied behind the head in the style of women workers, which sociologist 
Victoria Bonnell shows was characteristic of both the kolkhoznitsa and the krest'ianka. Second, 
stylized facial features such as rosy cheeks and red lips, as well as richer clothing such as an 
embroidered blouse, signaled beauty, a part of the makeup of the krest'ianka never seen on the 
kolkhoznitsa. Third, the slightly rounder silhouette of the corn in figure 6, in comparison with 
the straighter bodies of the gender-neutral cobs in the surrounding images, suggests traits 
associated with fertility. In this, the image remotely evokes the womanly krest'ianka of the late 
1930s and the 1940s, not the slender kolkhoznitsa of collectivization-period posters. Images of 
feminized corn typically accompanied depictions of food, further reinforcing the equation of 
corn and abundance. For instance, the back covers of the December 1961 and January 1962 
issues of Kukuruza present to the reader a range of modern convenience foods: popcorn, corn  
                                                        
audiences; therefore, they depicted not the kolkhoznitsa, who peasants might interpret as threatening, 
offensive, or even sexually aggressive, but a softer, more traditionally feminine peasant woman, the 
krest'ianka. Artists endowed her with a fuller figure, and depicted her at work on the collective farm as 
well as at home, enjoying the fruits of her labor. Bonnell, “The Peasant Woman in Stalinist Political Art of 
the 1930s,” American Historical Review 98, no. 1 (1993): 55–82. 
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Figure 6: Kukuruza 7, no. 12 (1963). 
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oil, cornflakes, canned corn, and candies. In each, a figure of a corncob with a smiling human 
face looks on. Its femininity is marked by red cheeks and lips, as well as a green shawl tied under 
the chin. 
The subsidiary images in figure 6, which appeared in the December 1962 issue of 
Kukuruza, reinforce the message that corn equaled abundant food. The sign at the center 
declares corn “a New Year’s gift,” and the crop’s productivity is announced by placing the figure 
on a balance to weigh it. In the first and final images, the presence of Ded' moroz, or 
“Grandfather frost,” the Russian Santa Claus-like figure associated with the holiday, signals that 
the page is a timeline for the year 1963, which moves from left to right, top to bottom. In the first 
scene, corn and the other feed crops celebrate the New Year along with a farmworker. In the 
second, third, and fourth images, the crops team up with cattle and hogs to measure and 
distribute corn and other feeds to fatten the animals. In the fifth image, sows show off their 
piglets, declaring, “Good food means a large litter!” Below that, corn provides food for humans: 
“dry breakfasts,” that is, cornflakes, to schoolchildren on the left, while on the right convenience 
foods including cornflakes, cornmeal, porridge, corn oil, canned corn, and candies. The images 
at bottom return to the production sphere: they herald the arrival of new varieties (at left). On 
the right, tractors bear the promise that farms would “begin to prepare for [next year’s] harvest 
already in the fall.” At the bottom right, the point is that corn benefits, thanks to the productivity 
of hybrids, from the application of synthetic and organic fertilizers, which the sign marks as 
destined for the cornfield. 
The press cast corn as a welcome part of the food supply to make it familiar, to Sovietize 
it, rather than to give it particular national characteristics, Russian or otherwise. To achieve this, 
publications offered readers snippets of a culture of corn. These represented a small, but 
significant part of the content of the “academic-technical” journal Kukuruza. In 1963, the total 
of 443 stories included more than 67 percent on technical or policy-related topics. Nonetheless, 
35 articles (8 percent), or an average of 3 per issue, were classified under the rubrics “Corn on 
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the table,” “Satire and humor,” and “Read this, it is useful to know,” the last offering stories 
instructing readers in the history and science of corn. These articles, images, poems, and songs 
accustomed the audience to corn’s presence in Soviet fields and on the country’s tables. The 
January edition, for instance, combined the story lauding the store on Moscow’s Leninskii 
Prospekt with a brief piece on the appearance of the crop in Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s 
poem, “The Song of Hiawatha.” Articles published that year extolled corn’s nutritional value and 
offered recipes for how to use cornmeal and other products derived from corn, both frequent 
features of the press. Others recounted the history of how ancient Mesoamericans domesticated 
corn, or offered readers jokes and games, all of which worked to make the crop familiar. In 
another example, in 1962, songs appeared in each of the May, June, September, and October 
issues. By comparison, in the twelve issues of the 1961 volume of Kukuruza, approximately 
twenty stories in the journal fit in similar categories, reinforcing the conclusion that the 
publication had grown more conscientious in appealing to the audience on these grounds, rather 
than on its narrowly technical ones alone. Finally, the journal reached a substantial audience: its 
print run grew from 44,600 in 1960 to 65,580 in 1964. Although this amounts to very few 
subscribers, the libraries of collective farms, technical colleges, and research institutes most 
likely subscribed to the publication, meaning it reached a much wider audience. 
Corn also received Lenin’s blessing. The prominence of his maxims, writings, and life 
story surged under Khrushchev, who packaged de-Stalinization as a return to a more pure 
Bolshevik past. For instance, between 1958 and 1965, a new printing of Lenin’s voluminous 
collected writings appeared.41 Historian Nina Tumarkin notes that the cult of Lenin reached a 
high point, and veneration included iconographic representations of his life and “reverence 
toward Leninism as to sacred writings, . . . so polished and so pervasive that it left no facet of 
                                                        
41 V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochenenie, 55 vols. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi 
literatury, 1958–1965). 
  252 
public life untouched.”42 This included even corn: for instance, the press reproduced a letter the 
first Soviet leader wrote to G. M. Krzhizhanovskii, chief of the state planning agency Gosplan, in 
October 1921. In it, he praised corn’s potential as a new crop to aid efforts to feed the struggling 
country and to recover from the destruction suffered in the period of war and famine lasting 
from 1914 to 1921. Lenin ordered the Soviet government to secure supplies of seeds and to 
educate the peasantry about the crop’s value. The journal Kukuruza told readers that the 
documents “demonstrate the enormous importance Vladimir Il'ich vested in corn as a practical 
resolution to economic challenges.”43 
Naturally, corn also featured in the emerging Khrushchev cult, which showered praise on 
him as head of state and party leader, but also on his policies. His former allies denounced this 
phenomenon when they ousted him in October 1964, but they could do little to stop it while he 
remained in power. To illustrate, a 1960 conference of corngrowers in Russia’s Belgorod oblast 
praised Khrushchev and his corn policies. Invoking many achievements attained in 1959, the 
workers pledged even greater efforts in 1960. Communism was the course Lenin had charted, 
the text declares, and Khrushchev’s leadership was bringing the USSR closer to that destination: 
“We are proud that victory in peaceful competition with the USA will be ours. Much depends on 
us, the corngrowers, and we will not spare our efforts.”44 Communist plenty and the mission to 
vie with the US for superiority represented moral incentives for workers, ideals that encouraged 
their efforts to work harder, produce more, and bring each one step closer. 
* * * 
The Soviet press marketed individuals who embodied these virtues as “vanguard 
                                                        
42 Nina Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983), 255–61. 
43 “Kul'tura neischerpaemykh vozmozhnostei: V. I. Lenin o dostoinstvakh kukuruzy,” Kukuruza 7, no. 5 
(1962): 4–5. 
44 RGASPI, f. 556, op. 22, d. 286, l. 74. 
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workers,” or peredoviki (sg. peredovik). N. F. Manukovskii, A. V. Gitalov, Liubov Li, E. A. 
Doliniuk, M. E. Ozernyi, and other similar corngrowers were reminiscent of the “shockworkers” 
(udarniki) and Stakhanovites of the 1930s. Back then, the most famous workers—those most 
studied by historians—busted norms in industry by emulating the eponymous coalminer A. G. 
Stakhanov.45 Until recently, scholars had largely overlooked Stakhanovites in agriculture: 
challenging the finding that farmworkers sought only “minimum disadvantage” from 
interactions with the state, Mary Buckley convincingly shows that some women adapted to rural 
Stakhanovism, achieving their own ends.46 Portrayals of these women in print and in film, as 
well as their performances at public meetings, cast them as the result of policies transforming 
the countryside, counterparts to male industrial workers. Women earned this honor by actively 
participating in these campaigns: playing assigned roles in public, these women sought moral 
and material rewards at the risk of ostracism for cooperating with the hated authorities.47 
After the war, Stakhanovites and shockworkers gave way to the “vanguard worker.” 
Encouraging outstanding production in socialist competitions, vanguard workers contributed to 
Khrushchev’s corn crusade. In the ideal, well-managed farms and productive individual workers 
would embolden all to achieve similarly exceptional results. The idea was to provide incentives 
to the very best: much like the women of the 1930s, vanguard workers performed in 
mobilization campaigns and reaped rewards great and small. They might speak publically about 
their work; earn medals or awards; or achieve an honorary position in district-, regional-, 
republic-, or even union-level soviets. The latter, although only a symbolic vote in a rubber-
stamp assembly, offered prominence and access to authorities, making it attractive. These 
                                                        
45 Historian Lewis Siegelbaum finds that the Stakhanovite campaigns were in fact complex processes in 
which leaders, local authorities, and even workers pursued their own ends. See: Stakhanovism and the 
Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935–1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 6. 
46 Mary Buckley, Mobilizing Soviet Peasants: Heroines and Heroes of Stalin’s Fields (New York: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2006), 8. Buckley draws the term “minimum disadvantage” from: Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s 
Peasants. 
47 Buckley, Mobilizing Soviet Peasants, 6. 
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workers would then encourage the rest to improve their own productivity. As a republic leader 
in Lithuania put it in 1957, the goal was to “provide incentives to vanguard workers and spread 
word of their achievements.” This, in turn, set an example based on “moral influence (moral'noe 
vozdeistvie) not only on the best, but on the entire group where they work, and has great import 
in educating peers.”48 Such expectations were, however, unrealistic given the fact that only a 
select few enjoyed the material support needed to make a good worker into a peredovik. 
Moreover, there is little evidence that many workers responded this way. In his studies of 
industrial labor, Donald Filter finds that these efforts rarely encouraged enthusiasm.49 
How did the Soviet press portray vanguard corngrowers? Too many came and went 
during the Khrushchev decade to name each one, but a few stand out because they exemplified 
changes in methods for cultivating corn. One of the first vanguard corngrowers, M. E. Ozernyi of 
Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovs'k oblast, had gained fame and rewards already before 1953. In his 
address to the September 1953 Central Committee plenum, Khrushchev paid tribute to Ozernyi 
as a model worker who had earned the coveted Hero of Socialist Labor medal and the Stalin 
Prize. The leader had known Ozernyi during his time in Ukraine, where in the late 1940s the 
collective farmer had grown record-breaking harvests surpassing 20 metric tons per hectare.50 
Ozernyi’s fame spread in newspaper articles, pamphlets, and books, all of which encouraged 
readers to emulate him and instructed their audiences in the techniques needed to do so. 51 The 
                                                        
48 LYA, f. 1771, op. 191, d. 423, l. 16. 
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51 See, for example: M. E. Ozernyi, “Moi opyt vyrashchivaniia vysokikh urozhaev kukuruzy,” Sel'skoe 
khoziaistvo (April 7, 1955): 3. In addition to the newspaper articles about him or under his byline, Ozernyi 
also had a number of books and pamphlets attributed to him. They include, but are not limited to: M. E. 
Ozernyi, Kak ia vyrashchivaiu kukuruzu (Moscow: Ministerstvo sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR, 1955); 
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approved methods most common in 1955 required extensive manual labor to weed the 
plantings, but could produce high yields if applied properly. 
As the USSR strove to use industrial farming technologies to plant, cultivate, and harvest 
corn, new vanguard tractor drivers achieved fame.52 The most prominent were A. V. Gitalov of 
Kirovohrad oblast in Ukraine and N. F. Manukovskii of Russia’s Voronezh oblast, who spoke 
before Central Committee plenums and performed other ceremonial duties.53 Gitalov appeared 
on the front page of Sel'skaia zhizn' as part of coverage of the Twenty-second Party Congress in 
1961. The image (figure 7) shows the corngrower before the dais, presenting a ceremonial ear of 
corn to Khrushchev and shaking the First Secretary’s hand, as smiling and applauding leaders, 
including L. I. Brezhnev and A. I. Mikoian, look on. Gitalov had earned fame for having 
completed his assignment to work on Roswell Garst’s farm in Iowa, returning to the USSR to 
spread the word about modern farming methods he had mastered there. Manukovskii similarly 
had led Soviet tests of these methods on his home collective farm, trying them out on conditions 
comparable to those faced by the average tractor driver on the average collective farm. Like 
many others, Manukovskii became the focus of documentary films designed to spread practical 
knowledge as they broadcast the fame of vanguard workers.54 Given the widespread practice of 
showing of documentary and propaganda films, and the dozens preserved in the Russian State 
Documentary Film and Photo Archive, these films reached a broad audience. Even Khrushchev 
                                                        
Kukuruzu – vo vse raiony (Moscow: Sel'khozizdat, 1955); and Sovety vyrashchivanii kukuruzy: Otvety 
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52 D. V. Meksin, “U posledovatelei Aleksandra Gitalova,” Kukuruza no. 9 (1963): 29–30. 
53 “Na Plenume Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS: Vystuplenie tovarishcha A. V. Gitalova,” Sel'skaia zhizn' 
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tovarishcha A. V. Gitalova,” Sel'skoe khoziaistvo (May 12, 1959): 2. 
54 See, for example, the short documentary K izobiliiu (1958). Russian State Documentary Film and Photo 
Archive (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv kinofotodokumentov, RGAKFD), edinits khraneniia 
(preservation unit) 15682. The segment in question is entitled, “The machine operator of the [Kirov] 
collective farm explains the work of his composite [kompleksnaia] brigade in cultivating corn.” 
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Figure 7: A. V. Gitalov and N. S. Khrushchev at the Twenty-Second 
Party Congress in 1961. Sel'skaia zhizn' (October 22, 1961): 1. 
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occasionally commented on their content.55 In 1959, Gitalov and Manukovskii agreed to 
compete with one another not only to achieve the highest yield, but also to not use any 
inefficient manual labor. Moreover, they pledged to broadcast their hard-earned knowledge to 
every Soviet corngrower. The press coverage staging the event communicated to readers how 
Manukovskii wrote to Gitalov, “I propose that we include another point in the competition rules: 
to convey our experience to the young machine operators, and carefully teach them the newest 
methods.”56  
The press portrayed each as a Soviet everyman, but one whose outstanding dedication to 
his work made him a model for all. Gitalov’s experiences in America reinforced his image as a 
practical man with whom the audience could identify. Outlining his training in Iowa under 
Roswell Garst, he described the farm and how he learned by doing. “I received the assignment of 
learning American methods of farm management,” he recounted, “and the best way to achieve 
that is to sit oneself behind the wheel of a tractor.”57  
The press portrayed female vanguard collective farmers using the visual language 
developed in the late 1930s and the postwar period. Bonnell argues that, in the process of 
creating the kolkhoznitsa and krest'ianka, “political artists . . . feminized the image of the 
peasantry as a social category.” She shows that artists gave the ideal women workers of the latter 
1930s many of the characteristics of the krest'ianka. That image evolved in the postwar period 
into “the pastoral romance of high Stalinism,” in which “plump, joyous women wearing 
embroidered blouses [sat] at the wheel of a tractor or combine. The sheaves of wheat have 
gotten bigger and symbols of prosperity are everywhere.” Emphasizing traditional markers of 
                                                        
55 See, for example, a record of his private memorandum to his inner circle of agricultural advisors in 
April 1959: RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 298, l. 94. 
56 “Zachinateli kompleksnoi mekhanizatsii vozdelyvaniia kukuruzy vstupili v sorevnovanie,” Sel'skoe 
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57 A. Gitalov, “U nas i v Amerike,” Sel'skoe khoziaistvo (January 3, 1959): 3. 
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femininity, visual artists created ideal images in which young figures with womanly physiques 
stood alongside representatives of an older generation.58 
In the Khrushchev era, that first generation of collective farmers was represented by 
women such as E. A. Doliniuk. Born in 1914, she was the champion corngrower of Ukraine’s 
Ternopil oblast, and the press commonly depicted her as a 
model for others, often by printing her picture. In one case 
(figure 8), Sel'skoe khoziaistvo trumpeted the release of a 
propaganda poster featuring a candid picture of Doliniuk, 
decked out in her two Hero of Socialist Labor medals. She 
displayed the large stalks of corn that she grew in the field. 
The poster typifies the visual language used to portray her. 
She was always dressed simply, in clothing of a single color, 
with a light-colored headscarf tied behind her head. The two 
medals always adorned her jacket or blouse. 59 Each of these 
is reminiscent of the image of the krest'ianka, hardworking 
and enjoying the prosperity that accompanied success. An 
accompanying poem captured Doliniuk’s celebrity: 
Not for nothing in her native land, 
Does Auntie Zhenia and her work team 
Boast a reputation for corn feed and grain 
It should be said, “Let a beauty 
As in Auntie Zhenia Doliniuk’s field 
Grow everywhere, all around!”60 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, Doliniuk often appeared in the 
Soviet press, as well as on stage at political events, much like 
                                                        
58 Bonnell, “Peasant Woman in Stalinist Political Art,” 79–80. 
59 See, for instance, a sketch accompanying a profile of Doliniuk: Ia. Makarenko, “Vsegda idti vpered!” 
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Figure 8: "Plakaty rasskazyvaiut," 
Sel'skoe khoziaistvo (May 12, 
1959): 3 
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Gitalov and Manukovskii.61 In December 1959, she outlined how her farm used the machinery 
Khrushchev championed in accordance with his American models. “Comrades, Mr. Garst 
explained that it is necessary to have hybrid seeds, machines, fertilizers, and, what’s more, 
chemicals for destroying pests and weeds,” she said. “We have the first three conditions on every 
collective farm.” They still needed, however, more of all of them, as well as the chemicals needed 
to enlarge the harvests, cut the labor, and reduce the cost of production.62 
As a record-breaking corngrower, Doliniuk became the focal point of a “people’s 
academy,” where she taught corngrowing methods to workers from her home oblast, and those 
who came from many others. According to Soviet officials, short-term practical training 
demonstrated approved corngrowing methods more effectively than a newspaper article or 
government pamphlet because they offered hands-on experience. “Schools of vanguard 
knowledge” such as Doliniuk’s appeared in 1957 and spread quickly: by 1959, 300 leaders of 
Komsomol brigades attended the training session on her home collective farm consisting of 
single-day sessions in each of the four phases of the agricultural calendar, from wintertime 
preparations for the spring to planting, cultivating, and harvesting the corn. The press 
propagandized her name so much that hopeful youth arrived from other oblasts of Ukraine and 
even from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.63 And they achieved results: party officials 
reported that in as many as 100 cases the trainees had doubled the yield they had grown in the 
previous year.64 Responding to that success, Ternopil oblast leaders expanded the program in 
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  260 
1960 and 1961 and other oblasts began to adopt the format: by early 1962, 89 such schools 
existed and, in the course of their existence, some 21,000 Komsomol leaders, activists, and work 
team heads had completed the course.65 
By the early 1960s, Soviet journalists 
revealed more about vanguard workers’ lives, 
illustrating the new focus on the individual. In 
contrast to Doliniuk, Ozernyi, Manukovskii, and 
Gitalov, the stories portraying the work of Liubov' 
Li detailed her daily life, although this too served 
didactic purposes. Li stood out because she lived in 
Uzbekistan, a non-Slavic republic, and was of a 
non-Slavic nationality herself: her name, a 
Russianization of the Korean family name often 
transliterated into English as “Lee” or “Rhee,” 
indicates that she was a member of the Korean 
diaspora sent to Central Asia by Stalin. In the early 
1960s, Li earned prominence as newspaper and 
magazine profiles hailed her achievements in the 
fields. At the same time, the images and stories 
offer a candid portrait of work and daily life.66Like 
the young, vigorous women Bonnell highlights  
as the hallmark of the late 1930s and the postwar 
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Figure 9: "A zavtra novyi trudovoi den'," 
Kukuruza 9, no. 1 (1963): 5. 
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period, Li—a generation younger than Doliniuk—is always seen well dressed in the overtly 
feminine manner not of the kolkhoznitsa, but of the krest'ianka. Moreover, the accompanying 
stories highlight her role as mother of two young sons, as befits that image. The publication of 
two feature articles in the journal devoted to corn, Kukuruza, in the first six months of 1963 
alone further illustrates the prominence she earned. Although far from the only woman among 
those featured in such stories, Li was a mother, a role with prominent place in the piece by 
V. Kliuev. It portrays a humanity and personality earlier profiles of vanguard workers lacked. It 
begins with Li returning home from the fields to be greeted by her sons, who present her with 
the stack of letters filled with inquiries and goodwill from around the Soviet Union received on a 
nearly daily basis.67 The pictures accompanying the articles (such as that in figure 9) show her 
with head modestly covered in shawl or cap against the broiling Central Asian sun, devoted to 
the task of tending her fields. 
As a Hero of Socialist Labor, a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and as a model 
citizen, Li served as an example for all. Little about the media portrait of Li deviated from the 
life of the ideal Soviet person, even down to her rejection of religion. “Beyond the ocean, in 
corn’s old homeland,” one of the articles tells the reader, “people still believe in god and 
miracles. There was a time when, for example, Peruvian maidens brought forth bread baked 
from cornmeal as a gift for the sun.” Central Asia witnessed nothing of the sort: “Liuba Li does 
not believe in god. She prefers her inspirational labor to him.”68 The publicity spreading a 
vanguard corngrower’s fame intersected with related efforts because they attempted to shape 
the way the audience thought and, thereby, how it acted. In this case, the story contributed to 
the virulent antireligion campaign Khrushchev pursued in concert with the push to “construct 
communism.” As historian Tat'iana Chumachenko shows, Stalin tolerated the church for 
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pragmatic reasons during the war, and afterward allowed it to open monasteries and train 
priests under the watchful eye of government minders. Pushing Soviet society to a new stage of 
development, Khrushchev closed monasteries and undertook propaganda campaigns against 
religion in an effort to achieve ideological purity and ensure that “the builders of communism” 
received a proper atheist upbringing.69 
* * * 
In tandem with this antireligious appeal, related efforts to educate youth and prepare 
them to live the communist ideal concentrated on work as a vital element of that upbringing. 
Authorities used propaganda campaigns, school programs, and youth competitions in hopes of 
strengthening the younger generation’s work ethic and commitment to socialism. This reflected 
authorities’ fears that the youth of a postwar society becoming urban and affluent had become 
increasingly disinclined to hard work and indifferent to ideology. Historian Juliane Fürst has 
shown that the postwar years “witnessed incredible propaganda successes and displays of 
loyalty by youth, but also saw the decline of youthful commitment to socialist values and 
ideology.”70 To illustrate, a report on a group of schoolchildren in Penza in 1959 described the 
previous four years of their working in the fields in their spare time. By making certain that 
students contributed to the local collective farm, the school had “conducted major work in the 
labor education of its pupils.”71 Corngrowing by schoolchildren and teenagers represented 
educational policies and practices designed to give students hands-on experience working in 
some sphere of production, both to teach practical skills and to inculcate appreciation for 
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manual labor.72 Special literature aimed to teach children about corn and to encourage them to 
participate in growing it.73 A search of a catalogue of periodical publications finds, for instance, 
dozens of articles on the subject in journals such as Kukuruza, Narodnoe obrazovanie (Popular 
Education), and related journals.74 
Here too, the example of America influenced Soviet leaders. In 1955, the delegation the 
Ministry of Agriculture sent to the United States stressed the importance Americans ascribed to 
teaching teenagers to work. Members reported to Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, that 
American rural communities nurtured an appreciation for manual labor. As a consequence, 
Soviet policies for growing hybrid corn drew in young people, who performed vital tasks in that 
process. Secondary students in the US might spend a portion of their summer vacation 
detasseling corn, and some did so in the Soviet Union. The First Secretary’s belief in the 
importance of such efforts became apparent in an unguarded exchange he had with B. P. 
Sokolov, the hybrid-corn expert, as the latter reported on his trip to the US. Sokolov recounted 
how Americans expected youth to detassel corn and perform other work on the farm. “They 
really do habituate children to work,” Sokolov exclaimed, describing how the sons of several of 
the researchers and university professors he met worked on nearby farms. “This is not,” he 
clarified, “because they don’t have money to feed themselves, but because they consider that 
[young people] should have work experience.” Khrushchev retorted, “And here, if a professor 
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has a son and he finishes secondary school, he doesn’t want to go to work!”75 
The education reforms Khrushchev pursued in the late 1950s required students 
completing secondary education and seeking to enter higher education to perform manual labor 
and master a trade. The story of one student in Stavropol krai reveals how this initiative forced 
youth to participate in work such as the corn harvest, and the subtle forms of coercion they faced 
in the process. In the 1950s, regardless of Khrushchev’s irritation at Soviet students’ perceived 
aversion, authorities expected students and Komsomol members to weed and harvest corn by 
hand. The students’ incentives were threefold: they received some pay, while refusal to work 
risked disapproval by peers, and, more consequentially, punishment by educational institutions 
or Komsomol committees. This work was, in the words of one who experienced it, “voluntary-
compulsory.”76 In the autumn of 1958, students from a Stavropol medical college traveled to a 
nearby state farm to lend a hand during the corn harvest. This otherwise unremarkable event 
became the subject of a story in the krai youth newspaper, Molodoi leninets (Young Leninist). 
The story’s title, “Izhdivenets,” describes a dependent, but implies that the individual is 
undeserving beneficiary. The author leveled this charge at his subject, I. T. Kirakozov. A first-
year student in the college’s dentistry department, Kirakozov alone among his comrades did a 
poor job harvesting corn—according to the story. The author claimed that this was because 
Kirakozov resented having to pick cobs from the stalks by hand. When challenged to be more 
thorough and conscientious, the young man haughtily retorted, “If you don’t like my work, do it 
yourself; I’ll go home,” at which point he left the field and returned to the city. For this, he 
received a mild reprimand from the college’s Komsomol organization, to which he belonged. The 
reporter charged that this incident reflected a lifetime of coddling and unearned advantage. 
Khrushchev’s educational reforms to combat this perceived ill, then coming into full force, 
required students applying for higher education to have proof of “experience in production.” The 
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author implied that Kirakozov had acquired the supposed experience recorded in his labor book 
at minimal effort thanks to family connections allowing him to work for a month in a 
sanatorium, and put in a few hours here and there at a machine shop.77 The krai’s main 
newspaper, Stavropol'skaia pravda, similarly named Kiriakozov “barchuk,” a young lord, 
someone who was haughty and disdained work. “Let Kirakozov first work a bit in production,” it 
counseled, “having perhaps learned to appreciate labor, he will be mature enough for the 
institute.78 
The two articles demonstrate work’s rising significance in the education system, but they 
do not tell Kirakozov’s side of the story. He did this in a letter to the editorial board of Molodoi 
leninets, and in appeals to the krai party authorities. His entreaties provide additional details: 
first, after the events of November 1, he received a reprimand from the Komsomol committee. 
Then the newspaper articles attacked him, and only afterward, on November 19, was he expelled 
from the youth organization and the medical school, and not on the grounds that he had spoken 
rudely, but for poor academic performance.79 Second, Kirakozov described his own version of 
the events of that day in the cornfield, adding crucial details the newspaper omitted, and 
reinterpreting them to his own benefit. He directed his rude remarks not at the team leader or at 
a fellow student, but imprudently at S. I. Maniakin, the head of the krai party committee’s 
agricultural section, who happened to inspect the farm’s operations that day. Maniakin had 
questioned Kirakozov about unharvested corn in nearby rows. Kirakozov responded that those 
were not his responsibility, speaking words similar to those reproduced without context in the 
newspaper story. Not rejecting all work, he stated only that he considered those rows others’ 
responsibility. He acknowledged within a few minutes that his words were “tactless” and “hot-
tempered,” and asked for Maniakin to forgive him. The official, however, “did not accept my plea 
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for forgiveness and began to threaten me with expulsion from college.” Kirakozov conceded that 
he left the farm, but for a reason he considered justifiable. He had neither been forced to leave 
nor had quit in anger, but instead had secured the blessing of his superiors to travel the thirty 
kilometers to the city of Stavropol on foot, seek out Maniakin in the party committee offices, and 
beg his pardon once again. When he arrived, Maniakin was not there. Kirakozov instead told his 
story to a party official who encouraged him to learn a lesson from the incident and return to 
work on the farm, which he did. Only later, when the newspaper articles appeared, did 
Kirakozov perceive the danger to his otherwise bright future as a student. In his letter, he hinted 
that the stories and the punishment happened at the instigation of “an influential person,” that 
is Maniakin, who falsely built the case against him.80 
Kirakozov’s pleas to the newspaper editors and to the Komsomol authorities, however, 
apparently achieved little. Dated January 20, 1959, the letter caused the head of the students’ 
section at Molodoi leninets to write to the krai party committee inquiring about the incident. In 
his memorandum, he expressed sympathy for Kirakozov. “Judging by the impression,” he wrote, 
“[Kirakozov] made during a face-to-face meeting, and according to his story, the behavior of . . . 
Comrade Maniakin was not entirely objective.” Unfortunately for Kirakozov, nothing seems to 
have improved as a result: in March, the krai party committee reaffirmed the validity of 
Kirakozov’s expulsion from the Komsomol and the college.81 
The story of the chance conflict between Maniakin and Kirakozov, illustrates the unease 
officials felt at the links between work and education. As historian Donald J. Raleigh documents, 
students in higher education were commonly assigned to harvest-time tasks, but many tried to 
avoid it and few found the work itself a positive experience, especially in light of conditions on 
the collective farms. At most, a few bonded with peers during these forays into the country: “We 
were young,” one recalled, “we were with girls, there were dances, and we celebrated birthdays 
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and organized picnics.”82 Publicizing the incident involving Kirakozov, the local press created a 
morality tale for others, demonstrating the consequences of refusing to join enthusiastically in 
the labor required by Khrushchev’s education reform. In this version of the story, Kirakozov was 
unprepared for the work of harvesting corn because he had not been properly trained to 
appreciate manual labor. Furthermore, the incident illustrates the capricious, personal nature of 
power. Kirakozov was a relatively well-connected man: his father was vice rector of a college and 
his aunt served as a deputy in the town soviet and managed the sanatorium where the young 
man had worked. His privileges and connections, however, could not protect him against 
someone with more authority, a party post, and the connections to newspaper editors required 
to carry out a vendetta against a young man of perhaps nineteen years. 
* * * 
In addition to assigning students short-term tasks such as aiding farms in harvesting 
corn, authorities created student brigades to tend crops for an entire growing season, a program 
designed to accustom youth to regular work, to teach them about agriculture, and to inculcate 
appropriate values. In groups of fifty or more, high-school students banded together, under 
supervision, to cultivate crops, especially corn, in an environment resembling an agricultural 
summer camp. Living, working, learning, and having fun together, the students took 
responsibility for the crops, and in return earned wages, along with knowledge of and 
appreciation for an honest day’s work. Like other efforts of the period, this program was a 
response to rising concerns that the educational system permitted students to eschew such labor 
because they expected to graduate high school and move immediately higher education and the 
white-collar professions. The brigades first formed in Stavropol krai, but later earned the praise 
of national leaders, including Khrushchev himself. On a visit to the krai, he noted the 
“outstanding” achievements of students in the brigades who, “combining study with moderate 
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work, achieve high yields of corn, wheat, and sunflowers.”83 
The program was designed to inculcate in participants an appreciation for manual labor 
and practical knowledge about farming. Called “student production brigades,” or uchenicheskie 
proizvodstvennye brigady, the first formed in Stavropol krai’s Novo-Aleksandrov district in 
1955. By 1958, their fame had spread, earned them frequent praise, and ensured that other 
regions and republics replicated the program. In 1958, at an interregional conference dedicated 
to the program and the participants, an official of the krai educational department drew 
attention to the perceived defect of secondary schools. Citing Khrushchev’s words, he denounced 
the schools’ “detachment from real life,” which they passed on to students by shaping their 
attitudes to work and preparing students only for white-collar careers. Teachers and parents 
threatened students who behaved or performed poorly, “If you don’t do well in school, you’ll 
have to go work on the collective farm.” The new requirements for manual labor went hand in 
hand with the renewed emphasis on the party’s efforts “to construct communism.” The 
education administrator lamented that students listened passively to frequent lectures about the 
importance of labor, but this achieved little. “Communist upbringing cannot be divorced from 
labor,” he said, “or detached from real life, from the workers’ real struggle to construct a new 
society.”84 Put another way by the Komsomol Central Committee’s representative at the 
conference, the present generation needed “to prepare . . . for a life of useful labor, which 
inculcates in Pioneers and schoolchildren the high moral qualities required in a communist 
society.”85 
In the program, students in their final years of secondary school volunteered for a 
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summer, joining a group that combined work, education, and recreation.86 In contrast to an 
adult collective farmer’s eight or more hours, the students worked only six hours for equal pay, 
with remaining hours given over to rest and recreation.87 School personnel and the farm 
specialists oversaw the brigades, which cultivated corn, especially plots where hybrid seeds 
grew. Beginning with one group in 1955, the program swelled to 122 groups in 1956, 239 in 1957, 
and more than 300 in Stavropol krai alone in 1958 and 1959.88 In 1958, the 25,000 participants 
cultivated 34,000 hectares of corn, along with other crops.89 In 1959, they cultivated 
approximately 50,000 hectares of cropland, or 5 percent of the krai’s 1 million hectares.90 
The summer camps sought to shape students’ actions, but also to transform participants’ 
attitudes. The chairman of the “Rossiia” collective farm in the krai’s Novo-Aleksandrov district 
likened the program to “a trip like one to the Virgin Lands.” Parents were pleased with students’ 
promises “to never let dear friends down, and to work as never before.” On a practical level, the 
chairman noted, “they learn to follow the schedule in work and in leisure, conducting 
themselves as they should.” The transformation was clear: “We once had beloruchki: there were 
those who didn’t want to work while in school, but that time is past. Now there are no more 
beloruchki here.”91 The chairman’s idiomatic expression, meaning “a person with uncalloused 
[lit. “white”] hands,” indicated haughty disdain for dirtying them. This imagery of 
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transformation through labor tapped a vein in Soviet ideology that envisioned recasting 
individuals to make them suitable for creating and then flourishing in the new communist 
society. As a krai party committee official explained, “The most valuable part of the brigades is 
that they produce new people (novye liudi).”92 This mission to transform the citizen into the 
“new person” was central to Soviet ideology. As historian Thomas Wolfe noted, the Communist 
Party proclaimed that socialism would  “transform human conduct” and reshape human nature 
to make it suitable to the new society. Prominent in the early years of the Soviet experiment, the 
undertaking reemerged under Khrushchev as the requirement to educate the builders of the 
coming communist society. Wolfe wrote that this was “a plan for modeling of ‘new’ persons who 
both embodied and fulfilled the promise of socialism.”93 Lest the brigades prioritize work only, 
the participants—at least in the ideal—also received opportunities for intellectual, political, and 
artistic development. 
Speakers at a conference called to praise the program unsurprisingly spoke in glowing 
terms about the results, but the students also confronted real challenges. Reports from 1958 
suggest that conditions had been harsh in previous years. “In comparison with last year, the 
brigades work in the best conditions,” a report on Petrov district’s fifteen brigades recognized. 
The local party committee had provided better shelter, timely transportation, and hot meals, all 
absent before. These improvements did not, however, eliminate “instances of callous attitude 
toward the student brigades,” in which the leaders of farms and other organizations refused to 
provide such necessities. Agronomists failed to instruct or monitor the students. Farm managers 
commandeered them for work outside their assignments.94 Some leaders expressed misgivings, 
moreover, about the participants’ motivations: “Little has yet been done to organize labor and 
achieve educational goals. . . . The students consider pay the most important objective of 
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participation. They understand the educational goals poorly, as well as the purpose of the 
brigade: to complete tasks the party and government assign to improve agriculture.”95 
Declarations that the students worked hard notwithstanding, some exploited opportunities to 
shirk work and use the time for recreation. In the Sukho-Buivolinsk school’s brigade, leaders 
allowed lax discipline, which “many students demonstrated by running off into the orchard or to 
the pond during work periods, [with the result that their] plots are poorly cultivated.”96 Despite 
lofty rhetoric about reshaping teenagers into vanguards of the communist future, some viewed it 
as a chance to spend the summer away from parents and among friends, all while earning a little 
money. As Raleigh’s Baby Boomers recounted about their experiences in summer camps, they 
considered the work secondary to other pursuits, from swimming and singing to transgressing 
the rules: that is, in the words of one, “going exactly where they forbade us to go.” Even when 
they worked with enthusiasm, the work was not always done effectively: “It meant doing some 
fun work on the nearby kolkhozes,” Irina Tsurkan recalled. “I remember that they sent us city 
kids to weed carrots. We good-naturedly weeded and weeded. Not a single carrot was left. We 
pulled them all up!”97 
These brigades, in seeking to develop “new people,” foreshadowed the publicized 
“communist labor brigades” [brigady kommunisticheskogo truda] that followed in 1958. The 
latter campaign responded to resolutions of a Central Committee plenum and the Twenty-first 
Party Congress, as well as the tide of propaganda heralding the “construction of communism.” 
As a speaker at the Stavropol krai youth festival in November 1958 put it, the student brigades 
were only a first step: “Those who work in student brigades demonstrated heightened interest in 
studying the parts of the curriculum on agriculture.” Moreover, “their attendance rates 
increased significantly and, by using their work experience, they set an example of study and 
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conduct for the younger students.”98 These traits made them successful participants in the 
communist labor brigades, which combined obligations for output with rules for conduct and 
guidelines for instruction in politics. As one official stated: 
Who are the young people who have given their all to working to make 
communism a reality? They are those educated in our schools. . . . They worked in 
the summer on collective farms and now, when they have received their own 
assignments, they understand that they must contribute their knowledge and 
youthful vigor. They must not work any old way; instead, they must work as 
communists (po kommunisticheski), as V. I. Lenin taught us, as the Communist 
Party teaches us.99 
This was the result Komsomol organizers sought, and they broadcast it to wider audiences. At 
the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1958, a young woman from Stavropol krai, Comrade 
Dobrovol'skaia, described her experience: “Working in the brigade provides great moral 
satisfaction. The guys (rebiata) are correct to say that [it] encourages self-reflection, teaching us 
life skills, hard work, and constructive pastimes,” including team sports, the arts, and group 
trips.100 
* * * 
From 1955 through 1964, the press coverage of Khrushchev’s corn crusade highlighted 
examples of success in growing the feed crop, especially using industrial farming methods for 
cultivating it. As this chapter’s examination of corn propaganda suggests, representations of 
corn encouraged audiences to consider corn a symbol of abundance. Images equated corn with 
plenty by making the crop into a figure with features signaling femininity and fertility. The press 
underscored that this “queen of the fields” was a source of novel modern foods such as 
cornflakes, but also that it was most important as livestock feed needed to provide the meat and 
dairy products consumers wanted. This portrayal, moreover, cast corn as an almost miraculous 
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phenomenon, an idea seemingly at odds with the technological wonders of modern corn 
cultivation. The Soviet press thereby tried to change the attitudes toward corn of a large 
audience of consumers. 
Furthermore, the mass media aimed more narrowly tailored messages at farmworkers, 
encouraging them to work conscientiously to plant, cultivate, and harvest corn as a contribution 
to efforts to provide abundance for all. These workers saw the praise heaped on “vanguard” 
corngrowers who set an example of productive labor in the fields. These “moral incentives” 
hoped to achieve enthusiasm for farm work by appealing to desires to emulate these ideal 
laborers, to secure world peace, to construct communism, and live out socialist virtues. Instead 
of coercing workers, these incentives were meant to shape their conduct by influencing their 
understanding of the world and, thereby, their individual aspirations. As a result of these 
practices of “governmentality,” citizens would—in the ideal—choose to contribute to the corn 
crusade and the Soviet project in general. Evidence that these messages achieved major success 
is difficult to see, even in light of the optimism that reigned in society in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. 
The press chose female corngrowers as vanguard workers, and created feminine 
representations of them. These evolved from Stalinist conventions developed in the 1930s that 
gendered the peasantry feminine. And, indeed, women did much of the work needed to carry out 
the corn crusade—including vast amounts of manual labor weeding and tending corn before the 
widespread adoption of machines after 1960. The grandiose Stalinist visions of happy, singing 
peasants and bursting shocks of wheat, which Bonnell shows were characteristic of the postwar 
period, gave way. By the early 1960s, portrayals focused on the individual person and on her 
experiences that, even if more genuine, still served the purpose of embodying an ideal. The 
quintessence of the Khrushchev era was not the “bucolic bliss” and “happy peasants who, in 
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their spare time, performed folk dances in front of the Kremlin,”101 but one of calm 
determination and motherly warmth, as in the portraits of Liubov' Li in photos and prose. 
Educational programs, as well as the press coverage of them, emphasized how work—
including that done in tending corn—inculcated good morals and communist values. “Student 
production brigades” assembled for the summer offered moral incentives to youth participants, 
another effort to mold the conduct of the rising generation. Participation in the group obliged 
students to remake themselves through labor, preparing them to remake society—all while 
producing food and other useful agricultural products. Although voluntary and paid, work 
performed by students also carried a latent but present element of coercion, as in the case of the 
dental student Kirakozov and his school group’s work harvesting corn. 
Each of these tools exemplified the efforts by the Soviet press to carry out a mission to 
refashion people by influencing not only their actions, but also their values and understandings 
of the world around them. Rather than coercing them, state and party authorities wanted 
citizens to act of their own initiative, but within the boundaries prescribed by official policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPETING FOR CORN: MOBILIZING YOUTH TO GROW “THE QUEEN OF THE FIELDS” 
The Komsomol, or Communist Youth League, sponsored corngrowing competitions for 
youth during the entire decade of the corn crusade. Using propagandistic exhortations to 
incentivize participants, Komsomol leaders and the press made corn a “front” on which young 
farmworkers could “struggle for high yields.” Concurrently, these contests offered prizes and 
awards to the winners. Much like the practices of Soviet journalism Wolfe documents, the 
Komsomol was an instrument of “governmentality,” shaping the attitudes and the actions of 
youth. The competitions achieved considerable success by some measures: hundreds of 
thousands of youth participated in the corn project during the decade, tending millions of 
hectares of corn, and harvesting tens of millions of metric tons. In some oblasts and republics, 
they grew as much as one-half the crop. For instance, in 1960 the Komsomol expected members 
to cultivate 14 or 15 million hectares of corn, nearly 50 percent of the total for the USSR, 
although the actual figure reached only 11.6 million.1 
The Komsomol appealed to young citizens in their teens and twenties to engage in the 
corn crusade. Intended to inspire a new generation, the project drew on practices with a long 
pedigree. During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks mobilized sympathizers, party members, and 
Komsomol members to the frontlines in moments of crisis. As Donald Raleigh documents, these 
efforts often did not achieve much success due to the fragility of Komsomol and other 
organizations.2 They did, however, provide precedent for later mobilizations during the First 
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Five-Year Plan (1928–32), when Komsomol members, inspired by the slogan “On the march for 
metal,” contributed to constructing the titanic Magnitogorsk steelworks on previously barren 
steppe.3 Beginning in 1954, the youth organization marshaled volunteers for Khrushchev’s 
Virgin Lands campaign.4 By 1955, it joined efforts to grow corn across the Soviet Union, echoing 
its earlier motto by proclaiming its members to be “On the march to raise corn.” 
The Komsomol corngrowing competitions demonstrate how the corn crusade worked in 
practice, how the organization functioned as part of the bureaucracy managing the economy, 
and how leaders tried to soothe their own fears about the commitment of the young generation 
to socialist ideals. In particular, the contests of early years of the corn crusade shed light on 
Khrushchev’s fight to supplant centralized government ministries with the Communist Party, 
and its Komsomol subsidiary, as a driving force in the economy. By the early 1960s, the 
competitions evolved, incorporating under tight control elements of the social activism 
associated with Khrushchev’s ideological formulation that the USSR was becoming a “state of all 
the people” as it “constructed communism.”5 
* * * 
Mobilizing youth for work to create politically active citizens, Komsomol leaders 
preached the virtues of Khrushchev’s corn crusade using a militant tone reminiscent of the Civil 
War and World War II, when the Komsomol had organized young people for military service. 
“Fighters on the corn front,” they declared, should put themselves “in the vanguard of the 
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competition to achieve high yields of ‘the queen of the fields.” The Komsomol also ensured that 
its committees and members contributed to the crusade. In 1955, the first year of the corn 
crusade, activists organized 100,000 work teams, or “links” [sg. zveno, pl. zven'ia], each 
comprising on average approximately ten members.6 The corngrowing competition enlisted at 
least 1 million young people that year alone to do manual labor in the fields, a feat enabled by 
the Komsomol’s expanding membership, which doubled between 1949 and 1958.7 Furthermore, 
it reached more collective farms than ever before, enrolling more rural youth in the organization 
and in efforts such as this one. They hoped thereby to soothe fears that the younger generation 
shared neither socialist ideals nor the common experience of the war, instead harboring lax 
attitudes toward ideology and labor. The corngrowing contests were not unique, as authorities 
employed similar strategies in other spheres of production, for instance, one for employees of 
the Machine Tractor Stations (MTSs), to harvest and store more silage, hay, and other fodder. 
The Komsomol also established prizes for youth who distinguished themselves in machine 
trades or coalmining. The corngrowing competitions, however, lasted longer—from halting 
efforts in 1954 to full-scale national campaigns continuing through 1964—and attracted higher 
rates of participation than the others. 
The success of corngrowing mobilizations that I document is at odds with historians’ 
findings about parallel efforts to offer incentives to industrial workers. Donald Filtzer found 
that, under Khrushchev, socialist competitions failed to strengthen labor discipline in factories. 
Reversing Stalin-era practices, Khrushchev’s initiatives and speeches acknowledged a need to 
encourage, as Filtzer concluded, “the working population to begin to identify its own needs and 
interests with those of the regime.” Competitions combined material and moral incentives to 
encourage productivity and discipline, but workers disregarded them, viewing them as avenues 
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for bosses to reward the undeserving by falsifying results.8 I do not argue that Filtzer is wrong; 
instead, I contend that youthful enthusiasm for corn lent these Komsomol-led corngrowing 
contests a distinctive character. 
In general, younger generations support innovation and challenge the status quo; 
moreover, postwar prosperity helped define generations who came of age beginning in the 1950s 
in many countries. In studying this generation, Raleigh finds that their formative years reflected 
the less turbulent postwar era. Whereas their parents had firsthand experience with fear under 
Stalin and wartime tribulations, the Baby Boomers were optimistic and enthusiastic in their 
youth.9 Many participants in Komsomol competitions in 1955, perhaps born between 1928 and 
1938, were somewhat older than the 1967 high-school graduates Raleigh studies, but by 1964, 
competitors were members of the postwar generation. Moreover, because the earliest 
competitors were too young to have experienced the war, they were more likely to share an 
outlook with those younger than with those a few years older, born before 1928 and of military 
or working age during the war. The politics of generation remained a feature of Soviet life 
afterward, as leaders attempted to mobilize youth in the 1970s to construct the Baikal–Amur 
Mainline railway (BAM).10 
Small-scale corngrowing competitions began in a few oblasts and republics in 1954, 
predating by a year Khrushchev’s full-scale rollout of the crusade. Responding to his initial 
praise for corn in September 1953, Belarus and Latvia, as well as Russia’s Omsk, Briansk, and 
Arkhangel'sk oblasts—all located beyond corn’s traditional range—held a local contest in 1954. 
The Latvian Komsomol organized 800 work teams, and charged them with growing 10,000 
hectares of corn. In the typical positive tone, the republic Komsomol described to Moscow 
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efforts to overcome local officials’ opposition, as well as technical mistakes resulting from the 
unfamiliarity of the crop and the methods for growing it. The work teams that raised the highest 
yields earned scarce consumer goods such as cameras, radios, and wristwatches.11 In Belarus, 
over 1,400 work teams participated, similarly struggling to overcome the crop’s unfamiliarity 
and local leaders’ opposition.12 These practices set the tone for subsequent years, when they 
combined with efforts to conduct educational outreach, oversee production, and overcome farm 
mangers’ skepticism. 
Beginning in 1955, Komsomol bosses committed their organization to Khrushchev’s corn 
crusade. At the January 1955 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 
Komsomol First Secretary A. N. Shelepin pledged that youth would cultivate the crop, and that 
the Komsomol would employ tested strategies to organize them. Addressing a Komsomol 
Central Committee plenum convened on February 17–18, 1955, to reaffirm that promise, 
Shelepin stressed the organization’s obligations and echoed Khrushchev’s formula that corn 
offered “the solution to two problems” by simultaneously producing grain and silage. “Until 
recently,” he lamented, “corn has been confined, undervalued, and planted only in southern 
regions, and even there in insignificant quantities.”13 Extolling the efforts made in 1954, he 
exhorted his audience to extend that style of competition to every oblast, district, and farm.14 
This required meetings to explain the significance of corn, to demonstrate approved methods for 
growing it, and to organize work teams dedicated to growing it. To support this mission, 
Shelepin proposed adopting and publishing an open letter urging Komsomol members to lead 
this corn crusade.15 On February 24, 1955, the bureau Komsomol Central Committee, its 
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permanent executive committee, approved a text for publication designed “to mobilize youth for 
the struggle for raising corn.”16 
The following day, the front page of Komsomol'skaia pravda featured the letter, which 
called on youth to join the Komsomol “On the march to raise corn!” Addressing members and 
nonmembers alike, even those not already involved in agriculture, the letter envisioned mass 
participation by students in technical and high schools, and even by members of the Pioneers, 
aged seven to twelve years. The language and style echoed boilerplate phraseology, which 
Komsomol'skaia pravda later continued to use to promote the corn-growing contests. It called 
for “Komsomol zeal” from all who would engage “in the struggle (bor'ba) for high yields of 
corn,” and provided specific guidance for spring planting. It ended with a clarion call: “Join the 
competition! Let work team compete with work team, brigade with brigade! Spare no strength in 
growing high yields of corn everywhere this year!”17 
The press spread this message to a wide audience. The letter appeared in central 
newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestiia, as well as the Ministry of Agriculture’s daily, Sel'skoe 
khoziaistvo. The next day, Moskovskii komsomolets [Moscow Komsomol], the newspaper of the 
Komsomol’s Moscow city and oblast committees, published the letter.18 The call to action 
appeared in local newspapers, including semiweekly publications issued by vanguard collective 
farms, a rarity in 1955. On March 4, Stalinets [the Stalinist], the newspaper of the Stalin 
collective farm in the Chuvash ASSR, lauded in January by Khrushchev for growing corn beyond 
its traditional range, catalogued the responsibilities of the farm’s Komsomol members.19 The 
Komsomol Central Committee ordered distribution of 300,000 copies of a flyer relaying the 
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letter’s message.20 Soviet radio joined the wave of corn propaganda: for example, a broadcast 
made on the morning of February 28, 1955, announced to listeners, “[the Komsomol Central 
Committee’s] communiqué calls on Komsomol members and all rural youth to cultivate corn, 
spreading it to every corner of our Motherland.”21 The audiences’ reception of this message is 
impossible to measure, but heroes of the corngrowing competition such as Ukrainian champion 
corngrower A. A. Il'chenko noted its influence.22 Large quantities of pamphlets, posters, and 
other materials produced by central and regional authorities also raised awareness. Compiled in 
June 1955, a report on the quality of “books, brochures, posters, and flyers about corn” 
characterized them as “simple and clear, accessible to every collective farm member and 
youth.”23 Authorities considered these measures useful: those who reported that a republic, 
oblast, or district had underachieved in growing corn often blamed the absence of or inadequacy 
of these measures. 
The Komsomol aimed its message not only at active members, but also at every young 
person, setting the corn-growing competitions apart from feats such as the Virgin Lands 
campaign. Relocating to Siberia or Kazakhstan, participants in that campaign disrupted their 
lives, leaving behind education, friends, family, and an established way of life for a period of 
several years; some even settled permanently there.24 By contrast, the corngrowing competition 
offered everyone an opportunity to contribute to a cause that required less sacrifice because, as 
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Khrushchev asserted, corn could grow in nearly any region. The Komsomol envisioned 
mobilizing youth already working in agriculture, as well as students and Pioneers. Soviet leaders 
stressed that corn was equal in importance to farming the tselina, as they called the Virgin 
Lands in Russian. As early as January 1955, Ukrainian party chief A. I. Kirichenko reasoned, “As 
you see, comrades, corn is our own sort of tselina. True, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev 
encouraged us to grow corn, but it is only fair to note that Comrade Khrushchev also encouraged 
our Kazakh and Siberian comrades.”25 At a Komsomol Central Committee meeting in 1959, an 
oblast Komsomol secretary declared, “Party, Komsomol, soviet, and economic organizations 
everywhere seek and find new reserves, new potential, and figuratively term them their ‘tselina.’ 
For some, this is draining marshes, for others it is expanding cropland, and for still others it is 
designating corn their ‘tselina.’”26 Komsomol leaders and activists repeatedly claimed, and not 
without reason, that they had made corn “a Komsomol crop” in much the same way that they 
claimed successes in the Virgin Lands as their own. 
In 1955 and 1956, the Komsomol competitions typified responses to Khrushchev’s 
reforms to decentralize the ministries and reemphasize the Communist Party’s intervention in 
the economy. Komsomol leaders in Moscow required each oblast committee to hold a contest, 
reporting its results at the end of the year. Central authorities dictated the form and function, 
but left to the regions details such as the size and number of prizes. District, oblast, krai, and 
republic committees implemented the policy, dispatching accounts of the outcome to Moscow, 
where officials oversaw the whole. The Komsomol Central Committee’s Department of Rural 
Youth often did little more than to send out inspectors, to reprimand those who failed in some 
aspect of the campaign, and to summarize the competition’s results for the Central Committee. 
The corngrowing competitions were a practical outcome of Khrushchev’s requirement that the 
party, and by extension the Komsomol, show initiative in directing production. Echoing 
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Khrushchev’s demands, Shelepin exhorted local officials to figuratively and literally get their 
hands dirty. In February 1955, he warned subordinates that superficial leadership and lax 
oversight of corngrowing would earn only reprimands. Without organization, education, and 
technical proficiency, Komsomol members’ efforts would remain an empty gesture. He 
cautioned, “The plans should be specific. Otherwise, everything will remain on paper and 
become only idle blather. Regardless, the development of animal husbandry requires not plans 
and resolutions but action, because cattle and hogs are unable to read resolutions—they require 
feed.”27 
Issuing formal orders and enlisting local committees to participate, the Komsomol 
leaders left little room to misunderstand the campaign’s urgency, especially since newspapers 
reiterated the message to ensure it was understood. An article in the May 5, 1955, issue of 
Komsomol'skaia pravda illustrates how authorities conveyed their expectations, in this case 
making the policies appear to be part of a popular initiative. Entitled “We will help raise corn!” 
the article was purportedly an open letter written by a group of students at a technical school in 
Voronezh to peers at similar institutions. The letter’s tone conveys the adventure and excitement 
associated with the corn crusade, mimicking that used to appeal to potential participants in the 
Virgin Lands campaign. A draft text in the Komsomol Central Committee’s files, dated April 29, 
1955, suggests that Komsomol officials composed it, or at the very least edited and approved it.28 
That document diverges only slightly from the published version. The opening line, “Corn is the 
key to plenty,” reads in the published version: “Corn is the key to increased production of grain, 
and to producing plenty of meat and dairy products.”29 The remainder of the paragraph reads 
the same, declaring corn a “miraculous” source of grain, feed, meat, and milk. Even if a group of 
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students in Voronezh had drafted the letter, the official approval and editing it received in 
Moscow converted it into an integral part of this concerted mobilization strategy. 
Similarly, newspaper articles criticized practices that authorities considered ineffective, 
even harmful, while describing approved methods for organizing the competitions and working 
the cornfields. In 1955, such efforts proved necessary because corn suddenly became a priority 
for those who had no experience growing it; the union-wide reach of Komsomol'skaia pravda 
made it suited to the task. An article by A. Zanina, Komsomol secretary of a collective farm in 
Russia’s Bashkir ASSR, describes a trial attempt in 1954 to grow corn. Shedding light on 
approved methods, it outlines how to cultivate corn, organize work teams, and hold a 
competition, all measures that supposedly guaranteed positive results. It exemplifies the way 
articles commented on an individual or a group to call attention to a common problem. Pointing 
to needed improvements, Zanina described how at an oblast conference, “The activists sharply 
criticized the oblast Komsomol committee because they had neglected to guide the young 
corngrowers.” In light of the new contest for 1955, Zanina wrote, “hopefully past mistakes, which 
left the competition only on paper, will not be repeated.”30 
The competitions typically began with a challenge by the Komsomol members of a farm, 
but the responsible oblast and republic Komsomol committees closely managed this initiative. 
Committees had to meet expectations for organizing, which they could demonstrate by 
presenting data to officials in Moscow on the number of participants, hectares cultivated, and 
tons of corn harvested. The Azerbaijan Komsomol committee’s account is typical of the reports 
local authorities sent to the Central Committee. It opens by quantifying the republic 
Komsomol’s “active engagement”: 6,000 participants cultivated 37,625 hectares, more than half 
of the republic’s total of 70,000 hectares. The committee stressed that initiative had come from 
the district and farm committees, although this frequently was actually a response to prompting 
from superiors: “The Komsomol members and youth of Belokan district challenged others in the 
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republic to join the socialist competition to grow 10 metric tons of grain and between 80 and 90 
tons of green fodder [used to feed cattle] per hectare.”31 The competition had achieved its goals, 
the committee claimed, based on the support of the republic Komsomol committees, which 
ensured “real success in this patriotic task.”32 
Apparent popular initiative also fueled programs involving Pioneers, groups of 
schoolchildren too young for Komsomol membership. One campaign trumpeted the challenge 
made by a group of schoolchildren in Leningrad oblast.33 Including a wider cross-section of 
youth than the Komsomol, Pioneer druzhiny, or troops, worked to grow corn from Stavropol 
krai in the south to Kirov and Moscow oblasts in the north. In April 1955, the Komsomol 
committee of Russia’s Arzamas oblast,34 for instance, reported that it had partnered with the 
local department of education to organize the endeavor. “Schoolchildren in nearly every district 
willingly help the collective farms grow corn,” the committee reported with pleasure.35 Other 
oblast committees indicated that large groups of children, guided by responsible adults and led 
by peers, promised to grow plots of corn up to a few hectares in size. An award-winning 
detachment (otriad) from the Grinev school in Belarus’s Brest oblast comprised Pioneers from 
the seventh grade, approximately fourteen years old, who worked a plot of only one hectare.36 
The Komsomol expected local officials to exhibit hands-on leadership, and often 
chastised individuals and local committees unwilling to do so. A Komsomol Central Committee 
inspector sent to Belarus’s Gomel oblast found that the competition in one district “proceeded in 
lifeless fashion.” The local committee’s lack of initiative caused youth to participate 
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unenthusiastically in tending corn plantings. In one common inducement, a district or oblast 
committee offered a pennant, or “vympel,” as a trophy to the work team that completed 
planting, cultivating, and harvesting more quickly and effectively than the rest. Receiving this 
praise, such work teams served as examples to the rest, much like “vanguard workers.” In 
Belarus’s Gomel oblast, however, district Komsomol authorities acted only when the oblast 
committee demanded a progress report.37 By contrast, the Komsomol secretary of Russia’s 
Kaluga oblast extolled one of his oblast’s district committees in nominating it for a prize, 
writing, “Exhibiting leadership in practical ways, [the committee] regularly tallied the results of 
the competition between links and sponsored articles in the district newspaper by work team 
leaders with the goal of broadcasting exemplary practices.” The district’s Komsomol leader, V. 
Sazanov, “played a major role by often visiting the work teams and offering them practical 
assistance.”38 
These actions offered a portrait of an ideal committee and Komsomol leader. In keeping 
with the model of leadership Khrushchev championed, hardworking and disciplined leaders 
needed knowledge about production and had to educate workers about it. Inspectors from 
Moscow identified oblast secretaries and other personnel who possessed these qualities, and 
noted those who lacked them. An official sent to the Mari ASSR in European Russia described 
the many successes and a few failures of the oblast’s organization. She saved her fiercest 
condemnation, however, for the oblast Komsomol secretary. He poorly understands the state of 
affairs in the oblast,” she charged. “In the past five months, he has not taken a trip 
(komandirovka) to assess any district.” Failing to live up to the ideal of hands-on management, 
his work lacked “efficiency and a businesslike manner (delovitost')” as well as “creativity and 
imagination (tvorchestvo).” Because he failed “to delve deeply into the issues, he often could not 
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clearly express his own opinion.”39 Expecting these qualities from subordinates, authorities 
praised them in outstanding activists, those that carried out the corn crusade while fulfilling 
other vital Komsomol missions, including educating youth to be better citizens, and combatting 
drunkenness, theft, rudeness, and similar ailments. 
To encourage this leadership model, the Komsomol inspected oblast committees and 
reprimanded the leaders of those that failed to meet these expectations. The Komsomol valued 
this oversight mission, and admonished those who failed to carry through the organization’s 
dual mandate to educate youth in communist values and to supervise their labor. Detailing their 
efforts, the leaders of the Latvian Komsomol committee contended that this latter task required 
exceptional effort because corn was new to the republic’s farms. They therefore had to “regularly 
inspect (kontrolirovat') the Komsomol organizations’ contributions to corn cultivation. To that 
end, during its meetings, the bureau heard reports by district and farm Komsomol 
secretaries.”40 Monitoring subordinates furthermore entailed observing work directly, ensuring 
that necessary efforts did not remain merely “on paper.” A Komsomol Central Committee 
inspector on assignment in Russia’s Ivanovo oblast concluded, “The Komsomol regional 
committee weakly oversaw the district committees and primary organizations.” He wrote that 
the committee knew only the total of work teams organized, but not the number of hectares of 
corn they grew. Worse still, some farms had no Komsomol work teams at all. For example, in 
the oblast’s Sokol district, he found them only on seventeen of the thirty-two collective farms. 
Even where youth had been organized to grow corn, their exceedingly modest responsibilities 
barely matched the number of hectares children were expected to tend. On the Chapaev 
collective farm, the Komsomol work team tended a three-hectare field, while the local students 
had pledged to cultivate the same area.41 Coming to light only when outside inspectors arrived, 
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these situations cast the regional committee in a poor light: it had either knowingly allowed 
them to happen, or failed to discover them in the course of its own inspections. 
The report about Ivanovo oblast is representative of typical external “criticism,” but each 
committee also had to engage in “self-criticism” by describing failures and steps to remedy 
them. This expectation remained consistent: the bulk of any given document a Komsomol 
committee sent to its superiors conveyed quantitative data, backed by specific examples, 
demonstrating the value of the directive or campaign in question. Contrasting evidence of any 
“shortcomings,” as committees invariably termed them, remained confined to a smaller space at 
the end of the document. Two reports on Russia’s Kalinin oblast illustrate this practice.42 In 
early June 1955, the Komsomol Central Committee’s inspector outlined widespread obstacles to 
growing corn, previously rare in the oblast. The oblast committee had acted “formalistically,” 
meaning that it had not organized an effective response to the campaign. Officials had instead 
merely created a predetermined number of work teams and done little to educate the members 
about corn, and therefore the teams had lacked the support to succeed in planting and 
cultivating corn.43 The oblast committee’s defense characterized the situation as still imperfect, 
but improving. Following the standard format, the committee praised better districts, while 
acknowledging that others had little to show for their efforts. Several of them had “weakly 
mobilized youth for the struggle to achieve high yields of corn,” while others had allowed the 
“collapse” of work teams that had formed. Still other districts had failed to account for their 
activities at all, leaving the regional committee only “to note a lack of discipline in reporting.”44 
The oblast committee frankly admitted problems because the Central Committee already knew 
of corn’s poor showing, but it nonetheless used the standard format balancing negative and 
positive results. 
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Oblast committees also complained about district officials who apparently ignored their 
orders. In December 1955, the Saratov oblast committee relayed to Moscow the expected 
information characterizing the results of the year’s competition. It also bemoaned subordinates 
who did not properly hold the corngrowing contest or, in some cases, failed to transmit any 
results at all. Instead, they “formalistically approached the implementation of the oblast 
Komsomol committee’s directives.”45 The oblast committee thus shifted blame to the districts, 
avoiding the conclusion that they should have more vigorously carried out its mission to oversee 
them. 
Komsomol Central Committee officials in Moscow required not merely the outward 
appearance that a competition took place, but also substantive evidence of it, the absence of 
which brought about charges of “formalism.” The Department of Rural Youth often leveled that 
accusation when it summarized results for the Central Committee’s secretaries, suggesting that 
the common problem caused leaders considerable concern. In April 1955, the department 
praised a few oblasts and republics that had organized widespread participation, but condemned 
others for failing to use propaganda or organize effectively. “A host of regional committees,” it 
explained, “unsatisfactorily implement the resolutions of the Komsomol Central Committee 
plenum [of February 1955] . . . by formalistically creating work teams.” For example, the 
department’s report singled out Velikie Luki oblast,46 in Russia’s northwest where corn was a 
new crop, for organizing a total of only 300 work teams on the more than 1,000 farms in the 
region. Moreover, officials there did not verify that work teams pledged themselves to grow large 
plots of corn.47 An inspector sent to Moscow oblast’s Lotoshinsk district found an equally sorry 
state of affairs. Among his strongest charges was that the district committee had undertaken the 
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formation of work teams “in a formalistic fashion.”48 Six weeks after the Komsomol launched its 
corngrowing campaign, the district committee had formed only eighteen work teams, gave them 
inadequate support, and assigned them insufficient numbers of workers. A resulting meeting of 
the district committee condemned the poor organization of production and gave orders to 
strengthen collective farm Komsomol organizations in the district by reassigning 120 members 
to them.49 In Ivanovo oblast’s Sokol district, the failure to organize teams on more than 
seventeen of the thirty-two collective farms was compounded by the fact that those “existed 
formally, on paper alone.” The oblast committee had neither organized the corngrowing contest 
nor investigated progress “on the ground.”50 
Once republic and oblast committees had established a competition, the Central 
Committee also expected them to publicize its existence and the rules, a tool for influencing 
youth to participate documents often called “glasnost'.” In this context, the term meant that the 
press, lectures, meetings, and similar methods disseminated knowledge about corn and the 
competition. For example, the Komsomol Central Committee’s letter published in 1955 required 
that each committee sponsor meetings about the Komsomol’s directives on the competition. The 
bureau of Russia’s Belgorod oblast committee obliged its subordinates to meet and discuss the 
campaign, “to encourage extensive glasnost in the competition.”51 This stipulation remained 
operative in subsequent years, when the Central Committee continued to use the term in a 
similar manner: for instance, its directive on the guidelines for the 1958 competition called for 
“extensive glasnost'.” An inspector sent from Moscow to Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovs'k oblast 
condemned the local committee’s “serious shortcomings,” as a result of which, “many work 
teams of Sinel'kov, Dnepropetrovsk, and many other districts do not know the competition 
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rules.”52 In Russia’s Penza oblast, “a few bureau members tally the results without inviting 
participants or Komsomol activists. They tally the results formalistically, without a deep analysis 
of the work of each work team. There is no glasnost'.”53 
Episodes such as these illustrate the obstacles blocking smooth transmission of orders in 
the Komsomol hierarchy, making it similar to the party and the government. Reports that 
catalogued failures help outline the expectations local authorities faced in organizing the 
corngrowing contests. This ideal paralleled the growing role of the Communist Party in 
managing production, especially agriculture. The competitions, alongside the Virgin Lands 
campaign, demonstrate renewed efforts to raise the Komsomol’s profile in the press, 
encouraging youth to join projects that authorities envisioned would define a generation. For 
Komsomol officials, the campaigns ensured that they would not neglect their duty to involve 
Komsomol members, Pioneers, and youth in corngrowing. 
* * * 
Although they shed light on expectations and failures, official reports provide little 
insight into the participants and their motivations. Leaders’ speeches, newspaper accounts, and 
related sources portray officially acceptable ones. For some, the prospect of winning praise and 
awards for themselves and the collectivities to which they belonged offered sufficient incentive. 
The material rewards, the youthful enthusiasm of a younger generation, and the attraction of 
social bonding may explain why others joined “the struggle for high yields of corn.” 
Young participants emphasized that growing corn was their contribution to the Soviet 
project. To achieve success, they had to test the status quo, embodied in the authority of 
collective farmers, farm managers, and local authorities that scoffed at the possibility that a crop 
so strange as corn might actually grow. Speaking to a youth conference in Belarus, the leader of 
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a work team on the Dzerzhinskii collective farm in Gomel oblast recalled, “When we began to 
plant corn, [local leaders] didn’t pay attention to us, or they laughed at us. But we wanted to 
prove that, regardless of it all, even in imperfect climatic conditions, corn could grow.”54 Located 
in southeastern Belarus, Gomel oblast was 200–300 kilometers north of the traditional range of 
corn cultivation, but better suited than many regions where Khrushchev’s crusade introduced 
corn. The Komsomol committee secretary on the Karl Marx farm in the same oblast similarly 
recounted the response to the Komsomol’s call to arms: “I remember the meeting where 
collective farmers deliberated over preparations for the spring planting. It was difficult to prove 
to them that the crop could grow on our farm, in the conditions and soils of our region.” The 
secretary continued, “Even the collective farm’s management doubted the chances for success. 
And thus, to prove that corn could grow on our collective farm all the same, the Komsomol 
members decided to aid in the task” by creating ten work teams assigned to grow corn.55 
In 1955 and 1956, each oblast and republic set rules and distributed awards; in 
subsequent years, these became part of an All-Union Corn-Growing Competition [Vsesoiuznoe 
sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie komsomol'tsev i molodezhi za vyrashchivanie vysokikh 
urozhaev kukuruzy] first co-sponsored by the Komsomol and the USSR Ministry of Agriculture 
in 1957. The contest’s rules set a yield per hectare of grain or silage, which varied according to 
climatic region, required to win a second place or a first, which offered substantial rewards. For 
oblast and district Komsomol officials, winning earned a bonus equaling one month’s pay. The 
committee received an automobile (for first prize) or motorcycle (for second prize) for official 
use. A farm’s Komsomol organization might win a radio, a set of musical instruments, or an 
assortment of sporting equipment for its members’ use. Outstanding individuals, typically work 
team leaders, received an all-expenses-paid trip to Moscow to visit the All-Union Agricultural 
Exhibition [Vsesoiuznaia sel'skokhoziaistvennaia vystavka, or VSKhV; in 1959, it became the 
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Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy, or VDNKh].56 Other prizes included 
wristwatches and cash payments. These prizes augmented the moral incentives that encouraged 
participants to consider themselves a part of a larger project and to embody socialist virtues. 
Recognition spurred them too, by offering, for example, 1,000 outstanding corngrowers an 
invitation to a Conference of Youth Corngrowers in Moscow that, in addition to the honor of 
selection, awarded them a paid visit to the USSR’s capital, a trip perhaps difficult for a typical 
rural young person to imagine. The total annual budget for prizes surpassed 1 million rubles, 
mostly in the form of goods and bonus payments, which came from joint funding provided by 
the Komsomol and the Ministry of Agriculture.57 This amounted to a mere .0009 percent of the 
official budget of 112 billion rubles for the union-level government, and even less if the 127-
billion–ruble combined budget of the union republics is included.58 Nonetheless, this small sum 
represented substantial material benefit to the winners. 
Outstanding Pioneers, like their counterparts in the Komsomol, could also win prizes. 
First awarded by oblast Komsomol committees, the Central Committee distributed them 
according to the all-union competition criteria beginning in 1957. For example, among the 
Pioneer troop from the aforementioned Grinev school in Belarus, three members who proved 
“especially outstanding” in their duties growing corn won trips to Moscow, where they attended 
the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. Still others won a visit to one of the country’s most 
prestigious Pioneer summer camps, such as “Artek,” on the Black Sea coast in Crimea, or a 
year’s subscription to Pioneerskaia pravda, the organization’s newspaper. 
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57 At the official exchange rate and adjusted for inflation to 2013, this figure equals some $33 million. In 
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58 “Zakon o Gosudarstvennom biudzhete Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh respublik na 1955 god,” 
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Komsomol committees doled out nonmonetary rewards, such as banners, pins, and 
certificates, much as the party did to adult workers. In promoting the competition, the 
committees constantly appealed to patriotism, to the ideals of socialism, and to pride in the 
organization’s long history of achievements accumulated through the activism of generations of 
youth. In the corn-growing competitions, these awards supplemented material rewards by being 
more widespread, even if they achieved a lesser effect. Many earned an award and 
accompanying lapel pin, or znachok, proclaiming: “For Raising High Yields of Corn.” For work 
teams, brigades, farms, and districts, travelling trophies in the form of a banner 
(perekhodiashchie znam'ia) signified to passersby a successful collective effort to grow corn. 
Others, such as the Ukrainian youth A. A. Il'chenko, won the highest award, a designation as a 
Hero of Socialist Labor. 
The story of Il'chenko illustrates the forces that motivated those who participated in 
these competitions, even if the recognition she achieved made her story far from typical. Success 
in corngrowing brought Il'chenko from Ukraine to Moscow in April 1958 for the Komsomol’s 
Thirteenth Congress, giving her the rare opportunity to speak before the highest ceremonial 
gathering of youth leaders. She declared, “From this podium, I want to thank the party for its 
care for us, the young collective farmers. In the name of all the girls in my work team, in the 
name of the collective farmers of Cherkasy, allow me to thank Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev for 
teaching us to love and to raise a crop as valuable as corn.”59 Il'chenko’s brief speech illustrated 
the Komsomol’s mission with events from her life on a collective farm. She described the labor 
and daily life of her work team members, nine young women of Komsomol age. Having finished 
high school, they faced a choice: to remain and work on the collective farm or to leave their 
home village in search of education and work in the cities, as so many of their peers did. 
Il'chenko recalled that they were told, “Don’t stay on the collective farm or you’ll never get 
married!” Having dedicated themselves to work on the farm, however, she and her peers proved 
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that admonishment wrong. She and her friends acquired a technical education and found 
suitable husbands in a rural community short on eligible bachelors. The young women, now 
valued farmworkers, married “not drunks, but tractor-drivers, agronomists, and combine-
drivers,” which is to say, men with skills and prospects.60 Most importantly, however, they had 
mastered how to grow corn. In fact, in 1957 Il'chenko had become a Hero of Socialist Labor.61 
This opened to her the path to party membership, awards, and prizes. She found herself on the 
podium because she was an exemplary leader of her local Komsomol group, and a winner of the 
annual corn-growing contests. 
Il'chenko’s carefully choreographed speech also worked to popularize the competitions 
by reaching not only regional audiences, but those across the Soviet Union. In her speech, 
Il’chenko described her work team’s goals for 1958: to grow thirteen metric tons of grain per 
hectare, several times more than the average yield. After Il'chenko quit the podium, Komsomol 
first secretary V. E. Semichastnyi read to the audience a note from a challenger, A. Muntian, 
leader of a Komsomol work team in the Moldavian SSR who promised to raise 13.5 tons per 
hectare.62 The contest between the two young women to measure whose work team would grow 
more corn illustrated on a small scale the much larger one among districts, regions, and 
republics. 
As Il'chenko’s story suggests, the Komsomol voiced concern for youth as farmworkers, 
but also for their way of life. She embodied an ideal in which young women equally pursued 
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education, skills, and a suitable husband. Similarly, accounts of the Komsomol competition 
sometimes commented on the participants’ way of life, as well as local Komsomol committees’ 
efforts to guide them or, should the worst happen, to police them. In contrast to those who 
demonstrated “discipline” and “industriousness,” some instead “embezzled collective farm 
resources.” Local Komsomol committees, such as the one on the Krupskaia collective in 
Belarus’s Minsk oblast, established “posts” designed to keep watch over communal property and 
behavior, owing to individuals who worked poorly, who were lazy and rude, or who were 
drunkards and thieves. The surveillance made malefactors “afraid not only of Komsomol 
activists, but of rank-and-file youth.” Those youth leaders “struggled” against poor labor 
discipline and “Komsomol members’ amoral conduct, and with hooliganism and profanity.”63 
Furthering the mission to educate members, Komsomol activists in the Moldavian SSR worked 
conscientiously, but also studied political events and engaged in “cultured leisure,” a term 
denoting approved recreational activities such as drawing, reading classics or political tracts, or 
playing team sports.64 
The Komsomol’s corn-growing competitions achieved at least partial success, especially 
in comparison with related methods used both in corngrowing and in other aspects of 
agricultural and industrial production. In one, an individual, group, farm, district, or oblast 
identified an “obligation,” a targeted level of production above the assignment they received in 
the plan. While common, these pledges seem to have fallen by the wayside once actual work got 
underway. Although the vanguard workers who received fulsome praise in the press always 
fulfilled their obligations, there seems to have been little incentive for the rank-and-file 
collective farmer or work team, lacking the publicity that followed those chosen few, to do so. 
Similarly, competitions “in honor” of some upcoming Central Committee plenum or congress of 
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  297 
the Communist Party or the Komsomol occurred with similar frequency.65 These appeals to 
moral incentives appear to have been considered a burden that workers had to formulaically 
take on, but which they could quickly forget. For instance, the Saratov oblast Komsomol 
committee “accepted elevated obligations and carried out major organizational work on the 
mobilization of youth for their fulfillment.” The Saratov committee’s report to the Central 
Committee offers tallies of participants—400 work brigades, 1800 teams operating combines, 
2094 corn-growing links, and more.66 However, the document provides little sense that the 
actual production these workers achieved was of equal concern. Other oblast committees sent 
similar numbers to Moscow, but bemoaned the fact that district committees had failed to make 
the most of these efforts. In 1959, the Komsomol committee for North Ossetia ASSR decried 
“serious shortcomings . . . in mobilizing youth to fulfill their socialist obligations.” For example, 
the Komsomol members on several collective farms “had outlined specific tasks and named 
substantial obligations, but those did not serve as a plan for actual work.” As a result, the 
districts had met their obligations in only two cases.67 Heightened enthusiasm and organized 
agitation, in the end, did not translate into increased production. 
 * * * 
Despite the prevalence of charges of pripiski (adding fictive production to statistical 
reports) and ochkovtiratel'stvo (fraud) in Soviet agriculture in the late 1950s, these phenomena 
apparently were rare in the Komsomol corngrowing contests. Although evidence of systematic 
falsifications is common in the archival records of the Central Committee of the Communist 
                                                        
65 See, for instance, the campaign preceding the Twenty-second Party Congress. Months before the 
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Party, there is little evidence of equal levels of dishonesty in the Komsomol Central Committee 
records. Those isolated incidents that did occur, however, illustrate the actions expected of a 
district Komsomol secretary, and the consequences of deceit. The Central Committee of the 
Komsomol of Kyrgyzstan, for example, disclosed to superiors in Moscow that it had punished a 
district secretary in Jalalabat oblast (Kyrgyz, in Russian: Dzhalal-Abad) for “deception and 
fraud.” In March 1955, he had informed superiors that his committee had organized twenty-nine 
work teams. The bureau of the republic Central Committee subsequently concluded that in fact 
he had done nothing. Although they did not remove him from the post, they issued a reprimand 
that counted as a strike against his outlook for education or advancement in the Komsomol.68 
In 1960, the North Ossetia ASSR Komsomol committee nominated a local corngrower 
for a prize, one of the few documented cases of deception in the corngrowing competitions. This 
type of fraud likely occurred more than once, but authorities’ extensive inspections apparently 
uncovered such episodes infrequently. After 1959, when cheating on statistics reached its height 
in the Riazan affair and related scandals, the Komsomol conducted reciprocal inspections 
among farm, district, and oblast competitors that might well have exposed fraud, but did not. As 
this case demonstrates on the rare occasions when they discovered trickery, the perpetrators 
earned reprimands, although not expulsion from the Komsomol. These facts suggest that the 
Komsomol competitions were comparatively free of outright falsification. 
In this case, a certain B. Kisiev led the work team that won first prize by growing the 
highest yield in North Ossetia. The personnel evaluation of him, or kharakteristika, the oblast 
committee transmitted to Moscow noted information common to hundreds of standardized 
reports in the files: his age, Komsomol membership, and leadership qualities. An attestation 
such as this one might have proven valuable at some later date, such as when seeking admission 
to an institution of higher education. The document featured the results Kisiev and his work 
team achieved: its ten members had tended ninety hectares of corn, surpassing their obligation 
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of seven metric tons per hectare by growing seventeen tons.69 In January 1961, however, the 
oblast committee recanted in an “explanatory note,” a document required when making an 
admission to a superior or an inspector. Despite multiple attestations signed by the proper 
officials, further investigation had discovered a total not of 17, but of 13.2 tons. The note does 
not reveal how the incorrect information had passed through the oblast Komsomol committee. 
The circumstances suggest that the separate groups of farm and Komsomol officials responsible 
for verifying the results had colluded to sign errant documentation, turning with the stroke of a 
pen an impressive yield into a record-breaking one. The North Ossetia Komsomol committee 
recognized “the complete responsibility of the oblast Komsomol committee for the mistake,” and 
that “the bureau held a serious discussion about it.” The infraction’s magnitude meant that the 
oblast Komsomol officials assured superiors in Moscow that they “had taken measures so that 
such an incident would not be permitted.”70 
The gravity of such infractions is clear in another case unrelated to the corngrowing 
competitions. In 1960, the Komsomol undertook a campaign to have members compete to raise 
livestock. Accounting irregularities soon became evident: some competitors worked to “finish” 
hogs: that is, to confine and feed the animals a high-calorie diet, including a ration of corn, for a 
brief period prior to slaughter, adding weight and resulting in pork valued for uses such as 
bacon. A summary sent to the Komsomol Central Committee dryly notes, “Some organizations 
reported incorrect data for the first two quarters.” The committees of Astrakhan, Orenburg, 
Orel, Tiumen, Cheliabinsk, and Yaroslavl oblasts and Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkariia ASSRs 
each asserted that Komsomol members were finishing numbers of hogs in excess of those the 
records of the Ministry of Agriculture registered for the entire oblast. The committees had lied, 
an “irresponsible” practice rendering it “necessary to strengthen oversight for the fulfillment of 
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declared obligations.”71 
* * * 
The corngrowing competitions evolved over the Khrushchev period, conforming to the 
ethos of participatory governance characteristic of the early 1960s. Moreover, the competitions 
expanded their scope: in the early 1960s, the RSFSR held a competition for mechanized 
corngrowing teams—the type exemplified by N. F. Manukovskii and A. V. Gitalov—of adults too 
old for Komsomol membership, suggesting that the authorities viewed them as an effective 
model worth applying widely. 
Expanding the competitions to all corngrowers was among the measures reported to 
Moscow in May 1961 by the party leaders of Russia’s Kabardino-Balkariia ASSR. The oblast 
secretary lauded the success of socialist competition in incentivizing workers “to fulfill their 
duties in cultivating high yields of corn” and of a commission established to monitor it. Like the 
Komsomol contest, each phase of the competition measured which work team, brigade, 
collective farm, and district could plow, plant, cultivate, and harvest its corn both quickly and 
effectively. For this, each group’s leaders earned material rewards such as prizes (“material'noe 
pooshchrenie”), as well as moral ones including a pin naming them “superior corngrower of the 
Kabardino-Balkariia ASSR” and a place on the republic’s “doska pocheta,” or a public honor roll 
of outstanding workers. “The most important” measure for mobilizing workers, however, was 
the “corngrowers day” held annually in the republic’s capital by the republic’s party and 
government leaders to fête those “who achieved the highest targets in socialist competition.”72 
The post-1960 evolution of the Komsomol corngrowing contests mirrored changes in 
ideology of the time, while permitting Komsomol authorities to address concerns prevalent in 
the competitions of earlier years. The committees moved to put them on “a social basis,” to use 
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the Soviet terminology: they established district, oblast, and interoblast “Soviets of Young 
Corngrowers” (Sovety molodykh kukuruzovodov) to administer them, supplanting 
administration by the Komsomol. The soviets united oblast, district, and farm Komsomol 
leaders to adjudicate the process and organize “social inspectors” to carry out “mutual 
inspection” among the competitors. These measures replaced a single Komsomol official, who 
might occasionally inspect fields, with a whole group of competitors from a neighboring farm, 
district, or oblast. More numerous, the groups had little incentive to turn a blind eye to 
“shortcomings,” as officials often did. The move illustrates the characteristic emphasis on 
activism that began in the late 1950s. Seeking to improve governance and economic efficiency, 
Khrushchev promoted measures replacing, at least on paper, state administrators with 
volunteers. His ideological formula announced that the Soviet Union was becoming a “state of 
all the people” (vsenarodnoe gosudarstvo), reinforcing the idea that it was in the process of 
“constructing communism.” In the absence of class conflict under socialism and the imminent 
arrival of communism, political and administrative functions were to devolve to nonprofessional 
groups. State bureaucratic structures, which Stalin had relentlessly strengthened, would begin to 
wither away as Marx and Lenin had promised. Each citizen would therefore have a stake in 
improving economic and legal systems. 
The corngrowing contests demonstrate the model’s limitations: ostensibly independent 
“social” institutions earmarked leadership positions for the same individuals making up the 
Communist Party and Komsomol apparatuses. They therefore continued to respond to the 
demands of party and state, producing changes in form, but only small differences in practice. 
Nominally a social organization but in fact an integral part of the party-state complex, the 
Komsomol thus actively worked to realize Khrushchev’s ideological formulation. Standard 
terminology called this “the reconstruction of agricultural leadership by developing democratic 
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forms of management.”73 Lasting until 1964, the soviets ensured that agricultural officials, 
Komsomol officials, Komsomol members, and rank-and-file production workers judged the 
prizewinners. 
In the late 1950s, the advent of “social inspectors” who verified the contests’ results and 
the quality of competitors’ work represented a first step toward expanded participation. This 
move predated the Soviets of Young Corngrowers, but itself drew on earlier precedents. Official 
descriptions and press accounts emphasize their “social,” or “public” (obshchestvennyi) 
character, meaning that they consisted of a mix of Komsomol officials, rank-and-file members, 
agricultural specialists, and agricultural laborers. The press, in turn, publicized their efforts as a 
prompt to form them in other oblasts and districts. In 1958, groups called “light cavalry” 
(legkaia kavaleriia) conducted inspection “raids” in growing numbers, although they had 
Stalin-era roots.74 In May 1958, the Komsomol newspaper of Stavropol krai, Molodoi leninets, 
published a message from the krai Komsomol committee that sheds light on these raids. Its 
short, punchy sentences, printed entirely in capital letters mirrored the format of government 
telegrams. “Calling the attention,” of city and district “commands” (the Russian “shtab” mimics 
military terminology) to “agricultural laborers’ pressing tasks,” the telegram required 
detachments of light cavalry to gauge progress in sheep shearing, a major part of the krai’s 
economy, as well as preparations of feed supplies, for the grain harvest, and “the careful 
cultivation of corn.” The telegram ordered local detachments “to establish Komsomol inspection 
posts (kontrol'nye posty) in crucial places, using various forms of public oversight 
(obshchestvennyi kontrol') to uncover shortcomings, rapidly remedy them, and report on raids 
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to the krai light cavalry command for publication in Molodoi leninets (emphasis in original).”75 
Regional and district Komsomol committees, moreover, described the raids and their purpose in 
similar terms. 76 
This apparent activism acquired its primary form in the Soviets of Young Corngrowers, 
which proliferated in 1961. Like the forerunner “light cavalry” raids, the soviets were generally 
under the direction of Komsomol leaders, with members also drawn from activists, 
farmworkers, and specialists. They attempted to improve the competitions’ power to incentivize 
youth to participate and grow large harvests, especially by expanding “mutual inspections” 
(vzaimoproverki). These investigations differed from the earlier “raids,” however, by putting 
competitors in charge of governing themselves. Work teams traveled to inspect neighboring 
work teams, districts to neighboring districts, and oblasts to neighboring oblasts. Speakers at 
the Komsomol Central Committee plenum in June 1961 signaled that the new program was a 
priority, and described how the soviets should function. The secretary of the Komsomol 
committee in the Krasnodar krai described the work to “render practical aid” to work teams. The 
soviets, furthermore, “directed socialist competition” by educating their charges and cooperating 
with their counterpart Komsomol committees.77 The krai’s Timashev district demonstrated how 
to succeed: members of the soviet themselves worked and carried out inspection raids. They had 
additionally organized a district-wide “voskresnik,” or voluntary day of work on Sunday, 
normally a day off, to complete a time-sensitive job. The secretary thus offered guidelines for 
how the soviets should function. Similarly, the head of the Belarus Komsomol described how the 
soviets and their raids, encompassing some 6,000 officials and activists, had brought new 
information to light and revealed “many examples of Komsomol committees’ unsatisfactory aid 
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to corngrowers.”78 In Krasnodar krai, moreover, Komsomol-led “oversight posts and social 
inspectors” put 2,000 specialists, vanguard workers, and other activists in the fields to carry out 
the mutual inspections among the districts.79 Only this kind of “mass-political work” ensured 
that the “fighters on the corn front” (boitsy kukuruznogo fronta) received the support they 
required.80 
The oblast and interoblast soviets were subordinate to the Komsomol Central Committee 
and its Department for Rural Youth. Although most submitted only brief minutes of their 
meetings, a few provided stenographers’ recordings of meetings and documents describing the 
winning teams, districts, and oblasts.81 The interoblast soviets gathered, condensed, and passed 
on much of the same information that the Komsomol Central Committee had gathered for itself 
between 1955 and 1960. In theory, they adapted and responded to individuals with greater ease 
than the established bureaucracy. Their members were more likely to be active in the districts, 
on the farms, in the fields, representing a variety of professions and positions. The interoblast 
soviet for the RSFSR’s central black-earth zone, for example, agreed that the constituent oblasts’ 
delegations, while headed by the oblast Komsomol secretary, should also encompass district 
officials and at least one rank-and-file farmworker.82 Regardless, Komsomol officials filled all 
leadership positions, meaning that the soviets remained firmly under the youth organization’s 
control. 
The soviets relied heavily on “mutual inspections” among the constituent oblasts, as well 
as among districts within oblasts, and even among farms within a district. For instance, the 
Krasnoiarsk krai agricultural department’s representative to the interoblast soviet praised this 
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80 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 414, l. 136. 
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measure by noting that they had “revealed the state of matters, aided in thoroughly explaining 
the work, and proven themselves impartial judges."83 This praise tacitly suggests that earlier 
methods, by which the Komsomol had administered the corngrowing competitions directly, had 
not achieved those goals. Mutual inspections in theory guaranteed that districts and farms did 
not simply report a satisfactory situation regardless of actual conditions. They put more 
observers on the ground than the Komsomol could dispatch on its own. Moreover, an outside 
observer had less incentive to accept conditions as they were or to allow individuals and groups 
to do as they had always done. The circular scheme of inspections relied on the fact that 
competitors did not have any incentive to turn a blind eye on their neighbors’ failures because 
their neighbors would do the same for them. Instead, one oblast inspected a second, the second 
oblast’s inspectors visited a third, and so on. To illustrate, in the central black-earth zone in 
1961, the Voronezh oblast’s inspectors traveled to Belgorod oblast, the inspectors of which 
traveled to Kursk oblast; the Kursk oblast inspectors examined work in Briansk oblast, and so on 
through Orel, Lipetsk, Tambov, and back to Voronezh oblast.84 
The Komsomol Central Committee’s Department of Rural Youth similarly praised the 
soviets. Considering Khrushchev’s 1962 reforms that reshuffled local Communist Party and 
agricultural bureaucracies, the department recommended that, since the soviets had made 
substantial contributions, they should continue to function. It proposed adapting them to the 
newly formed territorial production administrations, which replaced the former rural districts 
with larger administrative units.85 In 1962, the Komsomol Central Committee bureau noted that 
the soviets had organized the 90,000 work teams and their members had cultivated 18 million 
hectares of corn.86 The oblast, republic, and local soviets were designed to discover and correct 
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improper practices in corngrowing, but failures to use recommended methods remained 
widespread. For instance, the Central Committee charged that the Komsomol committees of 
Turkmenistan “had set adrift the work of the councils of young corngrowers, formulaically 
organizing the socialist competition” and failing in educational work. The extremely low yields 
of corn in the republic also meant that half of the fifty specialists with training in corngrowing 
no longer worked in that sphere of production.87 
These developments illustrate Komsomol officials’ attempts to improve efficiency in 
economic administration, but they achieved only limited success and did not survive 
Khrushchev’s ouster. In early January 1961, the Komsomol Central Committee had 
characterized the efforts of model Komsomol organizations, which “rendered active aid to party 
and economic organizations in restructuring agricultural management on the basis of 
developing democratic forms of administration.”88 The soviets contributed substantively to the 
corn-growing competitions and encouraged activism, but concurrently revealed the limits to 
those initiatives. They held competitions and judged the results, previously the sphere of the 
Komsomol regional committees. Their slightly broader base of members who possessed greater 
contact with practical work in the fields, however, did not ensure success. The soviets continued 
under the control of the Komsomol secretaries who were, as before, personally responsible for 
the outcome. The members drawn from among production workers had minimal influence on 
the direction of their work, undermining the mission of “public” activism. The soviets came into 
being because the Central Committee directed subordinates to form them and, their quasi-
independent status notwithstanding, they operated within the Komsomol’s guidelines and under 
the command of its officials. 
Studying related phenomena, scholars noted a rise in discussions of “socialist legality,” to 
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be carried out by “social organizations” in the “state of all the people.”89 Parallels such as 
“comrades courts” and “people’s patrols,” appeared, expanding citizens’ role in regulating their 
own communities. Examining the relationship of collective and individual in Russian history, 
Oleg Kharkhordin suggests that in the Khrushchev era naked coercion fell into disuse in 
comparison with the Stalin era, while social pressure and control grew, making the Khrushchev 
era in some ways more “repressive.”90 Yet other scholars have shown that these control 
mechanisms had many loopholes that limited their effectiveness.91 As the case of the Soviets of 
Youth Corngrowers shows, ostensibly independent institutions and their practices nonetheless 
employed the same party, Komsomol, and government leaders, and continued to respond to the 
party’s demands. In this, the organizations responded to social forces only when both aligned 
with official priorities. 
Finally, the Komsomol competitions illustrate how Soviet farms applied industrial 
farming technologies with increasing frequency in the early 1960s, transforming corn 
cultivation. In response to Khrushchev’s demands to replace manual labor with machines, apply 
synthetic and organic fertilizers, use herbicides, and so on, the number of participants and the 
number of hectares they cultivated changed radically. The transformation is clear in the example 
of Ukraine. In 1954, 4,500 Komsomol work teams cultivated 100,000 hectares—a per-team 
average of 22 hectares. In 1958, those numbers were 20,000 and 400,000, respectively, 
dropping the average to 20 hectares per team. In 1959, the numbers shifted radically: 24,335 
teams cultivated a total of 2,031,000 hectares (an average of 83.5 hectares per team). In 1960, 
the number of teams declined back to 20,000, even as the hectarage they cultivated soared to 
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3.2 million, yielding an average of 160 hectares.92 In 1962, when corn plantings officially totaled 
some 37 million hectares across the Soviet Union, the Komsomol organized 90,000 work teams 
that planted 18 million hectares, or almost one-half the total.93 The transformation seems even 
more remarkable in light of an estimate of the numbers of workers within each team. In the mid 
1950s, a work team comprised ten, twenty, or more manual labors, cultivating corn row-by-row 
with simple tools. By 1960, work teams (zven'ia, or “links”) were gone, replaced by “agregaty” 
(“collections”) of tractor drivers and their assistants who operated the machines. This was 
simply one driver and an assistant, or a handful of drivers and their assistants. The result: a few 
workers with capital—machines chemicals, and other materials—cultivated between 100 and 
200 hectares of corn, replacing the labor of dozens, if not 100 or more manual laborers. As the 
report from Ukraine explained, “The army of youth corngrowers has been significantly 
strengthened by new leaders (lit. maiaki, lighthouses, sg. maiak).”94 
* * * 
Mobilizing youth to participate in the corn crusade, the Komsomol leadership sought not 
only to have members of the organization plant the crop, but also to shape the attitudes and 
conduct of that new generation. The corngrowing competitions therefore offered material 
rewards to the winning work teams, farms, and districts, but also moral incentives. The 
Komsomol depicted agriculture—both in the Virgin Lands and in the cornfields—as the young 
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generation’s defining mission. Encouraging youth to challenge the status quo defended by 
conservative local authorities, the youth organization and its press used martial imagery to 
encourage them to commit to the project, portraying their efforts as contributions  to a “struggle 
for high yields” and, by extension, for the material abundance Khrushchev promised. The 
Komsomol appealed to the idea that labor was a virtue, which leaders viewed as a major 
component of bringing up the “new people” who would aid in the construction of the communist 
society, and then be at home in it. These mechanisms of Soviet “governmentality” worked, much 
as the press did in general, to shape young citizens’ actions and how they understood the world. 
Paralleling Khrushchev’s educational reforms of the late 1950s, the corngrowing competitions 
allowed leaders to soothe fears that young people had little appreciation for manual labor, and 
avoided it at any cost. In placing emphasis on moral and material incentives, Khrushchev era 
policies deemphasized coercion, which had served as a critical lever motivating rural labor 
under Stalin. Responding to economic, social, and ideological change, the Soviet system instead 
placed greater weight on encouragement, rather than the threat of punishment. 
The Komsomol leaders’ efforts to mobilize the organization’s members, Pioneers, and 
other youth evolved during the decade under Khrushchev. Beginning in 1954, local Komsomol 
committees directed the corngrowing competitions and, thereby, conformed to Khrushchev’s 
requirement that they, much like the Communist Party, take the initiative in directing 
production. Responding to the ideological formulation that the USSR was becoming a “state of 
all the people, the Komsomol privileged “social activism” by volunteers.  After 1960, the 
competitions passed from the Komsomol committees’ direct oversight to a looser system 
entrusting everyday management to ostensibly independent Soviets of Young Corngrowers. 
These were autonomous in name only, however, because they operated under the same 
Komsomol officials who had run the competitions in previous years. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE WAGES OF CORN: WORK, WAGES, AND LIFE DOWN ON THE FARM 
“Later on I found out that, year in and year out, it was a long time since Matryona 
Vasilyevna had earned a single ruble. She didn’t get a pension. Her relatives gave her very little 
help. [On the collective farm] she had worked not for money but for credits, the marks recording 
her labor-days in her well-thumbed work-book.” Thus Alexander Solzhenitsyn described the 
fortune of the sixty-year-old collective farmer with whom Ignatich, the narrator of the short 
story “Matryona’s Home,” boarded in a village deep in rural Russia in 1956.1 Perhaps 
symbolizing Mother Russia, Matryona was too ill to work regularly and therefore was expelled 
from the collective farm. In the absence of any guaranteed income, she toiled harder than the 
rest to secure food and fuel for the winter. In the tradition of the nineteenth-century Russian 
realists, Solzhenitsyn’s story, although a work of fiction, describes the lives of actual people. 
These dire circumstances speak volumes about the Soviet system’s demands on the rural 
population. 
Stalin’s successors could not ignore the fact that rural communities and collective farms 
often could not fulfill state plans, let alone undertake a corn crusade or adopt industrial 
technologies. Lacking capital and labor, they struggled to carry out basic tasks. This chapter 
examines labor, collective farm discipline, and the experiences of rural citizens in the 
Khrushchev era by exploring material incentives, the wages in cash or kind earned for collective 
farm labor; additionally, it focuses on collective farms rather than state farms.2 The majority of 
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cropland was farmed by collective farms, although that percentage declined annually during the 
Khrushchev era, reaching a low of 53.6 percent in 1964.3 Moreover, state-farm workers’ wages 
remained comparatively steady and were, in fact, the model that collective farmers’ wages began 
to resemble by the end of the Khrushchev decade. In 1953, state-farm workers’ wages were 
guaranteed, but not reliant on the outcome of production; collective farmers’ income, by 
contrast, was wholly dependent on output. By examining collective farmers’ living and working 
conditions, I shed light on their interactions with the farm officials and local authorities’ 
attempts to control their labor. This is not a comprehensive history of rural life at the time, a 
subject that deserves its own book. Instead, I use archival sources and local newspapers to reveal 
how oblast, district, and farm authorities carried out Khrushchev’s corn policies and his reform 
project as a whole. I examine the landscape seen by the foot soldiers of Khrushchev’s corn 
campaign, those tasked with planting, cultivating, and harvesting corn. This period proved a 
turning point for the Soviet Union: under Khrushchev, the coercive system that developed under 
Stalin and that offered only moral incentives to collective farmers transformed into a new one 
using subtler forms of pressure while offering actual “material incentives,” what Soviet sources 
term “material'naia zainteresovannost'.” Identified in 1953, this “problem of material 
incentives” persisted despite initial reforms between 1954 and 1957. The wage reform that 
followed between 1958 and 1960 corresponded to a renewed attempt to motivate collective 
farmers, but it too encountered difficulty as farms and districts implemented it. 
The Stalinist state had dominated rural communities through threats, taxes, and the 
MTS. The government initially had used violence to force peasants to join the collective farms 
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(1929–33).4 The collective farmers, in return, responded with strategies ranging from rebellion 
and foot-dragging, to participating in the campaigns.5 During the war, few material rewards 
were possible, so authorities substituted patriotism—symbolized by medals—and appeals to 
defending Orthodoxy, as inducements for the mostly female labor force to support husbands 
and sons at the front.6 Impoverishment was widespread, as machines, livestock, and other 
capital were destroyed in the areas that witnessed fighting, which drove many peasants from 
their homes and resulted in the deaths of many others. In Ukraine and other regions, the 
immediate postwar period was also one of famine due to drought and exacerbated by state 
procurement policies. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, peasants faced harsh working conditions on the 
collective farms, with the result that output remained low. After wartime service, many Red 
Army soldiers briefly returned to their home villages, but “soon became disillusioned by the 
abject poverty they encountered” and left to find a better life in the cities.7 As a result, the ratio 
of women to men rose was typically 2:1, and in some areas of Russia rose as high as 3:1.8 As 
Verbitskaia shows, authorities tried to increase the intensity of manual labor to “reconstruct” 
agricultural production, because the MTSs (and the state farms) had few machines, which had 
been lost to fighting or simply worn out without possibility of replacement.9 In 1950, as the 
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number of machines returned to the prewar level, output remained only at the 1940 level. 
The problem was that the peasants who stayed on the collective farms often refused to 
work because the system offered them little incentive. They instead concentrated their efforts 
instead on the private plots on which they grew food to sustain themselves and to sell in urban 
markets.10 From their inception, the collective farms used labor-days (trudodni, sg. trudoden') 
that measured not actual person-days worked, but an arbitrary quantity and quality of work. 
Worse still, labor-days did not correspond to any set payment, only to a share of the goods left at 
the end of the agricultural year after the collective farm had met every one of its substantial 
monetary and in-kind obligations to state institutions, such as taxes and payments to the MTS. 
In 1948, Stalin’s new policies raised quotas, work norms, and taxes, as the government moved to 
extract production from the peasants while paying them as little as possible, an apparent 
attempt to make the countryside foot the bill for postwar recovery.11 The result was that the pay 
peasants received had little to do with the outcome of their work and was paltry: in 1950, 
between 72 and 92 percent of farms paid collective farmers less than 1 kilogram of grain or flour 
for a day’s work. Between 4 and 8 percent in each region paid collective farmers nothing.12 To 
make up the difference, the state resorted to coercion, enforcing an individual annual quota of 
work on the collective farm and threatening those who failed to meet it with expulsion and 
internal exile.13 Even this had little effect: in 1952, more than 4 million collective farmers, or 15.9 
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percent, did not meet the minimum, and 600,000 did not work at all.14 
Throughout the period up to 1953, producing grain—to feed the Red Army and a growing 
urban population, as well as to boost industrial development—was the collective farms’ primary 
mission. Collective farmers’ interests mattered little, so the prices farms received for their 
obligatory deliveries to the state fell short of production costs. Local leaders therefore took to 
“violating the principal of material incentives” by using compulsion to extract the harvest. For 
district officials and farm chairman, compulsion was the tool at hand, and the image of the 
strong leader, the “edinonachal'nik,” ubiquitous. Under Stalin, a collective farm chairman 
protected by district authorities might act with impunity against peasants, as verbal abuse gave 
way to physical. By the Khrushchev era, that was no longer the case.15 Authorities began to take 
reports of abuse of power and physical assault seriously.16 
In examining peasants’ work on the collective farms and responses to Khrushchev-era 
reforms, I draw on labor historian E. P. Thompson’s concept of “moral economy,” developed in 
studies of the nascent English working class. Historians such as Jean Lévesque have recently 
applied it to the Soviet peasantry, showing that peasants’ understandings of what was right 
drove efforts to circumvent the labor discipline of the collective farm and achieve their own 
ends.17 He further explains that their “habits” and “permanent dispositions” toward work and 
the authorities, first learned in response to collectivization and Stalin’s harsh postwar policies, 
inclined them to avoid working on the state’s terms. This confounded Khrushchev-era reform 
efforts because peasants’ aversion to collective farm work and suspicion of the farm’s agents was 
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deeply ingrained.18 When pay was low or even nonexistent, collective farmers refused to work 
and employed practices that might loosely be termed “resistance,” although in the Khrushchev 
period it was nonviolent.19 Not only responding to actions by the party, the state, and the 
collective farm bosses, peasants acted using whatever means at their disposal, and in so doing, 
shaped the policies of their nominal superiors. Although collective farmers had little formal 
input into the policy-making process, they forced the authorities to respond by disregarding the 
rules, refusing to work, and seeking compensation by expanding private plots, appropriating 
hay, and taking collective farm property. Collective farm chairpersons had to coax them into the 
fields, exceeding the wage budget, lowering work norms, inflating pay for individual workers, 
and turning a blind eye to theft. Peasant actions thus changed the day-to-day operation of the 
collective farms and the course of Khrushchev’s reforms.20 
In this light, Khrushchev’s reforms were clearly necessary to strengthen material and 
moral incentives, offering peasants both wages and an antidote to the Stalin-era message that 
they were second-class citizens. Scholars have argued that this was a turning point in the 
evolution of the Soviet countryside, when the stable but repressive Stalinist system transformed 
under reforms attributed to Malenkov and Khrushchev; these made collective farmers more like 
state-farm workers, and granted them more rights.21 
* * * 
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An April 1953 summary of letters written by peasants in restive western Ukraine 
confirms that word of collective farmers’ desperation reached L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, and 
Khrushchev. “Dearest child, a spring so beautiful has come,” one man wrote his daughter, “but 
what can be done if there is nothing to live on? Whatever [the farm] has is not ours. What’s 
more, there’s no way to earn anything in our village. People work the whole summer and gather 
the harvest, and then the bosses divide it among themselves, leaving nothing [for the laborers].” 
Another writer lamented, “Dearest sister, I have not received even a single potato from the 
collective farm in the whole time it has existed.” Others complained of high taxes and of being 
cheated out of labor-days by farm managers.22 Summaries of letters, or svodki, are useful 
sources: police officials culled excerpts from letters and compiled them into reports that 
highlighted issues that circumstances or political leaders’ preferences made important. They do 
not directly convey the views of the letter writers: like any other source, they have been shaped 
by those who complied them. When the filters used are accounted for, however, these 
summaries can reveal what concerned officials.23 A police official in the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR gathered this one and sent it to Beria, the USSR Minister of 
Internal Affairs.24 Its purpose was to highlight peasants’ complaints about pay and work, well 
known to leaders and attested to in many other sources. Additionally, the report cited letters 
from a handful of regions in western Ukraine, which the Soviet state had incorporated them only 
in 1944. Having fought there against nationalist partisans and collectivized farms only in the late 
1940s, the Soviet leadership was especially attuned to instability in these locales.25 
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In August 1953, when Khrushchev and Malenkov began to address agricultural policy, 
they recognized these problems and moved to solve them. The peasants had little incentive to 
work, and therefore put little effort into what they did in the collective farms’ fields. As a result, 
the state did not get the grain, meat, milk, wool, and other goods it needed. A letter to the 
Central Committee from a party member and employee of the Vologda oblast newspaper 
Krasnyi sever [Red North], F. N. Kirikov, described the effect of repressive policies on labor, 
and influenced Khrushchev. Writing in July, Kirikov denounced the policy that resulted from 
Khrushchev’s initiative in the late 1940s to grant collective farms the power to expel collective 
farmers who failed to earn the labor-day minimum. Eliminating a peasant’s right to a personal 
plot, the punishment had to be confirmed by vote of collective farmers, but was so harsh that 
many collective farmers refused to enforce it.26 For others, it was no punishment at all, because 
they did not want to work on the farm. “Such measures had no effect here,” Kirikov asserted. 
“Those who were expelled happily left the collective farm: that was their goal. How could one 
consider it punishment for a collective farmer to leave a farm where he earned nothing for his 
work?”27 Instead, expelled collective farmers found employment in nearby industries such as 
timber production, and managed to keep their personal plots anyway. Those remaining refused 
to work on the farm. “Low labor discipline is readily apparent in the poor quality of the work,” 
Kirikov wrote. Peasants preferred to celebrate religious holidays and go mushroom picking to 
venturing into the fields, even when groups of townspeople arrived to help. The collective farmer 
had nothing to fear, “because administrative measures have lost their effect. She fears neither 
them nor expulsion from the collective farm.” The peasants, moreover, openly acknowledged 
that they worked only so much as to avoid losing the private plot.28 Kirikov concluded that, 
having little incentive to care for output, farmworkers were foremost among the reasons for the 
                                                        
26 For more, see: Lévesque, “’Into the Grey Zone’,” 103–19. 
27 RGANI, f.5, op. 24, d. 589, l. 82. 
28 RGANI, f. 5, op. 24, d. 589, l. 93. 
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oblast’s failures. This motivated Khrushchev to bring up the oblast’s failures before a gathering 
of party leaders in early August.29 
Having learned of the problem through letters and svodki, Khrushchev and Malenkov 
moved to address labor and wages as early as August and September 1953. A. A. Nikonov 
explains that the initial reforms Khrushchev introduced at the September plenum consisted of 
policies to address what the leader termed “low labor discipline ” and “violations of the principle 
of material incentives,” meaning wage rates and payment.30 For their part, the collective farmers 
confronted the problem daily. For instance, a tractor driver or other skilled specialist earned 
multiple labor-days for a single person-day at work in the fields; the manual labor that field 
hands—mostly women—performed warranted only one. The collective farm charter still 
required peasants to accumulate a relatively high quota of labor-days, but the compensation for 
each “tally,” a mark in an individual’s labor book signifying a labor-day completed, was 
unknown, contingent on the year’s harvest, and often paltry. In 1954, following rises in 
procurement prices farms received from the state permitted them to raise wages, many 
collective farmers still received little for their work.31 That year, the average annual income from 
200 days’ work on the collective farms amounted to as little as 33 percent of that of an 
equivalent state-farm worker.32 
After 1953, harsh punishments remained on the books, but their ineffectiveness further 
robbed authorities of power to muster farmworkers. Efforts under Stalin to coerce peasants 
                                                        
29 RGANI, f. 5, op. 23, d. 589, l. 91. For Khrushchev’s comments on the letter, see: Tomilina, et al., eds. 
Dva tsveta vremeni, 2:25. As a result, Khrushchev heavily criticized the oblast party leader, A. V. Semin, 
who was sacked in 1954. RGANI f. 5, op. 32, d. 25, ll. 95–97, cited in: Khlevniuk, Regional'naia politika 
N. S. Khrushcheva, 79–81. 
30 Nikonov, Spiral' mnogovekovoi dramy, 299. 
31 In April 1955, a report to the Central Committee from a district in Kazakhstan explained that one 
collective farmer in four completed no work on the farm, an approach the district party boss termed 
“completely refusing to engage in socially-useful work and adhering to a parasitic way of life.” 
RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, l. 61. 
32 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, ll. 72–73. 
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through “administrative measures” achieved little because, as Kirikov’s letter suggests, the 
peasants did not fear the punishment. The entire collective had to vote to expel a collective 
farmer who did not meet the labor-day quota. In many cases, groups of collective farmers 
refused to confirm the punishment, evidence that they considered the polices unjust and the 
penalty too harsh. Intricate power relations between the peasants and the collective farm 
managers made certain that the officials could not simply overturn the peasants’ decision. 
Although possessing considerable power, farm managers could not use it arbitrarily  to punish a 
few offenders, because that action would ensure that peasants would not cooperate in the future. 
As the Malenkov—Khrushchev reforms came into force in 1953, reducing the punishment from 
expulsion to a higher tax rate, this dynamic remained. Two district party workers in Lithuania, 
N. S. Il'in and A. I. Vol'f, wrote to the Central Committee to complain. Established only in the 
late 1940s as the restive republic became Sovietized, the collective farms had little control over 
peasants. Blaming the “personal property-based psychology” of the peasants, the local party 
authorities described how collective farmers expanded their plots beyond the legal maximum, 
cut hay from collective fields, and carted away grain from collective stocks. “Many collective 
farm families, and especially women, do not take part in socialized production at any time of the 
year; they are completely preoccupied with their individual farm, considering it more profitable 
than the collective.”33 The officials noted that farm managers could not easily impose the 
prescribed 50 percent increase in the taxes assessed on private-plot production. Every family 
had at least one member who failed to meet the labor-day minimum and, therefore, the general 
assembly of collective farmers refused to ratify the taxes. “For that reason,” Il'in and Vol'f 
declared, “the loafers go unpunished.”34 
Although circumstances in Lithuania were atypical, it was not alone in witnessing this 
                                                        
33 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, l. 14. For more on the context of Lithuania, see: Mincyte, “Everyday 
Environmentalism.” 
34 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, l. 16. 
  320
kind of refusal. In Stavropol krai, between 20 and 30 percent of members of the Malenkov and 
Apanasenko collective farms in the Apanasenko district failed to meet the labor-day minimum 
in 1954. Requiring labor to complete the harvest, the collective farm chairpersons resorted to 
hiring workers from outside the collective and even the krai—as far away as Astrakhan oblast 
and Belarus—to earn in a few weeks of intense labor what a collective farmer might make in a 
whole year. In these two collectives alone, the bill for these workers amounted to over 1 million 
rubles in 1953 and 500,000 more in 1954.35 Despite having to go this length because the 
collective farmers refused to work, the farm managers declined to report the names of collective 
farmers to receive the tax penalty. Admonition by officials from the krai financial office achieved 
little, so they demanded the krai party committee take action. “The majority . . . do not report 
the required lists [of offenders] and some . . . treat this extremely important measure 
formalistically again this year,” the accountants indignantly declared. On the “Zavety Il'icha” 
collective farm of Apollon district, they accused, “the managers’ negligent preparation for the 
meeting permitted the general assembly of collective farmers to reject the prepared list . . . on 
the grounds that every collective farmer had not fulfilled the labor-day minimum for legitimate 
reasons.” The document sardonically terms this a circumstance “that is extremely unlikely.”36 
In 1953 and 1954, reforms increased procurement prices, cut taxes, and scaled back 
compulsory deliveries, all of which improved collective farmers’ conditions and boosted output. 
Nonetheless, pay remained low and incentives sparse, so the amount and quality of labor 
                                                        
35 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6537, ll. 1–2. At the exchange rate of four rubles to the dollar, the 1953 figure 
amounts to $2.2 million dollars in 2013, providing an illustration of the size and complexity of the 
collective farms in the krai. That year,  the 316 collective farms in the krai averaged more than 9,800 
hectares of cropland. GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6537, ll. 52–53. Officials from the State Bank discovered that 
chairpersons had diverted collective farm funds earmarked for paying members’ wages had been used for 
other purposes, to the tune more than 50,000 rubles on at least five farms in the Arzgir district alone. 
GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6537, l. 8. 
36 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6537, l. 7. A similar, if extreme, case occurred in Ukraine’s Ternopil oblast, where 
in one collective farm, 334 of 1037 members (32.2 percent) did not earn a single labor-day in 1954. 
TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 24, d. 4182, l. 86. Farm managers’ efforts to combat this problem included economic 
sanctions. In one farm in Belarus in 1957, they attempted to implement a policy docking those who failed 
to meet the minimum number of labor-days 10 percent of the total, with the result that 416 labor-days 
were stripped from thirty-two collective farmers. RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 184, l. 66. 
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collective farmers expended in the farm’s fields was inadequate. Leaders came to understand 
that those initial reforms had achieved only limited success. In May 1955, Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture V. V. Matskevich informed Khrushchev and the Central Committee that again in 
1954 collective farms paid a pittance to their collective farmers. In all, 1.9 percent of collective 
farms distributed no flour or grain as payment in kind, while a further 8.5 percent paid less than 
300 grams, and a further 13.2 percent between 300 and 500 grams.37 Matskevich also reported 
that this was an improvement, and that overall income had risen 27 percent. And the proof was 
in the movement of population: for the first time since 1947 and 1948, the flow of peasants 
fleeing their villages for urban areas and industrial occupations—despite passport controls 
designed to thwart them—had reversed.38 
Realizing that higher pay incentivized greater productivity, leaders implemented a 
scheme for paying bonuses for output that exceeded the plan’s target yield, aimed initially at 
specific crops and animal husbandry products. This principle went into effect widely in 1956, but 
it began in 1955 as a pilot project that paid bonuses for high yields of corn. Documents 
accompanying the proposal clearly identified its mission to raise production by using material 
incentives. Even in areas where collectives had previously grown corn, the farms had ignored an 
existing policy requiring bonuses for exemplary harvests. In Vinnytsia oblast of southwestern 
Ukraine, only 40 of the nearly 1,000 collectives followed the old directive.39 In the old system, 
                                                        
37 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, l. 89. 
38 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, l. 92. In 1955, the collective farms served by the Reutov MTS of Moscow 
oblast saw collective farmers earn only 435,600 of the 503,300 labor-days earned. Of the difference, 
17,000 went to people “brought in from outside,” and a further 66,500 by MTS workers (who also 
received pay as state employees). The remainder of the days were worked by youth under sixteen and the 
aged. Of the able-bodied farm members, 209 of the total of 1331 (15.7 percent) worked fewer than the 
minimum of 200 labor-days, and 66 of those (4.9 percent) did not work at all. The average able-bodied 
member worked 326 days. TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, d. 2161, l. 2. For a labor-day, collective members earned 
300 grams of bread or flour. TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, d. 2161, ll. 8–9. Notably, the district’s yields for corn 
were correspondingly low, amounting to only 5.6 tons per hectare of green fodder. TsGAMO, f. 191, op. 1, 
d. 2161, l. 3. The file contains records for eight other MTS that returned similar results. 
39 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 108, l. 90. 
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barely 10 percent of peasants earned bonuses.40 Officials in Moscow connected higher pay with 
production, noting that “with the significant expansion of corn plantings, it is of special 
importance to establish monetary incentives, which would better interest all collective farmers 
in increasing the area planted in corn and the achievement of the harvest.”41 This resolution 
“recommended” that collective farms establish a pool consisting of 15 percent of any above-plan 
production from which to distribute bonuses, half going proportionally to those who had earned 
labor-days for a given cornfield’s cultivation and harvest, and half going to all collective farmers 
based on total labor-days earned. Adopting this directive in August 1955, Soviet leaders spread 
this policy to every oblast and republic where collective farms grew corn. The policy of paying 
bonuses for growing corn, moreover, continued throughout the decade, and also applied to 
state-farm workers.42 
These policies offered collective farmers reward for larger harvests, but results often 
failed to live up to officials’ expectations. In practical terms, the directive had the same force as 
law, but the legal fiction of the collective farms’ independence meant that it took the form of a 
recommendation that each farm’s general meeting then adopted.43 This left the door open to 
“shortcomings.” For example, in the autumn of 1955, the leader of a work team in Stavropol 
krai’s Aleksandrov district, a Comrade Mezhniakova, wrote to the krai newspaper to draw 
attention to her farm’s failures to harvest the corn. The year’s crop had turned out poorly and, 
worse still, the harvest lagged behind schedule. Each collective farmer had personal livestock, so 
they needed corn for feed, as well as wood for fuel, both of which were scarce on the steppe. The 
farm managers had arranged for neither as part of in-kind payment for the labor-days farmers 
                                                        
40 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, l. 79. 
41 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 108, l. 90. 
42 See, for instance, a report on these efforts in Ukraine’s Khmel'nyts'kiy oblast in 1961. RGANI, f. 5, 
op. 31, d. 168, ll. 79–84. 
43 As Nikonov notes, measures taken in March 1956 attempted to counteract district authorities’ 
meddling, although with apparently little result. Nikonov, Spiral’ mnogovekovoi dramy, 305. 
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had earned. Mezhniakova blamed the authorities for wasting time on meetings and paperwork 
instead of organizing the harvest. She reported that this failure had “destroyed the collective 
farmers’ belief” in earning wages for work. The managers did not care, she continued, how the 
collective farmers lived or worked but, “if they implemented the measures for increasing 
material incentives, it is doubtful that the members of my work team, Comrades Demenko, 
Brykalova, and Zhukova, would stay home to gather fuel” instead of harvesting corn. 44 The 
collective farmers lacked confidence that the farm’s management would remunerate them and, 
therefore, they refused to work. Whether a collective farmer actually wrote the article, or a state 
or party official did so, it singled out those who failed to follow the initiative to reward collective 
farmers. The frequent invocation of “material incentives” in this period illustrates this term’s 
place in the official lexicon as a principle all officials had to heed. 
Similar problems arose because of accounting practices. Collective farm work teams in 
Stavropol krai accrued bonuses only for crops for which they exceeded the production plan, 
ignoring those for which they achieved below-plan yields.45 An earlier policy had 
“recommended” a penalty of 1 percent of labor-days earned for each percentage difference 
between the planned yield and the lesser actual figure. Yet local officials refused to implement 
this policy, hoping to avoid conflict with the collective farmers, whose sense of fairness rejected 
docking labor-days. Thus the spirit of the directive, providing bonuses for better yields and 
penalties for lower, got lost in the policy’s implementation.  
Alongside the new wage policies of 1955, reforms required collectives to set a new, higher 
labor-day minimum and a monthly quota. This prevented collective farmers from avoiding work 
in planting and harvesting months, when the collective farm needed them more than ever, but 
they focused on their private plots. Because it required approval by a meeting of all collective 
                                                        
44 P. Mezhniakova, “Kogda budet vydavat' kukuruzu na trudodni?” Stavropol'skaia pravda (October 14, 
1955), 3. 
45 L. Pankratov, “Nekotorye voprosy oplaty truda v kolkhozakh,” Stavropol'skaia pravda (April 2, 
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farmers, the farms implemented this directive haphazardly. For instance, 20 percent of farms in 
the RSFSR established gender-differentiated norms.46 A lower quota for women acknowledged 
the reality peasants and collective farm officials knew well: women primarily milked and did 
manual labor in the fields, tasks earning few labor-days. Moreover, they worked less on the farm 
because they shouldered the bulk of domestic labor and maintained the family’s private plot. 
Authorities nonetheless considered it unacceptable, perhaps because it reduced the labor power 
available, and perhaps because it contradicted ideals of gender equality.47 
As a result of these reforms, Matskevich later reported, enthusiasm had grown, and 
exemplary collective farms’ high productivity correlated to the higher and more reliable pay 
their collective farmers earned. Successful farms dedicated a set proportion of income, between 
40 and 60 percent, to paying wages. They distributed pay in monthly advances rather than as a 
single lump sum at the end of the year, and assigned higher priority to paying wages and doing 
so regularly during the year, rather than out of the leftovers at the end. These reforms “allow the 
collectives to expand the part of their incomes that are distributed according to labor-days.”48 In 
support of Matskevich, Gosplan, the State Planning Agency, reported that “the most important 
stimulus . . . for raising collective farmers’ material incentives to raise output of agricultural 
products is implementing . . . monthly advance payments on labor-days from the income of the 
collective farm.”49 The new policies ensured that workers received something for their work each 
month, and wages rose as a result. In 1956, the total farm incomes for the RSFSR amounted to 
35.28 billion rubles for collective farms, while in 1957, that figure grew to 37.3 billion. The total 
wage bill amounted to 14.72 billion rubles, or 39.5 percent. As a result, the average wage for the 
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GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6537, l. 10. 
48 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 111, ll. 73–74. 
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Russian republic amounted to 3,022 rubles per collective farmer, although this concealed a wide 
range: the lowest average for an oblast was 1,142, and the highest was a comfortable 7,896.50 
Guaranteeing collective farmers some payment in exchange for labor might not seem a 
revolutionary concept, but it represented a significant innovation in Soviet practice. By 1959, 
Soviet leaders moved to convert the conditional payments given at the end of the agricultural 
year into a guaranteed minimum wage. These policies reflected conclusions drawn after 
attempts made in 1954 and 1955 to reform wages. 
* * * 
Wage incentives to work in collective fields shaped Khrushchev’s corn crusade, especially 
because before 1960 manually cultivating and harvesting the crop consumed vast amounts of 
the collective farms’ limited labor force at critical planting and harvesting times. Even when 
managers had workers to direct, they often assigned the farmers to other crops considered more 
valuable. This created a vicious cycle in which those in charge considered corn a low-yielding 
and therefore low-priority crop. Assigning little labor to cultivating it, they confirmed their 
preconceptions by ensuring that corn produced small harvests. In 1958, inspectors in eastern 
Siberia’s Krasnoiarsk krai found a common scene: collective farms had planted the corn that the 
plan required, but in fields with the poorest soil, without applying fertilizer. They compounded 
this by expending little effort to care for it, cultivating the crop “with considerable delay and low 
standards, with the result that the corn was fully overgrown with weeds.” All of this determined 
that it produced low yields. In Shirin district, farms brought in a maximum of 5.5 tons of feed 
per hectare. Declaring that the farm mangers “underappreciated corn as the principal feed 
crop,” the inspector rejected the farm managers’ pleas that they lacked the necessary machinery 
and labor force to complete planting, cultivating, and harvesting in a timely fashion.51 Inspectors 
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51 GARF, f. A-340, op.1, d. 116, ll. 8–9. Only 37 percent of fields, for example, received fertilizer. 
  326
found that despite numerous declarations announcing material incentives’ importance, farms 
used them little and they were therefore ineffective. They also discovered this problem in 
Briansk oblast. “None of the inspected farms have developed any material incentives for 
rewarding corngrowers. Even where they have enacted bonuses amounting to 50 percent of the 
harvest exceeding the plan, they are not actually paid anywhere.”52 This occurred even in 
Krasnodar krai, which Roswell Garst and Soviet experts alike recommended to Khrushchev as 
best suited to industrial corn cultivation on the model of the American Corn Belt. In 1958, an 
inspection concluded that yields were high only where farms implemented the proper 
techniques. “Nonetheless,” it explains, “the example of vanguard workers is insufficiently 
adopted and corn yields remain low,” amounting to only 1.29 metric tons of grain, just less than 
one-half the planned 2.52 tons. Similarly, the 63.6 tons of silage grown fell far short of the 
planned 132.4 tons. “Many farms undervalue its importance,” and therefore “corn is often 
planted on poor, unfertilized plots, and the cultivation it requires is not carried out.”53 Four 
years of endless agitation and propaganda between 1955 and 1958 had achieved far less than 
Khrushchev had hoped, and this problem did not go away. As late as September 1963 the 
problem remained: in a speech that month, Khrushchev told of Garst’s visit to a nearby farm in 
the krai. There, the American witnessed workers planting corn without applying the fertilizer 
necessary to achieve the full benefit of the high-yielding double-cross hybrids. Unable to stop 
them, Garst angrily pledged to tell Khrushchev of the outrage.54 
                                                        
Furthermore, 57 percent of fields had been first plowed the previous fall, to preserve as much of the 
winter snows as moisture in the soil. That means that the remaining 43 percent did not conform to that 
useful recommendation. 
52 GARF, f. A-340, op. 1, d. 116, l. 38. 
53 GARF, f. A-340, op. 1, d. 107, l. 17. 
54 Khrushchev, Stroitel’stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 8:179. To illustrate, in 1954, Stavropol krai fulfilled 
only 18 percent its plan for applying fertilizer, a crude measure of the process. Of the 2 million metric tons 
of organic fertilizer, only 372,300 tons made it into the field. In some districts, this figure was as low as 5 
percent. Additionally, there were only 6,000 tons of chemical fertilizer for the whole krai. GANISK, f. 1, 
op. 2, d. 6539, l. 5. As late as 1961, these problems persisted, as evidenced by Khrushchev’s initiative 
during that period to ramp up production. That year, the farms in Aleksandrovsk district applied only 
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Harvesting corn was a labor-intensive process, especially the method called “two-part 
harvesting.” Where corn matured fully, laborers manually harvested the cobs before machines 
chopped the plant for fodder. This produced two types of feed: the cobs provided a nutrient- and 
calorie-dense feed for hogs. Unsuitable for them, the plant could instead be consumed by cattle 
as a substitute for hay. The resulting demand for labor was intense. In September 1955, the 
Central Committee received reports from Voronezh, Kursk, Lipetsk, and Belgorod oblasts 
expecting a good harvest of sugar beets, but voicing concerns that it could not be brought in on 
time because of the labor demands of expanded corn plantings.55 As mentioned earlier, 
authorities diverted students and workers from normal activities for short-term work on farms 
for this purpose.56 In another case in 1955, the Ukrainian Central Committee in Kyiv reported 
satisfaction with the contributions of Soviet Army soldiers to alleviate the labor shortage, 
requesting that they be allowed to extend their stay from twenty to thirty-five days to help with 
the harvest of corn, sugar beets, and potatoes.57 
To make up for shortfalls, officials might attempt to coerce peasants into the fields to 
complete the harvest; peasants, for their part, could respond by appealing to superiors. An 
anonymous complaint to the USSR Ministry of Government Oversight from Ukraine’s Chernihiv 
oblast purportedly represented the words of “some workers.” In November 1956, they called 
attention to large areas of crops lost due to mismanagement, and denounced the authoritarian 
methods district party officials used in efforts to bring in the harvest. As winter advanced, 1,134 
                                                        
238.5 tons of the 1,546 tons of synthetic fertilizers on hand. GANISK, f 1, op. 2, d. 8594, l. 101. Similarly, 
chemical pesticides and herbicides lay unused. In 1961, again, the territory had enough 2-4D, a common 
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GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 8597, ll. 6–7. 
55 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 84, ll. 94–95.  
56 Other examples abound: The Central Committee agricultural department head’s response to a telegram 
from Kyrgyzstan in September 1955 reminds the republic’s authorities that they already possess the power 
to carry out such plans. RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 84, l. 103. 
57 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 84, l. 104. 
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hectares of potatoes and sugar beets remained unharvested in the fields, causing the party 
bosses to “try to hide this through falsifications of data and compelling people to work in 
inhumane conditions.” The officials attempted to force all local residents into the fields under 
the threat of a fine of 100 rubles for noncompliance. Moreover, the letter complains that the 
oblast party committee knew about these illegal measures, yet did nothing. “It is time to hold 
these people responsible. . . . Verify this by sending an inspector from your apparat [emphasis 
in original].”58 When required by officials in Moscow to investigate, oblast authorities found the 
charges mostly true. In addition to poor weather, progress lagged because of “the large volume 
of labor-intensive tasks, including digging sugar beets and potatoes, and harvesting corn.” To 
placate the peasants, the oblast committee sacked one collective farm’s chairman and the 
director of the local MTS, while the district party officials received only warnings. Investigators 
discovered the threat of a 100-ruble fine, which the letter writers found the most outrageous of 
all, to be real. They rescinded it, ensuring that no one had paid it.59 Peasants’ ability to lodge 
complaints was a serious threat to delinquent local officials, but their letters also reveal local 
conditions otherwise hidden. 
Collective farmers came into conflict with farm managers or local authorities over a 
variety of concerns. In cases of conflicts between farm managers and collective farmers, each 
had recourse to higher authorities. A chairperson who violated collective farmers’ sense of 
fairness might escape consequences, especially if enjoying district authorities’ protection. In that 
case, peasants could pursue justice by writing letters to newspapers, inspectorates, or party 
officials up to and including Khrushchev. Those letters did not always reach top authorities, or 
achieve results; moreover, the letters that survive were not collected and preserved in systematic 
fashion, but instead as svodki and other collections of documents based on officials’ opaque 
selection criteria. Those letters of complaint that do exist in the files, however, suggest that this 
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approach offered the authors an opportunity for justice, using the system to achieve their own 
ends.60 In a January 1957 summary of letters compiled by officials in the procuracy and sent to 
the Central Committee, peasants accused collective farm managers of all manner of unfairness. 
In one case, a chairman allowed the farm to fail and did not arrange basic communal necessities, 
such as a bathhouse, or banya, while he abused his access to an official car. “Velichko has set 
himself up like a dictator (ednionachal'nik): whatever he says goes. He pays those who don’t 
work and those who work – he doesn’t pay. And if Lenin were to come back, what would he say 
to us?” the letter queried. Velichko enjoyed the protection of the district officials who ignored 
the criticisms made by collective farmers and exacted legal retribution against those who spoke 
out.61 Another letter, written by an outsider based on conversations with members of a collective 
in Ukraine’s Khar'kiv oblast, declared bluntly: “They say that wherever they rule from Moscow, 
there is order; and wherever there is local power – it’s better to stay quiet.”62 Individuals took 
action they saw as justified as a result of such abuses, thieving to make up for unpaid work: 
“Velichko has corrupted the people, who have begun to refuse to work, and to steal collective 
farm property.”63 
Although unlikely to be the only cause for removing a farm or district official, charges of 
“having suppressed criticism” (zazhim kritiki) and “violating the democratic basis of managing 
the collective” often headlined the charges against them during Khrushchev’s campaigns to 
improve farm management and make production more efficient.64 Nonetheless, the letters 
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themselves occasionally proved suspect: on inspection, some anonymous letters turned out to 
contain baseless accusations. One claimed that an official had committed arson by burning 
down a farm building: the building’s destruction was documentable, but the charges of arson 
were impossible to verify.65 There are several potential causes for such accusations. First, letter 
writers perhaps considered factual things only rumored in a tight-knit rural community. Second, 
they reported circumstances that could not be proven by subsequent inspection, including 
episodes of drunkenness, fraud, theft, and so on. 
Peasants practiced other forms of resistance, including theft. This seems to have been 
common, but not substantial enough to influence output. Instead, its prevalence and persistence 
signal peasants’ deeper dissatisfaction with conditions and pay on the farms. S. N. Kruglov, 
Khrushchev’s choice to replace L. P. Beria as head of the powerful Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and responsible for the regular police, reported on the 1955 harvest, quantifying “numerous 
cases of grain theft” uncovered as of October 5. In all, 3,292 legal actions against 4,229 
individuals involved the loss of only 756 tons of grain stolen, of which the authorities recovered 
701.66 Although a substantial amount of grain, as a fraction of the 103.7 million tons harvested 
across the USSR that year, it represents an insignificant .0007 percent.67 Regardless of efforts to 
detect, report, and investigate the crime, officials could do little to quantify the total number; 
however, even if the actual number of thefts were several times that Kruglov reported, it would 
remain comparatively inconsequential. 
Thefts too small to report seem to have occurred frequently, leaving officials at a loss to 
combat them. The authorities of Rivne oblast wrote to Ukrainian republic leaders bemoaning an 
inspection’s finding that “the weak organization of security and preventative measures” resulted 
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in missing beets, potatoes, and corn. They suggested that most theft occurred at the end of the 
workday: when collective farmers returned home, they simply took a little of the crop along with 
them. Authorities’ attempts to limit these thefts by dispatching police and procuracy officials to 
the countryside had some effect, catching forty-three people, including eighteen for stealing 
corn.68 However, these were only a small part of the problem.  
These reports represent the view of the procuracy, taking pains to emphasize its officials’ 
usefulness; however, farm officials sought the authority to punish thefts too small to turn over to 
the legal system. 69 In Ukraine’s Ternopil oblast, they struggled to find suitable punishments and 
resorted to what the procuracy condemned as “administrative measures.” As one chairman 
explained, “I understand that this is unlawful, but when it is ineffectual to bring a criminal case, 
the collective farm management must adopt these measures.” “Petty” thefts of three or five 
kilograms of grain or chopping wood from collective land received fines of up to five labor-days 
or twenty-five rubles.70 Fining peasants a quantity of labor-days had little effect, however, 
because they received unreliable and low pay for them E. K. Zhidkikh, the chairman of a 
collective in Ukraine’s Nikolaev oblast, described efforts over several years to tighten the farm’s 
labor discipline, which was “on a very low level” when he, one of Khrushchev’s thirty-
thousanders, arrived. This levy of party members in industrial and military posts was dispatched 
to fill leadership positions in rural districts in hopes of strengthening party discipline and 
output. It drew on the legacy of the twenty-five thousanders, urban party militants sent to the 
countryside to facilitate enforcing collectivization.71 “As a result of [poor labor discipline] the 
harvest of corn, as well as the processing of hemp and rice, was completed only in the early 
moths of the following year,” Zhidkikh reported. “More importantly,” his letter went on, “there 
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were many instances of pilfering of collective farm property.” Despite improvements in 
discipline, theft continued. The threat of court action failed to deter them, so the farm managers 
had set up a system of fines for those responsible for guarding the property that had been stolen. 
Zhidkikh imposed them on three collective farmers who should have been guarding the hogs 
when three were stolen. Those fined complained to the district committee, which overturned the 
ruling and required the committee to take it to the courts. Exasperated, the chairman wrote to 
the Central Committee in Moscow asking for help and clarification of the law.72 In the end, 
authorities denied the chairman’s request for power for himself or the collective’s general 
meeting to mete out such punishments.73 
Petty theft reflected collective farmers’ feelings that the system was unjust: they 
considered their pay too low, so they sought to fodder, fuel, or other necessities by any available 
means. Procuracy officials in Ukraine inferred that these thefts occurred because farms failed to 
pay peasants in the feed they needed for their personal livestock.74 On one collective farm, the 
harvest was determined to be 1.8 metric tons of rye, 1.2 tons of wheat, and 2.4 tons of corn, all 
relatively good yields. As a result of poor management and late harvesting, however, the 
collective farm brought in the last thirty-seven hectares of corn only in February, by which time 
more than half of the wheat and corn crops had been stolen or lost.75 As a detailed analysis of 
theft on the Malenkov collective in Chortkiv district of Ternopil oblast surmised, theft “is 
widespread and largely goes unpunished, [being] especially common during the planting and 
harvesting campaigns, when potatoes, corn, beets, grain, hay, and other crops are stolen.”76 
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Alienated from the collective farm, peasants did not see theft from the farm’s fields as 
stealing from themselves, which it was in a legal sense. Because they earned a pittance from 
collective farm work and identified so little with its mission, there was little incentive to 
“preserve collective farm property,” as Soviet sources termed it. Partially blind to peasant 
motivations, officials’ characterizations revealed more about their own judgments than the views 
of the collective farmers they hoped to understand and control. For example, another collective 
farm in Ternopil oblast’s Chortkiv district had a smaller number of members, ensuring a tight-
knit community in which little that happened might remain secret. The farm had a smaller land 
area, simplifying managers’ job of overseeing farmworkers in outlying fields. Mutual 
surveillance among farmworkers and quicker action by officials to punish thieves resulted in less 
pilfering. Theft, common on many farms, was comparatively rare on this farm, suggesting that 
peasants took advantage of opportunities presented by the collective farm’s structure by 
exploiting holes in managers’ oversight of their activities. Unable to conclude that the collective 
farmers considered the farm exploitative or illegitimate, however, officials instead supposed that 
the widespread practice was merely a holdover from the previous lower stage of social 
development, in which landowners had openly exploited the peasants. The writer of this report 
conjectured that the peasants’ habit of taking home an armload of feed or a bit of grain at the 
end of the workday had developed under the Polish landlords who had ruled as recently as the 
1930s, when the oblast had been part of interwar Poland. In that system, peasants who returned 
from the landowner’s fields took a bit of the crop for themselves as payment, making this a 
practice of long standing.77 
Local authorities stole too. In one case, a collective farm bought three loads of hay from a 
neighboring farm. With the collusion of the collective’s chairman, one ended up in the 
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possession of the farm’s accountant, a transgression that several collective farmers reported to 
inspectors.78 If such officials accused others of theft, they faced charges of hypocrisy, resulting in 
a blow to whatever authority they possessed. 
Theft and related problems of labor discipline remained prevalent throughout the 
Khrushchev period. In December 1959, N. V. Podgornyi, first secretary of the Ukrainian Central 
Committee, reported to Khrushchev that an inspection uncovered numerous “malignant 
parasites” in rural communities that required rapid and decisive “measures of social action,” 
including the well-known “comrades’ courts.”79 Inspecting a sample of 373 villages across 
Ukraine, officials found many rural residents who avoided “socially beneficial labor.” In place of 
employment they preferred “moonshining, speculation, and seeking out other paths to an easy 
living. They lead antisocial, parasitic ways of life, which arouses the just resentment of honest 
collective farmers.” Among these troublemakers, Podgornyi counted freelance laborers and 
those who, although collective farmers, shunned work on the farm in favor of their private 
plots.80 Khrushchev, for his part, ordered that the report be circulated to the entire Central 
Committee and members of republic, oblast, and territory committees, indicating that he viewed 
this as a problem requiring wider attention.81 Theft remained a problem as late as September 
1964, when an inspection covering ten oblasts in the RSFSR reported 755 cases against 1,018 
people, resulting in the recovery of 379 metric tons of grain. Farmers and procurement workers 
themselves perpetrated most thefts, and some of them, far from “petty,” ran to hundreds of 
kilograms of grain.82 
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Social problems were not limited to theft: alcohol abuse and its consequences also 
contributed to erratic work and lost productivity. In 1958, the Central Committee circulated, 
“On strengthening the struggle against drunkenness and moonshine.” Each oblast’s party 
organization then carried out a series of meetings to raise awareness of the problem, gatherings 
that also allowed a forum for denouncing offenders. As a report to the Central Committee from 
the Saratov oblast party committee illustrates, alcohol abuse not only resulted in legal violations, 
but also interfered with critical work on the farms and resulted in destruction of collective farm 
property. On one farm, the chairman organized a night of binge drinking with a brigade during 
spring planting. During celebrations of International Labor Day, May 1, the farm manager of 
another collective farm commandeered an automobile, drove to the city of Saratov, went on a 
binge, and wrecked the car.83 In another case, drunkenness among workers of an MTS in 
Belarus resulted in major violations of labor discipline and serious bodily harm. “During work 
hours they make the rounds on their tractors from village to village in search of vodka, or leave 
the tractor in the field and go get drunk,” officials reported. In one instance, a senior tractor 
operator fell from the machine and was seriously injured. Because of this, and the failure of 
management to combat it, “some tractor drivers have moved on to criminal acts, including 
fraudulent work orders (pripiski) for incomplete tasks.”84 
None of this indicates that theft of corn or any other commodity significantly contributed 
to the farms’ underperformance. Instead, it indicates deeper problems in collective farmers’ 
attitudes to labor, which resulted from their low pay. The peasants’ attitudes toward the system, 
their “moral economy,” told them that since they worked on the farm, they should receive in 
return food and the money they needed to pay taxes, buy consumer goods, build shelter, and 
more. In the absence of compensation from the farm for their labor-days, they sought it through 
illicit means. In addition, the prevalence of small-scale theft demonstrates that Soviet 
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countryside was, far from subject to overwhelming state control, in reality comparatively 
undergoverned. Even on the level of a village or collective farm, local authorities had insufficient 
power to prevent theft or, once it took plate, to punish perpetrators even when they were known 
offenders. 
* * * 
Khrushchev needed to mend the system of labor incentives so that the collective farms 
would produce more, pay their workers better, and raise their productivity. These outcomes 
were necessary to fully realize his scheme to introduce industrial farming methods, to make corn 
the foundation for livestock raising, and, thereby, to provide the average citizen with a richer 
diet. Having paid bonuses for above-plan production, Soviet authorities tested guaranteeing pay 
and replacing the labor-day with a wage the farmer received in cash or in kind. In Stavropol krai, 
this began in 1957; by the early 1960s, this practice reached most collective farms. In late 1957 
or early 1958, the head of the krai party committee, F. D. Kulakov, and of the soviet, E. S. 
Krotkov, wrote to the RSFSR Council of Ministers to advocate transforming the accounting, pay, 
and planning practices of the comparatively large and affluent collective farms of the krai. They 
proposed to implement “khoziaistvennyi raschet” (often shortened to khozraschet) or 
“enterprise accounting” to track expenditures and incomes, and thereby to calculate the 
production cost for the first time. Without this system, farms had little idea of their production 
costs. With it, they could measure which commodities brought net income and how, allowing 
them to adapt—within state procurement plans—their operations to efficiently produce the most 
output at the cheapest cost.85  In the end, the authorities hoped to make production more 
efficient; thus these measures influenced the outcomes of farmworkers’ efforts to grow corn, as 
well as to do many other important jobs. 
This concern for cost and expenditure had been neglected under Stalin, but Khrushchev 
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expressed his interest in putting these principles into action. In October 1955, he responded to 
reports on accounting and production costs in the findings of the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
delegation to the United States. “Look at what we’ve sunk to, that such a basic truth 
[determining production costs] for every farm has become some sort of special secret to 
discover,” he said. In a capitalist economy, “this is a matter of life and death. It explains the 
irresponsibility that has plagued our system from top to bottom. Everyone behaves like a 
bureaucrat, and no one cares about the results.”86 In January 1954,he had expressed a similar 
thought more colorfully while complaining about the inefficiency of transforming grain into 
pork, which on state farms required a high ratio of eight units of feed to one unit of meat. “How 
does this happen?” Khrushchev demanded. Because, he charged, officials acted “wastefully” 
(beskhoziaistvenno) when disbursing resources such as feed. “Forgive me for my rudeness, but 
if this [state farm] were a commercial enterprise subject to the forces of capitalist competition, a 
farmer who spent eight kilograms of grain to produce one kilogram of meat would be left 
without pants. And here? The director of this state farm, well, his ‘trousers are just fine,’ as the 
Ukrainians say [the phrase, “dobry shtani”, is in Ukrainian], because he does not have to answer 
for this disgrace (bezobrazie).”87 This critique, moreover, had roots in social scientists’ efforts to 
understand Soviet rural society and to diagnose the economic problems of collective farms. In 
the 1950s, their findings, as historian Maya Haber shows, influenced Khrushchev and other 
decision makers.88 
Farms could calculate production costs only by accurately measuring the amount and 
cost of the labor required to produce a basic unit of output. The old system prevented this 
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because the money value of a labor-day varied according to the goods and cash left over at the 
end of the season. Instead, accountants required a system of labor that paid collective farmers in 
money or goods equivalent to a specified sum.89 Combined with a plan to pay a guaranteed 
minimum wage, this signaled a transformation in the relationship between collective farms and 
their peasants that had existed since collectivization. “The conditions exist,” Kulakov and 
Krotkov wrote, “for the organization of [farms’] finances based on full implementation of 
khozraschet, calculating production costs, the financial results of production, and the clear 
income [chistyi dokhod].”90 Furthermore, they explained, “a transition to money payments for 
the collective farmers’ labor [might] increase [their] material incentives, and bring closer the 
pay systems of collective and state farms.” They proposed slowly implementing this system, first 
on twelve economically sound farms over the next several years and in future years on the rest.91 
The experiment began on farms in the Piatigorsk district. A pamphlet published in 1958 
described to officials and collective farmers how the new system extended the normal process of 
“accounting” (raschet) that farms already used in settling debts to state agencies, such as 
procurements, taxes, loans, etc. The new approach applied that system to quantify production 
within each farm and within each brigade, allowing managers to determine where production 
brought a net profit, where it did not, and why. “The innovation is in adopting accounting within 
the collective farm itself, raising the responsibility of the brigade for the result of its economic 
activities, and in engaging each collective farmer in the struggle for economizing expenditures of 
labor, feed, fuel, etc.” This procedure “illustrates the results of each brigade’s work for collective 
farmers, and does not allow poorly working brigades to hide behind the broad shoulders of the 
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whole collective farm; that is, to live on others’ account.” In the old method, “brigade leaders 
and collective farmers had no responsibility for nonfulfillment of plan production targets or 
excessive expenditures on labor.”92 The pamphlet established procedures for implementing the 
reform more broadly, outlining the case to the collective farmers: they should favor the reform 
because good workers stood to earn more by abandoning the labor-day system and its “leveling” 
tendencies (uravnilovka).  
Authorities sought to reduce production costs of a ton of corn and, thereby, of meat or 
milk; they had to make those costs an indicator of a farm’s success and to supplement old-style 
management that pursued only raw commodity output. They additionally abandoned the labor-
day system to prevent collective farm managers from arbitrarily altering work norms. 
Theoretically, the new table was nonnegotiable: it outlined six classes of work and an 
appropriate money wage for each, adaptive to an individual farm’s ability to pay, along with 
work norms for each category. Collective farmers were pressured to exchange higher work 
norms for a raise in pay and a guaranteed advance of approximately 70 percent of the year’s 
planned wage, paid out each month in a prorated proportion of one-twelfth the total. Unlike the 
labor-day system, these new wages did not depend wholly on the leftovers at the end of the year, 
but instead as a set percentage of the farm’s income. Experiments conducted in the 1950s 
suggested that the optimal share for wages was at least 40 but no more than 50 percent.93 
Early on in the process, many meetings of collective farmers and of district party 
committees voiced concern about how the changes affected female collective farmers. 
Acknowledging that women often completed manual field labor such as weeding and harvesting 
corn—that is, work putting them in the first two of the six categories—some proposed raising 
those pay grades’ monetary value for fulfilling a day’s norm to overcome the fact that such 
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“underqualified workers earned such low wages.”94 In the summer of 1959, an inspection 
showed that the 138 collective farms that had made the transition had little heeded such 
concerns. In general, the first category, across the board from low-paying, economically weak 
collectives to the wealthy ones, remained at a level one-half that of the highest pay category, the 
rate at which tractor drivers and specialists earned their wages.95 In this, they simply recreated 
the inequality of the labor-day system, where tractor drivers and specialists earned labor-days at 
ratios at least 2:1 in comparison with manual laborers. 
Regardless of the caution they first voiced, the krai’s leaders directed a more widespread 
and hurried campaign in 1959. It achieved results, but also suffered setbacks. In May, Krotkov 
reported that, of the 146 collective farms in the krai, 141 of them (96.5 percent) had begun to 
transition to guaranteed money payments. This “extremely important measure” overcame the 
shortcomings of the labor-day. Krotkov offered an explanation for its obsolescence, saying that it 
“had played its positive role in the past, but now we’re saying ‘so long’ to it.”96 Farm and district 
officials put these measures into practice but they often make mistakes. The head of the krai 
party committee’s agriculture department, S. I. Maniakin, reported that almost all collectives 
had achieved “positive results” in the transition. They had “improved organization and raised 
labor productivity, increased material incentives, . . . and decreased unproductive expenditures.” 
Nonetheless, he wrote, “spot inspections demonstrated that on the collective farms of certain 
districts, [officials] permit serious shortcomings to occur.”97 
One of these “shortcomings” illuminates how peasants could make demands on 
managers, reflecting the collective farmers’ fears that they would, as they had for decades, be 
taken advantage of again. Accountants sometimes computed monthly payments based not on 70 
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percent of a monthly proportion of the expected annual total of wages, but on 100 percent. As a 
result, the farm would run out of money if the collective farm’s income fell below the plan, a 
common occurrence given the vagaries of weather, disease, pests, and other variables. To 
compensate, the paymasters recorded in each farmer’s pay book a figure representing one-
twelfth a share of the whole expected wage, but paid her in cash or kind only 70 percent of that 
figure.98 The peasants’ relationship to the farm, as well as the way authorities comprehended the 
peasants become clear: farmworkers saw one figure in the records and received only 70 percent 
of that. Maniakin, expressing exasperation, wrote that that event “elicits unneeded rumors and 
doubts in the guaranteed nature of the collective farmers’ pay.”99 In use on “several” collectives, 
this method nullified the advantages of the new system. Policy-makers intended the final 30 
percent the nonguaranteed part of pay. It depended on the quality of the brigade’s harvest and, 
therefore, on the sum of the collective efforts of brigade members to harvest and produce more. 
Maniakin elaborated, “To implement this differentiated . . . pay when the collective farmers are 
assigned a sum for the whole year’s pay is impossible.” 100 
This meant that, in Maniakin’s terms, the “leveling” (uravnilovka) in the labor-day 
system that authorities hoped to eliminate remained when the new policy became practice. 
These cases might simply have been a case of poor accounting; however, the collective farmers 
repeatedly showed preferences for practices authorities denounced as leveling but which 
ensured that the farmers received their pay based on collective, rather than individual 
achievements.101 Verbitskaia documents this general problem, arguing that the pay scheme 
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inherited from Stalin had amounted to: “Everyone gets the same—very little.”102 Those 
benefitting from better land, operating advanced equipment, or assigned to grow crops that 
grew well and fetched a high procurement price were positioned to earn more under a system 
that differentiated wages. Those who did not have those advantages, however, could not make 
much. Moreover, long experience under Stalin had taught the peasants to prioritize the kinds of 
work that provided stable, reliable sustenance: the private plot. Moreover, they had justifiably 
come to understand that the collective farms were only intended to extract wealth from the 
countryside. Many peasants were unwilling to commit themselves to an intensive labor regime 
on the collective farm; they guarded their time jealously and continued longstanding preferences 
for the private plot. Thus they cared very little for incentives encouraging more intense labor, 
preferring to get a little in return for as little work as possible. 
As late as 1963, the problem of matching collective farmers’ pay to the productivity of 
their work remained a concern. The proceedings of a krai conference of economists on these 
issues outlined a solution for paying bonus payments above guaranteed wages, the money 
equivalent to a set percentage of the purchase price of the production beyond the plan, or the 
equivalent in kind of the commodity itself. Curiously, the percentages differed among products: 
for milk, meat, eggs, and similar products, it was 15 percent; for crops, 25 percent; for corn, 
however, the proportion reached a 50 percent premium.103 After a decade of the corn crusade, 
Soviet authorities, far from tiring of corn, continued to introduce measures designed to 
encourage collective farmers to grow it. 
The change in wage policies had to overcome collective farmers’ decades of experience 
when, under Stalin, they had been subject to open coercion. Krotkov claimed that 
mismanagement on the part of farm officials—not the policies themselves—had caused 
peasants to loose faith in the new wage system quickly because it did not appear to the farmers 
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any different than the old. He denounced those who “did not change their approach” to labor 
and pay. He cited a farm where the chairman and accountant had failed miserably, distributing 
less than one-half the planned amount in January and nothing at all in February and March. 
“What kind of guaranteed pay is that?” he asked indignantly. “They claimed that there was no 
money; however, sometimes we not only have to trust comrades, but also to verify [their 
actions].”104 Later inspections found some cases in which lack of funds explained the problem, 
but not in this case.105 A call to the bank director revealed that the collective in question had 
received the money, but its management had used it to cover other costs instead of paying 
wages. To the collective farmers, nothing had changed. Speaking on behalf of the collective 
farmers, Krotkov bemoaned, “‘As much as they cheated us before, now [the chairman] is still 
cheating us.’”106 Even when the claimed shortfalls in funds turned out to have been real, 
peasants likely responded with similar exasperation. As the example of Aleksandrov district 
shows, that problem was widespread: there, the majority of collectives fell at least one month 
behind.107 
The average collective farmer might easily detect duplicity in adapting the wage scales 
and work norms after a general meeting of collective farmers had approved them. Rain fell 
heavily in Stavropol krai in the early summer of 1959, with negative effects on corn, winter 
grains, and other crops. District and krai authorities pressured farm managers to alter basic 
features of the pay system to compensate, balancing their books to offset decreased earnings 
from smaller than expected harvests. A report to the krai’s party and state leaders on collective 
farm finances demonstrates a marked change in plans. Farms had earmarked 39 percent of their 
income for pay and had guaranteed monthly advances of 78.7 percent of that figure. The actual 
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income was 339 million rubles (or 13.5 percent) short of the anticipated income of 2.5 billion 
rubles, requiring managers to “reevaluate wage rates, work norms, and the pay of management 
and service personnel.” On the date of the report, the collective farms had already overspent the 
original budget for labor by some 112 million rubles; furthermore, this figure was 189.6 million 
over the new budget, adopted in light of the lower expected income. “Such incorrect 
management of the collective farm budgets,” the report declares, “has been roundly denounced 
by the krai agriculture department, district agricultural inspectorates, district soviets, and 
district party committees.”108 
Managers of collective farms did not flout these orders lightly, but did so because they 
had to keep collective farmers working. Thus they paid wages first, especially once collective 
farmers’ expectations for pay had risen in the late 1950s. To make up the difference, the farm 
managers declared their enterprises in financial difficulty and requested allowances from the 
state such as short-term credit and temporary relief from debt repayment. Krai officials 
describing the situation indignantly declared the managers’ pleas “completely baseless.”109 This 
shows that collective farmers’ pay after the reform still served as a shock absorber of sorts, 
allowing farms to mitigate negative effects of drought, flood, disease, and other unanticipated 
changes in income or expenditure. The state received its grain no matter what, but the peasants 
might see their “material incentives” fluctuate wildly from year to year. This encouraged rank-
and-file collective farmers to mistrust this new, more equitable payment system as much as the 
old, nakedly exploitative one. The leaders of brigades and collective farm managers, therefore, 
had to negotiate with them to ensure that they would turn up in the fields to work. Guaranteeing 
their pay, even in a year of low yields and falling incomes, contributed to this effort. Weighing 
the consequences of failure, some farm managers preferred allowing wages to rise to charges 
that they had not fulfilled the plan. Krai authorities repeatedly bemoaned these practices. 
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“Unfortunately,” one declared,” even the leaders of district organizations, party and soviet 
officials, have developed the incorrect opinion that guaranteed collective farm pay should be 
paid without any attempt to economize or create reserves.”110 Krai officials became exasperated 
with collective farm managers, who had privileged keeping their workforce happy over staying 
on the budget as determined by khozraschet. 
Collective farmers had little direct input into government and party policies, but their 
actions influenced the process by forcing leaders to respond to conditions on the ground. 
Collective farmers demonstrated their displeasure by refusing to go to work in the fields and, 
sometimes, even by leaving the farm altogether. In this case, they did so to express their 
approval of the guaranteed wages. In 1960, Novo-Aleksandrov district officials pressured farm 
managers to abandon the new system of pay. A report lambasting the district party leaders’ 
“superficial leadership of collective farms” explains the situation on the Tel'man collective farm. 
“The district committee changed this collective farm, among the strongest financially, back to 
labor-days in the spring. Within two days the collective farm management was ordered to revert 
to money wages because the collective farmers refused to return to the old system of paying for 
labor.”111 Collective farm managers in the Karachai-Cherkessk autonomous oblast, an 
administrative subdivision within the krai for the two national groups, received criticism for “a 
dependent (izhdivencheskii) attitude” about labor and pay policies, meaning that they expected 
the shortfall to be made up on account of someone else, in this case the government.112 The 
                                                        
110 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 8262, l. 102. 
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report complained that the original plan had called for 50.9 million rubles in pay out of a total 
income of 149 million rubles. Expected income had fallen to 112.9 million rubles because of low 
yields, a 24.2 percent decrease, while guaranteed wages paid had risen to 59.5 million rubles, a 
17 percent increase.113 The officials considered this “a result of the fact that collective farm 
management and primary party organizations do not honor the collective farm charter and do 
not follow the production-finance plans as if they were law.”114 Instead, they were guided by a 
realization that, if they did not pay their workers, the farms would produce even less. Failure to 
pay full wages in a timely fashion caused farmers to stay home, but also to vote with their feet in 
a more dramatic manner. A report from Novo-Aleksandrov district records that conditions “did 
not allow settling accounts with the collective farmers on time, as a result of which labor 
discipline fell and even caused the departure of a substantial part of collective farmers to 
locations outside the district.”115 The letters arrived from other districts of the krai, showing that 
struggles over pay and labor discipline were general, rather than local.116 
Despite cases of peasant discontent and refusal to work, these new policies appear to 
have noticeably improved labor-force participation. In the summer of 1959, an inspection found 
that the number of person-days worked had risen and more collective farmers were showing up 
in the fields. In the first two quarters of 1959, 11,800 more laborers worked at least one day, a 
rise of about 7 percent over 1958. They worked 2,153,100 more person-days, 11 percent more 
than 1958 and amounting to 4.5 percent more per worker. Officials judged this a positive result 
in light of labor shortages and noted that, more importantly, it had led to a jump in output: for 
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instance, farms produced 22 percent more milk and eggs.117 The number of person-days, which 
fluctuated based on weather and volume of work required, ranged from 285.5 million in 1957 up 
to 300.4 million in 1958 and then back down to 271.8 million in 1959. 
As late as the summer of 1960, reports continued to register the same complaints. In one 
district, the krai statistical agency found problems with khozraschet, including basic questions 
of planning, executing, and overseeing pay. Despite earlier assurances that farms had completed 
the transition to guaranteed wages, khozraschet remained another matter: only two of the 
district’s eight farms had completed the process, and one had not begun. The district party 
committee’s admonitions achieved almost nothing, as farm officials paid little heed to their 
orders to begin with. The report cites the defense of one collective’s senior accountant, who 
declared, “From January 1, 1960, to May 1, 1960, monthly khozraschet assignments [i.e. targets 
for production and economizing on labor and materials] were distributed for field work and 
animal husbandry. In actuality, these achieved nothing positive and, therefore, the brigades and 
departments refused to adopt khozraschet.” A neighboring collective farm, by contrast, had put 
everything in order: it had distributed plans and met them, improving efficiency and lowering 
production costs.118 
In August, a report from the chairman of another collective farm portrayed a transition 
far from complete, inhibited by the collective farms’ other financial burdens caused by the 
period’s other campaigns. This farm in Novo-Aleksandrov district had succeeded in paying its 
laborers for work only through April of that year, leaving it more than three months behind and 
owing more than 2.7 million rubles in back wages. The chairman claimed that the farm had a 
low rate of capital investment prior to 1958 and that, coupled with the low yields experienced as 
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a result of excessive rainfall in 1959, had decreased income. It had made only 1.8 million rubles 
on the grain harvest, for example, rather than the planned 7.1 million. In addition to back wages, 
the farm owed a further 4.7 million rubles to the state, representing the balance resulting from 
pressure on collective farms to pay for equipment, bought when the MTSs dissolved in 1958, not 
over several years, but in an impossibly short timeframe. A report by local officials documents 
that this was a wider problem: “We consider that it was premature to seek to collect the full cost 
of the machines purchased. This removed the possibility for the collective farms to pay the 
collective farmers in a timely manner, and to create the bank balances necessary to pay future 
wages and production costs, which significantly harmed their financial security.”119 In addition 
to machinery purchases, the collective farms had to finance a plan to increase their livestock 
production at the expense of the primary source— collective farmers’ private holdings. This 
largely consisted of discouraging individual livestock holding by purchasing peasants’ cattle, 
sheep, and hogs. Thus the farm in Novo-Aleksandrov district had borrowed more than 2 million 
rubles of the 2.85 million required to purchase 767 cows. The coercive campaign took place 
behind the thin screen offered by claims that the collective farmers, happy with the pay they 
received for work on the farm, willingly ceded their private livestock and purchased milk from 
state shops. As the collective chairman put it, “Because of the requests and desires of the 
collective farmers to give up personal cattle, the management purchased them on a strictly 
voluntary basis.”120 In first quarter of 1960, the cost of these livestock crowded out savings, as 
well as loan repayments, eventually requiring a total 148 million rubles across the krai. Krai 
authorities blamed abuses on the district officials who had ordered the purchasing campaign.121 
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Krai authorities pursued the financial reform to institute khozraschet and replace the 
labor-day with a guaranteed income to achieve two goals. On the one hand, they aimed to clarify 
how much a farm spent to produce a metric ton of corn, a hectare of wheat, or a kilogram of 
pork. On the other hand, officials viewed the new system as a superior method of appealing to 
“material interests” by offering a steady and reliable wage. Both served the purpose of achieving 
higher labor productivity and stimulating their widespread use. Khrushchev’s industrial farming 
principles required them to do this; they often failed due to poor management and ineffective 
labor practices 
* * * 
In an effort to consider labor, corngrowing, and everyday life at the micro level, this 
section concentrates on one farm in Stavropol krai. The V. I. Lenin collective farm was located in 
stanitsa Goriachevodsk, a settlement adjoining the Caucasus Mountains spa town of 
Piatigorsk.122  The fact that the farm boasted a newspaper, published three or four times a 
month in a print run of 1,000, indicates it was large and successful. Kolkhoznaia zhizn' 
(Collective farm life) and its content portrays the farm as an economic unit large enough that 
each farmer knew few beyond her own brigade, a subunit within the farm that more closely 
approximated the size of whole collective farms in northern parts of the country. The paper was 
first published in 1957, a period when many large and wealthy collective farms around the 
country acquired semiregular newspapers. The first issue of Kolkhoznaia zhizn' described its 
mission as an “operational auxiliary” (boevoi pomoshchnik) to the farm’s party committee and 
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managers, mobilizing and informing citizens by reporting on developments.123 
The annual cycle of planting, cultivating, harvesting, and preparing for the new season 
structured each year’s print run, and corn enjoyed a prominent position within that sequence. 
Corn’s importance to the farm’s operations, given the warm southern climate, is clear in the 
target yields for 1957 that the farm’s chairman, K. I. Agnaev, urged collective farmers to fulfill 
pledges necessary in order “to catch up with and overtake America,” as the campaign launched 
that spring required. Bringing in three or four metric tons of grain and twenty to twenty-five 
tons of silage per hectare, the farm would, in a stock phrase, “create a stable feed supply for 
socialized animal husbandry” and put itself among the most successful in the krai.124 Each May, 
headlines exhorted those planting corn to plant faster, better, and begin cultivation in a timely 
and efficient manner. They announced a particular work team’s pledge to “genuinely struggle for 
a high yield,” and reminded farmworkers to “carefully attend to the corn, not breaking the rules 
of agronomy.”125 
As the season progressed into early summer, cultivation became the most important 
task, and the newspaper employed all means at its disposal to ensure everyone fulfilled their 
duties. This included public shaming. The newspaper’s editors served as ombudsmen of sorts, 
allowing individuals and groups to bring an issue or problem to the attention of farm managers. 
For the 1957 season, the newspaper’s content makes clear that, while the farm planted its 
cornfields with tractors and machines, cultivation required manual labor. “The [female] 
collective farmers in work team no. 1 care for their plots, but six have not yet begun,” a story, 
written by the brigade leader, explained. “M. Boiko, a member of the work team, has not been 
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seen in the fields for three weeks. The brigade’s members hope that the work team of Comrade 
Miasoeva will not hold the whole brigade back, making it lag behind the vanguard work teams in 
caring for corn and other crops.”126 
Naming and shaming those who violated social customs was common not only in the 
cornfields. The newspaper singled out individuals and groups who violated a whole range of 
norms in work and daily life. Stories frequently condemned instances of drunkenness, while 
others reported the consequences of such transgressions, especially sanctions imposed by the 
collective farm’s management.127 The method was calculated to both prevent recidivism by the 
offenders, and to warn other residents of the penalty for bad behavior. The offenses noted were 
not always so severe: in some cases, individuals broke social norms.128 
Repeat offenders or culprits in more serious crimes might find their cases before the 
criminal-justice system. For example, several drivers collaborated to steal 158 kilos of sunflower 
seeds, sell them, and use the money to go on a bender.129 This incident illustrates a problem that 
brings corn back into focus: theft, as this chapter has shown, was a major problem, but not 
sufficient to account for more than a tiny fraction of low productivity. Theft of corn was most 
common during the harvest, when crops neared their maturity. In August 1957, a story 
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denounced a worker at one of the farm’s dairies for stealing feed, and demanded he be brought 
before the management for punishment: “S. Lutsenko was caught on the night of July 31 in the 
cornfield planted for silage, where he was harvesting corn for his own cow. People say that this is 
not the first incident in which S. Lutsenko has ‘procured’ feed in this manner.”130 That 
September, the management stipulated that any collective farmer caught taking even a little 
corn from the fields would not receive any bonus pay for that year.131 
Despite evident challenges, the V. I. Lenin collective farm was a large and apparently 
profitable one: In August 1962, chairman Agnaev, received a pochetnaia gramota, an honorary 
certificate of merit, from the krai party committee and soviet. Writing in support of Agnaev’s 
nomination, the secretary of the district party committee described the farm and its successes in 
production. From the accompanying biography of Agnaev, a picture of the farm itself emerges: 
trained initially as a teacher, Agnaev had entered service as the director of the local MTS during 
the krai’s recovery from German occupation. Large harvests and efficient operations followed. In 
1955, in a final round of Khrushchev’s collective farm amalgamation, Agnaev became chairman 
of one of the two farms that remained from the original twenty-two served by the MTS. That 
year, the collective comprised 2,000 households and 4,700 people, of whom 62 percent 
qualified as able-bodied. (The rest were children, disabled, or retired.) The farm had 13,000 
hectares of cropland, and produced 12,000–15,000 metric tons of grain annually, as well as 
fruits, vegetables, milk, meat and eggs in large quantities. By 1962, the farm’s production had 
risen substantially: its planned harvest of corn (35 tons per hectare), as well as output of 1,468 
tons of meat (or 2.5 times the 1955 figure) and 5,430 tons of milk (or 2.4 times the 1955 figure), 
proved to party officials the effectiveness of Agnaev’s management, which the district secretary 
characterized as “honest” and “conscientious.”132 Although large, profitable, and in good 
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standing with the krai leadership, the farm had to continue to raise production and to combat 
theft and drunkenness. 
To increase output, the farm participated in local corngrowing competitions against the 
nearby “Proletarskaia volia,” or “Will of the Proletariat,” collective, considered one of the finest 
in the territory. The Lenin collective farm had several farmers whom its newspaper held up as 
examples for others both in work in the cornfields and in life. One of them, N. I. Kaplun, led the 
work team that grew the largest harvest of corn, spearheading the farm’s efforts to best its 
neighbors in corngrowing. Taking to the pages of Kolkhoznaia zhizn’, the farm’s party secretary 
praised the organized daily life Kaplun led, his caring approach to work, and his attentiveness to 
fellow party members and collective farmers facing hard times.133 In other instances, the 
newspaper prioritized the appeal for higher output: an editorial during corn-cultivating season 
entreated everyone to follow the example of Kaplun, as well as E. Ul'ianik, a young woman 
considered the best corn grower in the “Will of the Proletariat” collective.134 Kaplun’s name 
appeared on the “Honor Roll,” a list of exemplary workers published periodically—as well as a 
physical billboard in a public place—for all to see.135 The example of Kaplun, Ul'ianik, and others 
contributed to naming and shaming: newspaper articles admonished those whose enthusiasm 
and commitment flagged. In June 1957, one said, “One must ask the brigade leaders, Comrades 
Zozuli and Morgatyi . . . when they will organize an actual socialist competition among the work 
teams for raising high yields of corn and other crops. The collective farmers, of course, do not 
want to lag behind in this important event begun by the work teams of N. Kaplun and E. 
Ul'ianik.”136 In fact, Kaplun became the object of attention for the whole territory, if not beyond, 
                                                        
133 P. Kovtun, “Kommunist dolzhen byt obraztsom vo vsekh otnosheniiakh,” Kolkhoznaia zhizn' 
(February 15, 1958): 2. 
134 “Posledovat' primery zvenevykh E. Ul'ianik i N. Kapluna,” Kolkhoznaia zhzin' (May 25, 1957): 1. For 
others, see: “Na puti k izobiliu,” Kolkhoznaia zhizn' (November 7, 1957): 1; and “N. I. Kaplun – 
nastoiashchii chelovek!” Kolkhoznaia zhizn' (November 7, 1958): 1. 
135 See, for just one example: “Doska pocheta,” Kolkhoznaia zhizn' (June 15, 1957): 1. 
136 “Sorevnovanie kukuruzovodov,” Kolkhoznaia zhizn' (June 25, 1957): 1. Similarly, the farm participated 
  354 
when a team from the North Caucasus Documentary Film Studio arrived to shoot footage of his 
work and life.137 
Comparisons with the “Will of the Proletariat” collective farm encompassed other areas, 
including social problems. At a meeting of the Lenin collective farm’s management to 
summarize the results of the first half of 1959, speakers singled out Comrade Nevreev, head of 
the corps of drivers who had caused so many problems, for failing to discipline his workers, and 
particularly one who crashed one of the farm’s Moskvich compact cars while drunk driving.138 
Head of one of the corn-growing work teams and a vanguard worker in her own right, a 
Comrade Fabrova complained that this was not a problem in “Will of the Proletariat” farm. 
“Much has been said about thieves, drunks, and moochers who are of no use to the collective 
farm,” she noted, asking, “Why do they not have any cases of theft on the ‘Will of the 
Proletariat?’ Because there, all members of the collective look after collective property. . . . We 
must follow the example of the collective farmers of ‘Will of the Proletariat’ farm and establish 
. . . oversight so that no one gets in the habit of carrying off [property].”139 Given that petty theft 
and alcohol abuse were pervasive, it is difficult to imagine that the neighboring farm had no 
problems at all; however, because there was little day-to-day contact between the farmworkers, 
it served as an example for goading those who might violate discipline into compliance. 
On January 1, 1959, the Lenin collective farm made the transition from labor-days to 
guaranteed payments. A report on an “open” party meeting—one the public could also attend—
described this transition. It highlighted the importance of “material incentives” designed to 
improve discipline and quality. Agnaev extolled the farm’s economic strength: milk production 
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had grown 42 percent since 1955, and corn plantings from 1,570 hectares to 2,435, while yields 
more than doubled, from 2.08 metric tons per hectare to 5.63—a yield that compared favorably 
to American averages of the period. He then outlined the new six-tiered system of assigning pay 
and labor norms: the former amount of work that earned one labor-day would earn thirteen 
rubles, the second of six grades. One paid lower than thirteen, and the highest at twice that level, 
while machine operators could earn bonuses boosting their pay to thirty-nine rubles. Finally, he 
outlined stipulations for the farm’s particular bonuses: “To reward corngrowers’ achievements, a 
brigade or work team overfulfilling its planned yield will earn ten extra rubles for every tenth of 
a metric ton of corn over five tons.” Here, too, the leaders of the collective pointed to the 
example of the neighboring “Will of the Proletariat” collective farm, which had shifted to this 
system earlier, perhaps as one of the experimental farms in 1957.140 “Material incentives” made 
the most out of a tough growing season the farm faced in 1959. A special set of rewards outlined 
for corn-growing work teams and brigades offered them bonuses for grain and silage, above and 
beyond their usual pay.141 The collective farm, furthermore, had just purchased equipment from 
the MTS: 56 tractors, 32 combines, 300 implements of various sorts, 60 trucks, and 7 cars. 
Additionally, electrification, irrigation, and various other means of production were constructed 
in 1958, suggesting the ongoing modernization and industrialization of the farm’s production.142 
Farm managers’ efforts to clarify the new system in the newspaper and at meetings 
notwithstanding, some collective farmers grumbled about its results. Six months into the 
experiment with guaranteed payments, some dissatisfied farmers maintained that the new 
system, just like the old, robbed them of earnings. In response, the farm’s chief accountant took 
to the newspaper to justify the system to “Those who say that pay is too low,” as the article’s title 
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put it. The potential to earn a guaranteed wage, along with efforts to stock the farm’s stores with 
goods and provide the farmers access to commodities such as grain at the state’s procurement 
price, ensured that those who worked made a fair wage that allowed them to purchase 
necessities. Addressing the complaints, he took as an example a collective farmer—not by 
chance a woman, given their typically lower wages. She had made only 423 (old) rubles in a 
month and deemed this too little. However, when broken down by the number of days worked 
and the daily wage, according to the farm official, this was equitable. For the nineteen days in 
the month she worked, she earned a wage of 23 rubles per person-day, or nearly double the 
amount considered the value of one labor-day. However, those nineteen days were only 73 
percent of the working days in the month, so if she had worked the full twenty-six days, the 
monthly wage would have amounted to 579 rubles.143 
The reformed system still had glitches. Because of “mistakes” in planning payments, 
“wages were distributed among the collective farmers of each brigade at the same level, 
irrespective of their individual fulfillment of the production plan. A leveling was carried out. . . . 
As a result of this, and also because the farm did not fulfill its plan for money income [due to too 
much rain], the farm’s management did not implement cost accounting (khozraschet) in the 
brigades.”144 Moreover, the collective farms of the krai did not fully put the system in practice, as 
the common charges of “leveling” demonstrated. Yet officials also voiced concern about the rates 
of pay and variation among them. They feared that peasants would become dissatisfied if the 
wages for the same work diverged widely from one collective farm to the next. For example, 
some collective farms paid as much as 37 percent more than others in the same district for the 
same work.145 Again, these troubles indicate the indirect influence collective farmers’ 
preferences had over wage practices. 
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Other evidence further indicates that this system was not completely successful, as in the 
case of the Lenin collective farm’s fifth brigade. In past years one of the farm’s best, the brigade 
completed its tasks in a timely fashion and even helped other brigades that fell behind. In July, 
however, Agnaev criticized it for lagging in cultivating corn and cutting hay. Nothing had 
changed; new machinery, in fact, had made production potentially more efficient. “The whole 
reason they trail is the group’s falling labor discipline and in its organization.” The party and 
brigade leaders became, in boilerplate language, “self-satisfied” and allowed their workers to 
shirk work on the collective farm. Of the 450 workers in the brigade, 259 of them were assigned 
to work in the fields, a typical proportion. The problem arose from the fact that of those, only 70 
or 80 turned out for fieldwork regularly. As a result of the actions of a “certain undisciplined 
element” among the workers, labor progressed slowly, while many complained about their low 
pay which, as the farm’s accountant had attempted to prove in June, resulted from a failure to 
work the full number of days.146 
The new pay, labor, and accounting policies reveal much about the day-to-day operation 
on farms, and the pressures to which managers, farmers, and district officials alike responded. A 
financial analysis of the Lenin collective farm demonstrates khozraschet at work. It outlines the 
practices on the farm and highlights the ways in which practices on the farm differed from the 
ideal. “The brigades themselves formulate the production plans,” as standard procedure 
required. “However, the kontrol’nye tsifry [the figures for the most important categories of 
production] are distributed from above by the farm management,” a measure that was, while 
not formally approved, widespread.147 The plans had to appear as if they had started at the 
bottom, directly in the brigade, but that was not actually the case even after planning reforms. 
“After formulating the production plans, the brigades submit them to the collective farm 
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management for review and approval. The collective farm managers then adjust these brigade 
plans,” the report concludes. This indicates that managers both shaped the plan at the beginning 
and altered it unilaterally later in the process. Everything points to a similar relationship 
between the farm management and district authorities, and the district authorities and their 
krai superiors.148 For example, one report denounced district committees for ordering the farms 
to trim nonproduction expenditures. Constructing schools and clinics, as well as providing social 
services, was necessary, but had to wait until the farm was in a position to cover the cost without 
harming its production capacity.149 Finally, “on the basis of the brigade production plans, 
confirmed by the management, enterprise-accounting tasks are formulated, approved, and 
distributed to the brigades.”150 Here, the authorities noted a failure—or unwillingness—on the 
part of managers to implement a differential system of pay that allowed bonuses to those 
individuals and brigades with superior results.151 
* * * 
The activities of the Lenin collective farm show that a transition took place in the late 
1950s from manual to mechanized labor in cultivating corn. In early February 1959, a series of 
articles raised awareness of the importance of machines for cultivating corn. On February 19, 
the newspaper’s editorial declared the Lenin farm “On the march for the corn harvest!”152 At a 
general meeting of representatives of each part of the farm, one brigade leader spoke about how 
efforts in 1958 to cultivate corn without manual labor had achieved good results, mirroring the 
nationwide campaign to adopt the methods associated with A. V. Gitalov, N. F. Manukovskii, 
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and others. 153 In all, the farm formed twelve such work teams that year.154 In June, the time to 
remove weeds from the corn plantings, problems became apparent as the fields became 
overgrown with weeds. Using the typical martial language, Kolkhoznaia zhizn' declared, 
“Comrade collective farmers! The battle for a high yield of row crops has entered the decisive 
phase. . . . Rainy weather has caused weeds to grow quickly, so we must devote everything to 
their elimination!”155 The results of an inspection, however, show that this was an aspiration, 
rather than a fact. An official from the Piatigorsk city party committee described how the fourth 
and sixth brigades had fulfilled their tasks, but others, such as the first, had fallen behind. In the 
fields belonging to one mechanized work team, the weeding was of poor quality. The leader of 
the team complained of machinery in poor repair, especially of dull blades on their cultivators. 
Despite “many requests to the chief machinist, Comrade Prutkov, to replace them, he remains 
deaf to our appeals. Thus we save a few kopecks and lose hundreds of rubles.” And the inspector 
found that this was the case, and not only in the first brigade, a situation leading to “instances of 
shoddy work.”156 
The corn campaign reached its apogee, measured in terms of number of hectares 
cultivated, in 1962, as Khrushchev’s pressure to cultivate the crop using full mechanization 
grew. This also proved true in Stavropol. Although policy since the December 1958 plenum, 
these measures required significant efforts to spread, and factories produced the necessary 
machinery slowly. In late December 1961, the Central Committee’s Bureau for the RSFSR 
distributed a directive entitled “On the spread and wide adoption of the vanguard methods for 
raising high yields of corn and sugar beet without resort to manual labor, according to the 
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method of V. A. Svetlichnyi and V. Ia. Pervitskii, machine operators in Krasnodar krai.” This 
longwinded order required attention from each party committee, not least of which in 
neighboring Stavropol krai. In March 1962, the krai authorities reported to the Central 
Committee Agricultural Department about the campaign: the krai’s newspapers, its radio, and 
its television had broadcast information about the new effort. Study of the required approach in 
“schools of vanguard methods” had advanced far, as 334 individuals had gone to learn alongside 
Svetlichnyi himself. The change in the way corn was cultivated is clear in the figures reported: a 
tiny number of individuals: 774 work teams, encompassing as few as four and as many as ten 
operators and drivers, pledged to cultivate 377,000 hectares of corn, or an average of 487 
hectares apiece.157 It is clear that this was a major change from practice most common in 1955, 
when one person took responsibility to weed at most one or two hectares. 
Despite this progress, difficulties remained. “In addition to the vanguard farms,” the krai 
party committee announced, “in Shpakovskii district there are also serious shortcomings in 
preparation for and planting of corn in the necessary timeframes.” The officials blamed the fact 
that work went on in one shift, not two. Workers often stood idle because machines 
malfunctioned or the soil in the fields was unprepared. On the “Zaria” collective farm, one team 
“badly regulated its planter, so that the seeds were poorly placed and not planted at the proper 
depth, and as a result the squares and clusters—required to eliminate weeds between the rows in 
both directions—were imprecise. Some machine operators had not learned to operate a new 
model of planter, and thus they did not use it at all in planting.” Local party bosses poorly 
oversaw work, did not raise the issue at their meetings, did not visit the farms, and used a 
“formalistic, cautious approach to the organizing planting.”158 To achieve the necessary results, 
officials required that “corn cultivation be at the center of the district party committee’s 
attention,” and that it “take measures for the mobilization of the entire able-bodied population 
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for carrying out cultivation of row crops.”159 These descriptions echo those of the opening phases 
of Khrushchev’s campaign: the equipment was new, but the difficulty in ensuring efficient 
operation remained much the same as eight years before. 
In March 1963, F. D. Kulakov spoke to a krai conference on agricultural development 
and outlined what he saw as the continued problems with an agricultural system that struggled 
to implement—or was against implementing—Khrushchev’s ambitions for industrial farming. 
The krai party boss naturally framed his critique in terms of the day’s ideological line, that this 
was “the period of full-scale construction of communism.” This required not slow, incremental 
developments, but revolutionary change, Kulakov said. He cited Khrushchev: “’Now we must 
double, triple output and not in forty years, but in just a few.’”160 To make that happen, 
everything had to be transformed overnight, Kulakov continued, “In organizing production, in 
labor and pay, and in management methods we retain much that is outdated, backward, and 
conservative, useful for extensive use of the land [i.e. not intensive, industrial farming 
practices]. All this holds back productive forces, holds back the rapid development of 
agriculture.” 161 He then outlined ways farms in the krai had failed to adopt innovative methods. 
Although he did not use the term, they were industrial farming technologies. Most importantly, 
he denounced what he viewed as inflated expectations for pay, without concomitant gains in 
production. He chided, “We must ensure that each farm pays all its workers in relation to the 
quantity and quality of their output.”162 
Other officials addressed their areas of specialization, such as land management and 
crop rotations. Another krai party committee official evaluated the changes in pay. From the 
first experiments with eliminating the labor-day system and instituting cash wages, there had 
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been problems. The norms and plans on which this system rested came from the authorities late 
and were “not based on accurate, rigorous information, but [were] calculated roughly [lit. “na 
glazok,” or “by eye”].”163 Finally, another official concluded that all of these reforms, although 
still in progress, “were based on the effort to expand material incentives for agricultural workers 
to boost agricultural output.”164 Kulakov warned his audience, “The system of pay for labor is 
determined by the character of production. We must remember that production influences pay, 
but pay, in its turn, makes labor more productive, and therefore this issue should be at the 
center of attention.”165 Here again, Soviet officials reinforced the connection between technology 
and productivity per hectare of land and person-day worked, all measures central to industrial 
farming. 
Kulakov’s description of the situation for rural citizens as consumers brings us to 
pressing concerns of the end of Khrushchev’s leadership, to the charges leveled against him by 
the former comrades removing him from power: his policies had not improved collective 
farmers’ living standards. Whereas the desperation evident in 1953 was past, in 1964 the 
peasants’ problem was frustrated expectations. Charging that Khrushchev’s policies failed to 
solve rural workers’ problems, his former comrades blamed lagging agricultural output on him. 
In particular, they attacked his pay policies: “The problem of farmworkers’ material incentives 
(material'naia zainteresovannost') has not been solved,” they declared. “Comrade Khrushchev 
has delivered many speeches and signed numerous memoranda, but the results have been 
insignificant.” In 1958, a collective farmer earned an average of 1.56 (new) rubles a day, but only 
1.89 rubles in 1963.166 The conclusion of Khrushchev’s opponents that a wage increase of 20 
percent was insignificant is suggestive of just how depressed wages had been before 1958, but 
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also that Khrushchev’s policies and public pronouncements had raised expectations. Collective 
farmers produced more and earned more, but the assumption was that their potential for higher 
output and earnings had risen faster than actual measurements of either. 
In terms of collective farmers’ lives, the changes in both the availability of goods and the 
rise in their expectations were visible. In 1963, Kulakov stated, “We know that supplying bread 
and other foods is an important material incentive for collective farmers not only because they 
are in the habit of stockpiling grain, but also because even a ruble earned cannot buy all needed 
goods in the state trade network.”167 It violated peasants’ sense of justice that they should 
produce goods such as meat and milk, but not have access to them in local shops. In 1960, the 
chairman of a stanitsa soviet in Stavropol krai, wrote a letter to Khrushchev describing how life 
was getting better for the collective farmers: “In the stores, you can buy whatever manufactured 
goods you want; there’s bread and flour, too.”168 Because their private plots were too small, 
peasants did not grow grain, but instead vegetables. They therefore had to acquire bread or flour 
through the collective farm in return for their labor as an in-kind payment, or use their income 
to purchase it in state stores; they might also sell private-plot produce in the collective farmer 
market to earn the necessary cash.169 Grain was one thing, but milk and dairy products were 
another, because they were unavailable in rural stores. “It’s not good that every year our stanitsa 
ships a large quantity of milk to the towns, but for some reason milk products do not make it to 
our stores,” the chairman lamented. He explained that inquiries to the authorities revealed that 
no one had ordered the sale of milk products in rural areas. “I think that this is not right (ne 
sovsem pravil’no) . . . that [collective farms] sell [milk] to the state and only enough to raise 
calves remains on the farm, but nothing for use on the collective farm, not even for the nursery.” 
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“Nikita Sergeevich!” he concluded, “I ask you to tell us how to solve the problem of supplying the 
people with milk products.”170 These statements suggest that peasants’ motivations were 
comprehensible if considered in terms of their sense of justice—their moral economy. They 
responded to “material incentives” not because they wanted to raise production to achieve some 
abstract goal or to ensure future abundance, but because they hoped to earn more money and to 
procure goods that they could not produce for themselves. 
* * * 
This examination of labor, mobilization, and material incentives has demonstrated the 
evolution of the system that Khrushchev inherited from Stalin. After 1953, coercion declined in 
severity and frequency because it had proven ineffective. In principle and largely in practice, 
unpaid labor on the collective farms became a thing of the past. Threats and punishments 
remained, but neither had as great an effect as might be imagined. Peasants did not fear 
punishments because the meetings of collective farmers refused to vote to confirm them, or 
because the sanction did not disadvantage them or threaten their vital interests. Thus many 
expelled from the collective farms kept their private plots anyway. Similarly, punishments for 
violations such as theft and drunkenness, although potentially severe, saw only sporadic 
enforcement. Rather than a serious detriment to farms’ output, these acts were symptoms of 
deeper dissatisfaction that decreased productivity. Moral incentives, as chapter 5 suggested, 
succeeded in some small way in demonstrating to the collective farmers that their labor had 
value, a contrast to Stalin-era policies that made their status as second-class citizens apparent. 
Some of that reality, however, held over into the Khrushchev period, when peasants continued 
to live without pensions and internal passports, improvements that became a reality only in the 
era of L. I. Brezhnev. 
Material incentives to work on the collective farm increased. Tens of thousands of 
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peasants working on collective farms in the postwar period had received in return nothing but 
the right to a heavily taxed private plot. By the mid 1950s, however, reforms had curbed the 
worst of these abuses. Beginning in wealthy regions such as Stavropol krai and eventually across 
all oblasts and farms, pay became monthly, rather than a conditional, uncertain, and rare 
occurrence. These changes in the collective farmers’ lives did not make them efficient cultivators 
of corn. The evidence supports the conclusion that under Stalin the state had subjected the 
peasants to a “ruthless” labor regime that robbed them of mobility and control over their labor. 
The system of collective farms struggled under Khrushchev, as Roy and Zhores Medvedev have 
argued, in part because the collective farmers had little avenue for personal initiative, but also 
little incentive to fully commit to planting, cultivating, and harvesting corn—or any other crop.171  
The lack of machines and unfamiliarity of corn did constrain the productivity of early efforts to 
grow it, but even by the early 1960s, when those technologies became common, labor 
productivity lagged. 
Life in the Soviet Union’s rural communities improved during the Khrushchev period. 
Goods remained difficult to “acquire,” yet there were more of them than before. As the charges 
against Khrushchev’s policies leveled against him in October 1964 suggest, this was not only a 
problem of policy and of carrying it out, but also one of raised expectations. The party expected 
ever-higher production and rates of growth outpacing the rate of investments as farms brought 
latent capacity into production—for example by replacing low-yielding crops with high-yielding 
corn. This was the central idea of Khrushchev’s vision of industrial farming, and he enshrined it 
in policy documents, including the Seven-Year Plan (1959–65) and the Third Party Program. 
Urban dwellers expected to consume more meat, milk, and eggs, to buy them more cheaply, and 
to find greater variety and quantity of other goods in the shops, too. Rural dwellers similarly 
expected their lot to improve. More mechanization and other capital investments raised 
productivity, but not sufficiently to realize Khrushchev’s vision. This left his promises to the 
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peasants—just like those to urban consumers—only partially fulfilled, giving rise to 
dissatisfaction.
  367
CONCLUSION 
In early 1958, party and government officials in western Russia’s Smolensk oblast 
requested funds to consolidate the tiny villages scattered across the forested countryside into 
larger ones because the state did not procure its expected share of the output of the surrounding 
land. The 8,515 settlements in the oblast were organized into 860 collective farms and 78 state 
farms. Some 2,983 (35 percent) had fewer than 15 households (or dvory, sg. dvor, consisting of 
a collective farmer’s house, outbuildings, and private plot). After campaigns in the late 1940s 
and 1950s to amalgamate small collective farms into larger ones, these settlements were as 
much as several kilometers away from the farm managers. Telephones were rare and road 
connections were poor, and therefore the peasants in those communities lived beyond the 
immediate reach of authorities.	To illustrate the problem, oblast officials cited the example of 
the hamlet of Galeevka, one of the 541 settlements that had fewer than five homesteads. 
Galeevka was located three kilometers from the offices of the brigade, itself a subdivision of the 
Karl Marx collective farm. Of the twelve collective farmers making up the four families in 
Galeevka, only two fulfilled the annual labor-day quota. The crops they grew went to waste from 
the state’s point of view: the peasants cultivated only 26.6 of 49 hectares, and the state procured 
from 14 hectares of rye a total of only 1.5 metric tons. The peasants had taken the remainder of 
the rye,	as well as all the wheat grown in a field of four hectares. They also kept more livestock 
than the law allowed, and sold neither meat nor milk to the state.1 To gain a share of the output 
and labor of the residents of these outlying settlements, oblast authorities petitioned Moscow for 
funds to incorporate these 25,890 households into existing villages.2 The USSR Council of 
                                                        
1 RGASPI, f. 556, op. 14, d. 106, l. 22. 
2 They estimated the cost at 3,000–5,000 old rubles apiece, giving the project a cost of 130 million rubles. 
  368 
Ministers approved the proposal on the grounds that it would “enhance the collective farms’ 
economic health,” but required the collective farms to foot the bill.3 
Galeevka was an extreme case: the cities would not have been fed if all collective farms 
had fallen so far outside the state’s control. However, the situation represented a microcosm of 
the Soviet countryside and the state’s control over society; or rather, the limits of it. Try as they 
might to reshape people, economies, society, and basic interactions with the natural world, 
especially agriculture, Soviet leaders did not easily realize their ideals of high modernism—to 
use James Scott’s term—and prometheanism, suggesting that they had less dominance over 
society and nature than they supposed, and scholars have long presumed. Sometimes, as in the 
case of these Smolensk oblast officials, they acknowledged barriers to their capacity to govern 
efficiently and reconstruct the world according to their vision of socialism; their efforts to do so, 
however, speak volumes about the way the Soviet system worked. 
In this dissertation, I have argued that the actions of Khrushchev, of ministers, of local 
authorities, of collective farm managers, and of collective farmers themselves combined to 
further the leader’s plans, but just as often to hold them back. These individuals and groups, 
including the Smolensk oblast leaders and the villagers of Galeevka, enabled the system to 
function and permitted the dysfunction that constrained it, leading to the underperformance of 
agriculture, of industrial technologies, and of corn. By acting within the system’s boundaries, 
and by pushing against them, these actors augmented already formidable climatic and technical 
challenges, making certain the underperformance of farms. A rigid hierarchy, an uncontrollable 
society, an uncooperative officialdom, and the formidable diversity of local conditions made the 
system resilient and flexible, and therefore highly difficult to meaningfully reform. 
Corn did not fail because it was a “harebrained scheme,” was self-evidently unfit for the 
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USSR on the grounds of climate, was too technically challenging for farms, or for any other 
single reason. True, it confronted all of these limitations and more.	The leader’s impetuous 
nature; management practices ingrained in the system; disobedient local officials; farm 
managers; the peasants themselves; and—although many analyses have overemphasized them—
technological and climatic constraints all combined to cause the apparent failure of the corn 
crusade. I use the words “apparent failure” to describe its outcome because, although it is true 
that collective and state farms did not achieve the yields Khrushchev anticipated, the industrial 
farming principles he advocated provided the basic doctrine for subsequent agricultural 
development. In other words, Khrushchev’s campaign itself failed, but it succeeded in 
introducing principles that subsequently defined Soviet agricultural policy and investment. 
The climate did hamper Khrushchev’s endeavor. When planted in areas with an 
unsuitable climate, corn required farmers to apply best practices, use technologies effectively, 
and complete work in a timely fashion. Reflecting unacknowledged assumptions about the 
unsuitability of corn, collective farmers and managers often did none of these, making certain 
that corn did not produce well, and thus fulfilling their expectations.	Corn did not grow in the 
far north, a fact Khrushchev often, but not always, recognized. Nonetheless, even in regions 
where it had the potential to succeed, such as Krasnodar krai, the Moldavian SSR, and 
southwestern Ukraine, farms brought in smaller harvests than they might have, leading to a 
decade of small harvests and disappointing output. Corn struggled because it was unfamiliar to 
farmers, as were the techniques Khrushchev selected for growing it. 
Moreover, the Communist Party and Soviet state governed the countryside with difficulty 
because peasants continued everyday practices that hamstrung Khrushchev’s reforms. Through 
their labor and interactions with the collective farms, peasants saw to their own interests and 
reacted to policies affecting their lives, both of which shaped future policies. As second-class 
citizens, collective farmers maneuvered within the collective farm system to gain advantages. 
They stole corn, performed needed labor begrudgingly, and pursued their individual interests, 
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actions that required local and higher authorities to respond. To motivate farmers, authorities 
reformed wages in hopes of raising labor productivity, a goal only partially realized by 1964. 
Archival evidence also shows that the local officials and farm managers hypothetically in 
charge of carrying out Khrushchev’s policies were similarly uncontrollable. As a result, the corn 
crusade did not meet his expectations, and officials’ unwillingness to follow his agricultural 
program hampered the leader’s offensive to bring industrial farming technologies to the 
countryside. His reforms thus did not achieve the high output and labor productivity he 
imagined, or that which the foreign models on which he drew suggested was possible. Habits 
endemic to the Communist Party and Soviet government bureaucracies also limited the practical 
authority Khrushchev had over policy. Even potentially useful policies floundered because the 
centrally planned economy and the inflated bureaucracy built into the system under Stalin 
circumvented Khrushchev’s attempts to reshape them. Bureaucrats pursued their own ends, 
ignoring or even contravening superiors’ orders while creating the appearance that they had 
complied with the given moment’s campaign. Officials fulfilled corn-planting plans, but 
neglected to see that the crop yielded the feed that it might have. Farms planted on the least 
productive land, applied no fertilizer, sent insufficient numbers of collective farmers to weed it, 
refused to use scarce agricultural machines to cultivate it, and harvested it too early in the 
season, before it was fully mature. Any one of these practices might have resulted in a small 
harvest, which confirmed the skepticism of the crop common among officials and the populace. 
Local authorities likewise used duplicity to conceal low yields, making change in republics, krais, 
oblasts, and districts more difficult. In Lithuania, the local party and government perpetrated 
mass fraud by reporting that they had plowed up their pastures and planted corn, while actually 
preserving the orthodox crop rotations better suited to the local climate. Thus center-periphery 
relationships also complicated carrying out the corn crusade. 
Khrushchev’s actions and rhetoric deserve a substantial measure of blame. Soviet 
political culture made the leader’s word law. Worse still, the First Secretary berated anyone who 
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advised caution, brooking no opposition to his policies. His preference for corn became an 
ideological article of faith, and consequently alternative crops did not receive a hearing. Thus at 
a conference in Stavropol in the rush to plant corn everywhere in 1955, when an agronomist 
spoke in favor of sorghum, a crop better suited to the hot, dry conditions of the krai, no one paid 
attention because his technically sound suggestion contradicted the party line.4 Demands to 
expand corn plantings fivefold in 1955 alone gave officials and farmworkers little time to 
prepare, resulting in low yields that gave the corn crusade an inauspicious start. In 1957, 1958, 
and 1959, Khrushchev escalated demands for the high yields needed “to catch up with and 
overtake America,” which resulted in mass fraud and scandals, rather than the large harvests of 
corn and plethora of meat dairy products he expected. His campaigns against the standard 
grassfield system of crop rotations,	or travopol'e, introduced still more uncertainty into land 
management and farm operations. Requiring farms to replace pastures with corn grown using 
capital-intensive industrial farming methods, his policy put potentially more economical and 
sustainable solutions at a disadvantage. Although it later bore fruit, his program after 1961 to 
apply more synthetic fertilizers and chemical herbicides had too little time to succeed in the few 
years of leadership he had left. The institutionalized mania for corn as a panacea forced farms to 
neglect seeds, machinery, and techniques for growing a range of crops that, together with corn, 
might have solved the fodder problem. 
Despite Khrushchev’s	seemingly rash decision to make the USSR a corngrowing nation, 
he did not choose the crop on a whim. I have argued that Khrushchev consistently pursued an 
approach that was part of a global trend in agriculture. Developing the parts of industrial 
farming already present in the Soviet system, he furthered reforms based on the models of 
industrial farming he saw spreading around the globe. Information gleaned by	sending 
delegations to the US helped make modern agriculture the foundation for Soviet farming 
practices. Consequently, the USSR followed a path of technological development related to that 
                                                        
4 GANISK, f. 1, op. 2, d. 6539, l. 42. 
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of other industrialized countries in the postwar period. Khrushchev also envisioned grafting 
these methods to the socialist system in hopes of making the USSR a model that might spread to 
newly independent countries of the Third World, giving his ideals some influence over 
developments in what became the Green Revolution. Khrushchev’s globally-inspired plan to put 
industrial farming methods to use on collective and state farms was a sound one, but his own 
failings and those of the uniquely Soviet system doomed them to underperform. 
The practices that limited corn harvests were widespread and chronic problems. In 
December 1964, months after Khrushchev’s ouster, two economists, M. Ia.	Lemeshev and B. 
Solov'ev, wrote to the Central Committee to offer an analysis of Soviet corn cultivation and to 
plead for official backing to publish their book on it. Each worked at Gosplan’s Economic 
Research Institute, where Lemeshev headed a department and Solov'ev was a senior researcher. 
Their institutional backing and connection to Gosplan indicates they had access to the best 
information available—although even that data was problematic. Making their case to the 
country’s new leaders, they highlighted the policy’s failure “to properly account for various 
regions’ natural and economic particularities, as well as the farms’ material and technical 
capacities. As a result, techniques for cultivating the crop were adopted formulaically 
(shablonno).”5 Noting the ubiquitous propaganda devoted to corn, they considered the 
impression it created harmful, because it publicized only the positive examples of a few 
“vanguard” farms.6 Lemeshev and Solov'ev offered data to support their argument that corn was 
an economic disaster because officials had forced farms to plant it despite inappropriate climate, 
with no accounting for costs, and without ensuring that the collective and state farms could 
plant, cultivate, and harvest the crop in a timely fashion. Analyzing each locale’s prospects, they 
found that even in regions with hospitable conditions, such as southwestern Ukraine or 
                                                        
5 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 84. 
6 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 149. 
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Krasnodar krai, harvests remained alarmingly small.7 Even in places and years with favorable 
weather, much corn was harvested before it ripened. Typically as much as 50 percent of the 
cropland was harvested prior to “milky-wax maturity,” meaning that the feed harvested had only 
one-half the nutrients and calories of hay and pasture grasses, and it cost more to produce. In 
some years, as much as 70 percent of the crop was harvested in this way.8 Furthermore, the 
economists found that silage yields actually fell after Khrushchev’s efforts between 1958 and 
1964 to lower production costs by introducing more machines to do the work required to grow 
corn.9 Lemeshev and Solov'ev drew three conclusions about why farms harvested the crop so 
early: first, they lacked the machines needed to do the work, a result of the bureaucracy’s 
mismanagement of the task of manufacturing these implements. Second, the farms’ supplies of 
livestock feed began to run short in late summer since they had largely replaced their pastures— 
on which they traditionally fed livestock during that season—with corn at Khrushchev’s 
instigation. They therefore had to harvest corn to maintain a feed supply. Third, the farms faced 
time constraints imposed by the crop rotations of southern regions, where winter grains 
followed corn. This meant that farms had to harvest and plow the fields, as well as plant the 
wheat, before frosts came, a further incentive to bring corn in early.10 
Thus Khrushchev, the government, and local officials share blame for the farms 
harvesting the corn at this stage; the corn crusade did not live up to expectations because of 
interacting technical, political, climatic, and economic reasons. Despite this, Lemeshev and 
Solov'ev concluded that the USSR should not abandon corn production. It had promise in warm 
regions such as the Moldavian SSR and parts of Ukraine, as well as on irrigated land in a wider 
                                                        
7 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 92. 
8 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, ll. 86–87. 
9 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 88. 
10 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, ll. 89–90. 
  374
range of drier regions.11 In most locales, however, they prescribed a return to the grasses that 
Khrushchev had rejected, repairing the damage caused by high expenditures to produce corn 
and the resulting low yields.12 They insisted that nothing should be done “formulaically,” and 
that efforts to reduce corn plantings should not swing to the “opposite extreme.”13 
These conclusions and recommendations are recognizable in the policies, if not the 
rhetoric, that followed. Soviet farms did not forswear corn, as some scholars have suggested by 
wrongly claiming that corn receded into obscurity following Khrushchev’s removal. In fact, it 
remained a regular feature of the farm economy, albeit one far less prominent in propaganda. 
After reaching a peak of over 37 million hectares in 1962, the amount of corn planted began to 
fall. Khrushchev’s statements and official statistics alike bear this out, showing a 20 percent 
reduction in 1963 and 1964. In December 1963, Khrushchev conceded that farms should use 
synthetic fertilizer and chemical herbicides on whatever crop local conditions favored, not 
automatically on wheat, corn, sugar beets, or any other single crop. “Why is Khrushchev, who 
agitated so much for adopting corn, now sounding the retreat?” he asked rhetorically. “We must 
not be afraid to reevaluate crop structures and, if necessary, to limit corn planting in dry zones 
and plant high-yielding varieties of wheat, barley, pulses, and sorghum.” Instead of seeing corn, 
or structural reforms, or any other single program as the one solution, he promoted a package of 
measures designed to “intensify” production, getting more out of labor and capital by more fully 
realizing industrial farming principles. Nonetheless, he still expressed enthusiasm for corn: 
“This is not relevant to irrigated lands. On irrigated lands, corn gives higher yields than any 
other crop.”14 Medvedev and Medvedev incorrectly conclude that the declining hectarage of 1963 
                                                        
11 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 146. 
12 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 97. 
13 RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 103. 
14 Khrushchev, Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR, 128. Lemeshev and Solov'ev support this conclusion, 
finding that whereas wheat produced only 28 percent more on irrigated lands, corn yields were some 220 
percent higher. RGANI, f. 5, op. 45, d. 368, l. 101. 
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and 1964 gave way to a subsequent precipitous decline: “The crop had become so unpopular 
during Khrushchev’s time in office that in 1965 the amount planted fell below the 1940 level. 
Even those [collective farms] where it had been a success now refused to plant corn! Silage corn 
decreased at a double rate.”15 Yet Jasny reports that plantings in 1940 were just 2.4 million 
hectares, all for grain.16 Official statistics published at the end of the 1960s place the total 
amount of corn planted for grain in 1965 at 3.2 million hectares.17 The sudden disappearance of 
the relentless agitation for corn meant that officials had no incentive in 1965 to overstate this 
figure. Medvedev and Medvedev may have intended to highlight that the percentage of cropland 
devoted to corn had fallen to equal that of 1940: because Khrushchev had expanded the total 
cropland, 3.2 million hectares was 1.4 percent of the total, equal to the proportion of 1940. The 
Medvedevs’ claim, however, leaves out the much larger number of hectares planted for silage 
and green fodder. Far from falling radically, these amounted to some 20.2 million hectares in 
1965, a decline from the peak reached in 1962, but similar to other recent years. For instance, 
the 1965 figure was only 2.9 million hectares less than that for 1960. Official statistics further 
confirm that the 3.2 million hectares planted for grain in 1965 was the lowest annual total for 
any year in the remainder of the decade: by 1970, it had risen to 4.2 million hectares. Silage 
plantings to produce livestock feed persisted, declining only by about 10 percent, from 20.2 
million hectares in 1965 to 18 million in 1970.18 Plantings for grain fell to just under 3 million 
hectares in 1980, but rebounded to surpass 4.5 million in 1987.19 In 1980, farms planted 17.2 
                                                        
15 Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 128. Later, they write, “In the spring of 1965, when the farmer 
was given freedom of choice, corn acreage sharply decreased.” Ibid., 182. 
16 Jasny, Khrushchev’s Crop Policy, 141. 
17 USSR Council of Ministers Central Statistical Department, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR, 119. 
18 Ibid., 119–130. 
19 USSR Council of Minsters Central Statistical Department, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo SSSR: Statisticheskii 
sbornik (Moscow: “Finansy i statistika, 1988), 70 
  376
million hectares of corn for fodder, a figure that grew to 18 million hectares in 1987.20 Corn 
grows today in the fields of most post-Soviet states. In the Russian Federation, for example, 
plantings for grain rose from 798,000 hectares (.9 percent of the total cropland) in 2000 to 2.06 
million (2.7 percent) in 2012, while plantings for feed declined from 3.7 million hectares (4.3 
percent) to only 1.4 million hectares (1.8 percent) over the same period.21 Reports of corn’s 
demise were greatly exaggerated. It was only Khrushchev’s career that had come to an end in 
1964. 
Corn was and remains a prevalent part of the culture in post-Soviet states, where people 
continue to associate Khrushchev with corn and corn with Khrushchev. The Soviet 1960s were 
defined in part by the ubiquity of corn propaganda. Aleksandr Genis and Petr Vail' describe the 
atmosphere of the period: if the USSR had to overtake America, it would do it in just three years; 
and “if corn must be planted, then plant it from the subtropics to the Arctic.” This they ascribe to 
Khrushchev’s “impulsive dogmatism.”22 This legacy of the era finds many contemporary forms: 
his nickname, kukuruznik, remains in place. Souvenir nesting dolls [matroshki] depicting 
historic Russian leaders from V. I. Lenin to V. V. Putin include a grinning Khrushchev with an 
ear of corn in his hand. Marketing Thaw-era kitsch to diners, a restaurant in central Kyiv 
complements period cuisine with appropriate décor, complete with images of corn adorning the 
front door, which serves as a portal into the Soviet past. The post-Soviet press often runs stories 
about Khrushchev’s fascination with corn.23 It even has been captured in marble: in Krasnodar 
                                                        
20 Ibid., 192 
21 Federal'naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Sel'skoe khoziaistvo, okhota i okhotnich'e khoziaistvo, 
lesovodstvo v Rossii: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Rosstat, 2013), 76–77. The total grain crop in 2012 
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22 Vail' and Genis, Shestidesiatye, 203. 
23 For some of the many examples, see: A. Muravlev, “‘Potemkinskaia’ shtabka dlia Khrushcheva,” 
Al'taiskaia pravda (April 17, 2009); G. Petrov, “V SShA vspominaiut Nikitu Sergeevicha,” Novye izvestiia 
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krai, the local association of seed corn producers erected a statue to Khrushchev in May 2005 
bearing the dedication, “To the great champion of corn.” The local response was mixed: the 
older generation recalled the era’s spaceflights	and queues for bread, while the young simply 
shrugged their shoulders. Reflecting on the Khrushchev era’s legacy of optimism, the 
chairperson of the association named his generation “children of corn,” oddly mirroring M. S. 
Gorbachev’s description of his generation of reformers as “children of the Twentieth Party 
Congress.”24 Rather than ending abruptly in October 1964, collective memory of corn and the 
Khrushchev era finds expression in post-Soviet fields, restaurants, and public monuments. 
The Krasnodar seed corn producers’ enthusiasm notwithstanding, Khrushchev and his 
policies have been generally reviled in the five decades since his fall. Agricultural policies have 
fallen on the negative side of the scale, while his moves to empty the labor camps and pursue de-
Stalinization contribute to the positive attitude of some.25 This resulted from politics of his 
removal and his successors’ efforts to condemn his policies. When the corn crusade and 
programs to adopt industrial agriculture did not meet his expectations, he denounced the 
leviathan bureaucratic machine he nominally controlled. His ceaseless and intense criticism of 
the apparat portrayed them as responsible for the spasmodic functioning of the economy, lax 
administration, and Riazan-style scandals. Collaborating to oust Khrushchev with nearly 
universal support from the Central Committee and bureaucratic elites, his former comrades 
                                                        
(August 28, 2009): 2; A. Gasiuk, “V Aiove po-russki,” Rossiiskaia gazeta (August 31, 2009): 5; O. Sul'kin, 
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24 S. Perov, “Ot blagodarnykh ‘detei kukuruzy’,” Novye Izvestiia (May 24, 2005): 7. 
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that Khrushchev ranked fifth of seven twentieth century leaders, with 6 percent of Russian respondents 
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expressed their own opinions of Khrushchev’s policies: “adventurist,” “irresponsible,” “ill 
conceived,” “irrational,” “unscientific,” and more. In a twist of fate, the 1964 growing season that 
followed the previous year’s disaster produced a bumper crop, but the representatives of the 
apparat pressed home their attack on Khrushchev. They explained away the previous five 
disappointing years by heaping blame on Khrushchev’s leadership and policies alone, shifting 
attention from themselves and the apparat. The speech of G. S. Zolotoukhin, party secretary of 
Tambov oblast, at the Central Committee plenum on agriculture in March 1965, captures this 
point: 
An anti-Marxist, subjective, volunteerist approach to agriculture has been 
allowed in recent years, causing much damage. At plenums, in print, and in 
directives it was mistakenly reported that our farms had everything, or nearly 
everything, needed for development. Every problem was the fault of the local 
officials themselves, who have become scapegoats. At the same time, 
fundamental questions of agriculture have not been resolved. Force was used. 
Speeches were pronounced about local initiative, but nothing was done. A 
scientific approach, an analysis of the actual state of things was supplanted by 
harebrained scheming [prozhekterstvo]. Because of this subjective approach, no 
one in the planning agencies ever defended the interests of agriculture or paid 
attention to the needs of this fundamental economic sphere. From year to year, 
they trimmed finances as well as material and technical aid, while attempting to 
extract as much wealth as possible.26 
Khrushchev’s name remained absent from the indictments—as it would until the era of 
Gorbachev’s reforms—but the message was clear. Zolotoukhin and the others reversed 
Khrushchev’s charges that local authorities had failed to bring sound plans to fruition, turning 
the now disgraced former First Secretary into the scapegoat for all that ailed Soviet farms. 
Ukrainian party boss P. E. Shelest stated at the same plenum, “Violation of the laws of economic 
development resulted in adventurist policies. We all know the slogans ‘to catch up with and 
overtake in a few years the USA in meat and milk production’ . . . and ‘today we live well, and 
tomorrow we will live better.’ And yet there are lines for bread.”27 Although they contain a grain 
of truth, the charges assigned no culpability to the system, or to the party officials whom 
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27 RGANI, f. 2, op. 1, d. 780, l. 72. 
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Zolotoukhin or Shelest represented. Having ousted Khrushchev in October 1964, the new 
leaders reassessed the situation confronting farms.	Their attacks on Khrushchev 
notwithstanding, they continued the Soviet Union’s embrace of the industrial-framing principles 
Khrushchev had promoted with such vigor: they invested in machines, chemicals, infrastructure, 
and other projects, achieving modest returns in meat, milk, and eggs during the 1960s and 
1970s. They even let farms continue to plant corn. 
Nevertheless, the apparat’s representatives helped define conventional evaluations of 
Khrushchev. Official Soviet histories of the Brezhnev period blamed the First Secretary for 
agricultural failings	without ever naming him. Even nonconformist accounts reflected this 
stance: dissident historians Roy and Zhores Medvedev considered Khrushchev’s early policies 
reasonable, and later ones ill conceived and impossible to implement.28 During Gorbachev’s 
reforms, conservative critics such as I. V. Rusinov savaged Khrushchev’s initiatives in terms 
derived from the apparat’s critique. He wrote in an official journal of Communist Party history 
about three “superprograms” (the Virgin Lands, corn, and livestock) that by each failing 
individually constituted a further collective “failure,” amounting to a total of four.29 Textbook 
explanations of the corn crusade emphasize climatic and technical factors and Khrushchev’s 
blindness to them. One concludes, “Khrushchev’s 1955 scheme to turn vast areas of arable earth 
into Iowa-like cornfields to feed both livestock and humans turned sour because of unsuitable 
soil and climate and popular resistance to eating corn. . . . Agriculture remained the weakest link 
in the system.”30 Historical analyses emphasizing Khrushchev’s overwhelming authority and the 
powerlessness of others capture only some of the problems, while reflecting the assumptions of 
                                                        
28 Medvedev and Medvedev, Khrushchev, 117–28. 
29 Rusinov, “Agrarnaia politika KPSS,” 43. 
30 Catherine Evtuhov and Richard Stites, A History of Russia since 1800: Peoples, Legends, Events, 
Forces (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 437. 
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the Central Committee plenums of October 1964 and March 1965.31 With the benefit of insights 
that archival access allows, I have found that Khrushchev deserves some blame, but so do the 
Soviet system and the bureaucracy. As the success of his policies’ counterparts abroad suggests, 
Khrushchev’s agricultural initiatives had the potential to provide the abundance he envisioned; 
Soviet farms’ inability to do so reflects the weaknesses of the system. Indeed, the Soviet Union 
increased its investment in agriculture under Brezhnev, but also expanded its grain imports. 
That system, and its weaknesses, remained in place, resisting measured and cautious 
reforms under Brezhnev, such as those associated with Premier A. N. Kosygin. The problems of 
labor and productivity facing Khrushchev in industry, and especially in agriculture, presaged 
those confronted by Gorbachev. When the Soviet reformer, who first became engaged in politics 
as a Komsomol and Communist Party official in Stavropol krai beginning in the late 1950s, 
launched his initial program in 1985, he introduced the concept of “the human factor” alongside 
“acceleration” and “perestroika,” his efforts to restructure the economy and modernize 
productive capacity. He announced efforts to make social and economic relations more closely 
reflect the needs of people, to reduce the importance of command and control, and replace them 
with ideals and incentives that would reinvigorate the socialist system.32 In April 1985, 
Gorbachev stated that he envisioned changes “making sure that every person works on his job 
conscientiously and to the best of his ability.”33 These first reforms proved insufficient because 
the leader and his advisors did not understand the economic problems at hand.34 They did 
reflect, however, legacies of the formative period of their political lives. As Moshe Lewin found, 
                                                        
31 I. E. Zelenin, for instance, acknowledges that others shared blame, but privileges Khrushchev’s power, 
authority, and actions. Zelenin, Agrarnaia politika N. S. Khrushcheva. 
32 Martin McCauley, Gorbachev (New York: Longman, 1998), 57. 
33 M. S. Gorbachev, Selected Speeches and Articles (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 19. 
34 McCauley, Gorbachev, 66. These initiatives, as political scientist George Breslauer and others show, 
were the first stages of what became a revolution designed to democratize society and dismantle the 
command economy only in 1987 and 1988. George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 56. 
  381
the concept “human capital” had been present in the writings of Soviet social scientists since the 
1960s. The lessons of the Khrushchev era were there, as Lewin put it, “in the idea that people, 
the basic capital of the nation had to be treated appropriately.” This encouraged “profound 
changes in existing relations of authority and hierarchy” in both the workplace and society as a 
whole.35 Thus the Khrushchev decade, the previous era when a new leader challenged the 
system’s ingrained traditions, influenced the ultimate effort to reform the flawed Soviet 
system.36
                                                        
35 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of 
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